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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, THAILAND
and
JOINT UNITED STATES MILITARY ADVISORY GROUP, THAILAND

MACTCS

1 Nov 69

SUBJECT: Mission Policy on Base Defense

**DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 12958
BY EXECUTIVE ORDER REVIEW TEAM**

SEE DISTRIBUTION

DATE 3 Dec 2001 REVIEWER cdh

1. The attached U.S. Embassy directive, Mission Policy on Base Defense, is forwarded for information and compliance.

2. The attached document is a current compilation of base defense policy statements which will be up-dated as required by U.S. Embassy. USMAGTHAI/JUSMAGTHAI Regulations 190-1 and 190-4 complement/supplement the Embassy paper.

3. The U.S. Embassy policy is directive in nature. Any questions or recommendations concerning its content will be directed to ACoS, Operations
ATTENTION: MACTJ32.

4. Attention is directed to the "No Foreign" dissemination. For maximum dissemination among US personnel the directive has been classified at the lowest possible classification commensurate with security. Local reproduction of the Mission policy is authorized.

5. Distribution to 7/13th Air Force has been made directly from the U.S. Embassy.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


MARION F. CARUTHERS
Colonel USAF
Chief of Staff

1 Incl
Mission Policy on Base Defense

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MISSION POLICY ON BASE DEFENSE

I. Introduction

A review of US Mission policy has been conducted in order to consolidate statements of base defense policy into a single document. Although not necessarily all inclusive, this document will serve the US Mission as the focal point for base defense policy. Since much of the policy is based on an estimate of the current threat, this document will be updated when an assessment of the threat changes and/or if current US involvement in Thailand is significantly modified. The US Embassy in Bangkok will continue to define the parameters for base defense within which all members of the US Mission will operate and conduct planning. Questions of base defense policy not clearly answered by this document will be submitted to the US Embassy (SA/CI) for resolution through the appropriate channels.

II. General Policy

A. Responsibility for internal and external defense of RTARF bases rests with the respective RTARF Base and Area Commanders. US forces utilizing such bases will participate fully in the internal defense of the base. For broad policy reasons affecting paramount national interests of both the US and Thailand responsibility for all defensive measures which take effect outside the base/installation perimeter is and must remain entirely a Thai responsibility without participation by US personnel. No US weapons systems or armed personnel are to be used to take effect outside the immediate perimeter area in defending installations.

1. At some bases, ammunition dumps and other key US facilities are located at a distance from the main base. US security forces are permitted to move freely to and from these facilities at all times and to react as necessary to defend themselves in so doing. They will, however, use prudence in returning fire and will not pursue attackers beyond the immediate vicinity of access roads.

2. Operational integration of Thai Security Guards with US forces will be assumed throughout this document, but with due regard for the notification requirements established by Supreme Command. Paragraph II G 1 and 2.

3. US weapons systems will not be moved outside the base except as noted in II A 1 above. Individual weapons to include automatic weapons, grenades and riot control agents may be directed to take effect off the base only under conditions specified in paragraph III A below. Crew-served weapons to include mortars, recoilless rifles, machine guns and air delivered ordnance will not under any circumstances be directed by US forces to take effect off the US-occupied installation.

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B. No weapons systems not now deployed, or personnel designed to serve such systems, will enter Thailand without approval of the American Ambassador. Heavy weapons will not be deployed by US Forces into Thailand for the purpose of base security.

C. The national interest of both countries is best served by protecting the political relationship which permits US forces to be deployed in Thailand and by due regard for Thai sensibilities. The exercise of superior leadership, careful planning, and ingenuity in preparing defenses can assure base security while protecting this political relationship. In this regard, the highest priority US unilateral contribution to base defense is physical security. This encompasses an organized perimeter, aggressive guard program, adequate fencing, lighting and bunkers, with particular attention to security of sensitive areas, as well as rapid notification and alert procedures.

D. Of equal priority, but requiring bilateral US-Thai effort, is area security coordination. The mechanics of this process are outlined in 13th USAF Reg 207-3 and USMACTHAI/JUSMAGTHAI Reg 190-4. However, more simply stated, area security coordination is establishing sufficient rapport with the appropriate RTG agencies in each area to ensure that RTG forces will respond when called upon for assistance. In this regard, active participation by commanders and their staffs in base civic action, community relations, and informal contacts involving the leaders of these RTG agencies is an important factor in establishing such rapport. Designated US Area Security Coordinators are responsible for coordinating the defense of all US military installations in their area of responsibility.

E. All new base defense planning, arrangements and major joint exercise proposals are to be coordinated in advance with the US Embassy so that due account can be taken of the vital necessity to balance political and military factors in base defense.

F. Prior to starting arrangements to bring in US reinforcements from out of Thailand, Ambassadorial permission must be obtained and the Ambassador must be informed of the role envisaged for the imported forces.

1. In requesting authority for deployment from out of country the following information must be provided the Ambassador:

- (a) State of perimeter defense.
- (b) Availability and capability of RTAF and THPD defense forces.
- (c) Vulnerability of the particular base to attack.

2. RTG approval must be obtained by the US Embassy for each deployment from out of country.

G. US and/or TSG forces can be deployed in reasonable numbers from one US occupied base to another within Thailand in response to intelligence reports, alerts or actual attacks as follows:

1. Request for approval to move TSG units under normal conditions will be submitted through MACTHAI to SCHN (FWD) with request for training moves reaching SCHN (FWD) at least 3 days prior to date of movement.

2. Under emergency conditions, COMUSMACTHAI or Dep Cdr 7/13th AF will coordinate movement of TSG forces directly with local Thai authorities. SCHN (FWD) will be notified through MACTHAI as soon as possible. The Ambassador will be informed of any plans to exercise this contingency before they are executed.

3. Deployment of US and/or TSG forces must be in a reinforcing role from one US occupied installation directly into another US occupied installation without engaging in combat operations to achieve entry into the reinforced installation.

4. Only as a last resort and only then after Ambassadorial approval (Deputy Chief of Mission in his absence) will US forces/TSG be sent on combat operations to relieve a US occupied installation under attack.

H. If a US manned base is subjected to a continuing attack and RTG airlift for some reason is absolutely unavailable, USAF or USA aircraft available in country may be used to bring RTG forces into the vicinity of the source of attack. However:

1. Prior approval of the Ambassador (or the DCM in his absence) is required, unless it is impossible to reach him within a reasonable time. In this case COMUSMACTHAI or Dep Comdr 7/13th AF may authorize the airlift.

2. USAF or USA aircraft are prohibited under any circumstances from firing on ground targets in Thailand or becoming otherwise involved in direct combat.

3. The lift of RTG forces by USAF or USA aircraft can be undertaken only to halt continuing fire on US manned bases and not to pursue fleeing attackers or for any other purpose.

4. The above guidance does not prohibit the emergency airlift of RTG forces for any purpose from one point to another within the perimeter of a US manned base. This contingency may be exercised on a routine basis.

5. The above guidance does not prohibit the emergency airlift of RTG forces onto a US manned base from a point off base for the purpose of reinforcement or transit of the base. The Ambassador will immediately be informed of any plans to exercise this contingency.

6. RTG officials will not be informed of the availability of US airlift for movement of troops to an off base location. However, US advisors may participate in US planning for this contingency.

I. Electrically charged fences may be installed on US occupied installations only after approval of US Embassy and RTG. Such fences may not be the outer perimeter fence and the electrical charge must not be such as would produce serious injury. Numerous bilingual signs must be displayed. Installation of such type fencing will not detract from or substitute for priority installation of the complete perimeter security systems.

J. Approval to conduct soil sterilization and/or defoliation operations on or around US occupied installations will be obtained from the US Embassy. Coordination will be effected with the local US Consul where applicable.

K. U.S. helicopter or fixed wing flare ships may be employed to drop flares in the immediate vicinity of US occupied bases at the direction of the local US Base Commander. Flare drops will be coordinated with local Thai authorities and the US Embassy will be kept informed of this activity.

III. Rules of Engagement

The overall policy guidelines for the use of weapons by US military personnel is that weapons are to be used in a defensive role and then only for the protection of vital US resources or when danger to the life of US forces personnel and citizens under control of US military forces is imminent. None of the rules of engagement shall be construed to prevent an individual from using minimum reasonable force to save his life.

A. Individual Actions. A US armed sentry on duty inside the perimeter of a US occupied installation may engage hostile targets on the installation when live ordnance is directed against him, other military personnel on base, or vital resources on base; when an attempt is made to overcome a sentry or capture US personnel; when an intruder, committing a hostile act fails to halt after adequate warnings in both English and Thai. The US sentry may not pursue the intruders off the base; however, he may direct fire off base when he can positively identify a target located off base which is delivering fire against him, other military personnel on base, or vital resources on base, then only providing he will not endanger civilian noncombatants.

B. Additional reactions not requiring prior US Embassy approval include:

1. Change of installation alert posture. (However, MACTHAI and the Embassy must be notified of such change and reason therefor.)

2. Employ US quick reaction force forces anywhere inside the installation perimeter.

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3. Emplo/ previously authorized crew served weapons, but only directed so as to impact inside the installation perimeter.

4. Directing 81mm mortars to fire illumination missions only.

5. Ready unobtrusively US forces for reinforcing missions.

6. Dispatch US/TSG reinforcing forces to another US-occupied installation (see paragraphs II G 2 and 3) (MACTHAI and Embassy will be notified immediately.)

7. Initiate requests for outside support.

C. Situations not specifically covered in this outline of rules of engagement and not mentioned elsewhere in this document require US Embassy approval prior to US action.

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March 4, 1970

MEMORANDUM

TO: COMUSMACV - Maj. Gen. L. F. Smith
Dep Cdr 7/13 AF - Maj. Gen. R. L. Pettit

FROM: SA/CI - William W. Stokes

SUBJECT: Mission Policy on Base Defense, Change 1.

Change Paragraph II B 1, page 6 of Mission Policy on Base Defense dated October 28, 1969, to read as follows:

"1. Prior approval of the Ambassador (or the DCM in his absence or the SA/CI in the absence of the DCM) is required, unless it is impossible to reach him within a reasonable time. In this case, COMUSMACV or Dep Cdr 7/13 may authorize the airlift."

CC: USOM - Mr. Roy H. Hill
USMA - Mr. G. Lewis Scholten
SA - Mr. Lewis J. Lapham
ARPA - Dr. Philip Worchel
CSG - Lt. Col. C. T. Black
33rd RASOU - Lt. Col. F. A. Ulmer
Amcon - Udorn
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CAC
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DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 12958
BY EXECUTIVE ORDER REVIEW TEAM

DATE 3 Dec 1981 REVIEWER *WJ*

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