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tionary pressures which his system has been helping to generate. In the face of a mounting Federal deficit, Federal policy should have been neutral during the first half of 1967, and restrictive from mid-year on.

If Federal Reserve policy were reversed and average free reserves of the member banks were reduced from the present plus \$275 million to a minus \$400 million figure by a tight-money policy, no tax increase would be necessary.

A tax increase isn't needed at this time and once imposed is difficult to reverse. Federal Reserve policy is much more flexible if used intelligently.

CONCLUSION OF MORNING BUSINESS

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further morning business? If not, morning business is concluded.

ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY AMENDMENTS OF 1967

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the Chair lays before the Senate the unfinished business.

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (S. 2388) to provide an improved Economic Opportunity Act, to authorize funds for the continued operation of economic opportunity programs, to authorize an Emergency Employment Act, and for other purposes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the unanimous-consent agreement reached on Friday last, the pending business is amendment No. 341, offered by the Senator from Nebraska [Mr. CURTIS], and the debate is limited to 2 hours to be divided equally and controlled by the Senator from Nebraska and the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. CLARK].

ORDER FOR RECOGNITION OF SENATOR COOPER

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that—withstanding the unanimous-consent agreement, that Amendment No. 341, offered by the Senator from Nebraska [Mr. CURTIS], be the pending business—the distinguished Senator from Kentucky be recognized for 20 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

VIETNAM

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, President Johnson said in his comprehensive statement of the administration's position on Vietnam last Friday evening that peace lies with Hanoi. One statement was:

It is by Hanoi's choice, not ours, not the world's, that the war continues.

I cannot agree. I do not criticize my country, but fact and reason dictate that the first step toward negotiations and peace—the unconditional cessation of the

bombing of North Vietnam—lies now in the choice and control of our country.

The reasons which lead the North Vietnamese, in my view, to ask for the unconditional cessation of bombing, the growing support of this requirement by friend as well as foe, lead to the conclusion that there is little hope for negotiations and for a just settlement of the war in Vietnam until the United States takes this first step—the cessation of its bombing of North Vietnam.

This has been my judgment since the bombing started in 1965. It is a judgment which I expressed first in March 1965, when the bombing commenced, and later in January 1966, after I had returned from Vietnam, and in several speeches in the Senate this year. It is a judgment that I have expressed to the President of the United States and to the Secretary of State since that time.

I speak today because there are new situations which cause me to urge again this course of action.

The first is the possibility of the assistance of the United Nations, or of its member states, during its session in New York. The strong and consistent position of the distinguished majority leader, the Senator from Montana [Mr. MANSFIELD]—a man whom we all respect and admire—that the issue of Vietnam should be submitted by the United States to the Security Council without reservation, and if the Security Council will not act, to the General Assembly, has received wide support in the Congress and throughout our country.

The distinguished majority leader is correct in holding that the United Nations should assume jurisdiction and satisfy its chief reason for existence, that of maintaining peace, whatever the obstacles may be. The United Nations should assume jurisdiction, but if it does not, the presence of representatives of concerned countries at the United Nations provides an unusual opportunity for private discussions and negotiations—an opportunity which will not be easily available after the session has adjourned.

We may note, while jurisdiction has not yet been assumed, that the chief burden of practically every speech of representatives of the members of the United Nations; speaking in the General Assembly, has been the war in Vietnam.

There is a second reason which leads me to speak today. We are on the eve of a national election—one of the great events in American political life—and the campaign debate is already underway.

Vietnam will inevitably be an issue, for it is the greatest problem and concern of our country. It would be strange indeed if it were not an issue in the coming campaign. Parties and candidates will take positions and the people will make their decisions upon policies and the course of the war in Vietnam.

We know that in the heat of the campaign when emotions are aroused, politics may for a time override the reasonable debate of policy, and the opportunity for a settlement of the war may be postponed until after the election next November. I do not want this to happen. I do not speak politically today, for the war with

all its problems and burdens is the concern of all our people.

No one can say whether this will cause a postponement of a settlement of the war, but if it does, we know that in the intervening period until November 1968, a heavy price will be paid by the young men of our country and the peoples of South and North Vietnam. And in that period, the dangers of an expanded war will not be lessened.

We have all been in politics; we have all been in campaigns. Many of us have participated, one way or another, in presidential campaigns. I believe we will all agree that there will be less possibility of a settlement of this war during the campaign year.

The cessation of bombing is a difficult decision for the President to make. It involves a change in present policy, but such a change would be consistent with the President's speech at Johns Hopkins in April 1965, in which he stated that the United States would be willing to enter negotiations unconditionally. Admittedly, the cessation of bombing might not result in negotiations, and admittedly it involves some immediate risk to the security of our forces in Vietnam. But the possibility of a cease-fire, negotiations, and a settlement based upon the determination of the people of North and South Vietnam far outweighs any risk.

It is in this sense that I believe the issue of negotiations and of peace in South Vietnam lies now with the administration and with our country.

Now I should like to direct my attention to some questions and criticisms that have been raised regarding the proposal to cease bombing. It is correct and proper that questions should be asked and criticisms should be raised on such a vital issue.

I am aware that it can be said that the plea for a cessation of bombing expresses only a hope. I do not believe it is only a hope. Fact and reason are the basis of my support and my appeal for the cessation of bombing.

We must take into account the long record of North Vietnam's requirements for an unconditional cessation of bombing. As escalation has increased, its government has presented to the United States additional and harsher requirements; but the continuing condition, without variation, has been the cessation of bombing.

Ho Chi Minh's response to President Johnson's letter of February 10 of this year, in which he asserted the full list, the old list, of requirements, appeared to foreclose the President's offer; but it ended with these words:

It is only after the unconditional cessation of United States bombing raids and all other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam that the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the United States could enter into talks and discuss questions concerning the two sides.

The Vietnamese people will never submit to force, they will never accept talks under the threat of bombs.

Our cause is absolutely just. It is to be hoped that the United States Government will act in accordance with reason.

Recently, after the speech of Ambassador Goldberg—and it was a very good speech—in the United Nations, the re-

example of freedom and opportunity at home, which the peoples of the world seek.

The war troubles our people. I do not think it is a criticism of the American people to say that it troubles them. We are concerned that our country shall, by its actions, express the ancient principle, in which we believe, that the affairs of nations and men can best be governed by reason and justice, and not by force—even our force, and that our country with all its power and influence shall lead the way to sustain that principle in the world.

If our country does not do this, then I see little hope that other countries in the world with power and influence will do so. It is because of this faith, as well as for the practical reasons which I have argued, that I urge the President, who wants peace—who has sought peace—and who must make the decision, to order a cessation of the bombing as a step toward negotiations and a just settlement of the war in Vietnam.

Mr. President, I close by reading the closing paragraph of an editorial which was published in the New York Times last Friday:

The Administration has repeatedly protested its desire for peace. Now is the time to prove this intention by heeding the advice of close friends and the wider world community. As Danish Premier Jens Otto Krag observed the other day: "He who takes the decisive step by which to bring the fighting to an end, to get negotiations started, and to insure durable peace in Southeast Asia will inscribe his name in the books of history."

I would like for the name of the United States to be included in the books of history for this noble cause.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator from Kentucky yield?

Mr. COOPER. I am happy to yield to the Senator from Montana.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I commend the distinguished Senator from Kentucky for his responsible attitude and the statesmanlike address he has just delivered.

I know how deeply he feels. He recognizes that the President of the United States wants peace. In his suggestions he has been most respectful and most constructive. He has weighed, as he pointed out in his remarks, the consequences of a bombing halt.

That raises a most interesting question, because if there is to be a bombing halt, is it to be of a temporary nature, with a time limitation, or is to be permanent and marked by a period?

If it is to be the former, I think the danger is great that if there is no reaction from the other side and bombing is once again resumed, the war will be widened still further, made more open-ended, and will create a greater possibility of a confrontation with China.

The Senator from Kentucky, though, has not indicated that he is interested in that kind of cessation in the bombing, that he is interested in a cessation, period. In that event we could confine our activities to South Vietnam per se, and see what the reaction would be on the basis of the proposal made by the Senator from Kentucky.

In that respect, I might say that in discussing Vietnam this morning with

the distinguished dean of Republicans, the Senator from Vermont [Mr. Aiken], we came to the conclusion that what we are doing in Vietnam is fighting two wars. One is a civil war in the South. That is how this war began. The other is a war against Hanoi because of the penetrations—with the buildup of our forces—of troops sent down by General Vo Nguyen Giap, commander of Hanoi's armies. We should remember that the war is a two-phase struggle. Even if we do bring the war in the north to a satisfactory conclusion, we still will have the elements in the south which number about 250,000 Vietcong plus 50,000 North Vietnamese—almost exactly the same figure they had a year ago at this time.

That is something we should keep in mind. But I am getting off the point here.

The Senator has also brought out and raised again the proposal in which he is so much interested; namely, the taking of this question before the United Nations. He has indicated that many voices have been raised in the United Nations, in this session, on the subject of Vietnam. Friendly and unfriendly nations have discussed it from their own points of view; but practically all the nations, as the Senator has indicated, who have spoken thus far, through their highest officials in the field of foreign affairs, have indicated a deep, intense, and abiding interest in what is going on in Vietnam and what they consider to be solutions for the situation there. I cite, as examples, the statements made by Paul Martin, Minister for External Affairs in Ottawa, by Couve de Murville, French Foreign Minister, and many others.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator from Kentucky has expired.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to proceed for 10 additional minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MANSFIELD. As these talks go on in the United Nations, the fighting continues on land and the bombing in the north extends, first, within 10 miles, or 30 seconds from Chinese frontier, and, second, in the past few weeks, within 6.8 miles, or 24 seconds, from the border of China.

During this period, also, an announcement was made that it is the intention of this country to build a light antimissile defense, not against the Soviet Union but against China—it says here!

Well, it is a necessity, I assume, not so much because of China, in my opinion, but because no agreement has been reached with the U.S.S.R. to hold back in the construction of an ABM system—a system which, if we go through with it, will cost this country at least \$40 billion and the Soviet Union a similar effort.

Mr. President, in my judgment, all these factors indicate the increasing possibility of a confrontation, not necessarily in the immediate future, but at some time in the future, if conditions develop through miscalculation, mischance, or accident, to bring this about—and I am referring to China.

Now is the time, as the Senator from Kentucky has indicated, and the Secu-

rity Council of the United Nations is the place, to bring up the U.S. resolution on Vietnam which has been on the table since early February of 1966, to propose another resolution, or to consider a resolution offered by another country. I mean no offense when I say that this is not the time to take U Thant at his word, that what is necessary is a halt in the bombing. He is the Secretary General of the United Nations; Kosygin is the Premier of the Soviet Union; Hans Tabor of Denmark; and Paul Martin, of Canada can speak only personally for their proposals for a settlement. The times call for the Security Council, to speak officially on the basis of the procedures of the charter.

Now is the time, and the Security Council is the place, to take a consideration of this sort in open discussion.

It would be my hope that we would push the initiative, which the President undertook in February of last year, to insist that this matter come before the United Nations Security Council.

The question of taking up is not vetoable.

The question of discussing and who should participate in the discussions is not vetoable.

If the Security Council members do not want to have this issue called up before their body, let them stand up and tell the world what their reasons are for refusing to use the charter or trying to open the way to a settlement of the situation in Vietnam, a settlement which is as much their responsibility as it is of the combatants directly or indirectly concerned.

If they want to recommend a stop the bombing, if they want to reconvene the Geneva Conference, if they want to lay down these conditions, let them take that responsibility officially under the charter and keep it away from any one man, be he a Secretary-General of the United Nations, or a foreign minister advising us what should be done.

Even though they express their opinions singly, their collective voices are rising. It would help to hear them officially in the Security Council.

I thank the Senator from Kentucky very much for allowing me to make these remarks.

Mr. COOPER. I appreciate more than I can say the remarks and advice of the majority leader.

I have been strengthened in my support and resolve in the position I have taken because of the example and high patriotism of the majority leader. I remember that in 1954 when it was proposed that American ground troops and bombers should be sent to Vietnam to support the French before and even after the fall of Dienbienphu, that the Senator from Montana opposed and I supported our involvement at that time, and we have been together on Vietnam since that time.

The question has been asked, "What does unconditional cessation of bombing mean?" It means exactly what it says. The Secretary of State and the President have spoken of our bombing pauses. There always has been a call for reci-

procity or pauses during religious holidays.

I do not question the good motives of the President in ordering those cessations, but they do not meet the condition—one we do not like to admit, but it is nonetheless a condition based upon the fact that North Vietnam considers U.S. bombing an aggression against their land—one which is not negotiable.

May I say this? I do not think we will run any greater risk by stopping the bombing and confining the battle to South Vietnam than we are running now—and that it will entail a lesser risk to our men. The pressure has been from the north. If we stop the bombing, perhaps the pressure might be lessened. At least we will find out.

We must consider also that the struggle for independence from any foreign power has been one of long duration. The people fought for independence from China for years. They fought for independence of the French for years before World War II. We have to face up to the fact that Ho Chi Minh has long been leading the fight for independence. During World War II he led the fight against Japan. The United States supported him then with supplies and weapons. When the war closed, he declared the independence of all Vietnam. The French moved in to assert their colonial domination. The French promised free elections, and the withdrawal of troops. Ho Chi Minh agreed that Vietnam would become a member of the French Union. But the French broke their pledge. In 1954 there was another chance for independence, when the Viet Minh had defeated the French. But Ho Chi Minh agreed to the 1954 Geneva Conference.

This history of Vietnam in its struggle for independence makes it apparent the Government of Vietnam will be determined by the people themselves, and not by the United States.

Several Senators addressed the Chair.

Mr. COOPER. I promised to yield first to the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. Fulbright].

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, first I wish to congratulate the Senator. I think his original statement is extremely well done. He has rendered a service in bringing this subject up once again, as he has in the past. I particularly wish to associate myself with what he has just said with regard to the origin and history of this conflict.

I was interested in his reference to the Geneva Conference and whether or not it might be reconvened as a result of putting the matter on the agenda of the Security Council. It strikes me, under the present conditions, as being one of the best ways to proceed that I can think of.

If I understood the majority leader—although he did not put it exactly this way—the onus for asking for a reconvening of the Geneva Conference should be on the Security Council, because there are 15 members, and many of the members were participants at the Geneva Conference when the meeting took place in Geneva in 1954. Furthermore, Security Council initiative would remove the responsibility from either the Russian or the British, or ourselves for that matter, in requesting it.

I think what the Senator had in mind in his statement, was that he would recommend that the United States do everything possible to have the Security Council recommend the reconvening of the Geneva Conference. Is that correct?

Mr. COOPER. Yes, I think that the most likely and appropriate way would be for the Geneva Conference to resume its jurisdiction.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I agree, because most of the participants at Geneva are in the Security Council, except for the NLF. It was not in existence at that time, and some provision might be made for it to participate with the other conferees. I think the Senator is quite right. It is a most timely recommendation. If there is anything I could do or say to help prevail on the President to take that course, I would certainly like to do it.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the distinguished Senator may be allowed to proceed until the debate is concluded, at which time the Senator from Nebraska will be recognized, and the time begin to run on the limitation.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, the Senator made reference to our security, as nearly everyone does in commenting on this subject. Our security is very much in the minds of the military people and everyone else. I think the speech is excellent and speaks for itself, but I would like to ask him to comment on what effect the Senator thinks this war, as such, is having on the security of this country generally. It surely cannot be that the Senator believes South Vietnam itself threatens the security of this country. Does he?

Mr. COOPER. No. I do not think we can intervene over the world unless our security is actually threatened or unless the whole problem of freedom in the world is involved. No, I do not think our security is threatened in South Vietnam. If our security were threatened on this continent or hemisphere, or even because of some countries with which we have close ties, it would be a different thing.

The Senator asked me if this war threatens our security in other ways. I think it does. Our involvement has made our relations with the Soviet Union more harsh and reduced our capabilities in the Mideast, Europe, and elsewhere. It makes it more difficult to settle conflicts elsewhere, and in these respects endangers the security of the United States to a greater extent.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I think the Senator ought to extend that thought a bit, because I think the country does not realize the ramifications of this war if it continues, not only as it ties up our own military men and our arms, but what it is doing to our relations with many countries which have been traditionally our friends and supporters and who believe today that we are taking a wrong course and who have very grave doubts about our wisdom. Does the Senator not agree?

Mr. COOPER. Yes. No country can be right in every instance. Naturally, that

is true. But I think countries must have assurance about our judgment—and I think we have exercised good judgment—

Mr. FULBRIGHT. In the past.

Mr. COOPER. In the past, in most of the dangerous situations that have arisen. A progression of events led us into the war in Vietnam, and perhaps the great mistake, and the great criticism of everyone is, that we did not look ahead. But the question remains, What can we do to break out of this cycle? The countries of the world do look at the United States, the most powerful and the richest country in the world, and ask, "Why doesn't the United States take the lead to bring the war to a close?"

Mr. FULBRIGHT. What I am trying to lead up to, perhaps in an awkward way, is that we have two alternatives. There may be others. One alternative is to follow the Senator's suggestion, which I favor. If we do not do that, it seems to me we are undermining the security of this country in a very serious sense, because of the fall-off, if you like, in our other relationships.

Take our domestic situation. I do not think there is any doubt, and I ask the Senator from Kentucky, does he think there is any doubt, that the difficulties in our budgetary matters here at home, the great deficit of \$28 billion which the President mentioned a few weeks ago, when he made his great speech with respect to the deficit, are aggravated by the fact that since that time we have pledged ourselves to an ABM, a thin one, at an initial investment of \$4 billion, and the majority leader has stated that if we go through with it, the cost will ultimately be \$40 billion; he has also mentioned the proposals of the Secretary of Defense to save money by building a new early warning ABM system, at a cost of \$4 billion; and by the fact that we are pursuing the SST, which we will soon have before us, and also pursuing the moon-shot?

All of this together, it seems to me, is seriously undermining our security in a very broad sense, because we are tied down militarily in Vietnam, and we are neglecting our affairs everywhere else, all over the world—in the Middle East, South America, and so on—in addition to our domestic problems.

If we balance the two off, which is the greatest long-term threat to our security, to continue this war, with all its side effects, or to seek to negotiate, through a reconvened Geneva Conference?

Mr. COOPER. Of course, the former, without question.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator says "without question." It does not seem beyond question to the President. The President stated the other day that the key to all we have done is our own security. Apparently it is not as obvious to the President as the Senator says, "without question." There must be at least some question in some people's minds about this matter.

I think it is very useful for the Senator to make it as clear as he can, because the President seems to think our security will be in great jeopardy if he changes his position on South Vietnam. I would gather that from what he says. I think those are his words.

The Senator from Kentucky does not agree that our security is dependent upon pursuing this war in South Vietnam, does he?

Mr. COOPER. No; I do not agree with the President that our security is dependent upon pursuing the war in South Vietnam. I feel in my bones it is not.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Oh, I do, too. But, on the other hand, I feel—

Mr. COOPER. The problem is, what do we do to find some way out?

My thought is that if the people of this country, and the overwhelming majority of Members of Congress, believed that our security was threatened we would be united, and we would support without question any means to fight the war. We would endure any deficit. We would endure controls. We would do what we have done in other wars.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Surely.

Mr. COOPER. The real answer, and I believe it is this answer that troubles our country, is that the people do not believe such a threat exists.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. To put it another way, I am reminded of an editorial published in one of the leading Chinese newspapers about a year ago, not too long after we were having hearings on Vietnam.

The editorial, as reprinted in the New York Times, stated, after a lot of preliminary talk, of course, in their usual vitriolic manner, that the Chinese should be obliged to the Government of the United States for bringing its soldiers, weapons, and material over to the continent of Asia, because otherwise the Asians and the people of North Vietnam would have no way to get at them, to destroy them; that the only way they could put the United States in its place was for us to come over there. I thought at that time that there was a good deal of truth in it.

What worries me about our security is not the war in Vietnam, but what is happening to us here at home and all around the world: particularly here at home, if we do not stop it. If we continue with our present course, and continue to have the inflation we are threatened with, which is beginning now, with this tremendous budget deficit, then I really begin to have fear about the future effectiveness of this country in defending itself and its interests in all parts of the world.

So it seems to me that our country is much more endangered by continuing the policy we have followed for the last 2 years than it would be by following the Senator's suggestion. Does the Senator agree?

Mr. COOPER. That is my purpose in trying to propose some ways to try to see if the war can be brought to an end.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I concur in the Senator's position; and, without asking further questions, I yield.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I join with the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations and the distinguished majority leader in again calling attention to the distinguished public service rendered by the Senator from Kentucky [Mr. COOPER], in his continuing analysis of our situation in Vietnam, where, as

the whole world knows, we have a bear by the tail.

I agree with the Senator from Kentucky that a world framework is now again being established—as it was established in January and February 1967, when we failed to take advantage of it—which perhaps will accommodate an unconditional cessation of the bombing, with, in my judgment, the word “permanent” stricken out. The President, for all practical purposes, has acknowledged that, but apparently, and for reasons that are not clear, just could not bring himself to the final point of saying, “We will do it.”

I agree that a bombing cessation is worth trying. We know it will amount to some risk for our forces but our forces are suffering losses now, and the question is whether the risk is worthwhile. I think it is.

I should like to join also with the majority leader in his feeling that the United Nations should be seized of this decision. It is high time that Vietnam was debated in the world forum. We can have no fear from that.

I would, however, like to ask the Senator from Kentucky, whose judgment is so important in this matter, this question: Is not the real nub of this problem what we can do for ourselves, rather than what others can do for us? If we cease the bombing, it is up to Hanoi whether they will negotiate. If the United Nations takes jurisdiction, it is up to the United Nations as to whether anything will happen, with the Russian veto and everything else in the book. But is it not necessary also that something be up to us?

I call attention to the Senator's statement, which I believe every American should read and reread, which says:

I believe also that the ability of the United States to determine the course of another country is limited.

And the further statement:

It is clear that the United States cannot prescribe the affairs of another country, and cannot intervene throughout the world.

And so on. Now, the President directly challenges that. The President says—and I think this is the quotation for which the Senator from Arkansas was searching—

I would rather stand in Vietnam in our time and, by meeting this danger now, reduce the danger for our children and grandchildren.

So the President places it strictly upon the basis of a war for survival of the United States.

I ask the Senator, Is not the real issue before Congress, whether this is our war, or is it the war of South Vietnam? Do we help them until they demonstrate that they do or do not have the capacity for helping themselves, or do we help them forever, even if the country becomes empty and everybody lays down his arms except the U.S. Army.

This is the issue the United States has to face, in my judgment, Mr. President, and I say to the Senator, we will not face it until we rewrite the Gulf of Tonkin resolution. We do not have to repeal it; we do not have to embarrass the Presi-

dent and the country by canceling it; but we have to write a new one, and we ought to, by now, have enough courage to know that he is not going to ask us for it, and we will have to do it ourselves.

We must delimit a new commitment, which is not a blank check. That is the only way, in my opinion, to proceed.

We can start with these three things: An experiment in ceasing the bombing; submitting the matter to the United Nations, if it will take it; and rewriting the Tonkin resolution to give us a tolerable posture, where we are not locked in on only one basis, so that we have to stay there forever, and commit all the resources of the United States, and unless we do, we are nationally disgraced.

I do not believe that. The Senator from Kentucky does not believe it. I think the majority of the Senate does not believe it. It is high time the President's hand was called. I believe that the Senator from Kentucky has put the issue very succinctly and very clearly.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from New York. I know that his long and deep interest, his faithful work, his creative thought, and his speeches have played an important role in bringing some light and reason to this situation.

We have to face the fact that we are in Vietnam, and ask ourselves, how can help end the war? How do we try to perform our mission, to help South Vietnam?

I have just proposed in my speech, as I have done before, a method and means of determining whether the war could be brought to a close. I frankly do not think anything significant is going to happen to the people of South Vietnam until the war is ended.

I do believe that if reforms to benefit the people do not take place—and they have not taken place yet of any substance because land reform is denied, just as it was under the French—and if no substantial reforms come to the people of Vietnam, we will have fought the war for nothing. Although we cannot direct them or order their government to do things, we can say: “If you do not undertake these reforms, we will have no further responsibility.”

I have always thought that we could have gotten out in 1959 and 1960. I thought, too, Diem, although he had done some good, would not accomplish any of the reforms prescribed by President Eisenhower. I thought that if President Kennedy had taken the same course of action when he took over, it might have helped. It was admittedly difficult when President Johnson came in because the troops were already committed.

That does not mean, however, that the matter is closed. We must reverse our present course of action or, it seems to me, we will not have done any good for ourselves or for South Vietnam, but will have sustained a great loss of American and Vietnamese lives.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I congratulate the Senator for a great address.

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, I congratulate the distinguished Senator from Kentucky for once again thinking

through a very difficult problem and giving us a great deal of food for thought.

I particularly would like to indicate my longstanding association with his position that our vast power should be concentrated in the bombing of those infiltration routes leading into the south and directly bringing supplies and manpower from North Vietnam to wage war against our forces and our allied forces in South Vietnam.

I want to comment for a few moments on what I think is another aspect of the problem which has not been touched on this afternoon. That concerns what this war is doing to our own people.

I think it is dividing our people and separating them from this administration because of the frustration and bitterness and discontent which I see existing from one end of the country to the other on the problem on Vietnam.

I do not think we can overemphasize what this dissension which is growing and mounting is doing to our people with respect to the programs that we must carry on not only in the world but also here at home.

I have just returned from my sixth visit to Illinois for the express purpose of having a "listen-in" with the people of Illinois.

I had a desk moved down to the ground floor of a Federal building in one of our cities and listened to anyone who wanted to come in.

The No. 1 topic in those "listen-ins" and in all of the correspondence I have received since I have arrived in the Senate has been Vietnam.

I can well remember how the people dissented from some positions taken by the administration, such as the time when the President in Chicago tried to characterize all those who disagreed with him as "nervous Nellies" and put them in the position of showing an almost unpatriotic attitude toward our country.

We are deeply sympathetic with the problems encountered by the President in this tragic war, I think it is a necessity that we speak out and try to analyze why more and more unhappiness is displaying itself in our country.

Last Friday night President Johnson made a very strong argument against unilateral withdrawal from Vietnam. Few Americans, and few, if any, Members of Congress are asking for unilateral withdrawal. The President, by suggesting that his critics want unilateral withdrawal, is, I think, attempting to dishonor all of them.

Nearly half the American people today disagree with the manner in which the President is conducting the war. But only about 10 percent of them favor unilateral withdrawal.

The President's problem is with the vast majority who are dissatisfied with his performance in Vietnam, not with the 10 percent who urge withdrawal.

How has the President failed to win the support of the majority for his war in Vietnam? I would say that the President has had seven failures in Vietnam and that these failures are at the root of his problem with the American people.

First is his failure to persuade the South Vietnamese Government to insti-

tute truly democratic reforms which would win the support of the people of their own country.

Second is his failure to persuade the South Vietnamese Army to carry its rightful share of the combat, so that our American men will not have to bear the heaviest burden of the fighting by themselves.

Third is his failure to persuade our other Asian allies to participate substantially in the military, economic, psychological, and diplomatic tasks, confronting us in Vietnam. Further, he has been unable to persuade a single country in Western Europe to provide any meaningful help or support.

Fourth is his failure to pursue every possibility for negotiations leading to a settlement of the war.

Fifth is his failure to learn from experience that every U.S. escalation is matched by the enemy and only brings more casualties.

Sixth is his failure to recognize that bombing so near China has already caused the Chinese and the Soviets to massively increase their military role in support of Hanoi. Thus, for limited military gain, he has provoked heavier military pressure against our own military forces.

Seventh is his failure to understand that widespread dissent indicates something may be wrong with his policy, rather than with his critics.

These are the seven failures of Lyndon Johnson in his Vietnam policy. He is not being criticized for refusing to withdraw unilaterally. He is being criticized because he has failed to succeed either with military force or with diplomatic initiative.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. PERCY. I have only 1 additional minute. However, I yield to the Senator from California.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, is there evidence of massive Chinese and Russian forces now being massed on the borders there?

Mr. PERCY. I understand from the best information I have that there are some 400,000 Chinese forces in South China now. We know, of course, that they have 2½ million soldiers under arms and additional millions in reserve.

I was in Peoria last weekend. I asked everyone who came up to my desk whether he was aware of the fact that there are already 40,000 or 50,000 Chinese forces in North Vietnam manning AA installations, repairing roads, and repairing railroads. I do not think that one out of five or six had any idea that the Chinese were already that deeply involved.

We do know that the Russians have agreed to escalate and step up their technical assistance.

Mr. MURPHY. That was my reason for speaking. I have just returned from Vietnam. I saw an entirely different picture there than I had obtained from reading the press and the reports.

All reports seem to indicate that we were in a stalemate. Our military people there do not reflect this view. They have continually said that we are winning and

could win a lot faster if we were not fighting a limited war.

I want to get out of Vietnam as fast as anybody. However, I want this to be done in the best interests of our Country and not to accommodate a troublemaker.

Our military people have said, and I have said, that certain basic things will make it impossible for the enemy to continue fighting.

We have said we would cut off his supplies.

The administration, for one reason or another, refuses to do this.

I agree that the quickest way out is the way we should go. However, it must be an honorable and proper way.

I never hear discussed many of these things that I found on visiting areas in Vietnam.

Also, I have heard here that we are fighting the entire war. I was told there by our military people that this is not true, that the South Vietnamese are doing an excellent job, and possibly the toughest job. I was told that we are doing the conventional job.

I spent a day and a night with the Marines, and they said that if they had their choice, they would rather be where they are than to be in another part of the war which they consider tougher. I heard expressions of approval for the magnificent job they are doing.

Much danger is involved because of the urgency of the situation. However, we must consider all sides. I sometimes worry about this aspect of the matter. I do not say that the military is always right. However, certainly these men have been trained in their careers to study and become experts on the conduct of war.

I have said for 3 years, and I continue to say, that I think more attention should be paid to their desires.

A few months ago, the great Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL], who has worked for a year and a half to get a battleship into the waters of Vietnam in order to save our fliers, finally secured agreement for this action.

Many of these things have been going on, and every time we make the accommodation, we continue to make the accommodation.

I disagree with the President's policy. I disagree with the President on many things. I believe I am one of the most outspoken Senators, perhaps too outspoken for a freshman Senator; but, then, I have not too much time to be here. I disagree with many things the President does. But I am convinced that it is in our best interests to be in South Vietnam. I am convinced, having spoken with people in four areas of the country who know exactly the problem, that they are not under any misapprehension.

I spoke with an old man in Hue, and he said:

Naturally, we would like to have a civilian government, but now our country is at war. When we are at war, we want military people who can get us out of it, and when peace is here again, we'll have another election and elect civilian people.

They know the story forward and backward, and I believe most of us in the Senate know the story; and if we do not,

we should. I have been studying it for 25 years, and I am concerned when I hear that the only option we are given is to stop bombing. The record shows that bombing has been most effective psychologically.

We also know that the number of North Vietnamese coming over to the south has doubled in the last 3 months—each month the number has doubled. They all speak about the bombing.

More than anything else, my concern is for the division about which the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT] has spoken. Our military people in Vietnam point out that the French did not lose in South Vietnam. They lost in Paris, because of pressures that were put on the continued character of the war, as it was delivered to the people. I am afraid that exactly the same thing is happening here—that we are being denied some of the options that should be ours.

I rise to make this point because, having just returned from Vietnam, I am kind of full of it. I believe we are there properly and that the Vietnamese want our help. I believe if we got out, all of Southeast Asia would be lost. I do know that Indonesia straightened out its problems without any military help from us, once we had exploded the theory that America was a paper tiger and would never come to the assistance of anybody.

This has been the story for 15 or 20 years. It did not just start here. The tactic here is not a new one. It is an old one.

I rise to make these remarks so that the record may show that I want to get out. Members of my family are in the armed services, and I am as concerned as anyone. But I want to make sure that we get out in a manner that is to the best interests of the security of the United States, as the Senator has said, not only the immediate interests but also the long-range interests of the United States.

Mr. PERCY. The distinguished Senator has raised a number of provocative questions. I disagree as strongly and as respectfully with some of the positions the Senator has just taken as I did two weekends ago, when the distinguished Senator spoke in St. Louis and I spoke in Kansas City on different aspects of the war.

The distinguished Senator said that if we unleashed the military, we could win this war in 30 days. Sometime I should like to have an explanation as to how we can win this war in 30 days if we unleash the military. I believe if we could do that with conventional weapons, with non-nuclear weapons, we might give someone 30 days, if we could end this war.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. PERCY. I yield.

Mr. MURPHY. Actually, this statement was not an invention of my imagination. Many military experts, most of whom are now retired, have been saying this for a year. They did not just start it.

I pointed out how it could be done. If you cut off the supplies of the North Vietnamese, he can not continue to fight over 30 days. It is the most painless and simplest method.

I assure the Senator that experts in Vietnam, including people at our Embassy, say that some of the reasons why Ho Chi Minh and Hanoi continue this effort is that they are told from time to time that we are divided at home, and if they continue a little longer, our division will be so great that our entire capability in Vietnam will be impaired.

I heard one of my colleagues suggest the other day, "Get out under any conditions. Get out." It is similar to saying, "My goodness, the dam has burst." I do not believe it is that bad.

I will give the Senator a couple of speeches that were made a year ago, and I will be glad to supply him at another time with all the information I have been able to gather. I am convinced that these experts were not really making pipe-dreams. They are quite serious about the matter and believe that the war could be ended in 30 days.

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, in concluding my comments, I should like to return to the distinguished Senator's comment about one of the points I raised, as to whether or not it is valid to indicate that, as the distinguished Senator has pointed out, in his judgment, the South Vietnamese forces are assuming a major share of the burden and are doing a great deal of the dirty fighting that is going on. All the evidence I have been able to secure is completely to the contrary. More and more, increasingly, the tough burden of this responsibility is falling on the backs of American forces, and less and less, relatively speaking, is being done by South Vietnamese forces. The evidence I have comes not from detailed military knowledge but from analyses by responsible reporters. It comes from boys with whom I have spoken as recently as a week ago. A young, fresh, wonderful looking Negro boy, an amputee, hobbled in with a wooden leg and a wooden arm—the result of a hand grenade. Listen to this boy say what kind of a dirty job the Americans have to do and how willing or unwilling the South Vietnamese forces are.

A year ago I went to the amputee ward at Great Lakes Naval Hospital, and an amputee there, among many, said to me:

The difference between this war now and when we went out there is that when we went there, we thought we were going out to help them with their war. But increasingly, our experience has been that they are ready to hold our coat while we go in and do the fighting.

That is the difference. As we have gradually escalated our effort, we have not asked for commensurate commitments from the South Vietnamese, that they fight their war; and increasingly it has become an American effort, with less and less effort from the Asian nations, as well as the South Vietnamese.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield for one more question?

Mr. PERCY. I yield for a question.

Mr. MURPHY. As I have said, I am not a military expert. I have had experience with amputees. As a matter of record, in World War II, I made the first trip through 25 hospitals, and I greeted the first ships which came back from Normandy, and I was abroad just before that time. So I know of this aspect. I

know of the horror. I know that it is a dirty, nasty, foul, evil business. I know as well as anybody in this Chamber that at this point in our so-called progress in civilization, God knows, we should have found a better way to solve our problems. Unfortunately, we have not.

The next to the last experience I had in South Vietnam, which was 3 weeks ago, was a briefing by a general who detailed exactly the activities and the deployment of our brigades, where they were fighting, where the enemy divisions were set up; and when I say that the South Vietnamese are taking up a pretty dirty side of the war, I am using his language, not mine. I must assume that he did not achieve the rank of general by not knowing his business. I know that the Army is just as competitive as many other fields in American life, and I must assume that he is telling the truth. I had the privilege of living with General Westmoreland for 4 days, and if that general was not telling the truth, I am certain that General Westmoreland would not permit him to brief people such as I, who come there to learn what the facts are.

I thank the Senator for allowing me to interrupt. I did not mean to speak at this length, but I felt that since the picture was going so quickly in one direction, and many facets are being glossed over, I should like to attract attention for a moment to the facts I have stated.

I thank the Senator.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield on the last point?

Mr. PERCY. I yield.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, in my committee we have had direct conflict in the evidence on this question about the ARVN Army. The representatives of the Pentagon have stated very much what the Senator from California has said. We had a very high-ranking civilian member of the administration who had been out there. Mr. Komer—

Mr. COOPER. I believe it was Mr. Porter.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Yes. Mr. Porter, the Deputy Ambassador. His testimony was the opposite. It was in accord with what the Senator said in his overwhelming evidence. I can say from my experience, from letters I have received, and from my observation, that it accords with what the real facts are.

Mr. PERCY. I thank the Senator for this additional statement.

Several Senators addressed the Chair.

Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, who has the floor?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kentucky [Mr. COOPER] has the floor.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, the Senator from California has raised some valid questions. But we are not talking about the same matter. He is talking about how a military victory might be won. The President said that is not our purpose.

What I have been talking about and what I think others have been talking about is how to bring the war to an end by negotiations and to achieve our purpose in Vietnam without war, under conditions of peace—which is the only way I think these goals can be achieved.

Mr. President, I am prepared to yield the floor. I thank the Senator.

Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. COOPER. I yield.

Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, I find myself in somewhat of a double-barreled situation because I had hoped to participate in dialog with the Senator from Kentucky, and in waiting for my turn I found myself caught in the crossfire of a separate and unrelated matter.

I hope that the junior Senator from Illinois is willing to remain in the Chamber until he and I might get the floor and discuss the seven points he sets forth. If we can set those aside for a moment—

Mr. COOPER. I have not addressed my remarks to any domestic or political situation.

Mr. McGEE. That is why I wish to ask the Senator a question or two about his speech. The Senator, as he always does, provokes what to me is helpful dialog on this very troublesome question.

First of all, I wonder if the Senator from Kentucky means to suggest to us, as I thought he said, that because of our preponderance of strength, power, and force, that we can do more about the aftermath of a bombing suspension in Vietnam than can the North Vietnamese. Did I understand the Senator correctly in that suggestion?

Mr. COOPER. I have two points. First, we have great power, force, and influence in the world. We can take a step toward bringing about peace without loss of face because of our power and influence, that a smaller nation could not take. Second, suppose the stopping of bombing does not bring about negotiations. I spoke to that point. I said if we have to fight, we can fight just as well in South Vietnam, protected by our fire power which now is spread over all of Vietnam. I spent my 4 years in the Army in the war in Europe but I am not a military expert. The confinement of the war seems a better road to negotiations and our security than the present policy of ever increasing escalation.

Mr. McGEE. The reason for my question is, if my memory serves me correctly, in previous bombing pauses the interruption of the bombing was not met by Vietnamese inaction. The best evidence we have is that they took advantage of it by bringing up and sending in more supplies and men. It looks to me as if it is wrong to point the finger to us and suggest that because of our preponderance of power and if we take a breather that is all they ask. That does not seem to be all they ask. They move in in a hurry the moment they get extra squirming room and send in more men and supplies.

Mr. COOPER. I raised that question. I said, in my view, they past pauses—and "pause" is the correct word because they were only pauses—were hedged with time limitations or done during religious holidays when time ran out.

What has been required, although we do not like it much, is unconditional cessation of bombing.

I gave reasons why I believe the North Vietnamese insist on "unconditional." It is because they consider the United States an aggressor against their territory.

Let us try this approach. If it brings negotiations for peace the world would be happy, the United States would be happy, and North and South Vietnam would be happy. If it does not work I suggest confinement of the battlefield to South Vietnam, and according to testimony many have given, including the Secretary of Defense, our bombing has not hindered much the actual infiltration and passage of supplies from North Vietnam to South Vietnam. That is the point.

Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, my friend, the Senator from Kentucky, in the colloquy which followed his very thought-provoking speech, was asked to comment on the American national interest in this whole area and what we had at stake in this matter.

It seemed to me, as I listened to that colloquy, that conspicuous by its absence was the suggestion that there was realistically much more at stake than what happened to the Vietnamese.

As I remembered in listening to the President on Saturday night, as many of us have been saying for some time, as these leaders have been saying, what we are doing has already made a difference.

Does it mean nothing that President Marcos of the Philippines said that if it was not for our effort in Vietnam it would only be a matter of time, and they would face the same problem; that the Foreign Minister of Thailand said that they would be next to face the threat if we do not hold the line; that Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore said, "If you do not hold out we are finished"?

What about the Burmese who now are saying that our presence there will determine their future? What about Malaysia who advised the United Nations, a few weeks ago, that they are only one step removed, and that if we do not hold, then they are next? What about the shift in position of Sihanouk of Cambodia, who is now discovering that his problems are closing in?

Mr. COOPER. I would not rely too much on Sihanouk.

Mr. McGEE. What about the poor Indonesians who told me, after I had visited there not long ago, that their chance for constructive change stemmed largely from our presence in Vietnam?

That is a part of the question of Vietnam, really, which gives us a more proper and basic perspective of the issue, than just to talk about how we are bogged down there. What happens in this country could have very much more of a bearing on our security. Is the Senator's position that we let those areas go, that they do not make much difference anyway to our national interest?

Mr. COOPER. I am well aware of these problems. I have thought a great deal about them. The Senators and I have discussed these points before, earlier this year in this Chamber, and in other places as well.

I have visited some of the countries the Senator has mentioned, Thailand, the Philippines, and I was told that our presence in Vietnam was important to them. I am sure that if those countries should be invaded by China or North Vietnam, their governments would be very glad for us to come to their aid.

Mr. President, my judgment is that these countries will settle their own destinies. Sometimes I believe that they will settle them better if we are not there. When we go in, we are welcomed, for our generosity and good will. But, after a time, the spirit of nationalism asserts itself, disagreements occur, the people begin to dislike us, and finally we are asked to leave.

Our position and purpose is not colonial, but the human instincts of people is the same toward the domination or long continued pressure of the armed forces of other countries.

I draw a little bit upon my own experience in India. I remember, when I went there, it was difficult for our people in the United States to understand what we called India's neutralism, which the Indians called nonalignment. Some felt that they were morally at fault because they would not commit themselves to our side of democratic government.

I listened while I was there, and I learned something of what they meant by nonalignment. It is that the first desire is to be independent—dependent of outside domination; free to make their own decisions.

I must say this, that even if we intervene in other countries, with the best of intentions, I do not believe in the long run that we can do much about prescribing what their governments and what their societies should be. In fact, our presence can stir up the spirit of nationalism against the regime we assist.

But the Senators have asked the more immediate question; should we get out of Vietnam and would it endanger other countries?

It might affect Thailand because of our large forces there. Of course, we are faced with the same danger in Thailand that we faced in Vietnam—involvement in war, but if we could help settle the war in Vietnam and withdraw, the countries in the area will have a better opportunity to develop their governments and societies by agreement among themselves without our presence, without war, and aggression from the Communists.

Mr. McGEE. I think that the Senator and I are talking about two different things.

Mr. COOPER. I do not think so.

Mr. McGEE. I suggest that because I agree with him that I do not believe we should make little Americans or little Democrats out of these people. That is their business. They have to evolve in their own way. What they have been saying to us, as their leaders remind us, is the importance of our presence there, that might give them the opportunity to achieve their full-blown independence. They want the chance to evolve whatever form of government they think best fits their part of the world.

They feel they will not get that chance if there are skillfully calculated outside forces already under way that by infiltration, terrorism, try to take them over through violence, and not through the peaceful evolution of change and under conditions of stability.

At the very time Vietnam became the critical question in our foreign policy, it seemed to me that the evidence of the presence of trained guerrilla cadres was already apparent in northeastern Thai-

land. Thailand will tell us that they thought their days were numbered at that time if we had not intervened.

Mao Tse-tung bragged that the Thais were next.

Still, 9,000 trained cadres from Hanoi were in the eastern third or half of Laos, in violation of the truce.

Whose independence are they interested in?

There are now cadres of the National Liberation Front which Cambodia affirms are present in two of their north-eastern provinces.

Whose independence are they interested in?

What the Philippines, the Thais, the Vietnamese, the Malaysians, and the people in Singapore are trying to say is that they want that opportunity. As President Marcos of the Philippines reminded us, the only power in the world in Asia today capable of winning them that chance is the United States.

They ask for that chance.

I think that is the essence of our presence there. We are the wall, the umbrella, or whatever figure of speech you wish to describe it. That is our role.

They want to do it themselves, if they can achieve stability, political sophistication, and economic viability which will permit them independence. They do not want to be confronted by a new regime forced upon them by the mobilizing of terrorist groups from the outside. It is as simple and as elementary as that.

Our role is to help them win that time, in the desperate hope that some day they will architect the new infrastructure of Asia, that they will be the keeper of the peace in Asia. The sooner that comes about the happier we shall all be. But they have to have that chance to achieve that opportunity.

Thus, it seems to me that is why we are talking about two different things, not about making democrats out of them, or even achieving their independence now, because their independence was in jeopardy before we were ever there, because a number of designs were already being practiced in the field by the National Liberation Front on more than one frontier at the same time.

That is the reason I raised that question with the Senator from Kentucky. I agree with him that they should go their own way and should build the institutions and systems which fit them best. But they must have the opportunity to do so, and we must oppose someone imposing on them from the outside by force. That is the reason for this.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, will the Senator from Wyoming yield?

Mr. McGEE. I yield.

Mr. MURPHY. I should like to point out that from my experience as an observer at the recent elections, at the request of the President of the United States, we have records that over 1,000 persons were killed by terrorists trying to stop the election, trying to impede the election, trying to frighten people from exercising their right to vote in a democratic process.

Our purpose there was not to try to influence an election. We were sent there merely to find out how it was being conducted. We found that it was being

conducted very well—much better than many elections in our own country, let me say.

However, we never heard very much about the 1,000 people who were killed in order to keep them from exercising their right to vote. The Senator, I am glad to say, has put his finger on the important part.

The propaganda against us is that we are the aggressors. If one listened to the Russian ambassador to the United Nations, we have been the aggressor for 30 years in every instance. I said at one time:

If he is telling the truth, the United States should be put out of the United Nations because we have broken the rule, and if he is not telling the truth, he should be put out for breaking the rule, that is, being dishonest.

The Senator has pointed out a most important question, which is that we are not there as conquerors or to impose our ideas or ideals of our own, but merely to protect these people, as stated by four American Presidents, in their right of self-determination, with some degree of safety.

If my colleagues do not recognize the importance of this, I suggest that they read the record of the imposition of tyranny through Europe and the results of the conquest there.

We had an example of this in Korea at one time. My friend General "Rosie" O'Donnell said he wanted to take out the Yalu bridges so that the supplies could be cut off. He said he could do it with 10 aircraft and no casualties. He was taken out of command and sent to March Field. I met him when it was done a year later. He said he had not been able to find out what the casualties were and how many Americans had been killed by that time.

I say this is not a simple proposition. It is not one-sided. But all the considerations and all the options should be placed on the table, and not just that of those who say let us get out of Southeast Asia at any price.

I agree with the Senator when he says if we get out of Southeast Asia, then that entire area, including Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines, are in jeopardy. Where then do we finally make the decision?

We have the same problem building up in Latin America. My distinguished colleague speaks about the safety of this hemisphere. It does not exist any more.

These are questions involved in this particular problem, and it is a problem that needs solving, but we must look at the board, overall problem.

I congratulate the Senator for making this point about the situation so clear in his remarks.

Mr. McGEE. I thank my friend the Senator from California, and conclude by suggesting that where we get off the track is to try to reduce this to a separable Vietnam problem. The Vietnam question is incidental. It happened to happen. It could have happened in half a dozen other places. Therefore, we ought to invoke some order in the suggestion which are made to keep them in their proper order and priority.

The real issue at stake is all of eastern Asia. Lee Kuang Yew has said:

If we can prevail, all of eastern Asia will be closer to stability than at any time in this century.

I do not know whether that is right or not. I think most of them think they are edging toward that kind of condition. I think independence is a pretty cardinal principle that we have tried to write. It reads the same in all languages. But it is more than that. Southeast Asia makes a difference to the future structuring of Asia. We are a Pacific Ocean nation, and our future lies in that direction. The shape it takes will be determined to a large extent by what happens in Southeast Asia. As Lin Piao has said China is interested in this area because if she can move in there, she will outflank India, she will face headon the Philippines, and stand face to face with Malaysia. So this is indeed a calculable prize that some desire.

I think the shape of the new Asia will be conditioned by whether we seek to let people in Southeast Asia who are not Chinese structure their own countries or whether we forfeit them to the domination of the mainland group.

Mr. President, this is an area of a couple of hundred million people. It is an area rich in bauxite and tin and rice and other natural resources of great abundance. The Japanese thought enough of it to strike there as one of the objectives of its war. Other nations have recognized this area as of great significance. It lies astride the great trade route between East and West. It has a bountiful supply of resources and products that makes a great difference to the economic advance of its people. To me this is also a national interest reason for our country.

Finally, this area is of concern to us because, for the most part, as I see it, we brought about this condition. How did this vacuum occur in Southeast Asia that has tempted the predators of violence and terror to try to move in there? It was done by the United States. We destroyed Japan. We won the war. We made the British move out. We were instrumental in running the French and Dutch out of Indonesia and Southeast Asia. There were no allies who were in a very substantial role in World War II in the Pacific. It was an American undertaking in our own interest.

As a consequence can we now go home and say, "All right, we left it in a mess. We left a vacuum," or are we to shoulder that responsibility to try to put those pieces back together as meaningfully and as intelligently as mortals are empowered to do?

This is why we cannot dismiss the question lightly by saying it does not make any difference or that we do not have an obligation to be there. I say we have an obligation to be there because we turned out to be the fortunate victors in World War II. I appreciate that the role of the victor, under the old saying, used to be "the devil with the loser." I think the people expect a better statement from us, especially in view of the times in which we live.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McGEE. I yield.

Mr. COOPER. I do not want to keep the floor all afternoon, because I know other Senators have business to transact; but my speech, although narrow in its terms, was, I hope, broad in its concept. I have not talked about withdrawal of forces from Vietnam. I said nothing about surrender. I stand for my country. I said we should try to find a means to bring about the war to a close and also to avoid an expansion of the war. That is what I have talked about and offered a plan.

I do not agree that Vietnam has such significance that we should accept a military solution which could involve this country in a larger war in Asia, with the predictable intervention of the Communist Chinese with the support of the Soviet Union. Such counsel, I think, blows the situation up beyond any sensible meaning. That is what I am arguing about.

We ought to confine this war to some reasonable scope and at the same time do all we can do to prevent its disastrous expansion, which will occur unless we change our course. That is what I have been arguing today.

Mr. McGEE. I want the Senator to know that I read his speech very carefully, but his speech did surface many comments. I was addressing myself to the comments which the speech provoked.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, did not the Senator from Kentucky have the floor?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kentucky has the floor unless he yields.

Mr. CURTIS. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator will state it.

Mr. CURTIS. Who will have the floor when the Senator from Kentucky yields it? What is the order of business?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The unanimous-consent agreement provided a limitless and endless amount of time to conclude this debate. As the Chair recalls the way the unanimous-consent agreement was ordered, it did not specify that the Senator from Kentucky had control of the floor throughout all the tenure of the debate. At the termination of the debate, the motion which was before the Senate earlier would be the pending order of business, and the Senator from Nebraska would be recognized, of course, to pursue this matter.

Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator will state it.

Mr. McGEE. Does that mean, then, that the colloquy that I asked permission to join in after the Senator from Kentucky leaves the floor, with the Senator from Illinois, to respond to his seven points, would be in order, under that unanimous-consent agreement?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. It is the opinion of the Chair that that would be a legitimate part of the entire area of debate, which revolves around the speech and discussion of the Senator from Kentucky.

Mr. McGEE. I thank the Presiding Officer.

Mr. COOPER. I yield to the Senator from Iowa.

Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Kentucky. Like all of us, I appreciate what he is trying to do. He is conscientiously trying to help us achieve some kind of a method for bringing this unfortunate war to an honorable conclusion.

What bothers me about the idea of this unilateral cessation of bombing—and I am sure the Senator can check this—is that we have had testimony upon testimony from responsible military leaders, under whom troops are serving, leaders who go down to the hospitals every morning to see their men who have been wounded during the night, who tell us that a unilateral cessation of the bombing would cost us more and more casualties.

Now, I must say that testimony from people in that position of responsibility carries great weight with the Senator from Iowa. Certainly, I am sure the Senator from Kentucky is not advocating some step that would cost us more casualties, more men in hospitals, and more who will not come home. I wonder why the Senator does not accept the testimony of those people.

Mr. COOPER. I will respond by saying I addressed myself to this very question in the speech I made.

First, it is my hope that a cessation of bombing would be followed by negotiations. If that were true, then the problem the Senator has suggested would not be relevant.

Mr. MILLER. Will the Senator yield at that point?

Mr. COOPER. Surely.

Mr. MILLER. Negotiations, possibly, yes. But there is nothing that I know of which indicates that negotiations might not proceed while fighting goes on, or while the enemy would take advantage of a cessation of the bombing to lock itself in more deeply.

Mr. COOPER. That is possible.

Mr. MILLER. That is, as I recall, what happened in Korea for a while; and it was the concern that there is no commitment from the other side, I am sure, that led President Johnson, last Friday night, to say very carefully—and this, I might say, was not picked up as much as it might have been in some of the stories I read about the speech—that we assume that while these talks are going on, there will not be an advantage taken by the other side.

I suggest that that assumption is absolutely indispensable to the idea of negotiations. If we cannot assume that, and if the enemy takes advantage of the pause and causes us more casualties, then it seems to me that that is not likely to help shorten the war.

Mr. COOPER. I have had to be frank. I said, first, my belief is that there will be no negotiations unless the bombing is stopped. That is my position. Second, I said that if bombing was stopped, and negotiations did not ensue, then the question of danger to the security of forces would arise. I question whether there would be any more danger with a cessation of bombing than has occurred with bombing. We have had to place 500,000

men over there, the casualty losses have steadily risen, and where we have reached the point where the danger of an expanded war increases—and since bombing started.

I have further said that I foresee the possibility that, with a constriction of the war, a gradual de-escalation on both sides might occur, and eventually bring the war to a conclusion.

Of course, these are questions that cannot be answered; and they will not be answered finally until the effort is made.

Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, I follow up my first question with this: Does not the Senator from Kentucky recognize that throughout 1966, as the testimony before the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, which has been released to all Senators, pointed out, only 1 percent of all of the sorties flown in the north were directed at what might be called key military targets, and that it has only been within the last 60 days or so that there has been attention focused on the quality of military targets, which might persuade the enemy that it is paying too high a price, between what is taking place in the south and what is taking place in the north, and that thus by holding back this air and sea arm, which we have the advantage of possessing, we might actually be causing the war to be still more prolonged than if we used it to its best advantage to shorten the war?

Mr. COOPER. Yes, I am certainly aware of the testimony and of the report, and I have heard some of the generals testify. I have also been briefed on South Vietnam, and have received, I may say, a very thorough and I think absolutely honest briefing.

I am acquainted with briefings. I have heard them during World War II, as did the Senator from Iowa.

I recognize that the function and mission of military men is to win the war. They have what is called a military mission. The Senator knows, having been in the military service, that they propose courses of action under the doctrine of military necessity, to do whatever is necessary to accomplish the mission.

That is the function of the military man. It is his duty and humble duty. I am not getting into the military field at all.

The President said we do not have a military mission to win the war, that we have a mission to help South Vietnam become a free and viable state. I am merely proposing what others have proposed, that we take steps to see if we can accomplish our correct mission by peaceful, political and not by military means.

That is the only answer I can give.

Mr. MILLER. The Senator knows that every Senator would like to see our objectives attained by peaceful means and not by war.

Mr. COOPER. I know that, and nothing that I have said here would in any way derogate that. All in the Chamber, in the House, our President, want the same objective.

Mr. MILLER. Does not the Senator recognize that in order to attain the political objective which he just stated, it is essential that people in South Viet-

nam be free from terror and outside aggression? Does the Senator think that political objective can be obtained if the South Vietnamese are not free from terror and subversion and outside aggression?

Mr. COOPER. I know that objective has not been attained by war, and I am proposing another course.

Mr. MILLER. It has not been attained so far.

Mr. COOPER. The matters and decisions which relate to the shape of South Vietnam will have to be made, in my judgment, in negotiations. The negotiations will come at some time. Then, whether South Vietnam achieves those objectives will depend upon what the government and the people of South Vietnam do.

We can help every country in that area with military forces and money, but unless they reform and provide some advancements in the living standards of the people, in time revolution will occur. That is my judgment.

Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, I thoroughly agree. However, I would like to make one point.

It is true that the war has not so far brought about the situation which is necessary to provide for the political objective we seek. It has in some parts of Vietnam, but not in the country as a whole.

I wonder why that statement could not have been made during the course of World War II by somebody saying: "We are not obtaining our objectives in restoring Europe to freedom and taking back the islands in the Pacific." That statement would not mean that we could not hope to achieve those objectives as the war progressed.

Now that the bombing is obviously causing the north to pay a price they do not want to pay, it seems to me this is an unfortunate time for us, in effect, to stop what we are doing.

It appears to me that we have hopes of attaining our objectives much sooner than many of us might think. However, to say that we have not attained our objectives in a matter of about 2 years in a country which is most difficult to fight a war in, I think is denying the fact that we have hoped that our military power could provide the very atmosphere that is necessary to attain the objectives.

I am afraid that if we do not do it, we will have an atmosphere which will not provide for this political objective for a very long time, and it will not help to say that there may be hope for insurrection over there. The people in Cuba have lost hope for insurrection. The people in the captive nations of Europe have lost hope for insurrection.

I hope that the people in South Vietnam will not have to lose hope, too.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I have great respect for the views of the Senator from Iowa, and I thank him.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I have promised to yield first to the Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. PELL], and then to the Senator from Colorado [Mr. DOMINICK].

Mr. PELL. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. COOPER. I yield.

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I did not have a chance to hear the Senator's speech. However, I read it carefully.

I congratulate him and commend him on his speech.

I felt and have said from the beginning that the bombing has been counterproductive to our interest, to the interest of Vietnam, and to the interest of the world.

Our objective originally was threefold: first to hurt the morale of the North Vietnamese; second, to improve the morale of the South Vietnamese; and, third, to stop the flow of men and supplies from North Vietnam and South Vietnam. Actually, just the reverse has happened. First, the morale of the North Vietnamese, or, at least, their leaders, has been hardened, not weakened. This, too, is what history shows us to be the case when a country starts being subjected to civilian bombing. Second, Truong Dinh Dzu the candidate who stood for peace and a cessation of bombing, is the candidate who, after the Government-sponsored slate polled most strongly in the recent election. And, third, Secretary of Defense McNamara himself has said:

"I don't believe that the bombing up to the present has significantly reduced, nor any bombing that I could contemplate in the future, would significantly reduce the actual flow of men and material to the South."

I think the speech of the Senator was altogether excellent. I congratulate him on it.

Mr. COOPER. I thank the Senator. Only recently he made a very thoughtful and constructive speech on the problem of Vietnam—which should be read and studied widely.

Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from Colorado.

Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, I express some concern with the speech which is well thought out, well expressed, and highly thoughtful in trying to suggest some method by which we can arrive at a peaceful settlement of the dispute.

I know that this is exactly what the Senator is trying to do. The difficulty with it is, it seems to me, that we look at this only from our side and not from the point of view of some of the statements that have been made out of North Vietnam.

Just last Sunday, David Schoenbrun had an article in the Washington Post, a copy of which I do not have present. However, it was an article that I read with great interest because under no circumstances can he be called a hawk.

He had had an interview with the North Vietnamese Prime Minister and was discussing this very issue.

The Prime Minister of North Vietnam said that in trying to determine when negotiations would be possible, he would refer back to the interview of August 27, I believe it was. It listed the four points, once again, that he had made.

One was the definitive and unconditional stopping of our bombing raids on North Vietnam. That is the point the Senator addressed himself to. However, it goes much further than that. It then says "and all other acts of war."

Point No. 2 is that we have to withdraw all our troops and all the troops of our allies out of Vietnam.

Point No. 3 is that we have to recognize the Vietcong, the National Liberation Front, as the sole representative of the Vietnamese people.

Point No. 4 is that the Vietnamese people can then settle their own affairs among themselves.

The difficulty with this is that there is no room here for the optimism, as far as I can see, to say that the simple matter of stopping the bombing is going to result in negotiations. If it does not result in negotiations, then we are in about the same position we were in before we started the bombings. However, in the meantime we will have given them the opportunity to repair the damage that has been done there and to concentrate their forces near the South Vietnamese borders where it will hurt us the most.

I think there is this fundamental distinction which has not been brought out here. As far as the North Vietnamese are concerned, there are not two countries there. There is only one country, and since there is only one country, there is no boundary by which they are obligated under a treaty or anything else to recognize.

They feel, consequently, that they can go through the country at will and do what they want to impose their own will on both the north and the south.

It is this problem, it seems to me, that creates the major danger in trying to forecast that we will get negotiations with a cessation of bombing.

In order to obtain negotiations, there are three or perhaps four other things that we would have to do before they would enter into negotiations. And if we do not get negotiations this way, then I think we have placed our own position and that of the South Vietnamese in more jeopardy than at present.

This is the reason why it seems to me we should approach this matter very carefully.

I might say, in passing, that when I was in Vietnam in May of this year, I discussed these possibilities at some length with our State Department representatives in the area as well as with the military. The State Department personnel, so far as I know, did then and would now reflect, I believe, a great reluctance to cut off the damage that is being inflicted on North Vietnam, and I believe they would do this from the diplomatic point of view that I have just mentioned. We have no assurances of any reciprocity if we start to de-escalate.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I will respond briefly.

I may say that everything the Senator from Colorado has said is precise and thoughtful. What he has said with respect to the statement of conditions that at times have been laid down to the North Vietnamese is absolutely correct. In referring to the response of Ho Chi Minh to President Johnson's letter of February 10 of this year, I said that Ho Chi Minh laid down the same list of requirements; but that he emphasized, at the close, that the cessation of bombing had to occur.

U Thant has also reported this. Premier Kosygin told President Johnson that if cessation of bombing occurred, negotiations would result.

I know that other requirements have been laid down, but I have said that cessation has been emphasized again and again.

It is also correct that North Vietnam considers Vietnam as a whole. That was contemplated by the Geneva agreement. But unless we take some affirmative means other than we have been taking, I see no change at all—just more of what we have been doing.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. COOPER. I yield.

Mr. MURPHY. I believe the Senator has said that the Geneva agreement pointed out that North Vietnam considered the entire country as one.

Mr. COOPER. No, not the Geneva agreement. The Geneva agreement itself considered the whole country as one. The 17th parallel was to be a temporary arrangement.

Mr. MURPHY. I thought that was a result of the Geneva agreement, which was agreed to by the North but never agreed to by the South Vietnamese or the United States.

Mr. COOPER. The Geneva Conference agreed that Vietnam was one state. But for the purposes of arranging affairs preparatory to election and arranging the withdrawal of troops and the movement of people from one area to another, the 17th parallel was established as a temporary dividing line, with the understanding that 2 years later there would be an election throughout the entire country.

Mr. MURPHY. I thank the Senator.

Mr. COOPER. And to constitute a government for the whole country. The only agreement signed was an armistice agreement between France and the Vietminh. A statement was issued—as my colleague [Mr. MORTON] knows so well, because he was an Assistant Secretary of State at that time—approved by all the parties except South Vietnam and the United States.

Mr. MURPHY. I thank the Senator. I just desired to make certain in my mind that I understood the facts correctly.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I have said that I would yield to the Senator from South Carolina.

Mr. THURMOND. I thank the able Senator from Kentucky.

Mr. President, I respect very highly the able Senator from Kentucky, as he knows, but I could not disagree with him more violently on any matter than to put into effect the cessation of bombing in North Vietnam.

I do not know whether the Senator has had occasion to read some of the testimony before the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services with respect to the air war against North Vietnam. I would invite his attention to the statement of General Johnson, the Chief of Staff of the Army, and I shall quote two paragraphs which I believe are pertinent to this matter:

First, the air campaign is making it more difficult for the North Vietnamese to support

enemy forces in the South. They have had to divert an estimated 500,000 to 600,000 personnel to full and part-time war-related tasks to counteract the effects of the air campaign. These individuals represent a work effort and, perhaps more significantly, management and technical skills that might otherwise be more directly engaged in support of activities in the South. The high level of attacks since the advent of good weather in April, particularly against the lines of communication in the northeast quadrant, has resulted in a major increase in the level of damage inflicted. Although trucks, rail cars, and equipment are replaceable, and bridges and rail lines repairable, valuable North Vietnamese resources must be diverted to accomplish this repair and replacement. Thus, these resources are unavailable for commitment to South Vietnam.

Second, the air campaign is exacting a cost from North Vietnam for her aggression. In this regard we have also achieved some success. All or substantial segments of the militarily important elements of North Vietnam's limited industrial bases have been destroyed; for example, her explosives, pig iron, and cement production facilities as well as her thermal power plants have suffered major damage.

In summary, I believe that air attacks in the North have contributed significantly to the success we have achieved thus far in South Vietnam.

According to General Johnson, the Chief of Staff of the Army, if we did not bomb 500,000 to 600,000 personnel would not have to be diverted as they are being diverted because of our bombing. It seems to me that is a very important point and is very significant in substantiation of the bombing. I did not know whether or not the Senator had seen that statement, and I thought he would like it called to his attention, if he had not.

Mr. COOPER. May I say that I have read the statement.

Mr. THURMOND. Also, the new Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Moorer, testified, in a very short paragraph, to this effect:

Well, I think there is no question about the fact that the bombing has certainly reduced their capability to conduct operations in South Vietnam. It has greatly increased the difficulty with respect to repairing roads and mobilizing forces and increased the effort they have had to take to repair their facilities that are struck, and so on. Had we not conducted the bombing, there is no question about the fact that the effort they are putting forth in South Vietnam would be much larger.

In other words, Admiral Moorer's view is that if we had not conducted the bombing, the effort by the North Vietnamese would have been much stronger, much more powerful, much greater, and, naturally, would have caused the loss of many more lives.

So the evidence is clear, in the testimony of these people whom I am quoting very briefly, that the air war has been a tremendous asset to our side in this war.

General McConnell, the Air Force Chief of Staff, was asked this question:

What is your assessment of what the impact of halting the bombing north of the 20th parallel would be; what impact would that have on the war in the south?

General McConnell. If you stopped that I think it would enable them, in a matter of time, to recover all of their normal ways of life up there. They would be able to bring in a lot more equipment, and they could

certainly increase their rate of infiltration. They undoubtedly would move their defenses, which they have already done, down into the Route Packages [deleted] and we would find it pretty hot down there.

General McConnell takes the same position as the others I have mentioned.

General Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was asked this question by the distinguished Senator from Maine [Mrs. SMITH]:

General Wheeler, you have stated that the war in Vietnam is a single war, and that air strikes in North Vietnam have an important influence on combat operations in South Vietnam.

Is it your belief that a reduction or restriction of the bombing of the North would result in increased casualties of allied forces in the South because of the increased support which the enemy would receive there?

General Wheeler. That is correct, Senator Smith; that is my belief.

Then, Admiral Sharp, our commander in the Pacific, who has command over General Westmoreland and that entire area, was asked this question by me:

Admiral Sharp, this morning you stated that the less bombing we do, the more troops we would need in South Vietnam. That was the effect of your statement, was it not?

Admiral Sharp. If we stop bombing.

Senator THURMOND. If we stop bombing, we would have to have more troops?

Admiral Sharp. That's right.

Mr. President, what does this mean? It simply means, as I see it—and as has been testified to by General Johnson, General McConnell, General Wheeler, and Admiral Sharp, our commander in chief in that area; and all of these people take the same position—it would be a great mistake to bring about a cessation of bombing.

They say, first, that the bombing is now diverting 500,000 to 600,000 people from aiding the north in the war against the south. That is one strong reason. They say further that if we stop the bombing, more troops will be required. That is exactly what the American people do not want. The American people do not want to have to send more troops to Vietnam.

My answer is that we should do more bombing. Every one of those gentlemen who testified took that position. All the military people took the position that they would like to see the restrictions lifted on the bombing. If we would do that and permit them to bomb all military targets they wish to bomb to win the war, and close the port of Haiphong, through which 85 percent of the supplies pass for the enemy, as well as the other two ports, we could cut off the north from receiving essential, and otherwise unavailable, supplies.

Without the help of the Soviets I do not believe the war could last but a brief while. The Soviets supply surface-to-air missiles, the Soviets supply Mig planes, the Soviets supply anti-aircraft artillery, communications, complex radar, and all the equipment necessary in order to assist the north in fighting this war.

Red China is supplying some small arms and ammunition, but most of this equipment is supplied by the Soviets. If we had the courage to close the port of Haiphong and the other ports, and cut off supplies and remove restrictions on

the bombing—and military men want both of these things—we could bring the war to a close in a reasonable time.

We have had a cessation of bombing several times. What happened? Military people tell us that the North used that cessation of bombing every time—not once, but every time—to increase their supply line south, to regroup and repair damaged facilities without fear of danger from the air, to fortify themselves in all respects to continue the war even more aggressively.

Does the Senator have any evidence that if we have a cessation of bombing the north is not going to use that opportunity to fortify itself again, to bring in more supplies, to get ready to continue this fight longer? If so, it is new information, it is vital information, and it would be most helpful. We have had no assurance.

My argument with the President has been that we have not used our power properly over there. In World War II, we put all of the power necessary, and in a proper fashion, to win it. The Senator was in that war and he knows.

We put in the power necessary to win it and win it as quickly as we could. We have not done that in Vietnam. We have fought with one hand behind our backs, as we did in Korea. We are only fighting for a stalemate, not a military victory. The President has said that over and over. I predict if we do not have a military victory there, we will have to fight again and maybe the next time it will be nearer home where our people will be endangered to a greater extent.

This is not a war between the north and the south. This is not a civil war. This is a war by the Communists to take over the world. This is just another battleground chosen by the Communists to wage another war in their goal of world domination.

We have the power to win. They could not stand it if we were to bomb as we ought to; they could not stand it if we were to cut off all supplies. We could win this war in a brief period, I firmly believe, if we put the power there and made it so hot for them that they could not take it.

Mr. President, I went to Vietnam a few months ago. I talked to our men. I not only talked to our generals, but I also talked to noncommissioned officers and privates. I went out on a battleship; I was in touch with the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines, all of them. The opinion among our military people is practically unanimous. They want to win it and they want to fight. They know what it takes to do it. But they are not allowed to do it.

The Senator may have reached the conclusion that we are not going to win it and that we are not going to put our power in there. The Senator advocates a cessation of bombing. From the way in which we have been fighting this war, I can see how it is so frustrating, and it might bring about a temptation for a cessation. However, the Communists do not operate that way. The Communists choose the time and place. The Communists make the decisions. They choose whether to stand and fight in South Vietnam. They are the ones who precipitated the war.

Who started this war; who came into South Vietnam; who inspired these guerrillas; who is supplying these guerrillas; who is giving leadership and training to the guerrillas and the Vietcong? It is the Communists of the Soviet Union and Red China and North Vietnam.

In my judgment, this will continue as long as the people of America appear divided. I think one of the greatest harms we can do in this country is to give the impression that our people would stop bombing. One of the greatest harms we can do is to give the impression that our people are divided. I can tell the Senate that in my experience in traveling throughout this country, speaking with the American people, the American people want this war won; they want to win it in a hurry, and get our American boys home. In my opinion, a cessation of bombing will not do that. A cessation of bombing will increase the timespan before we can bring the boys home.

These men I have mentioned are top military people in this administration; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, every chief of staff, and our commander in the Pacific, the top man, every one of them feels that we should lift the restrictions on the bombing, close the ports, and cut off enemy supplies.

Mr. President, I want to call the attention of the Senator to this, because I do not know whether he has read the testimony of all of these people or not. But again, I say, I can see that he might feel frustrated because we have not gone ahead and won the war, but I firmly believe that what he is advocating will not be in our best interests, but on the contrary. I would advocate putting more power in there as quickly as possible, and ending the war. We have got to have the will to win as well as the power to win. We have not said yet that we are going to win. All we say is defend, defend. That is what we did in Korea and we are still there—just defending. We have a stalemate there. The same thing will happen in Vietnam. If we have a stalemate there, will have to keep troops there for years and years unless the Communists are allowed to take it over.

I hope that public opinion in this country will rise to the point that it will demand the President win the war.

We can win. We should win. We should do it as promptly as possible so that we will not have to send more troops there, so that we will be able to bring our American boys back home as soon as possible.

Several Senators addressed the Chair.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I must respond to the Senator's remarks. The Senator has spoken at some length so I think I should be permitted to respond briefly.

The position taken by the Senator from South Carolina is a position held by some people in this country. I do not know how many, but it is an opinion held by many.

As I stated to the Senator from Iowa [Mr. MILLER], it is a perfectly reasonable position for the military to take, because their responsibility is to achieve a military mission by whatever means is necessary. They have to take that position.

I take issue with the Senator from South Carolina in saying that the mili-

tary people should have the right and the authority over the President of the United States.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, will the Senator from Kentucky yield?

Mr. COOPER. I yield.

Mr. THURMOND. I am sure that the Senator would not wish to misquote what I said, but—

Mr. COOPER. The Senator implied it by saying that we should follow their decisions.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I did not—

Mr. COOPER. Well, I say that—

Mr. THURMOND. I said that the military people know how to win the war.

Mr. COOPER. All right.

Mr. THURMOND. At least, that they advocate a certain policy. But the President makes the decisions. The President does not have to follow their recommendations. He is not obliged to follow them.

Mr. COOPER. But the President of the United States speaks for all the people. He has got to decide whether a policy recommended by the military is one which will be in the best interests of the country, or whether it might go far beyond the immediate military objectives which the military commanders might want to obtain.

He has got to determine whether that course of action would lead to far more difficult and possibly terrible consequences. To say that they should be let loose—as fine and as honorable men as they are—in performing their duty, which is to accomplish a military mission, so that their determination should be accepted, although that might lead us into a war on a greater land mass with Communist China, or perhaps the Soviet Union, is just beyond any kind of serious contemplation.

Let me say also, and I will close, why should we follow their judgments? They are chiefly responsible for our being in this war.

I have great admiration and respect for Gen. Maxwell Taylor, who advised President Kennedy. I respect him as a very attractive, brilliant, military man, very able military tactician. But unfortunately, he gave political advice to President Kennedy and again to President Johnson which I do not believe has been most helpful.

The thing we have to determine is: Which is the chicken and which is the egg?

These military men say that if we did not bomb, the great flow and volume of supplies would continue to come down into South Vietnam. But those supplies were not coming down in such quantity until we began the bombing.

Mr. THURMOND. Oh, yes; they were.

Mr. COOPER. Some supplies, yes; but it needed only 24,000 American soldiers to help contain them. Now we have over 500,000 and, in spite of the bombing, the flow of supplies has not been substantially reduced in the sense that it helps the South Vietnamese.

I appreciate the Senator's comments. We are old friends under arms, but I cannot agree with him.

Mr. MORTON. Mr. President, will my colleague from Kentucky yield to me?

Mr. COOPER. I am happy to yield.

Mr. MORTON. I am sorry that I could not be in the Chamber to listen to my colleague's remarks. I have read them with much interest. I have followed some of this colloquy for some time now. I want to associate myself with my colleague and point out that total military victory, which might mean complete destruction and the complete surrender of North Vietnam, would leave us with a policing job for years to come in a country located right on the borders of Communist China.

I wonder what we would do if the Chinese Communists decided to invade India. A commitment of 5 million men, perhaps, would be necessary. These are some of the problems we shall have to consider.

I commend my colleague for an excellent statement.

Mr. COOPER. I thank my friend and colleague very much. I appreciate his statement.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, will the Senator from Kentucky yield?

Mr. COOPER. I yield.

Mr. CLARK. I did not hear all the debate which has raged on this floor all day, but I did read the Senator's speech and I read it with some care. I think it is important that debate on Vietnam should not become a partisan matter. It is too important a question.

I commend the Senator for what he said. I agree with everything he said.

I note that at least one and possibly more Members on my side of the aisle have also commended the Senator, and I am glad that they have.

I note that the Senator from Kentucky [Mr. MORTON] has commended his colleague, and others, who feel quite differently about it. There is no doubt about the fact that the Senate is divided on this question of whether the bombing should be stopped.

It seems to me the more we think about it, the more we discuss it, the more we read about it, the clearer it becomes that the calculated risk of stopping the bombing, in the hope that we can stop the war and get to the negotiating table, is well worth taking.

I find myself in complete disagreement with the Senator from South Carolina whose comments I did hear.

As a Democrat, I want to commend the Senator from Kentucky, a Republican, for what he has just said. I assure him that I do not think this is a partisan political matter. I hope it will not become one. In my opinion, the course of action outlined by both Senators from Kentucky is completely sound.

Mr. COOPER. I thank the Senator. I read the Senator's statement last Friday on the same subject, and I also remember his statement last year calling for cessation of bombing.

This issue could become a partisan matter. That is one of the reasons I hope action will be taken before it becomes so partisan as to be a shambles.

The war affects all parties, the entire country. We must consider it from that viewpoint.

Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, I ask for the floor at this time because my good friend from Illinois [Mr. PERCY] has made a statement here and by agree-

ment I should like to address myself to it. The Senator is not in the Chamber at the moment, and I therefore suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. SPONG in the chair). The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. SMATHERS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S STAND IN VIETNAM WILL BE CONFIRMED BY HISTORY

Mr. SMATHERS. Mr. President, in a succinct, logical, and unemotional manner, the President of the United States last week restated the rationale of the American commitment in Vietnam.

In a serious speech to a gathering of elected State officials from all over the country, Lyndon B. Johnson again told the American nation what it already knew: that we are fighting in Vietnam so that our grandchildren may not have to fight; that the American commitment is vigorously approved by almost every free leader of Asia.

The President cited our commitments under the SEATO Treaty. Is there anyone recommending now that we nullify this treaty because it is being severely tested?

He cited our willingness to meet the postwar challenges of Greece, Turkey, Berlin, Korea, and Cuba. Is there anyone recommending that we now abdicate our responsibility to continue meeting such challenges?

He cited the Communists' belief that the United States would tire, become divided, withdraw. Is that the course for "the land of the free and the home of the brave?"

The President said—and I believe the Nation stands with him—that the United States will persevere until there is a sign that Hanoi seeks an honorable negotiated settlement which does not sacrifice South Vietnam to expediency.

The President said—and I believe the Nation stands with him—that the true peacekeepers are the men in Vietnam on the line and in the demilitarized zone who are preventing the takeover by one nation of another nation.

I commend this serious address of the President to the country and the people.

I ask unanimous consent that the President's speech before the National Legislative Conference be inserted in the RECORD at this point in my remarks.

There being no objection, the speech was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

REMARKS OF THE PRESIDENT BEFORE THE NATIONAL LEGISLATIVE CONFERENCE, VILLITA ASSEMBLY HALL, SAN ANTONIO, TEX.

Speaker Barnes, Governor Hughes, Governor Smith, Congressman Kazen, Representative Graham, most distinguished legislators, ladies and gentlemen:

I deeply appreciate this opportunity to appear before an organization whose members contribute every day such important work to the public affairs of our State and of our country.

This evening I came here to speak to you about Vietnam.

I do not have to tell you that our people are profoundly concerned about that struggle.

There are passionate convictions about the wisest course for our nation to follow. There are many sincere and patriotic Americans who harbor doubts about sustaining the commitment that three Presidents and a half a million of our young men have made.

Doubt and debate are enlarged because the problems of Vietnam are quite complex. They are a mixture of political turmoil—of poverty—of religious and factional strife—of ancient servitude and modern longing for freedom. Vietnam is all of these things.

Vietnam is also the scene of a powerful aggression that is spurred by an appetite for conquest.

It is the arena where Communist expansionism is most aggressively at work in the world today—where it is crossing international frontiers in violation of international agreements; where it is killing and kidnapping; where it is ruthlessly attempting to bend free people to its will.

Into this mixture of subversion and war of terror and hope, America has entered—with its material power and with its moral commitment.

Why?

Why should three Presidents and the elected representatives of our people have chosen to defend this Asian nation more than ten thousand miles from American shores?

We cherish freedom—yes. We cherish self-determination for all people—yes. We abhor the political murder of any state by another, and the bodily murder of any people by gangsters of whatever ideology. And for 27 years—since the days of Lend-Lease—we have sought to strengthen free people against domination by aggressive foreign powers.

But the key to all we have done is really our own security. At times of crisis—before asking Americans to fight and die to resist aggression in a foreign land—every American President has finally had to answer this question:

Is the aggression a threat—not only to the immediate victim—but to the United States of America and to the peace and security of the entire world of which we in America are a very vital part?

That is the question which Dwight Eisenhower and John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson had to answer in facing the issue in Vietnam.

That is the question that the Senate of the United States answered by a vote of 82 to 1 when it ratified and approved the SEATO treaty in 1955, and to which the members of the United States Congress responded in a resolution that it passed in 1964 by a vote of 504 to 2. "The United States is, therefore, prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed forces, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia collective defense treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom."

Those who tell us now that we should abandon our commitment—that securing South Vietnam from armed domination is not worth the price we are paying—must also answer this question. And the test they must meet is this: What would be the consequence of letting armed aggression against South Vietnam succeed? What would follow in the time ahead? What kind of world are they prepared to live in five months or five years from tonight?

For those who have borne the responsibility for decision during these past 10 years, the stakes to us have seemed clear—and have seemed high.

President Dwight Eisenhower said in 1959:

"Strategically, South Vietnam's capture by the Communists would bring their power several hundred miles into a hitherto free region. The remaining countries in Southeast Asia would be menaced by a great flanking movement. The freedom of 12 million people would be lost immediately, and that of 150 million in adjacent lands would be seriously endangered. The loss of South Vietnam would set in motion a crumbling process that could, as it progressed, have grave consequences for us and for freedom. . . ."

And President John F. Kennedy said in 1962:

" . . . Withdrawal in the case of Vietnam and the case of Thailand might mean a collapse of the entire area."

A year later, he reaffirmed that:

"We are not going to withdraw from that effort. In my opinion, for us to withdraw from that effort would mean a collapse not only of South Vietnam, but Southeast Asia. So we are going to stay there."

This is not simply an American viewpoint. I would have you legislative leaders know. I am going to call the roll now of those who live in that part of the world—in the great arc of Asian and Pacific nations—and who bear the responsibility for leading their people, and the responsibility for the fate of their people.

The President of the Philippines has this to say:

"Vietnam is the focus of attention now . . . It may happen to Thailand or the Philippines, or anywhere, wherever there is misery, disease, ignorance . . . For you to renounce your position of leadership in Asia is to allow the Red Chinese to gobble up all of Asia."

The Foreign Minister of Thailand said:

"(The American) decision will go down in history as the move that prevented the world from having to face another major conflagration."

The Prime Minister of Australia said:

"We are there because while Communist aggression persists the whole of Southeast Asia is threatened."

President Park of Korea said:

"For the first time in our history, we decided to dispatch our combat troops overseas . . . because in our belief any aggression against the Republic of Vietnam represented a direct and grave menace against the security and peace of free Asia, and therefore directly jeopardized the very security and freedom of our own people."

The Prime Minister of Malaysia warned his people that if the United States pulled out of South Vietnam, it would go to the Communists, and after that, it would only be a matter of time until they moved against neighboring states.

The Prime Minister of New Zealand said:

"We can thank God that America at least regards aggression in Asia with the same concern as it regards aggression in Europe—and is prepared to back up its concern with action."

The Prime Minister of Singapore said:

"I feel the fate of Asia—South and Southeast Asia—will be decided in the next few years by what happens out in Vietnam."

I cannot tell you tonight as your President—with certainty—that a Communist conquest of South Vietnam would be followed by a Communist conquest of Southeast Asia. But I do know there are North Vietnamese troops in Laos. I do know that there are North Vietnamese trained guerrillas tonight in Northeast Thailand. I do know that there are Communist-supported guerrilla forces operating in Burma. And a Communist coup was barely averted in Indonesia, the fifth largest nation in the world.

So your American President cannot tell you—with certainty—that a Southeast Asia, dominated by Communist power would bring a third world war much closer to terrible reality. One could hope that this would not be so.

But all that we have learned in this tragic century strongly suggests to me that it would be so. As President of the United States, I am not prepared to gamble on the chance that it is not so. I am not prepared to risk the security—indeed, the survival—of this American Nation on mere hope and wishful thinking. I am convinced that by seeing this struggle through now, we are greatly reducing the chances of a much larger war—perhaps a nuclear war. I would rather stand in Vietnam, in our time, and by meeting this danger now, and facing up to it, thereby reduce the danger for our children and for our grandchildren.

I want to turn now to the struggle in Vietnam itself.

There are questions about this difficult war that must trouble every really thoughtful person. I am going to put some of these questions. I am going to give you the very best answers that I can give you.

First, are the Vietnamese—with our help, and that of their other allies—really making any progress? Is there a forward movement? The reports I see make it clear that there is. Certainly there is a positive movement toward constitutional government. Thus far the Vietnamese have met the political schedule that they laid down in January 1966.

The people wanted an elected, responsive government. They wanted it strongly enough to brave a vicious campaign of Communist terror and assassination to vote for it. It has been said that they killed more civilians in four weeks trying to keep them from voting before the election than our American bombers have killed in the big cities of North Vietnam in bombing military targets.

On November 1, subject to the action, of course, of the constituent assembly, an elected government will be inaugurated and an elected Senate and Legislature will be installed. Their responsibility is clear: To answer the desires of the South Vietnamese people for self-determination and for peace, for an attack on corruption, for economic development and for social justice.

There is progress in the war itself, steady progress considering the war that we are fighting; rather dramatic progress considering the situation that actually prevailed when we sent our troops there in 1965; when we intervened to prevent the dismemberment of the country by the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese.

The campaigns of the last year drove the enemy from many of their major interior bases. The military victory almost within Hanoi's grasp in 1965 has now been denied them. The grip of the Viet Cong on the people is being broken.

Since our commitment of major forces in July 1965 the proportion of the population living under Communist control has been reduced to well under 20 percent. Tonight the secure proportion of the population has grown from about 45 percent to 65 percent—and in the contested areas, the tide continues to run with us.

But the struggle remains hard. The South Vietnamese have suffered severely, as have we—particularly in the First Corps area in the North, where the enemy has mounted his heaviest attacks, and where his lines of communication to North Vietnam are shortest. Our casualties in the war have reached about 13,500 killed in action, and about 85,000 wounded. Of those 85,000 wounded, we thank God that 79,000 of the 85,000 have been returned, or will return to duty shortly. Thanks to our great American medical science and the helicopter.

I know there are other questions on your minds, and on the minds of many sincere, troubled Americans: "Why not negotiate now?" so many ask me. The answer is that we and our South Vietnamese allies are wholly prepared to negotiate tonight.

I am ready to talk with Ho Chi Minh, and other chiefs of state concerned, tomorrow.

I am ready to have Secretary Rusk meet with their Foreign Minister tomorrow.

I am ready to send a trusted representative of America to any spot on this earth to talk in public or private with a spokesman of Hanoi.

We have twice sought to have the issue of Vietnam dealt with by the United Nations—and twice Hanoi has refused.

Our desire to negotiate peace—through the United Nations or out—has been made very, very clear to Hanoi—directly and many times through third parties.

As we have told Hanoi time and time and time again, the heart of the matter really is this: The United States is willing to stop all aerial and naval bombardment of North Vietnam when this will lead promptly to productive discussions. We, of course, assume that while discussions proceed, North Vietnam would not take advantage of the bombing cessation or limitation.

But Hanoi has not accepted any of these proposals.

So it is by Hanoi's choice—and not ours, and not the rest of the world's—that the war continues.

Why, in the face of military and political progress in the South, and the burden of our bombing in the North, do they insist and persist with the war?

From many sources the answer is the same. They still hope that the people of the United States will not see this struggle through to the very end. As one Western diplomat reported to me only this week—he had just been in Hanoi—"They believe their staying power is greater than ours and that they can't lose." A visitor from a Communist capital had this to say: "They expect the war to be long, and that the Americans in the end will be defeated by a breakdown in morale, fatigue, and psychological factors." The Premier of North Vietnam said as far back as 1962: "Americans do not like long, inconclusive war . . . Thus we are sure to win in the end."

Are the North Vietnamese right about us?

I think not. No. I think they are wrong. I think it is the common failing of totalitarian regimes, that they cannot really understand the nature of our democracy:

They mistake dissent for disloyalty; They mistake restlessness for a rejection of policy;

They mistake a few committees for a country;

They misjudge individual speeches for public policy.

They are no better suited to judge the strength and perseverance of America than the Nazi and the Stalinist propagandists were able to judge it. It is a tragedy that they must discover these qualities in the American people, and discover them through a bloody war.

And, soon or late, they will discover them.

In the meantime, it shall be our policy to continue to seek negotiations—confident that reason will some day prevail; that Hanoi will realize that it just can never win; that it will turn away from fighting and start building for its own people.

Since World War II, this nation has met and has mastered many challenges—challenges in Greece and Turkey, in Berlin, in Korea, in Cuba.

We met them because brave men were willing to risk their lives for their nation's security. And braver men have never lived than those who carry our colors in Vietnam at this very hour.

The price of these efforts, of course, has been heavy. But the price of not having made them at all, not having seen them through, in my judgment would have been vastly greater.

Our goal has been the same—in Europe, in Asia, in our own hemisphere. It has been—and it is now—peace.

And peace cannot be secured by wishes; peace cannot be preserved by noble words and pure intentions. Enduring peace—Franklin

D. Roosevelt said—cannot be bought at the cost of other people's freedom.

The late President Kennedy put it precisely in November 1961, when he said: "We are neither war mongers nor appeasers, neither hard nor soft. We are Americans determined to defend the frontiers of freedom by an honorable peace if peace is possible but by arms if arms are used against us."

The true peace-keepers in the world tonight are not those who urge us to retire from the field in Vietnam—who tell us to try to find the quickest, cheapest exit from that tormented land, no matter what the consequences to us may be.

The true peace-keepers are those men who stand out there on the DMZ at this very hour, taking the worst that the enemy can give. The true peace-keepers are the soldiers who are breaking the terrorist's grip around the villages of Vietnam—the civilians who are bringing medical care and food and education to people who have already suffered a generation of war.

And so I report to you that we are going to continue to press forward. Two things we must do. Two things we shall do.

First, we must not mislead our enemy. Let him not think that debate and dissent will produce wavering and withdrawal. For I can assure you they won't. Let him not think that protests will produce surrender. Because they won't. Let him not think that he will wait us out. For he won't.

Second, we will provide all that our brave men require to do the job that must be done. And that job is going to be done.

These gallant men have our prayers—have our thanks—have our heart-felt praise—and our deepest gratitude.

Let the world know that the keepers of peace will endure through every trial—that with the full backing of their countrymen, they are going to prevail.

ORDER FOR RECESS UNTIL 10 A.M. TOMORROW

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate completes its business today, it stand in recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

In other words, Mr. President, there will be no morning hour tomorrow; and I hope that tonight we can get started on the Curtis amendment, which is the pending business. After the prayer, and the disposition of the reading of the Journal, we will be back on limited time, and will take up the amendment of the Senator from Nebraska.

I apologize to Senators to whom I sent telegrams telling them there might be a vote at 3 o'clock today; but I am sure they will understand the circumstances.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request of the Senator from Montana? The Chair hears none and it is so ordered.

Several Senators addressed the Chair.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will the majority leader yield for a question with respect to his unanimous-consent request?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I made a statement on the floor earlier today that toward the end of the morning hour tomorrow, I would make a 5-minute statement on Vietnam, upon returning from my trip.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Well, I am sure the Senator can get 5 minutes, if that is what he wants. But we are operating on a debate limitation agreement on the pending amendment.

Several Senators addressed the Chair. Mr. MANSFIELD. I already have the agreement. I will be glad to yield, if the Senator wants me to.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I ask the majority leader to yield, because I would not wish to be in a position where there could not be any discussion of an idea that I have with respect to the possibility of obtaining peace in Vietnam.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Would the Senator like us to come in at 9:30? In that way, he could be assured of a half hour.

Mr. SYMINGTON. No; I withhold my objection, but I am not particularly happy about it.

Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator could get his 5 minutes. But if he wants a discussion, I would suggest coming in at 9:30.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I do not ask my fellow Senators to come in at 9:30; and I shall be very happy to abide by the majority leader's wishes.

Several Senators addressed the Chair.

Mr. CURTIS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for an inquiry?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nebraska.

Mr. CURTIS. Is it, then, expected that my amendment will be the pending business on tomorrow?

Mr. MANSFIELD. Yes; although it is hoped that as much debate as possible can be obtained on the amendment this evening.

MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE—ENROLLED JOINT RESOLUTION SIGNED

A message from the House of Representatives, by Mr. Hackney, one of its reading clerks, announced that the Speaker had affixed his signature to the enrolled joint resolution (S.J. Res. 109) to authorize and request the President to issue a proclamation commemorating 50 years of service to the Nation by the Langley Research Center.

VIETNAM

Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, I take the floor now to continue a colloquy with my friend, the Senator from Illinois [Mr. PERCY], who, a little while ago, expressed some views in connection with and as the aftermath to a speech by the Senator from Kentucky [Mr. COOPER]. Because I did not want to distract from the remarks that were being addressed to Senator COOPER at that time, we asked for consent to have our own colloquy at this time.

I wanted to raise with the distinguished Senator from Illinois some points of view in regard to his remarks. Since listening to him on the floor, I have been kindly supplied a copy of the Senator's remarks. I wanted to address myself to the seven points contained in the Senator's release. The burden of the seven points in the release, as I understand them, is that the President of the United States has had seven failures in Vietnam, and these failures are at the root of his problem with the American people.

We can take them up however the Senator would prefer, one at a time, or would he prefer that I address myself

to the seven quickly and then take them up en masse?

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, I should think it might be well for the distinguished Senator from Wyoming to make all of the points on the seven points that he cares to, and I shall be happy to respond. However, I am happy to do it in any way that the Senator wishes.

Mr. McGEE. Very good.

The first point that the Senator from Illinois makes is that the failure of the Government of the United States to institute truly democratic reforms in South Vietnam has contributed to the failure to win the support of the American people.

I think we have to ask ourselves, Mr. President, what our primary objectives and our priorities there are. I have made it clear on many occasions—and we heard more of it this afternoon here on the Senate floor—that it probably is not one of our greatest foreign policy efforts to try to make little democrats out of everyone, and that there are parts of the world that may never be able to prosper under what we call democracy; that, indeed, they would suffer political indigestion from it, if nothing else.

As the late Winston Churchill once said, it is the most difficult of all forms of government, not the simplest, and different patterns of government fit different part of the world, different cultures, different nationalities, in different ways than they happen to fit us.

Therefore, I would submit that, most importantly of all, our priority in our presence over there has to do with trying to win the chance for all of South-east Asia to effect whatever changes fit them best, without violence, without war, without being forced from the outside to accept somebody else's domination.

But now to the particular question itself. As a matter of fact, if we even want to argue the question of democracy in South Vietnam, I think we ought to remind ourselves from whence we ourselves have come. We have heard a great deal of loose talk about free elections in Vietnam. We ought to remind ourselves, with due modesty, that we have been asking the questions attendant to free elections in our own country for 200 years, and there are still a couple of places that would readily come to mind where they are far less than perfect. Yet we expect the Vietnamese to have free elections in 2 months. When are we going to begin keeping our perspective of political change in focus?

I think we ought likewise to bear in mind that it was only a year ago—I do not think the Senator from Illinois would have been involved at that time, because he was busy with other endeavors about a year ago—that critics on this floor were saying to us, "We dare you to call a constituent assembly; we do not believe you can call one over there. We dare you to try to write a constitution, because we do not think they know how to write a constitution in Vietnam."

Then, after they achieved those small steps forward, there were those who began to say, "Well, let us see them hold a national election."

I do not know how fair the national elections just held were. It would be hard to find very many elections that some

people did not think unfair. The candidate who loses always thinks they were unfair. That is part of the static we are hearing from Vietnam right now.

But I think the comment of one of the losing candidates for President over there was very significant. When he was asked, by the American press:

Were these elections fair?

He said:

Of course they were not fair, but they were the fairest ones we have ever had in our history.

What that says is that they are trying to move ahead, even though some try to torpedo their efforts on the floor of the Senate day after day by pronouncing them false. It is a hoax, a fraud, and a very bad job.

I say we ought to give them half a chance, because they are moving. Whether it is going to work, time alone can tell. It is hardly democratic, for us to try to measure our role in Southeast Asia in terms of how democratic the South Vietnamese are going to become. For in that part of the world they have been denied for many centuries any meaningful experience in self-government.

My real guess is that they will probably not be very democratic in our lifetime—let us say in my lifetime, not in the lifetime of the junior Senator from Illinois. He has a much longer life ahead of him. Maybe we will never see it there, I do not know. But I do not think we dare let that become a criterion.

Other Senators on this floor, Mr. President, have suggested that, if we do not satisfy ourselves that the Vietnamese are really determined to be democratic, we better pull out.

Nothing could miss the point farther than an assertion of that type. It ought to have nothing to do with the matter. I do not care who is in Saigon; the issue happens to affect the Philippines, it happens to affect Burma, Thailand, Cambodia, Malaysia, and Indonesia. It is not the politics of Saigon, nor the military background of Saigon, nor the democracy or lack of it, in Saigon, that colors their concern with what happens there.

That is why I say, Mr. President, let us put first things first; and the first thing there is that we help them achieve the chance to develop the kind of infrastructure in their own government that they think they can live with. That ought to be their business. It cannot be our business, when the chips are down. We try to help them achieve the chance.

Now, the second mistake of the President of the United States, according to my friend from Illinois—

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield at that point?

Mr. McGEE. Yes, I am glad to yield. I thought the Senator asked me to go ahead with the whole series.

Mr. PERCY. Before we miss the thread, I wanted to be sure that I understood the points the Senator from Wyoming was making on my first point.

Is the Senator maintaining that we have not had, as a national goal for the South Vietnamese Government, truly democratic reforms, and that that has not been our policy under the past three administrations?

Mr. McGEE. I think what the Senator from Illinois and I would quarrel over would be the semantics of "democratic institutions" and "democratic framework of government."

Our goal, under three Presidents, according to my understanding, has been to try to achieve a stable and responsive representative government.

Representative government is a relative term. There is democracy, and then there is democracy. Our own Government started at a time when one male in eight had a chance to vote, and no women could vote; and yet we were calling it a democratic republic.

So it is a case of relative terms.

I only say we cannot apply this as our priority yardstick, that this is an incidental that flows in the wake of the other events in Southeast Asia.

Mr. PERCY. Well, I would accept the last statement made by the distinguished Senator from Wyoming, as to a reasonable goal. I would think it might be stated another way, that we simply want to have a government out there that would serve the people rather than, in a sense, exploit the people, as have the province chiefs and the governors of the provinces over a period of a number of years.

But does the Senator feel, then, having had that objective over a period of three administrations, that we have succeeded in achieving sufficient democratic reform, over the period of the last 7 or 8 years when we have been deeply involved, so as to win the support of the South Vietnamese people, as would be indicated in the last election, when the winning candidate received only 34.8 percent of the vote?

Mr. McGEE. I say to my friend from Illinois that if we are going to play with the percentages of an election vote, then we should start with France, and suggest that we can think of a whole succession of French prime ministers who should never have been recognized by this country, because they got in with a fraction of the vote.

We have had fractional votes for American Presidents. What they have, however, is a government, with whatever percentage, that went through the test at the polls, that came up with the most votes, under the infrastructure of their constitutional system, that entitles them to the right to make up the Government. It is not like ours, but it is like theirs, as it should be, and there has been very considerable headway.

May I say that in the 4 or 5 years that this kind of concern has been expressed, there has been more progress in South Vietnam, given the point from which they began, from a totally unrepresentative colonial structure, than the United States made in the 5 years from 1787 to 1792, in our own history. Also our changes did not come about for almost 50 years, until the Jacksonian Revolution; and until then, we kept imposed on this country a rigid failure to change.

So my answer to the Senator is, "Yes, they have made some startling headway in the processes of a more representative approach to government."

Mr. PERCY. If I could just conclude on this point of the statement that the Senator makes that we ought to put back

in perspective the percentage points, I was trying to analyze why the American people, by every indication we have today, do not support the policies of this administration.

I think one reason is the judgment of the people that there has not been sufficient social reform, to date, over the period of many years that we have been in Vietnam, to win the support, not only of the South Vietnamese people, but to give to the American people the confidence that sufficient progress is being made to have warranted the kind of expenditure that has been made to date, in treasure as well as in American casualties.

Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, I appreciate the point the Senator made in response.

I think we ought to put the finger of responsibility, however, where it belongs—on the development of this as an issue. The war was being waged there from the outset. The decision was made in January of 1965 that some effort had to be made to stop the flow of large trained units of North Vietnamese—professional military, if you will.

The static then began to appear. It was said, "But, look at the kind of characters we have in Saigon. Look at General Ky. Why don't we have responsible elections?"

This was because we had to take the course of action of those who had to make the decision as to whether to stand in Vietnam. There was a steady staccato of assault from the Senate floor. And this builds up into a crescendo of opposition, and for the wrong reasons, about the need for our presence there.

The opinion was built up as a secondary issue to the tertiary issue to the point where there had to be an attempt to meet the criticism of some of the critics on the floor. Efforts had to be made.

It was said that someone like General Ky could hold out even though he is a professional military man. The hope was expressed that there might be a constitutional government.

This was in response to the critics who were talking about the issues on the floor.

As a consequence, this has been continuing over the last 2½ years.

They first said, "All we ask is that you write a constitution. We don't think you can do it, but we challenge you."

A constitutional convention was called and a constitution was written. But that did not calm the critics. They slipped off of that one and they moved to the next one.

They said, "We dare you to call an election in a wartime in a country in which they have never had experience with an election. We challenge you to call a national election."

That was a new line being pursued by the critics. This was a fresh assault on a new front.

Those elections were held, and they were held under very difficult, tortuous, and unlikely circumstances.

The fact that this happened there, it seemed to me, was significant.

This newest tirade from the critics was called, and called successfully, and now the have receded again to the next position.

They now say, "Look, there are some complainants as a result of the election. They are meeting with the voice of protest there. Why were the elections not more democratic? Why were they not better than they were?"

This is a new assault.

My point is that the critics will never be satisfied in their criticism until we pull out of Vietnam. That is why we ought to lock horns with the basic growing issue as to whether we have to be in Southeast Asia, and not what the South Vietnamese Government is doing in the course of an election. That is where the debate on this issue ought to center, because this is what the policy position is all about.

That is the reason that I think we are playing a slippery game in trying to keep up with the critics. They slip off one assault after another. The latest one came on the floor today after we have had a succession of bombing pauses. We have had these bombing pauses, even though they have produced nothing. We have given the other side a chance to say, "Well, we ought to try another one."

Maybe we should. I do not think we dare leave a single chance unexploited here. However, I think we ought to keep our shirts on about what we have a right to expect or demand concerning what constructive criticism is in terms of our basic policy position.

I think those who want to be honest with the people and with themselves ought to be digging into the question of why we are there. If they then say we ought to get out, let us debate it on those grounds.

I do not think this happens to be the number one priority consideration.

Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McGEE. We have six more issues to move to.

Mr. MILLER. But this is very important colloquy concerning the statement on the critics.

I think we must be careful not to put all critics in the same basket.

Mr. McGEE. As well as all supporters of the war in the same basket; because some of them are supporting it for the wrong reason.

Mr. MILLER. The Senator is correct. There are critics who want to criticize for no particular reason. And if a responsive argument is given to one of their criticisms, as the Senator has said, they will slip away and try something else.

Mr. McGEE. And those are the ones I had in mind while making my comments.

Mr. MILLER. I wanted to bring this out because there are other critics of the conduct of the war. They are not critics of the policy or the reason that we are there. However, they are critics of the conduct of the war.

Mr. McGEE. The Senator is correct.

Mr. MILLER. It seems to me that if this war has to become a prolonged war, there will be a snowballing of criticism of all kinds.

I said earlier this year that I did not believe the American people would tolerate a 5-year war or a war for a longer war, if they thought the war could be a shorter war than that.

I expressed myself then and have said many times since that I hope the President would get on the national television and tell the American people why we are not taking certain action to shorten the war. I said that until the President did that, the criticism would not stop. If anything, it will grow larger. I had hoped that this would be forthcoming on the television last Friday night. It was not.

I am not saying that the President can give persuasive arguments as to why the war must be a prolonged war. However, I think he ought to try. If his arguments are persuasive, perhaps the American people will tolerate a prolonged war.

I personally do not think they will. I personally do not think the President will be able to give them persuasive arguments. However, he should try. If the President does not do so and the war continues on, the criticism will become louder and, I am sorry to say, it will tend more and more to split the country.

Mr. McGEE. I say to my friend, the Senator from Iowa, that the point I was making here—and I apologize for not being sufficiently clear and articulate in expressing it—was to account for why in the public mind the kind of election in Vietnam had become all of a sudden such a big issue.

In my analysis it has become such a big issue because of what the Senator has alluded to. I agree that the little fuzzier class of critics who want to be heard but who make a slippery attack and then slip off of that argument and go to the next one have contributed to the public overexpectation of what we have any reason to expect in a political way from a country at the present stage of South Vietnam.

That was the basis for that allegation. I do not include in my suggestion anything more than the suggestions about the democratizing of South Vietnam. That has been a constant drum beat on this floor for a long time.

I think the question of the Senator from Iowa is directed at the kind of basic question we ought to be grappling with on the floor of the Senate. With respect to that, I disagree for reasons that I may have occasion to spell out later.

That is a good question. It is a proper question, and it is the kind of question we ought to be discussing.

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McGEE. I yield.

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, I am grateful to the Senator from Iowa for bringing the colloquy back to the principal point of my very brief—what I thought were to be my very brief—remarks of 2 minutes this afternoon.

I was trying to say that the President has made the mistake, I believe, in his address of last Friday night of equating all the critics of this administration's policy on Vietnam, that he made a year ago in calling them nervous Nellies. This time the President has equated them with all those who would call for unilateral withdrawal. And that is what he announced.

He was only then responding to the demands of a very small percentage of people in this country. I do not know of

anyone in this body who has called for unilateral withdrawal. Perhaps there are one or two. But certainly the majority of the overwhelming majority of the Senate would oppose that policy.

I recall that in the midst of a political campaign a year ago, the National Student Association was meeting in Charleston with a thousand delegates, and received word, while out on the road, that they were going to adopt a resolution that night, in a liberal caucus, calling for unilateral withdrawal. I sent a wire stating that I wanted to meet with them. I broke up my campaign and flew down arriving at 10:30, and denounced 600 of them, who were on the verge of doing that, as doing something irresponsible. We quickly arranged criticism at that meeting, and I did not adopt such a policy. I believe that particular group is present very frequently.

The President should address himself to the critics of the war who feel that there can be an escalated victory and show why, then, his policy does not lean in that direction; and he should address himself to those others who feel that we should in every conceivable way work toward what I felt was the consensus of the Senate—88 to 2—when this body said we should work toward an honorable, negotiated settlement.

I believe that we cannot have the welfare of the Asian people and the South Vietnamese fighting for their own territorial integrity, their own political freedom unless they have the social reform which President Eisenhower called for in his letter of 1954, in which he laid down certain conditions for economic assistance. Thirteen years later, land reform was presented to the Assembly, and it was overwhelmingly voted down. The type of reform that is necessary to gain the support of the people to rise up and fight for their own economic, social, and political well being simply has not been carried on by this government.

I do not believe it would be appropriate for me to comment on the fairness of the elections in South Vietnam, and I have not done so. I do not believe that a politician from Cook County should set himself up as an expert on free elections. Today, the constituent assembly did validate the Vietnamese election results, but only by a vote of 58 to 43, and the speaker resigned in protest. So, apparently, there is much dissension in the country about the election. But in my remarks I did not even address myself to the election. I addressed myself to the fact that people in this country and in South Vietnam are unhappy about the conduct of the war in Vietnam. And mean the other wars as well, because sufficient social and economic progress is not being made; and I truly believe that the distinguished Senator from Wyoming would agree that inadequate progress is being made, and this is why we have a certain amount of dissatisfaction.

Mr. McGEE. May I say facetiously that all progress is inadequate except the progress that I decree or that you decree and try to move along. We are relative in our judgments on those things. But as an outsider looking in,

believe most of us in America rather marvel at the type of progress that is being made in Vietnam in many ways, and that, therefore, it ill behooves us to raise this matter to the top as a number one yardstick that we apply in measuring whether this is the place where we should stand or whether we should continue our position there.

I do not know whether I detected in the Senator's comment just now that he was wishing to leave the impression that we were even questioning the sincerity of their judgment of their last elections because the vote was 58 to 43.

The Senator knows as well as I that we are lucky sometimes to get a vote of 58 to 57, and we feel pretty great about it. That is one of the processes of responsible government. You have to make a decision. You have to count the votes, and you will not get unanimous votes. Therefore, we should be applauding the fact that the assembly took the action that it did in saying:

We are speaking for those who sent us here, and in our judgment the elections were good enough to stand.

Let us give them credit for a vote. I am sure that if the issue had lost by one vote, we would have been hearing much oratory on the floor of the Senate about what a tremendous revolution or overturning of something or other this reflected in South Vietnam. That game can be played two ways. Let us give them the marks for having tried. They are moving toward greater stability.

Let me turn to the Senator's second point.

Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a comment at this point?

Mr. McGEE. I yield.

Mr. MILLER. Is it not interesting that many of the critics of the election in South Vietnam are so myopic that they have nothing to say about the lack of any elections whatever in North Vietnam?

Mr. McGEE. The Senator is correct. I do not believe that the people of South Vietnam are especially myopic in that respect, quite so much as some people who can be heard clearly in this country. They never remind us that North Vietnam abolished elections, that Ho Chi Minh abolished political parties. Nobody is talking about that. That is not wrong for North Vietnam. It is only wrong when it happens in the South. We have a double standard, largely because all the TV cameras and visitors got to South Vietnam. They cannot get to North Vietnam. It is an unfair judgment. The Senator has made a good point.

The second presidential failure, as described by my friend, the Senator from Illinois, is the President's failure to persuade the South Vietnamese army to carry its rightful share of the combat so that our American men will not have to bear the heaviest burden of the fighting by themselves.

I believe we should face up to some facts. The first is that in reporting on a war, most of the reporting is of the activities of American troops. And why? Because an editor back home says, "We want to know what the boys are doing.

The people want to read about the boys in their neighborhood." The news is loaded, to begin with, with American action, as it was in World War II. We had to wait until the war was over to learn what the Russians did at Stalingrad to Hitler's army, because we were reading about the Yanks and their heroic efforts on other fronts. And this is understandable. But we overread and we overreport on the action of our effort, and we underreport on the action on the other fronts.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD at this point a column by Joseph Alsop—if it has not been put in the RECORD already—that appeared in this morning's newspaper, because it makes a very good point; namely, that some of the dirtiest, ugliest, and meanest fighting of this war has been turned over to the South Vietnamese.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THIRD NORTH VIETNAMESE DIVISION REDUCED TO WRETCHED RABBLE

(By Joseph Alsop)

AN LAO, BINH DINH PROVINCE, VIETNAM.—The helicopter put down here as an Eagle might land in its eyrie among the clouds. Infinitely far below, to the east, there lay the rich, flat Bong Son rice plain. And to the west, the mountain plunged steeply downwards into the An Lao valley, once a major V.C. paradise.

It was a V.C. paradise in the old days because it was difficult of access, richly productive, and had many people who could be made to do the will of the V.C. They did not wish for this. Most of the An Lao people spontaneously moved out a year ago, when the First Air Cavalry Division ran a brief operation into the valley that briefly broke the grip of the V.C. But at the time, no proper arrangements to receive the people in the refugee camps had yet been made, so the majority trickled back again.

"You won't recognize the place now," said Col. James McKenna, commander of the Air Cavalry's 3rd Brigade, which has its command post here at Landing Zone Sandra. In proof, he led the way to a lookout post, where the whole valley lay spread out below. The mountain slopes were half defoliated. The rice fields were abandoned. The little villages were gone. The place was empty of all but war, for a minor air strike was going on, and smoke plumed lazily upwards from bombs dropping on the opposite mountain wall.

Some time ago, in fact, the needed arrangements were made to receive the An Lao people, and they were all moved out, as were the people of the other V.C. paradise in this province, the Kim Son valley. At one stroke, in this manner, the enemy was deprived of food, porters, conscript candidates and places for rest and recreation—everything he most needed, in fact, except arms.

Now therefore, the units of the 3rd North Vietnamese Division must either rot and starve in the mountains, or come down into the coastal plain and meet the terrible Air Cavalry.

One of those units, the 81st Battalion of the 22nd North Vietnamese Division, had been trapped recently in the grim waste that is now the An Lao valley, however, "lets go and have a look," said Col. McKenna. The chopper took off swiftly, and this time the landing was like a kittiwake on its nesting ledge—for the narrowest imaginable ledge on the steepest possible slope was the landing zone of A Company, 1st Battalion, 7th Air Cavalry Regiment. A Company had been toilsomely combing the

valley slopes for over a week, but Capt. Thomas C. Richardson was as debonair a host as the giver of a successful cocktail party when he welcomed us to his bleak C.P.

As we seated ourselves on the ledge, Sgt. Robert Leopold, a slender former Peace Corpsman, scaled the lip of the rocky cliff that fell away below us, and one by one, the men of his platoon followed him onto the landing zone. "If there are any V.C. in this damn draw, they must be using repelling ropes," the sergeant said amiably, and his giant Negro machine gunner, festooned with heavy skeins of ammunition, yet not even out of breath, nodded an enthusiastic assent.

"All the same," said Sgt. Leopold seriously, "there's plenty of water in this draw. (One could see and hear it, plunging down the mountainside in a series of silvery, loud-plashing waterfalls.) And where there's water, there can be V.C. So we've got to finish combing it out."

Again, there was assent from the rest of the platoon. And there, on that high ledge, among these hardy youngsters of every sort our country can produce, the story of the fate of the 8th Battalion of the 22nd North Vietnamese Regiment was unfolded bit by bit by gruesome bit.

The battalion had come back into Binh Dinh Province in fair shape, after resting, replacing and refitting beyond reach of the Air Cavalry in a refuge further to the north. Now, they were down again to about 300 men.

Worse still, the relentless pursuit by the Air Cavalry battalion assigned to track them had reduced the men of this once proud and formidable North Vietnamese outfit to a wretched rabble. Their whole battalion armament—two 75-millimeter recoilless, two 57-millimeter recoilless mortar tubes and much else besides—had been found in one hide-hole in the rocks. Their stock of mortar rounds had turned up in another hide-hole. They were mere fugitives, ranging the valley in groups of 2 to 10 men, without communications, without weapons in some cases (for abandoned rifles had also been found here and there), and almost without food. Three rice cakes a day was the ration reported by prisoners, and one little group had been run across tragically scrabbling in the garbage dump of an abandoned American C.P.

"We're wearing them down or picking them up by 3s and 4s and 5s and sometimes 8s and 10s each day, and if we just keep at it, this historic North Vietnamese battalion will be finished for good and all."

To those few who know the history of this strange war in Vietnam, the foregoing news from Col. McKenna in the An Lao valley will speak volumes.

Mr. McGEE. This is the platoon-level fighting. This is the five-man terrorist squad fighting. And that is where the casualties are, also.

But because the reporters sometimes like to travel where the transportation is such that they can get back to the communication line to call back home and get another column, we do not get a balanced share of the reporting on what else is going on in Vietnam.

I am sure that many of the Vietnamese military elements are goofing off. I suspect that it would not be the first case in the annals of military history in which some units have been less military than others in their propensities for carrying on the noble fight. This is the problem at any time with any army—and I say "any army."

Some people have spoken about the men with whom they have discussed this question when the men came home. We

have all spoken with the boys who have come home.

I had a boy in my office last week who said that he wished he knew how to counteract this impact, that he had just completed serving an assignment in the delta for 18 months with a South Vietnamese unit. He said:

I want you to know that I didn't cringe for one minute, knowing that my life depended on what the guy next to me was going to do or not do. I'd like to have a chance to tell the people that.

You can get anybody's reaction to this matter, depending on his experience. The man who lost a leg or an arm because somebody else did not live up to his obligation will always be understandably moved to this question. That is the casualty, the horror, and the unfairness at any time, in any place, in any war.

I spent a little time with several South Vietnamese units on two trips to Vietnam, the last one only a few months ago.

Many of those troops are some of the finest our military people say that they have seen. They are doing an excellent job; some are not so fine; but these men have been at war for 20 years.

We have people in our country wondering if we can stick it out for 4 years, 3 years, or another year. This has been a way of life, as one of these young lads said to me. He said, "I was born in war. I have never known anything else." Yet, he thought his group was right; he felt he had no option, no alternative.

The kind of assignment to which the ARVN is being shifted is in the rough, paddy fighting, and not unit fighting, to try to set up security around villages. This will happen more and more. It is not glamorous. It is the kind of place in which your chances remain uncertain 24 hours a day. There is no rest. Do not sell them short.

There are great ones and there are malingerers. The casualty list is one way in which we, at least, measure who suffers the most casualties. South Vietnamese casualties outrun ours several times over. Mr. President, you have to be in the middle of something if you are going to get shot up.

It is time that we dispense with this relatively secondary matter and say that the South Vietnamese are carrying their fair share. The task of moving in this kind of warfare is always preponderantly more difficult for those trying to maintain law and order than it is for those who have to destroy. In Malaysia the proportion was 10 to 1; at least, that is what the Malaysians, or the British told us.

Let us not overexpect, but in the final analysis the finest service we can get from the South Vietnamese is not enough. That is not the issue.

The issue is whether we hold successfully so that the Cambodians, Laotians, Filipinos, Malaysians, Burmese, and Indonesians, have a chance to restructure their part of the world in their own way.

That is the measure and that is a much bigger question than what the South Vietnamese Army is doing. It is time that we put the matter in proper proportions.

Perhaps the Senator would like to

comment on that point while we are on it.

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD an article recently published by the Wall St. Journal, from a distinguished correspondent, who commented in detail on the degree of effort being exerted by the South Vietnamese Army.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Wall Street Journal, July 17, 1967]

WANTED: SOUTH VIETNAM ARMY HEROES

(By Frederick Taylor)

SAIGON.—"We need more ARVN heroes," Barry Zorthian, the top U.S. public relations man here, told a group of military public information officers the other day. And so Mr. Zorthian, whose resounding title is Director of the Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office, Vietnam, and Minister-Counselor for Information of the American Embassy, Saigon, kicked off another drive to burnish the image of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, known as ARVN for short and pronounced to rhyme with Marvin.

This image-building campaign is aimed at the American press in South Vietnam, and through it, the American people. It stems from a fear among U.S. officials that, as the U.S. troop commitment continues to mount, Americans will get the impression that the South Vietnamese army is doing little to defend its own country.

There are those who would say this is precisely the case, but that's unfair. Only about 80% of the entire South Vietnamese army is ineffective.

UNUSUAL CONGLOMERATE

The South Vietnamese military force is an unusual conglomerate. It is composed of 320,000 regular army troops and about 300,000 Regional and Popular Force troops; regional forces are somewhat akin to U.S. National Guard outfits, mainly assigned to their home areas, while popular forces are mainly assigned to defensive tasks such as manning guard posts and supplying security for individual villages and hamlets. Technically the regular army is the ARVN, but the term is used loosely to include all South Vietnamese military forces.

In addition, there are about 100,000 paramilitary forces, including combat youth; civil irregular defense groups, which are the government's counterpart of the Viet Cong; and national police. But it is the 620,000 men in the regular army, regional and popular forces that are generally counted in enumerating South Vietnam's fighting forces.

In Washington last week at a White House news conference, the U.S. field commander, Gen. William Westmoreland, heaped praise on the ARVN, saying "They are fighting much better than they were a year ago." But reservations persist.

There are many reasons for the ARVN's ineffectiveness. One of them is that when the U.S. advisory effort began more than a dozen years ago the plan was to train the South Vietnamese to fight a Korean-style war, not the insurgency with which they became involved. There are others:

After 20 years of fighting, much of the ARVN leadership is war-weary and sees no hurry in pursuing the enemy; the war ends at noon Saturday and begins again Monday morning after the officers have relaxed in Saigon. This reporter, in the Delta with an artillery battalion of the ARVN's seventh division, one of the country's best, spent a rainy afternoon in the battalion commander's jeep; while his troops fired their artillery in desultory fashion (six rounds in five hours) between squalls at the Viet Cong five miles away, the commander was in town for a

leisurely lunch. He returned at 5 p.m. to take his men back to camp.

Officers are picked for their educational achievement, not their leadership qualities, and too often are promoted or keep their jobs because of political loyalty.

Brig. Gen. Phan Truong Chinh is the commander of the 25th division, recognized as the worst in Vietnam. (Gen. Cao Vien, the ARVN chief of staff and the only general officer ever wounded in combat, has called it not only the worst ARVN division but "possibly the worst division in any army.") The 25th division won't move at night; when U.S. advisers coerce Gen. Chinh into sending his troops out against a known VC unit, he's likely to direct his men carefully to a spot three or four miles away from where the VC were spotted. The common explanation of how he remains in command: He's a friend of his corps commander, and his corps commander is a close friend and supporter of Premier Nguyen Cao Ky.

The officer corps, never good to begin with, has been spread thin by the 50% expansion of the army over the past three years. Coups have resulted in exile or retirement of some skilled officers. The common practice of appointing officers as province and district chiefs and to government jobs in Saigon has further reduced the supply of leaders.

The ARVN aren't as well equipped as U.S. forces. An ARVN division has only two artillery battalions; a U.S. division has four. The U.S. Army expects to have air support from three to five fighter squadrons of 12 to 24 planes each during any given fight; the ARVN have only six fighter squadrons to support 15 army divisions. While U.S. artillery and U.S. planes support the ARVN when they get into a fight, the Americans support their own forces first, and in many cases there are long delays before aid reaches the South Vietnamese, because of communications difficulties.

CONNECTIONS AND KICKBACKS

Corruption is widespread among the officers, at least partially because of their deep involvement in politics; as the province chief is frequently a military man, it is easy for him and the local military commander to shake down local merchants, using the army to back them up. Promotions are frequently based on favoritism, family connections and the size of kickbacks to the commander.

Most Americans in Vietnam have no doubt about the courage and native ability of the Vietnamese soldier; they have only to look at the Viet Cong to know that, when motivated, the Vietnamese are tough soldiers. But the ARVN obviously are poorly motivated. One indication is the desertion rate. Despite great improvement from last year, in the first quarter of 1967 the rate still was 22 per 1,000 men per month; that means every 1,000 troops, only 736 would remain at the end of a year. (U.S. advisers take some comfort in the fact that ARVN don't usually go over to the enemy but return home; still, they aren't on hand to fight.)

It almost all goes back to leadership: "Almost everything we see is a failure of leadership," says a U.S. general in Saigon.

The chronicle of disasters resulting from this failure seems endless. In mid-May, Vietnamese army battalion command post was overrun and 29 ARVN and three American advisers were killed; only one VC body was found after the attack. Three hundred yards away three ARVN companies were in place; they didn't move to help.

In the Union II operation south of Da Nang, two ARVN battalions were assigned as a blocking force to cut off the North Vietnamese under attack by U.S. Marines. But they refused to block, and the North Vietnamese escaped. (A high U.S. general's comment: "Nobody blocks in this war.") U.S. advisers—the captains, majors and lieutenant colonels who work with the ARVN on the battalion and company level—tell of ARVN battalions melting away during battles, and

stopping their attacks after an hour or so of fighting ("When they've got all the battlefield souvenirs they can carry"), or refusing to leave camp at night, or deliberately playing transistor radios out on patrol to warn the enemy. (Some of the radios come from the U.S. Agency for International Development.)

Many U.S. advisers discount one argument frequently used to prove that the ARVN are doing their share: That ARVN battle casualties regularly outstrip U.S. casualties. Various studies indicate that the regional and popular forces, which make up less than half of the regular military, suffer about three-fourth of the fatalities, and because of the nature of these forces the fatalities are incurred while they are in defensive positions, such as a popular force outpost that is overrun by the VC. Its members are just as dead as if they'd been killed on an offensive mission, but they haven't killed many of the enemy.

In an attempt to make some use of the ARVN, and on the theory that only the Vietnamese can root out the VC infrastructure, about half of the 320,000-man regular army has lately been assigned to the pacification program, responsible for (1) guarding the revolutionary development teams being sent into South Vietnam's villages and hamlets to conduct civic welfare and political indoctrination programs, and (2) killing Viet Cong guerrillas, rather than engaging in big search-and-destroy operations against main force enemy units. It is still too early to tell whether this change will prove successful. There have been initial difficulties: The regular army troops so assigned come under the command of the province chief; some battalion commanders have shown their displeasure at having their authority curtailed and have refused to obey his orders.

EXPERIMENTAL BOOSTERS

To counter the ARVN's failings, a variety of experiments are being tried—pairing squads of ARVN with squads of U.S. soldiers; attaching ARVN companies to U.S. companies; team U.S. squads, ARVN squads and popular force platoons, all in hope that U.S. expertise will rub off. The ARVN failings also inevitably have led to proposals for a unified command in South Vietnam, which would permit the U.S. to remove incompetent ARVN commanders. But so far this hasn't taken place, primarily because of fear that any kind of unification would play into the hands of the North Vietnamese, who already charge that the South Vietnamese are only U.S. puppets.

In the meantime, senior U.S. generals here fall back on the tired comparison with the South Korean army in 1950 and the vast improvement it has shown in fighting in Vietnam today. "I spent 16 months in Korea and we had all the same things said then," recalls one. "There were great Korean leaders and there were others who didn't have the guts to lead their outfits. In time they disappeared from the scene."

But what the generals ignore is that it took 15 years for the Koreans to reach their present level of competence. Is there that much time in Vietnam?

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, I feel that when we mention accumulative and total overall casualties, we must bear in mind that we are dealing with current events, and that in 1 month in this past summer American casualties were double the casualties of the South Vietnamese army. It would seem to be a most unusual thing for an army that is coming to help another nation to have twice the casualties that the army has which is defending its own people on its own soil.

Perhaps this is attributable to the fact that there have been increasing reports that the South Vietnamese Army is

really on a 5½-day work week; perhaps we do not win a war and get it over as quickly as those who believe it should be brought to a final conclusion, on a 5½-day workweek.

There have also been considerable reports that the brunt of the fighting after dark must be taken up by American forces; that the South Vietnamese forces at dusk are not really as active as their counterpart forces, the American forces.

It would seem to me that the brunt of the attack of the Vietcong is at night-time; in the stealth of the night they have their ambushes, and make sneak attacks and otherwise. To have the local army, which knows the territory and the terrain there, and which is better adapted to living in it not carrying its full fighting force at night would certainly seem to me to be a situation that we have every right to insist that the military forces and the government correct over there.

Mr. McGEE. In response to that statement I would suggest that the assignment of the South Vietnamese, which is to preserve security at the village level, rather than to search-and-destroy missions, to throw the enemy off balance, is to use five-man and seven-man teams, and in some instances 19-man teams. These are specific numbers because I have just had an opportunity to go over the pattern of some of these tasks with some of our people who have just returned from there.

These missions are on a 24-hour basis. Every night these outfits can count on casualties. These casualties are not dramatic casualties. Perhaps there will be a casualty over in this village, and another casualty over in this village, and perhaps one over here gets shot at. If one wanted to trace the statistics, perhaps 20 percent are shot but it is not news enough for a news story and there are not many newspaper men who wish to crawl around on their bellies at night with the ARVN forces. I think it is all relatively irrelevant.

The real issue is that the line must be held, whatever the performance of the Vietnamese, the Laotians, or the Cambodians. The line has to be held if they are to win this chance. That is the proper priority and let us keep the priority in proper dimension.

Mr. PERCY. I wish to keep the matter in balance and in perspective. I am not a military expert and I do not pretend to be.

I attempt to present to the administration, if it does not know already, the reasons why a vast majority of the American public does not now support the policies of this administration in the conduct of the war. It is my general impression, after talking with thousands of people personally in all parts of the country that most of the people in this country—whether right or wrong I cannot personally judge, other than by sorting and sifting the evidence—believe that the South Vietnamese Army and the military forces are not carrying the main burden of the war, and that the main burden of the war has now been shifted to the American forces. That was my second point in my prepared remarks.

Mr. McGEE. I think that if the Senator is really concerned about keeping this matter in balance and perspective, to which he refers, that his help would be very gratefully received in bringing the public to a level of understanding. These American newspaper column reports are written by reports who are responding to demands back home. It is a hard way to win a war or to firm up a policy in the national interest.

For that reason I think we probably have more substantive evidence on this question outside the pages of a newspaper than we have from the signed columns which are sent back home. I would only suggest, therefore, that there inescapably is a great deal more to this on behalf of the South Vietnamese military than meets the columns in the newspapers.

Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McGEE. I yield.

Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, in that connection, on August 23, I pointed out that so far over 50,000 members of the Army of South Vietnam had been killed in action. I think American forces have suffered about 12,000 killed in action.

Mr. McGEE. At that time.

Mr. MILLER. At that time. That is very recent. I do not believe it is proper to say that the South Vietnamese Army has not borne the brunt of the casualties in the war.

When I was in Vietnam, I talked about the Army of South Vietnam with many of our military leaders. The story was pretty much what we might expect to find about almost any army. Some of the divisions, regiments, and battalions of the South Vietnamese are of top quality and others are not. There is the problem of good young leadership. Many of their finer and better educated young officer potentials were killed off. It takes time to develop that kind of leadership and develop a first-rate unit.

I also talked with some Marine commanders recently, who have been intimately concerned with the South Vietnamese division which is fighting with the Marines along the DMZ, and they had nothing but praise for them.

Thus, we might go to another place in the country and find a second- or third-rate unit which perhaps some member of the press happens to be visiting, and we get an entirely different impression.

But, I must say, if I were a South Vietnamese Army officer, I would point to the fact that 50,000 members of the Army of South Vietnam have been killed. That is a pretty good indication of their desire to maintain their freedom.

Mr. McGEE. I thank the Senator for his additional information. It is very well received.

The third of the points made by the Senator from Illinois is the failure of the President to persuade our other Asian allies to participate substantially in the military, economic, psychological, and diplomatic risks confronting us in Vietnam.

Again, this reminds me of World War II. These are always relative things. The Russians disliked the Americans because we were opening a second front

in Europe, and they thought we were not going to help them. We were unhappy with the Russians because they would not enter the war against Japan in the Pacific. The other guy never does help us enough, particularly when we are actually on the firing line. I think we should not look in too cursory a way toward our Asian allies as they are described here. The Koreans are not "nobodys." They happen to be Asian allies. They have more men in Vietnam in proportion to their population than we have. That speaks rather well for an ally.

In the second instance, the Philippines have—what?—3,000 combat engineers, yet the Philippines lie off short a couple of hundred miles.

The Thais have openly committed manpower to the fighting line, and have been involved in the fighting. The position of the Thai Army has made a considerable difference about that crucial flank. In fact, in Vietnam, the Australians have been committing men. New Zealand has committed less men. Malaysia and Indonesia have been in the throes of their own little wars until very recent months, which they have finally settled.

Indonesia is going through the throes of starting up its government with a new structure of stability, and is hardly in a direct position to make a contribution here. We should be grateful that they have made a great turn in a more hopeful direction. We should be grateful that Malaysia is able to pull its own weight without compounding the difficulties which have confronted them since their independence.

I do not believe we have a right to expect any measurable manpower contribution from Singapore. It is a brand new country now. It is a very compact, small area in many ways, and yet they, too, have switched their position in terms of their attitude toward our efforts in Vietnam.

Thus, those countries more closely involved in that area are involved at the front. At the same time, every one of those countries I have just mentioned has committed economic teams, psychological warfare teams, and hospital teams to Vietnam. This includes Taiwan, the Philippines, Australia, and a host of other so-called neutral countries—33 in all—who are committed in some meaningful way to the present endeavor in Vietnam.

Accordingly, let us stop making quite so much light of what our allies in Asia are doing in this conflict. None of them can do over-all what we are capable of doing. One of the reasons we are there is that there is no power or combination of power capability in that part of Asia. We are bound to be disproportionately larger than all of the rest who are there. That is why we are there. That is why it makes a difference that we are there.

Even the presence of the British in Singapore, where they still have in excess of 40,000 men, has made a difference. This, too, is part of the weight of the scales of the balance of force in that part of Asia. It protects and carries a bit of atmosphere of relative stability in a very crucial flank in all of Southeast Asia.

So it is not correct to assert, as this suggestion does, that there is too little

activity. There is always too little from our point of view. We wish they would do more.

I conclude this point with the suggestion that these men themselves, if they could win the chance and achieve the chance at a stable government and an economy that can produce, long for the opportunity to take this over themselves, to restructure the balance of stability in Asia. They ask for the time to win that chance. I think that is crucial to our concept and understanding of our role regarding point 3.

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, I can only say this, in response, that if they truly want to take it over and long to take back this responsibility, there will be a great many persons in this country who would be very happy to give them that opportunity, including 500,000 American boys in Vietnam who would like to get home to their families.

I have merely made the statement here—and I have not heard any evidence, really, to refute it at all—that our Asian allies have not contributed enough to convince the American people that the administration has done enough to ask them to carry their fair share of the load.

In illustration, I offer the incredible comment made by Clark Clifford, when he returned from Southeast Asia as an emissary of the President—and Gen. Maxwell Taylor—when he was asked the question: "Did you ask the Asian nations for additional support?"

He said, "No."

They had not even asked for additional support.

I should like to come back to the Asian nations in just a moment, but I should like to give my distinguished colleague an opportunity to comment and perhaps interpret, because I think that also contributes to the dissatisfaction over the policies of this administration.

My last sentence under point 3, "further has been unable to persuade a single country in Western Europe to provide any meaningful help or support." Why is it, after all that we have done in Europe to rebuild Europe, enemy and ally alike, why is it that the overwhelming burden of evidence, as the administration indicates, is that the freedom of the free world depends upon our actions in South Vietnam, but we have not yet been able to convince a single European ally to give us any meaningful support?

Is this an untrue statement that I have made, and does the distinguished Senator feel that that fact does not contribute to certain dissatisfaction which exists a great deal about our conduct of the war?

Mr. McGEE. I would say partially, it is untrue. The Senator asks me why the Western European nations cannot help us even though they were our allies in the last war and look what we have done for them.

I think the best way to put that in its proper setting is to remind the Senator that that is exactly the question the British were asking of us about 1935 and 1936 when Britain had the responsibility for maintaining relative stability in power politics around the world. They

wanted to know where the Americans were. We had to squirm a little bit and admit that we were isolationists. There was a long process of building up American understanding of British policy in World War II. It was a ticklish and decisive process, but we finally came through.

I think we have a right to ask the British this question today. The British Prime Minister made no bones about where he stood. He is catching a little flak back home as a result, but that is a part of the life of politicians. He has taken his position.

The only politician in Western Europe in opposition—except the Scandinavian countries—happens to be that "Batman"—you know who—in Paris. The man who can analyze the motivations there can probably answer a lot of other questions. It has to do with the rather embarrassing action of the French there. It has to do with the shabby way in which the allies in France sometimes treated De Gaulle. This leaves scars, and it is still leaving scars.

The role of the allies must be relegated to their proper role, which is a secondary role. Do not sell the British short. The world is round. The British are still maintaining a semblance of stability in other parts of the world where she still has a commitment.

I recall the words of a top official of Australia, who said:

For the life of me, I cannot understand our friends, some of our own family in Western Europe, and why they cannot see that what is happening in eastern Asia is as important to them today as what was happening to them in Germany was important to us 15,000 miles away in Australia.

It is a question of who is wearing the shoe, or which foot the shoe fits. It is human nature that the farther away something is, the less one seems to think that he will suffer immediate consequences. I remember reading articles in the British press, and clipping some of them for use in my classes, dramatizing how the British and French were saying to the Australians and New Zealanders: "You do not do enough to stop Hitler. Why don't you see that Hitler is your enemy?"

It is the reverse of the story now. It is understandable, even though it is not right. It is part of human nature that the farther away people are, the less the concern themselves with the problem.

Our role is different. Not only are we concerned in it by geography, history and policy; we happen to be the largest single force in that part of the world capable of trying to achieve a less violent method of change than the creation of those vacuums which would have occurred had we not moved in.

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. McGEE. Yes; I am pleased to yield.

Mr. PERCY. Is it the opinion of the distinguished Senator from Wyoming that European countries, allies of this country in Western Europe, should be doing more than they are now doing to help us in this effort which we maintain is not just to protect ourselves but to protect the interests of the free world?

Mr. MCGEE. I would say, in response to the Senator, that at any time "the other guy" ought to be doing more than he is at any one time. It would be difficult to imagine anyone saying that someone is doing all he can to help him. But our role with regard to that of the British is now reversed. We happen to be responsible for a good bit of what goes on in the world. The British have had to retreat. Therefore, they cannot take over as they were in a position to do in 1938, even though they have committed themselves where they have not been severed in other parts of the world from their commitments.

Mr. PERCY. Does the Senator feel that any reasonable man, taking into commensurate account the economic strength, prosperity, and available resources of the European nations, feels those countries are now contributing what is a reasonable contribution toward this effort? We have been unsuccessful to date, as I have pointed out, in convincing them to make that kind of contribution, and this is one of the underlying reasons why the American people are so dissatisfied when they see no European nation willing to help us in this effort.

Mr. MCGEE. I think the dissatisfaction arises as a result of having focused a television camera on one spot. In Europe, we have a rather integrated military force to which the Europeans have made a contribution, and still are. That is a commitment, and the firmness of the NATO commitment right now is one of the factors in restraining other capabilities which would have a bearing on Southeast Asia. It is one of the great balancing factors. So I think it would be totally unfair to dismiss the Europeans for doing nothing. I wish they would do more. If the British could have kept the job, it would have been a great thing, as far as I am concerned. But that was not fate or history. We emerged as the most powerful nation. We had to move into that nation's role whether we liked it or not. They are doing a great deal in Europe militarily. I do not think it is fair to dismiss it as not being one of the restraining factors on the other side's being willing to take greater chances in Southeast Asia. So my answer is that they are making a contribution, and a very meaningful one.

Mr. PERCY. I could not disagree more with the distinguished Senator. I think their relative contribution is virtually zero. In fact, it is less than zero, because we have now stationed in Europe, for their defense, as well as ours—

Mr. MCGEE. As well as ours.

Mr. PERCY. A quarter of a million in American forces. Yet they contribute nothing for our help where we are fighting and where the action is in Southeast Asia. As the Senator has pointed out, there is a gentleman in Paris who is obstructing the forward movement to help, but maybe it is because of the fact that De Gaulle cuts more mustard in Europe than does President Johnson. Maybe he is more eloquent and forceful in putting forth the view that that is the wrong course, and that there should be no intervention of European forces there,

than we are in persuading our allies that it is a right war and that their freedom is conditioned upon achievement of success there.

I am simply making the point that whereas we did have a situation in World War II where we did not rush in to help, it is significant that many of the hawks of today who would have us greatly expand our activities were the very bastions of support for the isolationist policy which kept us out of the war in Europe which was for our own well-being and security. It was the eloquence, it was the patience, it was the perseverance of a Churchill that worked on this problem steadily to get the American Government more and more deeply involved, short of a declaration of war—lend-lease, money, ships, equipment, and then manpower.

That is not the kind of help being given us by the European nations. These European nations are doing virtually nothing. In fact, Great Britain has notified us that she intends to withdraw additional support, leaving the burden on us for defending Europe—

Mr. MCGEE. By the 1970's.

Mr. PERCY. Yes; but they have given us due notice. I hope that we will be more persuasive in persuading them that, even though their facilities are taxed, we have a problem as to how much more we can continue to finance this whole commitment to the world.

I would now like to turn to Asia, because the distinguished Senator made the comment that the South Koreans are making a major contribution of 45,000 in fighting forces. I acknowledge this. This is a tremendous contribution to put their forces into a fighting war. They have been so effective that this is why for 2 years I have called for more Asian forces, because I think Ho Chi Minh is going to be much more impressed with multination action than he will with merely unilateral action by us. But I really must, in fairness to the whole picture, point out that the situation in South Korea is a unique one. We did save her freedom at the cost of 54,000 American lives and \$18 billion. They have 45,000 men in forces in South Vietnam. But that is sort of washed out. In fact, we end up short because we have today 50,000 in American forces tied down in South Korea. So we are still out 5,000 men in forces, and we are equipping all the 45,000 men in forces that they have in Vietnam.

I would simply say we must do more to get more forces of the Asians there. I have indicated, in numerous conversations with our military and our State Department, that I thought another 30,000 or 40,000 South Koreans would be far more effective than 30,000 or 40,000 more American forces.

Mr. MCGEE. The Senator must know that as he makes this plea to get more individual nations to do even more than they are doing, he really flies in the face of history; that at any time in history the disproportionate sharing of this kind of responsibility is a harsh fact of life. For most of our history, it has redounded to our advantage.

For the first 140 years of the history

of this Republic, we had a ring of friendly nations who fought most of our battles for us. They shielded us. But the times changed because of what the war did to England, to France, and to us, in opposite ways.

I would hesitate to share the comparison that the Senator suggested in asking what it is that De Gaulle has that L.B.J. does not have, or what it is he is doing that persuades, that L. B. J. cannot do to persuade.

I will tell you what the difference is. De Gaulle is enjoying the luxury of irresponsibility. He does not have to take the consequences of what he says or advocates now. The President of the United States has to live with what he decides, because what he decides makes a difference. He has to take the consequences.

It is interesting to note that Mr. De Gaulle was not taking any such divisive position at the time that Russia was the great question mark of Europe. In those very severely testing days, De Gaulle was strangely silent. It is only now that the success of our position, of our policy, of our firmness has achieved a kind of diplomatic ease in Europe, that De Gaulle feels emboldened to sound off—again because he does not have to take the consequences. That is the great difference between the leader of France and the leader of the United States of America.

We are not going to change that difference. It is an unfair difference, but it is a fact of life; and De Gaulle will continue to exploit it to his advantage. The President of our country does not dare live quite that recklessly, in terms of the kinds of decisions that we have to make.

Finally, on this same point, I think the Senator should understand, too, as I am sure he does, that Vietnam is not World War I or World War II, and we hope not world war III. This is a part of the difference. I think it still would have been impossible for the great Winston Churchill to have persuaded the Americans to help stop the Nazi onslaught in Austria, or to have stopped it somewhere else in Eastern Europe. It was only when it began to run away that we finally were brought into it; and thus it became the big war.

The chances of persuasion go up the worse the war becomes, rather than the better it becomes; and thus the task of persuading somebody in Western Europe or somewhere else around the globe to stand with us, with more men in South Vietnam, is made more difficult and more unlikely because the decision in Southeast Asia, in part, was premised upon the conviction that the place to stop it was at the start, at the beginning, rather than after it blew up into something much more difficult to contain, to control, or to put down.

Therefore, I say the Senator argues in the face of history. There is no valid parallel between South Vietnam, in terms of international psychology or persuasiveness of the vital interests of the other countries, and the movement of Hitler to the Atlantic coast of Europe, which had a tremendous shocking effect on a great many people who thought it could not happen. So did England's sur-

vival, when they thought she was going down.

So I do not think the analogy that the Senator has chosen to refer to here is totally appropriate, in the context of historical experience.

Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, will the Senator from Wyoming yield?

Mr. McGEE. I am happy to yield to the Senator from Iowa.

Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, I have been listening with great interest to the colloquy between the Senator from Illinois and the Senator from Wyoming.

I think that the Senator from Illinois has a very valid point. I run into great dissatisfaction, wherever I go, over what is deemed to be improper or inadequate support of our war commitment and our war effort on the part of many of our allies.

It is understandable. I have rationalized and explained the situation just as has the Senator from Illinois. That is an explanation, but it is not really an excuse. I know that we can recognize human nature for what it is; but that does not excuse it.

I have been more inclined to be critical of the failure of some of our allies to cease and desist from permitting any ships bearing their flags to visit the port of Haiphong. That is the very least we ought to expect of them. I think the very most we might expect them to do is to share in the burden of the war; but at the same time, I must say that I would wonder about how effective it would be if, for example, one of the European allies should offer to send a division of troops to fight over in South Vietnam. I think it is entirely understandable and entirely proper for the Australians to be there; but I would far rather see a division from one of the European countries.

The question is, then, why can we not get more Asian nations to join in the fighting? I think that the Koreans are bearing about all of the burden that they can properly be expected to bear. The Philippines could undoubtedly provide more troops over there.

My guess is that President Marcos would like to be able to do it. It may take more urging and more diplomatic relations to get it to happen; but at the same time, if I were one of the Asian nations' leaders, and the question came to me whether I would recommend sending a division of my troops to fight with the allies in South Vietnam, and my military leaders or advisers told me that from the way the United States was conducting the war in South Vietnam, it appeared that it was on a prolonged war basis rather than a shortened war basis, I am not so sure that I would be in such a big hurry to send a contingent of my people down there to fight.

I think that there is a point to be brought out, and that is that the way this war has been conducted, the gradualism approach to which former President Eisenhower referred would have had a tendency to discourage would-be allies from sending military personnel there to share in the fighting.

I add further that if there is a cessation of bombing directed without a quid pro quo and without a clear understanding that no advantage will be taken by

the enemy during such a cessation of bombing, but that genuine negotiations will take place, I think that we had better forget about any more people coming in from any other country. If we have a cessation of bombing, it will indicate to them that we are willing to sacrifice the lives of our fighting men for the sake of securing negotiations without any guarantees that our fighting men will not be put in further jeopardy as a result of the enemy's taking advantage of the lull in the bombing.

I think that those two points ought to be remembered when we start to talk about receiving more contributions from other forces apart from Southeast Asia.

I repeat that if there is any way I know of to discourage any would-be allies from sending fighting men into Southeast Asia to help us, it is to let them pick up their newspaper and read that the United States has called a unilateral cessation of the bombing in the face of warnings from our military leaders that this action will cost us casualties among our fighting men without a genuine quid pro quo from the other side.

Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, let me state quickly to my friend, the Senator from Iowa, that some of the Asians, I suppose, are a little more sophisticated than we are in this matter. They have been living under this kind of tension for a long while and it is a way of life with them.

I noted with interest the other day that two of the Asian leaders, President Marcos of the Philippines and Kuang Yew of Malaysia both made the following point: that in their judgment this kind of restraint and limited concept would be best for the American policy position vis-a-vis Vietnam, and was the only kind of restraint, because they thought there would be risk in a nuclear age and that it would take a very long process of pressure and attrition to effect a clear change over the long pull.

I do not think they would be about to give up if there were some restraints that ought to be exhibited. What those ought to be, I personally leave to the President and those who again take the course of action.

I think we ought to allow for the role of the newly independent Asian countries. They are brand new, and they also have stability problems. Their armed forces are not armed forces such as ours.

The Thai are probably the major exception in that part of the world and also the Koreans, because of what they were through 15 years ago. However, for the most part, those nations are still building their military capabilities and they have some stability problems. They have to make sure their Government stays on top, as our own Government did in the years following the gaining of our independence.

I should also call to mind, when we talk about the contributions that these Asians are making, that the whole continent of Asia is very large. It includes India.

Who would have thought 10 years ago that India would have a half million troops on the Chinese borders? If someone had said that 10 years ago, they would have been called crazy. Yet, India

has that many troops there now. Those Indian troops need to be counted and placed on the scales with which we equate the participation by Asians, because they contribute to the options that are available to those who play loose or close games in Vietnam.

I think we must keep the whole picture in front of us.

Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, I recognize that they are making a contribution with respect to other areas of Asia. I think they are to be praised for this action. However, when the Senator talks about the restraints, I guarantee to him that the restraint they do not want would be a restraint which would cause more casualties to the troops fighting in Vietnam. And if they have an understanding that we will exercise that kind of restraint—and I do not think that is a very good name for it—we should not expect them to send their fighting forces to join ours to be needlessly destroyed or sacrificed.

There are restraints and there are restraints. However, they are very perceptive people, and they understand very well what can happen.

If there is a cessation of the bombing as a result of which more United States and South Vietnamese and Korean troops can be killed, I think we ought to understand, if we want more of them to come in—and some more can come in from the Philippines, Thailand, and Malaysia—that our action in having a cessation of bombing will cause them not to send their fighting forces there.

I am not talking about a division from each country, but merely about more troops that can come in. If we want to discourage that from happening, we should just start to exercise that kind of a restraint, which I would not really call a restraint except in name only. If we do that, we should not expect them to send any more fighting men there to join us.

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, I am very delighted that the distinguished Senator from Iowa agrees with my premise that there should be more Asian forces there and that there can and must be more Asian forces there.

I think it is our job as public officeholders and representatives of the American people not to continue to find excuses why those forces cannot come in. I think we must find reasons why they should be there and eloquently persuade them that they must be there. We must open the doors so that they can be.

I have a great deal of sympathy for the unhappy role that the Senator from Wyoming has in defending this particular point on behalf of the administration. And I have considered it to be a failure to date.

There is no point on which I feel more strongly than this one. When I left South Vietnam and Southeast Asia 2 years ago after visiting with and talking with the Chiefs of State of all the countries of Southeast Asia and with their Cabinets and with our own officials there, I came back convinced that the Southeast Asian nations really wanted us in South Vietnam and were willing to give a degree of assistance themselves.

I talked to the leader in Thailand at that time, Kittichorn, and asked if they would be willing to put forces in Vietnam. He said "Yes."

After a business council meeting, I had a conversation with the American ambassador from Thailand to the United States who had addressed that group. I spoke to him and asked if they would be prepared to do so. He said "Yes."

I then went to the Secretary of Defense, Mr. McNamara—and I know that it is popular to condemn him, but I have a great deal of respect and admiration for him because of the burdens he carries which are occasioned by the war—and I mentioned to him that I wanted to be as helpful as I could, but that as an opening, I was hopeful that it would be the policy of our country to press in every possible way to have the Thais come in with direct force to make this a multinational effort, as we had done in the case of the Korean war, which psychologically made it a different war than an American war with us taking the place of the hated French as the Communists claim.

Mr. McNamara told me about the problems in Thailand and told me that he felt it would not be wise that they do it, but that it would be wiser that the Philippines do it instead.

And it would be better for me not to insist that the Thais do it. I quietly and simply have always hoped that the Thais would, and I rejoiced when they finally came in.

Apparently, they came in after a re-assessment of our policy there, and they recently came in with 2,000 or 2,500 fighting forces in South Vietnam. I believe this is good, much better than committing an additional 2,500 American boys. But I believe that Thailand, which has so much to lose—more than any other country—should South Vietnam fall, can afford this kind of effort; and it should have been the policy of our government for a long time to persuade them to come in directly.

I feel very deeply that the Philippines should send in fighting forces. They now have a 2,000-man noncombat military engineering unit in South Vietnam. I realize that internal politics makes it difficult to send combat forces. I know something of the political situation in the Philippines, though I am by no means an expert. But they have had experience with this type of war. The right kind of persuasion could convince them that their well-being is at stake, and I believe that they could usefully contribute substantial military training and pacification personnel to the allied effort, if they cannot contribute combat forces. They can go much further than they have thus far.

We can only ask the question: "What would their military cost be if we were not in South Vietnam, if we were not sacrificing as much as we are, if we were not stopping and having the Great Society in a shambles in the rubble of Newark and Detroit now, because of our incapability of carrying forward our own domestic programs, with a \$28 billion deficit?"

In the face of that situation, I believe they can make more sacrifice.

Malaysia has a very small army, but I believe it could do far more in the training of the Vietnamese in counterinsurgent tactics. Presently, they train only 30 to 60 men a month. Considering the \$47 million in U.S. foreign aid to Malaysia, it certainly should do more. They have had tremendous experience in this field, and they no longer have the threat they had from Indonesia. Their internal situation is much more secure with the new agreements than they were before. I believe they could ask themselves the question: "What if the United States were not doing this? Why don't we contribute, then, something substantially more than we are doing right now?"

Prime Minister Holyoake of New Zealand has acknowledged his country's responsibility to help South Vietnam, but he has provided fewer than 400 military personnel, and I believe he could be persuaded to provide more.

I should like to comment on Japan, because I realize an unusual situation exists there, with a constitution that prohibits combat forces. But when we consider what we have given, that we have strengthened the Japanese economy by \$3 billion, that the war in Vietnam continues to provide a tremendous amount of economic trade for them, I believe that Japan can afford to provide more economic aid than the total \$55 million it has given South Vietnam thus far.

I believe that agricultural experts from Japan would be more valuable than agricultural experts from the United States. Our technology is much different from the technology which Japan can provide. In the building of schools, aiding with education, and offering hope for future generations in South Vietnam, educators from Japan, the most literate nation on the face of the globe, would have a great impact and would lessen, once again, the tremendous burden that we are carrying ourselves.

Italy, which has been on the receiving end of \$6 billion in U.S. foreign aid, has only sent one surgical team to Vietnam. Just one, period.

In terms of personnel, the United Kingdom has provided six civilian advisers, a single pediatric team of four doctors, and one English professor. This is incredibly small, compared with the stakes that they still have in Asia today, and compared with what they are capable of doing.

Mr. President, I certainly do not wish to sound in the spirit of Shylock, demanding a pound of flesh because of what we have done for these nations, but the administration has apparently failed to effectively remind these countries that freedom has survived in this century because freemen have helped each other in hours of danger and in hours of need. Certainly, if the need is as great as our Government thinks it is, their eloquence should be just as great in convincing others that they should do more to protect themselves.

As the President, himself, said:

I am not about to send American boys 9,000 to 10,000 miles to Southeast Asia to do what Southeast Asian boys should be doing for themselves.

All through the campaign of 1964, the President spoke in moderating terms

against those who would escalate the war. He spoke against those who would step up our effort, and he spoke in terms of what a people must do for themselves.

All I am attempting to do today—in my original 2-minute presentation on these seven points—is to indicate once again that the American people are disunited because they feel, as I mentioned in point No. 3, that the burden is now on the backs of the Americans, and increasingly the Asian nations are relatively contributing less, and they should be contributing more.

Mr. McGEE. In response to the Senator from Illinois, I would say, first, that he should be assured that I stand here not to make an apology for an administration position or an administration case.

I sought to cast the point of the thrust on his third issue—the failure of our Asian allies and those in Western Europe to carry their fair share—in its historic setting, to remind all of us that this is nothing new which was just invented. This has almost always been the plight of the big power in the world.

I should like to address myself, first, to the suggestion that somehow we have not put the squeeze on these people to do their fair share. The Senator knows as well as I that that is not true; that every time there is a confrontation, every time an ambassador makes a call, every time a private team makes a visit, the screws are turned again, urging and urging for still more. That is how these things have happened; that is how they have come to pass. The picture is entirely different now than it was 12 months ago. Then it was much different than it was 12 months before that.

It is a slow process, because you are not the dictator. You can command satellites. Allies happen to be equals, and you have to move along in some orderly way by persuasion. You cannot browbeat; you cannot kick. You have to persuade.

In every conference of which I have known, in every confrontation at which I have been present, this was always one of the great thrusts: Do more, do more, do more. But what it all says, really, is that whether they do or not, or when they do it, is still relatively less important than the fact that they get the job done. That is the big question, even if it means doing a disproportionate amount of it ourselves. That is a far more important issue than weighing the relative contributions of a multilateral effort.

We are the big guys. We are the victors of the last war. We are the only great power in that area, in terms of sheer power capability. For that reason, it will be this way for a long time to come.

But rather than getting worse, the situation is getting better. It is moving in the direction of a greater participation by more, in greater depth.

The Senator knows, also, that we dare not converse about some of the aspects of this matter on the floor of the Senate, in open session, and that four and possibly six Southeast Asian countries are involved in terms of the type of help that has been available all along. It does not happen to be a headline.

I believe that in wartime we must take those things in stride. For that reason, it ill behooves us to throw out rather quick generalizations about how little they are doing, when it is not possible to talk at all times about how much they are doing.

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield on that point?

Mr. McGEE. I yield.

Mr. PERCY. The source of the information that I have just related is the State Department. Either I have been misled, or this is all that those countries are doing. If the Senator from Wyoming refutes the statements I have made, as to the degree of support these countries have given, I should like to have more evidence and more facts.

Until I hear such facts I will stand firm on the ground that this administration has failed the American people and failed this war effort, and has failed our boys in South Vietnam by not getting sufficient help from our allies whose political integrity and whose well-being and personal freedom are at greater stake than ours.

When the Senator indicated that on every occasion we have asked for more help but have not gotten it, and that it is going to take time, I would ask: How much time? We have only been able to get 45,000 to 50,000 troops to match ours from all of the Asian nations and our allies in 7 years. How many more years do we have to wait?

If on every occasion we have asked for this kind of help, why did Clark Clifford, when he served as an emissary of the administration on a much heralded trip to Southeast Asia, when asked if he had asked for help, say, "No." Why, with all of the power that he carried with the voice of the President, did he come back and say he did not ask for help? Either his instructions failed to embrace what I feel and the Senator feels they should embrace or he did not tell us the truth when he got back, because he may have asked for help and was turned down and did not want to report that.

I do not make any implications. I accept the statement that he made when he returned, "I did not ask for help," which seems to repudiate the statement of the Senator that on every occasion we asked for help. The help is not there.

Denmark has provided medical supplies and has trained nurses in Denmark, but we have given nearly a billion dollars, or \$920 million in aid to Denmark.

I am going country by country from a list supplied to me at my request by the State Department, when I asked what have we done for those countries and what are we doing now. As far as I know they reported a full disclosure and it is a minuscule effort compared with the gravity of the situation as announced day after day, month after month, and year after year by this administration.

It contributes to the misunderstanding, the disunity, frustration, and unhappiness of the American people which resoundingly, by a 69-percent vote, has indicated it does not support the policies of this administration. In my report I was simply trying to analyze this point.

Mr. McGEE. I suggest, first of all, that the Senator is fully aware that some

of these things that are available to him are not available publicly, as he well knows. I suggest that the Senator go back and have another sit-down session. It would not make for a speech in the Senate Chamber. I was suggesting that perhaps we are more interested in headlines than in getting things done. I was suggesting that in perspective, in terms of what they are doing, I wish they would all do more and do a great deal more.

The suggestion from the Senator seems to be that we have not tried, which is a grossly unfair and wrong statement. The facts that he himself recites suggest that you have participation here in its overall complexities that does considerable credit to Southeast Asia and Southeast Asians. We went through this in Korea. Part of the price we learned there was the fact that the nation that emerges as the greatest power in the world is added with that thankless burden.

Others helped us there for psychological reasons. However, it remained an American unilateral operation except for the freakishness of that Friday afternoon in the United Nations when we were able to slip through a helpful resolution in that body.

The Senator did say we should keep this matter in proper perspective. Our request and our hope for allies has hardly stretched over 7 years, however. The decision for the buildup came in January of 1965. The first large infusion of American troops was not until the spring of 1965, scarcely more than 2 years ago. I would request that the Senator not unpinge on the facts any more than the fact suggest. It is a tough enough experience to treat allies as allies and not attempt to make light of the contribution of the Filipinos and the Thais, or other Southeast Asian countries, where it does make a difference.

Thus, I submit to my friend that we have to sophisticate our action to understand that the first requisite is that the job has to get done. The next consideration is how much help can we get to accomplish the job. I am afraid that the Senator's suggestion tends to at least turn it around a little, and too much the other way.

If it is agreeable to the Senator, let us shift to the fourth point that he has made. The fourth point, and I shall read it:

Fourth is his failure to pursue every possibility for negotiations leading to a settlement of the war.

I say, with some frustration, Mr. President, that this comes as a considerable shock and it is going to be a position difficult not only to sell to the American people, least of all to ascribe to them.

Whatever conduct may be called into this, we have probed, pried, pushed, begged anybody, everybody, everywhere to try. We have made it clear, the President has made it clear, the Secretary of State has made it clear, and it has been reemphasized to ascertain if there is not some way, somehow we can sit down and talk. Just give it a try; the President will go anywhere. He repeated that on Friday night and he means it, I am sure. The Secretary of State said a while back, "Anywhere you can produce one North

Vietnamese who is willing to talk, just one, anywhere."

The cruelest cut of all would be to suggest that we have failed to probe and to test not only the probable, or likely, or the official, but even improbable, unlikely, and unofficial, in the hope that some of them would meet at some time in a breakthrough; and that there might come that propitious moment when there might be a taker in Hanoi. It still takes two. Nowhere can anyone suggest any visible, measurable shifting of attitude, as far as Hanoi is concerned. It still takes two.

I do think that point No. 4 is a spurious suggestion in terms of explaining the problems of the attitude of frustration about the war. We all know that experience of frustration; we all do. I suggest that this point does not have depth or meaning to the man in the street.

Mr. PERCY. If this is a spurious suggestion and cannot be valid, it is a suggestion supported by a great many of my distinguished colleague's friends on his side of the aisle; in fact, far more Senator on that side than on my side of the aisle.

It has been the contention of a distinguished member of the Committee on Foreign Relations and others that we have failed to pursue every possibility for negotiations leading to a settlement of the war.

I only point to the past Ambassador to the United Nations, a distinguished member of the administration, who told a reliable reporter, as it was fully reported after his death, his great disappointment that we had—and I cannot remember the exact words—muffed the chances offered to us.

I do not ordinarily quote from Communists or Soviet officials as an authority, but Kosygin, and our allies such as Mr. Wilson, and many other powerful states which are not spurious, felt that there was an opportunity, if the bombing had been stopped, to begin negotiations. I do wish to point out that I did not consider the President's letter to Ho Chi Minh as a basis for successfully pursuing serious negotiations. As I remember that letter, the President simply indicated that if they would stop infiltrating and sending supplies to their forces already in South Vietnam, we would undertake negotiations.

I can just imagine what the reaction of the distinguished Senator from Wyoming would be if Ho Chi Minh had made an offer, presumably in good faith, that he would sit down at a negotiating table provided American ships would stop coming into South Vietnam, provided we would not send a single additional American soldier or a pound more of supplies into South Vietnam. If we would cut off the 500,000 American boys in South Vietnam, and then he would sit down and negotiate with us.

That is not the basis for serious negotiation. That is not even a letter coming from a responsible office that intends, really, seriously to negotiate. There is no human being of whom I know to be responsible who would feel that was a reasonable basis for negotiation.

I merely come back to the point that I think would be supported by a large num-

ber of Members on the other side of the aisle, when I say what I consider to be important and responsible, and a very moderate statement, that the administration has failed to pursue every possibility for negotiation leading to a settlement of the war. The principal point that once again I wish to reiterate is that I am not trying to make it as a condemnation of the administration per se. That would serve no useful purpose. I am trying to explain, and am trying to understand myself as I pursue this question, why it is that the American people feel this way, and why it is that a large part of the American people feel that the administration has not successfully pursued negotiations in every way possible.

Mr. MCGEE. In the course of the question on negotiations, over 2½ years now of the intense part of the war, there has been a recurring buildup of some kind of demand for a special kind of feeler or proposal. Invariably, the terms change as the war intensifies and the dimensions change. I think it is important, when we sketch this from 2 years ago, and the evolution through the letter last January to the declarations at the present time, that we keep them in their proper context at the moment they were projected and what they meant at that time. But the nub of them all is that every single proposed request advanced among the critics as an idea was encompassed in some phase of the approaches, sometimes through some source. Whether third parties, allies, agents of a private source, or individuals of a public sort, it matters not. The record is replete with them. I question seriously the real role that this has, as it may or may not lurk in the thoughts of the average American.

Because the record is so stark. We had the bombing interruptions, not once, twice, but three times, and each time with the door wide open and only a hardening of taking advantage of it, not even sitting still, but taking advantage of it. We have had every kind of proposal that has been tested and tried, and always the answers are the same. The only different answers we get are those which Ho Chi Minh used to give visiting travelers of one sort or another, where he does not have to take the consequences. But when the chips are down, the blank wall is still there.

It takes two to negotiate. I would question any valid, reasonable, or even sometimes rather unlikely patterns of formulas, for testing the genuineness of the Vietnamese. The ultimate was just reached where now the President says and the Secretary says, "Just give us the assurance that you will really sit down." They do not ask for anything more than that. "Just give us the assurance that you will really sit down." And the same reply. It does not matter. But the degree of shift there must be compared in its proper context.

Now I know that the Senator has a dinner engagement, as I have—

Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, will the Senator from Wyoming yield?

Mr. MCGEE. I am glad to yield briefly.

Mr. MILLER. I also have a dinner engagement, but this is important, what we are talking about here.

I should like to make one observation. It just could be that the way the offer of negotiations has been brought on by the administration and its spokesmen has tended to diminish the possibility of success.

I do not deny the good faith. I do not deny that any member of the administration, let alone any Member of the legislative branch, would infinitely rather have the problems in South Vietnam resolved by peaceful means than by war. But the Senator will recall a speech entitled "Unconditional Negotiations," when the President of the United States first came out and offered to negotiate without any conditions at all.

I am sure this did not convey to the North Vietnamese that the President was willing to have negotiations carried on without the basic understanding that the U.S. commitment in South Vietnam would be upheld. That was so basic to the whole war and the negotiations that might be carried out that I am quite sure the North Vietnamese understood this, very loud and clear, and that they were not impressed by the term "unconditional negotiations."

Thus, right there, I think we got off on the wrong foot.

We talked about the desire for negotiations, but letting it be understood that we did not expect to negotiate away the U.S. commitment I think probably would have been better received than it was.

Then, further, there has been so much publicity attendant on the offers to negotiate that we could well have caused the North Vietnamese to get the idea that we were so worried about the situation that if they just hung on long enough, the United States, might cave in, especially cave in here in Washington.

I talked to foreign diplomats. My guess is, and that of many colleagues who feel this way, that all of the attendant publicity in connection with these offers and attempts to obtain peaceful negotiations, were not well received by foreign diplomats. They might have been well received by the American voting public but not by foreign diplomats, that the best way to handle it would have been to do it quietly.

So I think the way in which this activity has been carried on has had an adverse effect. No one knows whether we could have had peaceful negotiations by using any other system up until now. But knowledgeable persons have stated that we were going about them in the wrong way.

I think the Senator from Illinois has a point. I believe there has been good faith on the part of the administration. I do not deny that. But it has not borne fruit. I have heard just too many people who were much more knowledgeable than the Senator from Iowa say that we got off to a very bad start when the President said we would have unconditional negotiations, because certainly the leaders in Hanoi knew that that was not the case. The repetition of that statement and the publicity that has been attendant on those efforts has not done any good at all; as a matter of fact, I think it has probably given Hanoi cause for feeling that if it just hangs on long enough, the United States is so eager to enter

into negotiations that maybe North Vietnam will win the war anyhow.

Mr. MCGEE. The Senator from Iowa knows, as I do, that the negotiations that have been talked about or publicized are minimal. We could probably name them on the fingers of one hand. In contrast with this, I am sure that, in terms of general public knowledge, every avenue has been tried, whether public, private, secret, classified, prayerful, or hopeful. Whatever it was, every acceptable one was tried.

If in the fourth suggestion that the Senator from Illinois makes there is some better way to do it, some other way to do it, that we do not yet know about, or that might work, I think he owes it to somebody to be sure to spell out, privately or secretly, whatever it is.

I do not believe the record at all supports the suggestion that is alleged that these attempts have been ignored or have been goofed. I think everything has been tried. Nothing has been left untried, untested, or unattempted. Who is to say whether what was done was or was not wrong? We cannot know. We have to try and then, according to our best judgment, make the kind of attempt that we hope will be successful.

I would not want the impression left that those who have to take the consequences for making those attempts do not want to end the war. The Senator from Iowa and the Senator from Illinois would, I am sure, agree now that the President and the Secretary of State would give anything if they could bring the war to a close. They are not about to fumble or kick away an opportunity to end the war, if it is humanly possible to end it. I think this is the point we have to come back to every time. Such an allegation, it seems to me, is clearly out of line with the hard facts concerning negotiations, proposals, attempts, suspicions, inklings, or whatever we want to call them.

There have been more than 300 of them, according to what I have read. All of them have been pursued to the point where they were proved to be false, unyielding, or whatever the situation was.

Mr. PERCY. I have not the slightest doubt that the President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense would like to see the conflict come to a swift and satisfactory conclusion. I am certain that they are doing everything they can toward that end. But I believe that the Secretary of State, a man whom I respect greatly, a man to whom we are all indebted for the task he is performing for his country, is a victim of the problem the administration faces.

I think this is the credibility gap that exists between the American people and the administration, and the rest of the world and the American Government, today, and possibly it has even seeped into the enemy camp.

I think we have to try to analyze and understand as much as we can about the mentality of the enemy, because that is the mentality we have to negotiate with. For instance, the position taken by South Vietnam is that they will not negotiate with the Vietcong. If we do not have enough influence on the allies we are helping and supporting to help them get

off that deadend street and that unrealistic approach, there is something wrong with us. I can only judge this from something Ambassador Lodge said; namely, if we destroy the enemy force, we would still have 150,000 Vietcong in South Vietnam. We cannot pretend they do not exist or that we are killing them all off. They are probably being born faster than we can kill them today. So I do not think that is a realistic attitude.

I think we also have to look at the evidence that comes out of North Vietnam. An authoritative source indicated he had talked with high-ranking officials in Vietnam and asked them when they would be willing to negotiate with the Americans over this war. He said that that particular Vietnamese official looked at him and indicated the question how we would expect them to trust any negotiations with the American Government when even the American people do not trust the American Government and what it says at all. So this credibility gap is one of the great problems and one of the prices we pay.

We did face this problem in Korea. A man came along—I admit one in a century—who said, "I will go to Korea and try to settle this," and he did settle that war.

So maybe a change of face is necessary. The Senator from Vermont [Mr. ARKEN], who does not have a partisan bone in his body when it comes to saying what is right for this country, said that maybe a change of administration would give a face-saving door through which the enemy could walk, now that they realize—and certainly they must realize—that they cannot win this war, and sit down and negotiate, as so many Members of this body called for in a provision added to the defense appropriation bill.

Mr. McGEE. I cannot accept that that fanciful or real-meaning phrase "credibility" gap has in fact now become the deterrent in Hanoi for the Senator to peddle as the motivating reason why she cannot trust the United States, because the people do not trust the President of the United States. It seems to me that is so utterly ridiculous that I think it is very questionable in terms of good judgment.

The integrity and reputation of this government have been upheld, I think, beyond serious doubt all over the world, under rather trying circumstances. That has been a part of the record. I think the integrity of the President is the same.

For the reason I do not think we ought to give credence, or even the time of day, to whatever Hanoi might allege was its uncertainty in terms of whether they could trust an American negotiator.

I would think the Senator from Illinois might wish to withdraw that particular statement, or modify it in some way, because I cannot believe he believes it.

Mr. PERCY. I will expand on it.

Mr. McGEE. The Senator has learned the way of the Senate quickly.

Mr. PERCY. I will report it as a statement from an authoritative source. I was repeating it because it was germane to the argument and the understanding as to the mentality of the enemy and what is possibly going through their minds.

But if the Senator from Wyoming is to maintain that this could not be a factor, I think it is unrealistic. How many times, through private persons and publicly, has the enemy condemned what they felt was an understanding and agreement in Geneva which was not lived up to, and of which they say they want no part? That is why it is going to be so difficult to get them to Geneva. They feel that an agreement was made—which we were not a party to; thank heavens that we were not a party to that agreement—was not carried out, namely honest elections—

Mr. McGEE. We were not a signatory to that.

Mr. PERCY. That is right. I say, thank heaven we were not, because that election was not held—

Mr. McGEE. I wondered why the Senator has held that up as an illustration.

Mr. PERCY. Because they have pointed that out as a reason for being suspicious of any negotiating settlement, and they have indicated their willingness to carry on the fight for 1,000 years rather than sit down at a conference table.

But if the question of the credibility of this administration, its integrity, is the point—I think it has been alluded to by the Senator that I am off base on it and that we should not waste the time of day talking about it—I can only say that millions and millions of words of some of the most responsible members of the press have referred to what is known as the credibility gap. We could cite chapter and verse for years as to what has been built up in the American mind as contributing to this credibility gap.

I am not saying that this administration alone is at fault, because I am positive that it has existed under Republican as well as Democratic administrations, that at times the whole truth and nothing but the truth was not told to the American public.

But a pattern of misleading statements has become so consistent that there is now a so-called credibility gap, which is not a term manufactured by me nor, to my knowledge, by any member of my party, but manufactured and developed by the members of the fourth estate, who are constantly, day by day, 24 hours a day, dealing with the administration, to indicate that they simply feel there has been a lack of good faith in the reporting to the American people of events that have transpired that affect the security, the well-being, and the future of the American people and the Nation.

Mr. McGEE. I was not intending to deal with the credibility gap as an issue, a question, or a factor in our dialog here, at all, and did not inject it. It was my understanding that the Senator from Illinois had suggested that because of the credibility gap Hanoi had told some responsible person in South Vietnam that they could not trust Americans in a negotiation because of whatever they meant by that term credibility gap. My suggestion had nothing to do with the import of that term here at home at all. It had to do with the idea that this was a valid element in understanding that the North Vietnamese would not negotiate; that

they could not trust an American negotiator because of what they heard the American people saying in their debate.

I think it is germane to suggest at this point that I am sure that our divisiveness here at home has brought joy to Hanoi. But I happen to be one of those who thinks that is proper; that it is a part of the price we have to pay, in these times. I do not favor cutting off the allegations or the criticisms; I think we may have to face more of them, and that we must continue in that fashion; that the price we would pay for cutting them off would be far higher than I am prepared to pay. I think we have to be sophisticated enough to live with it. Hanoi will exploit that fact to the ultimate, but I reject that as an excuse for Hanoi not to sit down at the conference table, because they could not trust an American negotiator and for that reason I raise the question with the Senator from Illinois, not because of the use of the term "credibility gap" here at home at all.

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, I realize that we should draw this colloquy to an end, out of consideration for Senator and staff who must stay until we finish, but we do have this problem, and it may be a contributing factor in our inability to get to the negotiating table.

There is always, in any negotiation the question of the degree of sincerity of both parties. If one party does not believe, whether rightly or wrongly, that the other party is sincere in its professions and accurate in its statements and its representations, then I think it may understandably contribute to the fact that they are unwilling to get together to negotiate; because even if, under such circumstances, a satisfactory basis for negotiation were found, and it ended up signed, sealed, and delivered, the negotiator might not have the confidence that the terms would be carried out.

I wish to conclude by quoting, not a Republican, but a distinguished Democrat, the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate, who recently said:

The country sickens for lack of moral leadership.

Moral leadership implies all that the term embraces, with respect to the ability to achieve credibility in negotiating a settlement of some sort with an adversary who is suspicious of you to begin with.

Mr. McGEE. I do not intend to get into the things that many Senators have said on the floor here. A great many things have been said, because, again, Senator do not have to take the consequences. This floor has produced a great many declarations that probably are not very illuminating in terms of policy problems at the time that they are uttered. They are uttered in the context of some irresponsibility.

The fifth of the Senator's points is the failure of the President to learn from experience that every U.S. escalation is matched by the enemy, and only brings more casualties.

It seems to me that the Senator has this turned around, in reverse order, that there was no escalation until the other side began to escalate. That is what we are there. And I think it is imperative

that we keep that in the right order, and to realize that we have to do what increasing pressures require.

The limited nature of the war, the dimension of the conflict when it began in 1965, has not changed. There has been reckless use of this quickie word "escalation," when the proper word would more properly and more clearly be "intensification." An escalation, in my judgment, would be a change of the dimension of the war, not an intensification of doing what we set out to do, as the commitment there became increasingly difficult within the confines and the jurisdiction of the original commitment; namely, to conduct the limited war, to simply seek to require that the north stop doing what it was doing. Our effort has been contained and confined to that. There has been no spreading of the conflict; there has been no slipping over into China in terms of the dimensions of the conflict; the broad outlines of the original undertaking have been adhered to, and thus, I think, a rather careless use of the word "escalation" every time another thousand marines lands there, when in fact once the commitment was determined upon, we could not put 500,000 men there the next Tuesday morning, because they had to be prepared for this special kind of warfare. It was a gradual buildup, as rapidly as we could make our manpower available; and yet every new landing was described as an escalation. To me, that is an abuse of the meaning of that word.

Thus, in those terms, I think we ought to keep things in the right order; and that is that we have kept this within its original dimensions. We have not expanded it recklessly and irresponsibly; in fact, it was charged by one of the Senator's Republican colleagues a few moments ago that we have leaned over too far backward to try to keep it under control and restraint.

Mr. President, we cannot play this game both ways. Either we have been too cautious, too fair, and too unescalating in our conduct of the war, or we have been the opposite; we cannot be both.

So I think sometimes the President is so caught between these barrages of words by which he is assaulted that he feels, "Damned if you do and damned if you don't," because he has to take the consequences; he has to live with the decision that is made, and not just talk about it in terms of what it might mean.

This fifth point of the Senator from Illinois does not contain, in my judgment, a valid explanation of where mistakes have been made, as he has described them.

Mr. PERCY. If the Senator will yield, because I was involved in a colloquy over the dictionary definition of another term, the word "opportunistic"—and I would not wish to be considered an opportunist now in this case—I would like to ask unanimous consent for the Webster definition of "escalate" to be printed in the Record, to see whether or not I am using the term in the proper sense.

I am trying to use a term which is understandable to the American people, because that is our problem, to communi-

cate in understandable, unmistakable language what we mean.

I simply say that the war was escalated when we began taking the war to the north and bombing North Vietnam. That that was a distinct escalation; it was an upward movement of our effort, and it was done, as I understand it, for the purpose of making them pay a higher penalty for their involvement in the war. That end has certainly been accomplished. But also, it was presumed by some to mean that this "escalation" would weaken the will of the North Vietnamese people to resist, and would lessen the infiltration into South Vietnam, and thereby cut off supplies and manpower.

It has miserably failed in the last two categories; and anyone who could reassess the original position we had would say so, including Secretary McNamara, who maintains that was not even the original intention.

It has strengthened their will to resist. It has given them an enemy from the sky, raining down on civilian populations. I do not say that civilians can always be protected; but we must always measure how much value we get from bringing planes from Guam, 3,600 miles, to drop a bombload in the midst of a jungle, and merely kill a pig, a cow, or something like that, and then sending the planes all the way back to Guam, and whether this is a reasonable or sensible escalation.

There being no objection, the definition was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

Escalate. To ascend by or as by escalator.

Mr. PERCY. I thank the President. I should like to ask whether it is an escalation when, after having confined the bombing to areas well outside the Chinese borders—and the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense and the President of the United States clearly indicated that we did not want to involve the Chinese in it—we move up our bombers and two of them are shot down over China when we are bombing 7 miles from Chinese border. Is that a proper use of that term as defined by Mr. Webster?

Mr. MCGEE. In the opinion of the Senator from Wyoming, that is within the original definition of the limited development, vis-a-vis Hanoi and North Vietnam. If it were to involve an attack on the mainland of China, this would be a specific escalation in my judgment.

The aircraft shot down over China were not there as a matter of policy or escalation, but as a matter of accident. It has not been followed up since.

The escalation, it seems to me, has nothing to do with the number of men we have there or with the number of air strikes that are ordered as long as the demands remain roughly the same, and those have not changed. But the intensification of locking in combat has been changed. However, that, may I point out, was because the North Vietnamese began to build up very large launching platforms in the demilitarized zone, and whereas this was not an original area for assault on the part of our own troops, it became indispensable to move into some of those limited areas because of

the advantage that was taken by the other side.

Mr. Webster's dictionary will not record on escalation that some umpteen thousands of North Vietnamese in large groups moved across the 17th parallel in the late weeks of 1964 and from there on into 1965, which provoked the decision to finally move into South Vietnam, which finally required the decision to bomb in the north.

And this is the order of things that makes the difference, and that is the reason I took exception to the statement of the Senator, because we did not provoke it. It was indeed perpetrated by the original action taken by the North Vietnamese.

I think that is an imperatively significant point that the Senator seems to take too lightly or gloss over here.

Mr. PERCY. My whole point is that we have to weigh the consequences of our action. And I know it has been said that these are military decisions and that we must leave it to the military. But it is going to be a political decision as to whether China comes in. It is going to be a political decision to tell the military, "We are in now. Move."

It will be the same as when there were a million Chinese forces who moved across the border of South Korea. They came over in human waves and mowed down our boys.

We provoked them into coming in, and we had a monopoly on the atomic bomb at that time. Certainly we could provoke them into coming in now.

The Secretary of State said that he could not give a guarantee that they would not come in. We could provoke them merely because they might want a common enemy in order to consolidate all the dissident elements that exist in China today.

We could provoke them to do something that it is said could not be done.

With all our electronic gadgets, we assured ourselves that we would not fly over China. Yet, two planes have been shot down over China.

We know that many of the great wars have been provoked over small incidents, and this might very well be the case here.

We were told that we could not lose an atomic bomb. Tell that to the Spaniards. We had great difficulty in getting it back.

How much of a gamble do we want to take? How much do we want to try to entice them?

Actually, if they were bombing America and the bombs fell in Mexico, 7 miles from the Rio Grande, Lyndon Baines Johnson would feel a little different than if the bombs fell farther away from his beloved Texas.

We can provoke this action if we are too reckless. It has been the policy of this administration to be prudent.

How many have said, "Bomb them back to the stone age"? We cannot take that kind of a risk. This is a limited war, but we have gradually escalated the effort, and it has always been matched by a new escalation from the enemy.

The Soviets have signed a new agreement for assistance, and the Chinese have stepped up their assistance.

What are we going to do next to entice them to bring a whole series of armies down there?

This is all I am asking. I am not asking that we give up bombing the supply routes. I have advocated for months that we bomb the supply routes and pound away at those routes and concentrate on that. However, it is of limited value, it would seem to me, to take the risk of knocking out a bridge or a road 7 miles from China when that road could be taken out as effectively without doing it 60 seconds away from the Chinese border by jet plane.

The road can be taken out some place else without further endangering the outcome of the war and the lives of American men by taking needless risks.

As I said, point five is his failure to learn from experience that every U.S. escalation of this type is matched by the enemy and only brings more and more American casualties.

Mr. McGEHEE. The Senator has now moved on to the sixth point as well, because they are linked together. I think it makes it more convenient to tie them together.

The sixth point is that the President has failed to recognize that bombing so near China has already caused the Chinese and the Soviets to massively increase their military role in support of Hanoi.

Therefore, it ups the ante generally along the line.

This is a curious charge in many ways for the reason that the charge against the administration is that it has been forcing the men to fight with one hand tied down, that this has been limited and restrained, that it has been prudent. And I think that is the record of the whole conduct of this conflict, a consciousness and not taking any more steps to provoke a widening of the war in some irresponsible way. It is probably one of the heaviest considerations hanging over the head of every man in the Government tonight, whatever his philosophy may be.

For that reason, I do not see that any of this is out of that context. The tactical judgment in terms of whether to bomb within 10 miles or 7 miles is one of those hairline kinds of decisions that I will leave to those who are much closer to it.

I agree with the Senator that the presence of China is a conscious restraint at all times, but we cannot be so restrained that we fall flat on our faces, because the only way to have avoided that kind of decision was to not be there in the first place. I do not think the Senator agrees with that, that we should not have been there in the first place.

The Senator is simply interested, as we all are, in trying to find some way to deescalate the intensity of the combat and the loss of lives, and that somehow we can find a way to do it. But, if at some point we decide to take a stand, if we are called upon to take a position from which we will not retreat—namely, South Vietnam and the 17th parallel—we would have an instance then where we are going to have to reach that point where there is the risk of some kind of Chinese difficulty and we will be face to face with the policymaking.

The only way we can avoid that is not to have been there. That is the kind of close decisionmaking that must accompany every mission into the north, and I think it is to the credit of our system that those decisions have been reserved to the civilian commander of this country, and not to the generals.

The generals have to deliver on order. They are only tacticians, but the policy has remained political and diplomatic rather than military.

It is desperately important that we recognize it. It is one of the most frustrating things about the entire conflict. It is not a good, old-fashioned war. The old rules do not obtain. This is probably as frustrating an experience as any people can be expected to go through. It is my position that we have to go through with it and that we have to learn to live with that type of frustration, because the other side will not play fair—and they should not play fair, for the reason that they do not have the means to come out in the open and fight as they did in the old days. They are fighting the type of conflict they are best equipped to continue: guerrilla conflict, where they can hit and run.

We must learn to live with that type of conflict, without losing our composure or our tempers—and that means restraint. I would join the Senator in urging that type of restraint, in contemplation of where we ought to go or ought not to go vis-a-vis North Vietnam.

But that is not to suggest, therefore, that we are on the brink of plunging this country into war with China. I believe the Senator put it best of all when he suggested that, for all we know, the Chinese might decide to go to war for no reason. And that is part of the risk you have to take. To take any other type of approach to the matter would simply be to roll over and play dead, to forfeit the strategically important, critically significant vacuums, if you will, the filling of which makes a difference in terms of who does the filling and with what ingredients.

So, mindful as we all are that a nuclear conflict must be rejected, if we can; that war with China should be avoided, if somehow it can be, some things are even worse. One of those would be to contribute to the coming of that type of showdown because we were afraid to call their hand on the Rhineland in 1936, to call their hand in Manchuria in 1931.

What I am suggesting is that the parallels we should have learned from 30 years ago should warn us now that, with all the risks, the chances of succeeding are greater by stopping it at the beginning, at the outset, than to move away or look away and hope there is a cheaper time or a better place to do it, or some other way.

In a nuclear world, I suspect that this type of very limiting, frustrating war is the only kind of war that dare be risked. It is not a very happy one to cope with in terms of public opinion.

I share the point. I believe that the objection to the point does not reflect upon the President of the United States in his conduct of policy, that he has been mindful of—that this administration has been mindful of—the importance of try-

ing to keep this matter localized, to keep it in its perimeter, rather than spreading it recklessly to some other area of the globe.

Mr. PERCY. I believe all it does is reflect on his judgment, and I believe the judgment of the administration has been incredibly bad. In my opinion, this is the contributing factor to so much dissatisfaction by the country and why an overwhelming and vast majority of the country indicates today their disagreement with the policy of this administration in the conduct of the war.

This judgment has been bad. And if I could speak just on behalf of, say, the superhawks—and I would be an unbecoming spokesman for that particular thought—I believe it would be their argument that the judgment of this administration should have been to not lull the country into a placid condition, to not promise that we could end this without sacrifice, that we would not have to, say, call up the Reserves or not have to sacrifice in all our domestic programs; that we could have a great society at home and we could wage a war abroad, and even promise a great society to Southeast Asia—and do all that without the sacrifices necessary, the sacrifices possibly necessary for a politician, a public officeholder, to stand up and say what the consequences must be.

I believe it is the position of those who feel we ought to get in and win this war, and get it over with once and for all, that by constantly piecing out forces, sending a thousand men now, a thousand men a few days later, never really telling the American people what the price is going to be, what the number of men will be, what it is going to take to win this war, to placate the American people and get them used to this escalation, we are really detracting from the effectiveness, instead of just saying, "This is what it is going to be, and we are going to do it," and doing it, and not giving the enemy time to constantly build up with forces that counter our forces, that cost America more lives and more American casualties.

This is why I cannot help trying to report as honestly, as reasonably, and as responsibly as I can. These are the seven reasons why the American people are so critical today of the conduct of the war—and critical on both sides.

I can only judge by results. So far as I can hear from the American people and report to the President and Congress, the results simply are not there, in the opinion of the American people; and that is why there is growing dissatisfaction with the conduct of the war and with the administration's policy.

I should like to say, however, that I deeply appreciate the spirit in which the distinguished Senator from Wyoming has addressed himself to my "2-minute" remarks this afternoon. I hope they were important remarks, and I hope someone would care about them. I have no omniscient feeling that my judgment is the absolute judgment on these matters. But I deeply appreciate the conscientious, careful, thoughtful, and reasonable approach that the distinguished Senator has taken to each of these points, and the eloquence with which he has articulated and defended the ad-

ministration's position—a position that I believe is eminently wrong and is being so judged by the American people and the people of the world, but which I do not believe could have been more persuasively argued than was done in the colloquy this afternoon.

Mr. McGEE. I thank my colleague, the Senator from Illinois, for his generous comments. I remind him that it is not often that one has a pleasant dialogue on a subject that is so charged with great fear and great feeling as is the difficult and complex question of Vietnam.

I pay tribute to the Senator for having the courage to bring this matter before the Senate.

I would urge upon him, however, that the dialogue itself should not be measured, as a contribution of a discussion between a Democrat and a Republican, or separated by an aisle or an administration; that the differences between the distinguished Senator from Illinois and some of his colleagues on his side of the aisle are as great as—perhaps even greater than—the differences between this Democrat and some of his colleagues on his side of the aisle. What that says is that it is less a political partisan sort of question. It is even less a question of liberals and conservatives than it is a question of such intermeshed difficulties and decisionmaking requirements that many of the decisions turn out to be, let us say, 51 percent good and 49 percent bad. Because it is so close, do we then not make a decision? The answer is that somebody had to decide each step along the way. And that is why it is deeply important that dialogues such as this continue, and not at the partisan level, not even at the liberal-conservative level, but rather at level of trying to thrash out all the options, so that, if possible, the wiser of the options can be chosen or the least evil of the bad options can be chosen. Sometimes the answers are all bad. Some are just worse than others. I believe it is that type of reality in which we find ourselves, and in which some decisions must be made.

The fact we come down to, it seems to me, is that as we assess the picture in Southeast Asia, as we weigh the alternatives that confront us, there is very little wiggling room where rational people have to go. There is little wiggling room. We may disagree on the intensity of the moment on carrying out a particular aspect, but the basis is there, the direction is there, the concept of limiting this conflict is there, and the wish to end it and to somehow bring it to a close pervades everywhere. The disagreements are in the methods.

I express my appreciation in the hope that somehow we may have contributed a little in the differences we have exhibited here.

I think we are going to have more of this kind of difficult frustration with our constituents and each other in these times because it is the first time in our history that we have been called upon in the world to display this role of the chief victor in a world war of one whose responsibility it is to try to maintain

enough stability that peaceful change can prevail over violent change if at all possible. If all of this means you cannot run the rules of the old days where somebody wins and somebody loses, I suspect we are living in a time where wars can never be won but can be lost. I think it is a hard fact of our times. The old clichés about victory and defeat no longer have meaning and no longer apply because you have to keep your priorities and objectives on what the main goals are. Our main goal, it seems to me, is a more peaceful world.

I believe what we seek to help to do in Southeast Asia is achieve the chance where we will move a little closer to that kind of opportunity in Eastern Asia. We have come close to it in Eastern Europe, and closer than some people think.

Mr. Lee Kuan Yew stated it better when he said:

If you Americans succeed in standing firm in Vietnam, Eastern Asia will be closer to stability than at any time during this century.

I think there is much in what he said.

I thank the Senator from Illinois for his indulgence in this lengthy colloquy of what was to have been a 2-minute opening address.

Mr. PERCY. I thank the distinguished Senator. Any time he feels more comfortable on this side of the aisle, I know he would have the welcoming arms of 36 Senators welcoming him over.

This is not a partisan debate made on my side of the aisle. There are many Senators on my side of the aisle who would agree with the Senator's side of the argument, just as there is one man I have listened to, revered, respected, and admired more than most men I have met in my life, the distinguished majority leader of the Senate, who might tend to find points of agreement in my argument. I thank the Senator.

Mr. McGEE. I would say to the Senator from Illinois that in most other States, given his philosophy and point of view, he would have to run as a Democrat in order to be elected. These are matters that vary with the States.

Mr. PERCY. I have given my daughter. That is enough.

RECESS UNTIL 10 A.M. TOMORROW

Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate stand in recess until 10 a.m. tomorrow, in accordance with the previous order.

There being no objection, the Senate (at 7 o'clock and 14 minutes p.m.) took a recess until until tomorrow, Tuesday, October 3, 1967, at 10 a.m.

NOMINATIONS

Executive nominations received by the Senate October 2, 1967:

DIPLOMATIC AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Harrison M. Symmes, of North Carolina, a Foreign Service officer of class 1, to be Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, vice Findley Burns, Jr.

Hugh H. Smythe, of New York, to be Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to Malta.

Having designated, under the provisions of title 10, United States Code, section 5231, Vice Adm. John J. Hyland, U.S. Navy, for commands and other duties determined by the President to be within the contemplation of said section, I nominate him for appointment to the grade of admiral.

Having designated, under the provisions of title 10, United States Code, section 5231, Rear Adm. William F. Bringle, U.S. Navy, for commands and other duties determined by the President to be within the contemplation of said section, I nominate him for appointment to the grade of vice admiral.

Adm. Roy L. Johnson, U.S. Navy, when retired, for appointment to the grade of admiral pursuant to title 10, United States Code, section 5233.

THE JUDICIARY

Erwin N. Griswold, of Massachusetts, to be Solicitor General of the United States, vice Thurgood Marshall.

CONFIRMATIONS

Executive nominations—confirmed by the Senate October 2, 1967:

POSTMASTERS

ALABAMA

Emory S. McNider, Coffeeville.
Edna M. Usrey, Gurley.
Margaret S. Carter, Myrtlewood.
Pete Holman, Titus.

ARIZONA

Fern E. Morgan, Fort Defiance.
O'Reece T. Cleve, Inspiration.
M. Louise Zufelt, Kayenta.
Curtis L. Steveson, Kearny.
Betty L. Dunagan, Peach Springs.
Paul W. Strain, Sun City.

ARKANSAS

William C. McArthur, Dyess.
George E. Fryer, Russellville.
James F. Cannon, Saratoga.

CALIFORNIA

Morris A. Hoff, Aromas.
Charles E. Cotten, Boron.
Margaret Bridgham, Coloma.
Clarence J. Barry, Jr., Davis.
Lodema K. Cook, East Irvine.
LeRoy B. Stewart, El Cajon.
William A. Ellis, Exeter.
Raymond W. Gribbin, La Verne.
John W. Panighetti, Los Gatos.
Virginia F. Martin, Pioneer.
Bernice M. Willson, Richvale.

COLORADO

Russell C. Bowlby, Hideaway.
Cecil S. Hofmann, Iliff.
Donald G. Haynes, Jamestown.

FLORIDA

Richard M. Collins, Largo.

GEORGIA

R. Eldon Wilkinson, Leary.

IDAHO

Jasper E. Heller, Gooding.
Fay J. Evans, Malad City.
Phil Raymond Perkins, Montpelier.
Paul H. Boxleitner, Riggins.

ILLINOIS

James R. Huston, Braceville.
Francis I. Hogan, Byron.
Harold S. Gilvin, Cambridge.
Gordon R. McDowell, Cave in Rock.
Ralph J. Einhorn, Crete.
Richard W. Otto, Danvers.
Paul R. Hughes, Earlville.
Mary L. Yocum, Edgewood.
Jackie L. Moore, Gilson.
Paul E. Tucker, Jerseyville.
John R. Wallace, Omaha.
John J. Curbis, Panama.
Averil L. Keller, Sainte Marie.
Robert J. LaPointe, Westmont.
Pasquale C. Flاندaca, Winfield.

INDIANA

Wilma G. Rice, Helmsburg.
Edith E. Cain, Heltonville.
Mary J. Griepentrost, Lamar.
Donald F. Reidy, Medaryville.
Edna M. Gatewood, Poseyville.
Sam D. Talbert, Russiaville.
Glenn Dougan, Spurgeon.
James R. Kirkwood, Summitville.
Walter P. Hoke, Tipton.
Joseph J. Sorota, Whiting.

IOWA

Wayne G. Smith, Adair.
Edward P. Farrell, Algona.
Walter C. Anawalt, Cedar Rapids.
Robert F. Miller, Clarence.
Roy B. Martin, Junior, Clear Lake.
Duane P. Conrad, Dallas.
Quincy I. Rice, Delta.
Vernon P. Tiefenthaler, Halbur.
Bernard J. Mullaley, Marion.
Edmund J. Langenberg, Tiffin.

KANSAS

James M. Cameron, Summerfield.

KENTUCKY

Ernestine Ward, Inez.
Harry H. Boaz, Mayfield.

LOUISIANA

Bessie R. Brumble, Bethany.
Eva M. Boudreaux, Centerville.
Edward O. Douglas, De Quincy.
Hubert J. Bayham, Senior, Grosse Tete.
Evalina F. Agoff, Lafitte.

MAINE

H. Lloyd Carey, Augusta.
Robert A. Winslow, East Boothbay.
Mary F. Worcester, Harrington.
Robert R. Kendall, Perry.

MARYLAND

Arthur G. Virts, Jr., Boyds.
L. Everett Marvel, Easton.
Dorothy C. Bowle, Faulkner.
William J. Thomas, IV, Sandy Spring.
Wilber B. Lelzear, Silver Spring.

MASSACHUSETTS

Joseph P. Dahdah, Feeding Hills.
Norman W. Daunals, Graniteville.
Edward M. Bassett, Jr., Leominster.
Warren E. Ward, Lunenburg.
Walter D. Calnan, Merrimac.
Gerald C. Tucke, North Chelmsford.
Raymond L. Stauff, Scituate.
Kenneth H. Doulette, South Easton.
William T. Trant, Westfield.

MICHIGAN

Marion E. Cooper, Jeddo.
Shirley H. Fogarty, Smiths Creek.

MINNESOTA

Albin L. Zinda, Appleton.
John C. Webster, Beltrami.
David H. Jennings, Truman.

MISSISSIPPI

Joseph E. Martin, Bentonia.
Samantha M. Denton, Crowder.

MISSOURI

Kenneth P. Grace, Albany.
Harold M. Sliffe, Archie.
Lloyd J. McGeorge, Bismarck.
Buford A. Patten, Miller.
Warren D. Osborn, Patton.
Charles R. Sands, Sr., Rolla.

MONTANA

Rex P. Guthrie, Columbus.
Milton M. Sloan, Whitefish.

NEBRASKA

William J. Kleinow, Curtis.
Alvin G. Staben, Elkhorn.
Robert L. Johnson, St. Edward.
Freda T. Shubert, Shubert.
Carson C. Williams, Stamford.

NEW HAMPSHIRE

Rudolph E. Curry, Hampstead.
Arthur R. Beauchesne, Newmarket.
Milton B. Paradis, North Stratford.

NEW JERSEY

William R. Connelly, Jr., Cedar Knolls.
Betty W. Dunfee, Chatsworth.
Frank J. Sedita, Lodi.
Leonora T. Harrison, Tabor.

NEW YORK

John F. Schumaker, Albany.
George O. Barden, Barton.
Raymond L. Sabre, Calcium.
Donald A. Krantz, Callicoon.
James P. O'Connor, Sr., East Northport.
Edward B. Bierman, Jr., East Syracuse.
John J. Collins, Glens Falls.
John M. O'Malley, Le Roy.
Harold F. Pierson, Painted Post.
Francis A. Hanigan, Phoenixia.
Dorothy B. Hall, Richville.
Ruth B. Fraser, South Wales.
Raymond M. Yahnke, Sylvan Beach.

NORTH CAROLINA

George D. Elliott, Jr., Bath.
Merdice T. Simmons, Hampstead.
James R. Breedlove, Lake Toxaway.
Henry Franklin Wilson, Mount Ulla.
George H. Wall, Rolesville.

NORTH DAKOTA

Ralph A. Pederson, Park River.

OHIO

M. Virginia Miller, Fletcher.
George R. Cotter, Glouster.
David W. Barnes, Homerville.
Nello F. Bianchi, Put-in-Bay.

OKLAHOMA

LaWanda M. Smith, Milburn.
Bobby G. Pitts, Noble.
Clarence D. Robertson, Jr., Wapanucka.

OREGON

Alma M. Elliott, Chiloquin.
Marjorie A. Stumbaugh, Crescent.

PENNSYLVANIA

Martin E. Brett, Beaver Falls.
Florence M. Hannan, Bradfordwoods.
Lora E. Eschenbach, Clarendon.
John F. Schupp, Fryburg.
Katherine A. Hart, Genesee.
Dorothy J. Osterberg, McKean.
David J. Florentine, New Brighton.
Albert M. Fry, Orefield.
Myrtle A. Palm, Renfrew.
Robert B. Myers, State Line.
Frank A. Fargo, Warren.

PUERTO RICO

Mario Arroyo-Lopez, Toa Baja.

SOUTH CAROLINA

Tillman W. Derrick, Fort Mill.

SOUTH DAKOTA

LaVerne V. Binger, Tulare.
Milo L. Godfrey, Woonsocket.

TENNESSEE

Howard I. Harris, Dukedom.
Edward L. McDonald, Gallatin.
John G. Mitchell, Smyrna.
Dennis L. Lewis, White Bluff.

TEXAS

William T. Zimmerman, Burkburnett.
Jefferson D. Ouller, Cisco.
Homer R. Anderson, Forestburg.
Harry D. Anderson, McCamey.
Ruby M. Mouser, Spade.
Nezle L. Duncan, Willis.
William H. Kennedy, Woodsboro.

UTAH

Majorie C. Christiansen, Mayfield.
Richard C. Stevenson, West Jordan.

VERMONT

Lawrence A. Williams, Newface.
William B. Holton, Westminster.

VIRGINIA

John W. Wood, Jr., Pearlsburg.
George E. Kidd, Williamsburg.
Joseph C. Haines, Winchester.

WASHINGTON

Lawrence T. Baker, Alrway Heights.
Gunnar R. Johnson, Chelan.

WEST VIRGINIA

Charles C. Tickle, Bluefield.
Patricia W. Noel, Pratt.

WISCONSIN

Norman E. Anderson, Hudson.
Wallace J. Regan, Kohler.
Chris E. Yousel, Muskego.
Eugene L. Hoeffling, Poplar.

WYOMING

Betty J. Leonard, Balroil.
Bessie E. Lieuallen, Fort Laramie.

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and his Cessna O-1 "Bird Dog," the busy little single-engine observation plane, were all alone in the bright-blue sky.

"I was down on the deck," the colonel recalled later, "just plain having fun with flying, for a change, I'd fly up to a hill, then hump over it, and down the valley to the next hill. I was on my way home and there wasn't any hurry."

"Just then, I came over the top of the hill, and spread out in front of me was one of the longest, cleanest beaches in the world. I couldn't believe what I saw in front of me: a string of boats, beaching themselves, and men spilling out of them. These weren't landing barges, and I knew they weren't ours."

"'Hell,' I said, 'this is a Viet Cong landing party, and what a piece of luck this is.'" With his voice almost trembling with the excitement of his rare good luck, the colonel quickly put the message to his radio center, carefully making the navigational fixes and sending the exact co-ordinates of latitude and longitude.

TEMPTED TO STAY AROUND

"I knew we had people [troops] in the area, and I had flown over an Arvin [Army of South Vietnam] base camp a few minutes before, so I was tempted to stay around for the action. I knew it wouldn't be long before all hell would break loose."

"I could hardly wait to get to the base to get a report on the landing party. There were maybe 300 or so of them, and I knew they would have been zapped [shot up] by the time I got back to the base. I jumped out of my plane and almost ran to the [co-ordination center] to see what had happened."

"The sergeant on duty wasn't at all excited. Yeah, he had got my message. Yeah, he had passed the word on. The word finally was sent over to the local Arvin commander, like the plan says. I knew all that. I wanted to know what the Arvins had done with it. Nobody had ever given them sitting ducks like this one, and I knew that even the Arvins couldn't goof something like this."

"That was before I knew the Arvins as well as I do now. The Arvin commander had got the message all right. But he said he had another operation planned and he couldn't afford to change his plans."

And what happened to the landing party? "They came ashore unopposed, and for all I know they're still sitting down there on the beach."

THE NO. 1 SCANDAL

This was months ago: the colonel is retired and no longer in uniform, but it is typical of a story that is repeated frequently. Collecting tales about the incredible inefficiency, slovenliness, and laziness of South Vietnam's army is perhaps the easiest work in all of the country. The army is the No. 1 scandal of the war, and it is the No. 1 failure of the American military command here.

U.S. officials insist the Vietnamese army isn't all bad; they cite the Vietnamese rangers and marines as specific examples of units that have performed well, often remarkably well, under heavy fire and intense pressure. "When he has good leadership, the Vietnamese soldier will fight as well as anybody's soldier," says an American officer.

Yet, hardly anyone disputes the evidence that the good units are the rare exception. Even the Vietnamese concede that much of their army is not as good as it ought to be. No less an authority than Gen. Cao Van Vien, the chief of the Vietnamese joint staff, concedes it. He not long ago cited his 25th Division as not only the worst in the Vietnamese army, but probably the worst in the world.

Last week, the new president-elect, Nguyen Van Thieu, boldly cashiered four of his most

VIETNAM'S ARMY: "INEFFICIENT, SLOVENLY, AND LAZY"

Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, we are told that the war in Vietnam is going well, that we are making progress. Certainly we are making progress in the sense of progressing deeper and deeper into dangerous and difficult situations—as witness the plight of our Marines at Con Thien, and at Gio Linh.

But as our casualties go up, do the Vietnamese losses likewise rise? The answer is "No." We are doing exactly what we were told 3 years ago would not happen—we are fighting the war that Asians should be fighting for themselves. When they will not do it, we do it for them. The plain fact is, they all too often will not, so we are increasingly doing it instead. The facts are made clear in a recent article by Wesley Pruden, Jr., writing from Saigon for the National Observer. He cites incidents and circumstances in proof of the fact that, in his words:

The Vietnamese army is the No. 1 scandal of the war, and it is the No. 1 failure of the U.S. military.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that this article, from the September 25 issue of the National Observer, may appear in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

INEFFICIENT, SLOVENLY, AND LAZY—THE TROUBLED ARMY OF SOUTH VIETNAM

SAIGON.—The colonel was on his way back to the base, his day's work finished. He

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powerful colleagues—including three who were or recently had been connected with the training program. It was, Americans here hoped, the beginning of General Thieu's promised shake-up and clean-up of his army. But it is much too soon to say so.

Those fired (or forcibly "retired") include Maj. Gen. Ton That Xung, the former commander of the national military academy at Dalat; Maj. Gen. Bui Huu Nhon, commander of the Thu Duc Military Training Center; and Brig. Gen. Nguyen Thanh, who until recently commanded the army's military-training program.

If President-elect Thieu keeps his promise, others will be forcibly "retired" as well. Just before the Sept. 3 election, General Thieu said he might eventually get rid of as many as 50 top-ranking worthless (and worse) officers.

The National Leadership Council, the ruling military junta, has been pressed for months to replace corrupt and ineffective general, but it is not yet clear how many of them General Thieu can rid himself of. The first to go were dispatched on election eve, but the public charges against them hinted that their chief crime was the support of a rival presidential slate.

The officers dismissed last week were accused, vaguely, of several things, including helping themselves to bribes and acquisition of government-owned land. They probably won't be brought before a civil court, but will instead be required to answer questions of a special military disciplinary council.

But even if President-elect Thieu succeeds in getting rid of all the deadwood (which isn't likely), the Army of Vietnam will still have problems. Hard-nosed, honest combat leadership can't be found overnight and unless the entire approach to army organization is changed the officer is not likely to improve much, if at all.

Despite years of U.S. training, the Vietnamese army is woefully timid. Commanders rarely will commit their troops unless they are certain—the word here is certain, not confident—they can whip the enemy. Often, a Vietnamese commander won't even go to the aid of a neighboring outfit under attack if he thinks his own unit will get cut up in the rescue attempt. The fighting day stops promptly at nightfall.

THE THREAT AFTER DARK

The Arvin commander frets most of all about a night attack, because he knows the Communist Viet Cong are masters of stealth and speed once the land is enveloped by the brooding jungle night. If an Arvin outpost is attacked after dark, the reaction—usually by helicopter gunships—is left for the Americans.

"This is awfully frustrating," a grimy U.S. lieutenant remarked the other day, as he unrolled a map inside his tent east of Saigon, "but I can understand it. The Arvin commander figures the war might be a long one, and if he loses his troops he won't get any more, so he doesn't want to risk losing the ones he has." Understandable, but it means that the commander isn't likely to do much more than lose his men piecemeal, over a period of years rather than months.

The commander might or might not know very much about military tactics. The chances are his aptitudes for soldiering had little to do with how he got his job in the first place. His essential qualification was the attaining of a French-style second baccalaureate, or university degree, and this limits the officer corps to the wealthy.

Even more important than wealth in Vietnam is the family tie, and once the officer gets his commission, he is likely to count more on his cousins and uncles than skill and valor to get his promotions. There is no such thing as time-in-grade promotions; the lieutenant may wait 3 years, or 13 years, to get the golden insignia of the *daiue*, or captain.

POOR PAY SCALE

Pay is miserable, for both officer and soldier alike. The average infantryman makes the equivalent of about \$15 a month, the average captain a bare \$25. To this, the government adds a monthly rice ration and housing; officers take their families with them even to the remotest back-country outposts.

But what the Arvins need most of all is discipline. If Thieu can accomplish this, the improvement will be, by comparison with the present, vast. Desertion has not often meant anything more than a mild reprimand, if that; desertion in an American army in wartime can mean the firing squad. No wonder, then, that the desertion rate has been astronomical. Last year, more than 130,000 Vietnamese soldiers strayed away (though many returned later or joined other units closer to their homes).

Discipline in the ranks of the Viet Cong seems, on the other hand, almost miraculous. They are, after all, Vietnamese too. This dedication to Communist duty is too often taken, by critics of the Saigon army, as heartfelt devotion to a cause. It is hardly that. Captured Viet Cong, as well as captured Communist memoranda, have made it clear that Charlie fights because if he doesn't, he can count on getting shot in the back by his own people. Arvin, until now, has been able to run either way with little worry about the consequences.

Neither the officer nor the soldier has a military tradition to fall back on. The Vietnamese army dates only from 1949, when Bao Dai was recognized as chief of state, under the French union.

AN INCREDIBLE COLLECTION

Le Garde du Sud Viet-Nam, about 20,000 men, was then a part of the 150,000-man French army fighting the old Communist-led Viet Minh. The armed forces were an incredible ragbag of Frenchmen, Germans (veterans of Hitler's armies), Moroccans, Senegalese, and the Dutch. *Le Garde du Sud Viet-Nam* was officered exclusively by Frenchmen, who rarely hid their contempt for *les jaunes*—"the yellow." To the French, the color of Vietnamese skin was the same as the color of the Vietnamese spirit.

The first U.S. military aid to the Vietnamese began the next year, when the United States and France signed a mutual defense treaty for all of French Indochina, which then included both Vietnams, Laos, and Cambodia. This pact was signed two days before Christmas 1950, and a small group of American advisers went to Saigon to set up "the shop."

By 1954, the year of Dienbienphu, "the shop" had grown to 200, commanded by Lt. Gen. John W. O'Daniel. General O'Daniel came to Saigon, he said later, "to try to get a little bit of a voice in the training of the Vietnamese troops." The Vietnamese, of course, were still under the French. Though many of them left after the Geneva convention later in 1954, the last French officer didn't leave the Vietnamese army until 1956.

It was about this time that the first of the Vietnamese officers were appointed to military schools in the United States. The first officers accepted went to infantry school at Fort Benning; later, senior officers were admitted to the U.S. Army Command and Staff College in Fort Leavenworth, Kan.

Few of these officers are still in uniform; most are now past the retirement age. But all through the late 1950s, the size of the army grew. By 1961, it had increased to 200,000 men; by mid-1964, a year before the big U.S. build-up, it had reached 275,000 regulars.

NO U.S. COMBAT TROOPS

In these early days, there were no U.S. combat troops; all were advisers. When the Geneva agreements were signed in 1954, under which both Vietnams were to be kept

free from a military build-up, the American advisory force was kept to a level of 342 officers and men. Nearly all of them lived here in Saigon. At the end of 1960, form was still being observed: When Washington and Saigon wanted to double the size of the Military Assistance Group-Indochina, they sought (and won) the approval of the International Control Commission, which then (as it does now, for the record) policed the Geneva accords.

But by 1961, it was clear that neither Hanoi nor Saigon intended to maintain a placid little country. At the invitation of President Ngo Dinh Diem, the U.S. advisory force was increased to 4,000 men. By January 1965, it had reached 15,000. In February of 1965, the first U.S. combat troops arrived.

In Diem's last days, the army was not doing badly. Diem was very much the political boss, and the generals were told to run the war while Diem ran the government. It was after a succession of coups, following the murder of Diem, that the top leadership of the army degenerated. By one recent reckoning, only 2 of the 44 generals on active duty in the last days of Diem are still in uniform today.

CONFUSING TURNOVER

Some of the 42 general officers who have left the service have not, of course, left much of a void behind them. But this incredible rate of turnover is a striking illustration of the unrest and confusion that has made the Army of Vietnam the unreliable "fighting force" that it is today.

Confusion dogs the system from bottom to top. Only the rich become officers, only the poor become soldiers, goes the slick Saigon saying. It often seems so. Stories abound of the selling of draft deferments.

From this pool and others, South Vietnam is committed to raise another 60,000 troops. This would bring its combined total to nearly 700,000. About half are regulars and the rest are the home-guard Popular Forces and the militia-like Regional Forces. It's an impressive enough figure for a nation with a population of 16,000,000.

But until someone devises a way to make them into something more than a ragtag army of chicken thieves (Viet Cong commanders occasionally shoot their men for unauthorized "requisitioning" of villagers' chickens and pigs), the numbers that seem impressive on paper won't mean anything.

THE TEMPORARY SOLUTION

The natural temptation here is to shove the Arvins further into the background; U.S. troops are, after all, reliable and willing, even eager, to go after the enemy. This is hardly a permanent solution. Many Vietnamese are beginning to resent this, even though they understand why. Several civilian candidates struck a common plaint when they accused the generals of turning the war over to alien armies.

This feeling would be aggravated, many U.S. observers here believe, if, as some suggest, all military forces were put under a single, unified command. This was done in Korea, and a miserably inept Korean army was slowly transformed to the army that is fighting with distinction in South Vietnam today.

There are several important differences between this war and that one, however. Since troops were sent to Korea by the United Nations, a unified command was all but mandatory. And since most of the troops (as well as the money and equipment) was supplied by the United States, it was all but mandatory that an American general be named as the commander.

The most important difference is that the war in Vietnam is a guerrilla war, the Korean war was not. The Communists never let up in the propaganda that the United States seeks only to replace the French as the colonial master of Vietnam.

Thus, putting the Arvins under U.S. command and discipline, however effective it might be, could very well turn out to be the greatest blunder of all. To the sensitive Vietnamese, their army would seem to be nothing more than another *Le Garde du Sud Viet-Nam*, this time part of the U.S. Army.

Some success has been achieved by integrating certain Arvin units with American units at the company level, with joint U.S.-Vietnamese command. This has been done by the Marines near the Demilitarized Zone, by the 1st Cavalry (Airmobile) Division in the central highlands, and, most recently, by the 199th Light Infantry Brigade in Gia Dinh province, near Saigon. The idea is to tighten up discipline in these selected Arvin units, teach them effective fighting methods, and turn them back to their old units—and hope it catches on.

SOME ARVINS ARE EXPERTS

Some Americans are pleased with the results and contend that unification often has immediate benefits to the American units too. "When I'm point man on patrol," Pfc. Barrie E. Idom of Newport Beach, Calif., said the other day, "I'm glad my Arvin buddy is along. He can spot booby traps I'd never see. 'Charlie' is pretty good at setting booby traps. You can't see the wires; you have to spot the trap, and these Arvin soldiers are experts at that."

Sgt. Stephen Mulry of Long Beach, Calif., a squad leader, lights a cigaret and talks about the problems of joint command of the two squads with a Vietnamese noncom who speaks as little English as Sergeant Mulry does Vietnamese.

"I issue my orders and my counterpart issues his," Sergeant Mulry says. "Before every operation, we have a detailed planning session to prepare for any situation which may occur. Of course, if something develops that we didn't cover, we have to play it by ear. I remember once when we were forced to change our ambush site at the last minute. I pointed to a spot on the map and my counterpart shook his head and pointed out another one."

"Sure enough, we bagged two Charlies at his site. We may not speak the same language, but we're both soldiers and our military language is universal."

AN URGENT NEED

The experience of the 199th Light Infantry Brigade does, in fact, support the common view here that the Arvin soldier would be a good one if he had good officers and good training. To get this, the entire structure of the Army of South Vietnam will have to be turned upside down. It must be done soon.

General Thieu has promised to do this, and perhaps he will. But it is not likely to happen unless American pressure is applied. "There is lots to do," a U.S. officer remarked wearily. "There is pride to wound, and toes to step on, and if it comes to it, seats of pants to kick."

It will be difficult, because the generals do not like to be pushed, and it may take the kind of pushing that the United States has never liked to do here. The alternative is even less attractive, and it is a very, very expensive alternative.

—WESLEY PRUDEN, JR.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RELEASES TANKERS TO CARRY NO. 2 FUEL OIL TO EAST COAST

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I have been concerned with recent reports indicating that a tight supply situation is developing in New York and in other east coast States that could result in higher prices for millions of consumers for No. 2 household heating fuel oil.

Inasmuch as it appears that the principal reason for the current shortage is an insufficient supply of U.S.-flag tankers, on September 20 I wrote Secretary McNamara requesting that to the maximum feasible extent the Department of Defense release U.S.-flag tankers it uses so that they could be used to transport this fuel from the gulf coast to New York and other east coast ports.

Today I received a reply from the Department of Defense. In that letter I am informed that the No. 2 fuel oil situation on the east coast is improving. As one of the factors the Department of Defense reply cites the "recent" return to the commercial trade of four U.S.-flag vessels chartered by the Department of Defense. It also indicates that five more such vessels are scheduled to return to this trade by November 15, 1967. This is good news.

So that the public record may be complete on this matter I ask unanimous consent that my letter to Secretary McNamara and the Department of Defense's reply of September 29 I received today be printed in the Record at this point.

While the No. 2 fuel oil situation may be improving—and the relief provided by the Oil Imports Appeals Board on September 27 by granting import quotas to several east coast No. 2 fuel oil suppliers has contributed importantly to that—the winter season itself will determine whether the supplies are adequate and this situation bears therefore constant watching. I assure the Senate that I will do so and I urge that all interested Senators do the same.

There being no objection, the letters were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

SEPTEMBER 20, 1967.

HON. ROBERT S. McNAMARA,
Secretary of Defense,
The Pentagon,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SECRETARY McNAMARA: There is a tight supply situation developing on the East Coast that could result in sizable price increases to consumers of #2 Fuel Oil (household heating fuel). Since this product is used by millions of householders in New York and in other states on the East Coast, the added burden in the cost of living would be widespread.

I am informed that the main reason for this shortage is insufficient supply of U.S. flag tankers. The prime source of supply of #2 Fuel Oil is in the U.S. Gulf area and the movement up to the East Coast is inter-coastal trade and therefore U.S. flag vessels must be used.

Due to increased national security requirements in connection with the war in Viet Nam, the return of much procurement of fuel to domestic sources to lessen the dollar outflow and to improve our balance of payments, and more recently due to the Middle East crisis, the Department of Defense chartered every available U.S. flag vessel earlier this year. While some of the above factors still are in effect, with the availability of petroleum products in the Persian Gulf now returned to normal, I urge you to release U.S. flag vessels to be used in the East Coast trade. This move will not only continue to keep these vessels in operation and assist our domestic producers and marketers, but it will also very materially help the East Coast consumer by relieving the critical supply position that currently exists.

Other moves to bring relief to the East

Coast may be necessary, such as the easing of oil import quotas, especially if we have an unusually hard winter, but meanwhile you could very materially help relieve the present crisis.

With best regards,
Sincerely,

JACOB K. JAVITS.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
Washington, D.C., September 29, 1967.
Hon. JACOB K. JAVITS,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR JAVITS: This is in reply to your letter to Secretary McNamara of September 20, 1967, in which you requested the Department of Defense to release U.S. flag vessels for use in the East Coast trade.

We are aware of the supply situation on the East Coast and have had discussions with the Department of the Interior on this subject, including the possibility of our releasing additional U.S. flag vessels.

The Department of the Interior has advised us recently however, that the No. 2 fuel oil situation on the East Coast is improving. Factors contributing to the improvement are: (1) an increase in distillate fuel oil stocks on the East Coast; (2) the recent relaxation on No. 4 fuel oil imports; (3) the opening of the Trans-Arabian pipeline on September 15, 1967; (4) the decisions of the Oil Imports Appeals Board on 27 September 1967 granting import quotas to several East Coast No. 2 fuel oil suppliers; and (5) the recent return to the commercial trade of four DoD chartered U.S. flag vessels, with five more scheduled for return by November 15, 1967.

Despite the fact that the Department of Defense is also finding it difficult to meet tanker requirements under present conditions and the fact that we also are governed by public laws (Title 10, US Code, Sec. 2631 and Title 46, US Code, Sec. 1241(b)) on the use of U.S. flag vessels, everything possible will be done to assist the Department of the Interior and other governmental agencies to avoid a critical heating oil shortage on the East Coast.

Sincerely,

PAUL H. RILEY,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Supply and Services).

PANAMA CANAL CONTROL AND MODERNIZATION: VIEWS OF EMINENT CONSTRUCTION ERA ENGINEER

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, when first undertaking the serious study of interoceanic canal problems and Panama Canal history, the voluminous writings on them appeared overwhelming. But gradually, as knowledge was gained, the subject came into focus, and what at first seemed to be an insuperable task proved relatively easy when it was reduced to its simplest elements.

In the course of my examination of many contributions to canal literature, past and current, I have noticed a vast difference in quality between those composed by casual writers and self-serving propagandists, as compared to matter produced by persons with responsible experience in the construction, maintenance, operation, sanitation, or protection of the canal, and who have lived in the Canal Zone or in Panama. The latter group knows the problems of the isthmus at first hand and cannot be misled by fallacious arguments, however plausibly expressed. The latest significant contribution is an article by Dr. Richard H. Whitehead of Laconia, N.H., recently