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cepted his invitation to the gathering which was later held in May of this year in Geneva.

The facts are that his part in any type of communication with Hanoi was purely incidental, and the notion that he should be informed of all of the efforts of the Government of this country and of other countries to bring about peace in the world was only the thinking of a man of great arrogance.

As a matter of fact, I was interested in the observation made this morning in the Washington Post, where it referred to the gentleman as "The Arkansas Traveler" and referred to the article in this fashion:

Its high tone and imperious posture conveys the somewhat embarrassing impression that the author regards the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions as a sovereign power. The article sounds like a communique from a greater to a lesser, and infinitely more stupid and worse governed, minor state.

Referring, of course, to the Government of our own country.

The facts are that the President did address a letter to Mr. Ho Chi Minh, on February 8. Anyone who reads that letter—and it has been published widely—can only regard the letter as conciliatory, can only regard the letter as a most generous offer of peace made by a major power involved in a tremendous conflict.

That letter was rejected unilaterally, offhand, by Ho Chi Minh and published by him in his reply unilaterally some time in March of this year. The reply was one that we have received time and time again—that is, unconditional surrender.

But that was not the only thing that happened. I am talking now about 1967. I am not talking about 1964, 1965, or 1966, when effort after effort after effort was made to bring this conflict to the conference table.

But back to 1967, to give the lie to the charge made by Mr. Ashmore and his associates. After Ho rejected the President's February offer, U Thant of the United Nations made a proposal directed to this Government and the other governments involved in the Vietnam conflict. That proposal was readily and speedily and unconditionally accepted by the Government of the United States, and it was likewise accepted by the Government of South Vietnam. The Government of North Vietnam did not accord the United Nations the courtesy of a reply. It was rejected offhand in a radio broadcast emanating from Hanoi.

In the meantime Mr. Ashmore went ahead with his conference, Mr. Speaker, in Geneva. There was gathered a group of people who have come together in the name of peace. But let me quote a word or two from some of the speeches which were made there. Let us look at some of the things said there.

Dr. Linus Pauling, a member of the staff who headed the panel of scientists, repeatedly condemned our country. He talked about "the murder of tens of thousands, hundreds of thousands of men, women, and children in the war in Vietnam" by the United States. A lie of the first order.

He asked what justification could be presented for the United States carrying on what he called, "A cruel and vicious attack on a poor, small, weak people of Vietnam on the other side of the world."

Speaker after speaker after speaker described the United States as evil, as despotic, as murderous, as seeking to destroy civilization. This at a so-called peace conference sponsored by an American group.

Finally—finally, one man, a judge from New Zealand, stood on the floor of that conference. I will just cite a paragraph or two of some of these things he said at that time.

This was Judge McCarthy, justice of the Court of Appeals of New Zealand. He said:

I have been distressed at the readiness of so many speakers at this conference to impugn the motives of the administration of the United States. The people of New Zealand do not take that stand. We remember with gratitude that some 20 years ago we were saved by American power and American blood from a march of what was certainly in that case an expansionist eastern power. I hope we will never forget that. We see—

Speaking about the New Zealanders—the United States as a great and generous power and, whilst many in my country may doubt the wisdom of certain methods or means adopted by the United States, nevertheless most New Zealanders have confidence in the integrity of that nation and its elected representatives. For myself I accept that the United States could possibly be wrong in its decision, but I would never accept that it is evil.

The SPEAKER. The time of the gentleman from Louisiana has expired.

Mr. O'NEILL of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, I yield the gentleman 5 additional minutes.

Mr. BOGGS. Finally there stood on the floor Mr. McEver, of New York, the executive vice president of the United Nations Association of the United States. He said:

The narrow focused passion that has marked many of the expressions of the past three days have appalled me. I have sat here and heard words like "savage," "brutal," "uncivilized" applied to a country which has poured its human and material resources into the hands of others on a scale for which history has no precedent.

Mr. CAREY. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BOGGS. I will be glad to yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. CAREY. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Is it not true that this famous Geneva Conference which took place with the participation of Mr. Ashmore was one where the South Vietnamese Government had a duly authorized delegation to represent them in discussions and that they were there with the encouragement and support of our Government?

Mr. BOGGS. Yes. And I might say that because of the fact that North Vietnam did not send a delegation, the delegates from South Vietnam were not permitted to say a word.

Mr. CAREY. Exactly. If that is Mr. Ashmore's idea of fairness and the way to get them to the bargaining table, then

(Mr. BOGGS asked and was given permission to proceed out of order.)

SO-CALLED PEACE EFFORTS BY CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS

Mr. BOGGS. Mr. Speaker, I take this time to discuss for a few minutes the news stories which have appeared in the last several days with respect to allegations made by officials of an organization known as the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, and, more specifically, Mr. Harry Ashmore and Mr. William Baggs, who are associated with that institution, located in the State of California.

Mr. Ashmore, in an article published in a magazine which is sponsored by the organization which I just now mentioned, said that the President had "effectively and brutally sabotaged" a peace approach to Hanoi through private channels. Normally, Mr. Speaker, allegations of this kind are so totally irresponsible and their effect so limited that it is sometimes the better part of wisdom to ignore them and to trust to the good commonsense of the American people to analyze and reject this type of irresponsible verbiage. In this case, however, Mr. Speaker, these allegations have been given such broad circulation, have been quoted so widely in the press, on the radio, and on television, both here and abroad, and they are so far from the truth that some attention must be given to rebutting these statements.

First, let us take a look at what Mr. Ashmore was doing. He was going to Hanoi in January last to drum up delegates to attend a conference called "Pacem in Terris" to be held in Geneva in May of this year. Ironically enough, Mr. Ashmore abrogated to himself and to his associates in that institution the title which had been given to an encyclical enunciated by one of the great men of all time, Pope John XXIII, when he talked about peace on earth.

But Mr. Ashmore appointed himself as an ambassador and he went there to drum up someone to attend this conference, which was held later in the year.

Incidentally, I might say that he failed in that mission as well, because no one from Hanoi or from North Vietnam ac-

I think it discloses Mr. Ashmore's idea of what is true negotiation.

Mr. BOGGS. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BOGGS. I yield to the distinguished majority leader.

Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Speaker, may I commend the distinguished majority whip upon the very fine presentation and documentation which he has made. Does it not seem rather strange that all of these people the gentleman has mentioned are able to find so many things about which they can criticize the United States and the actions of our Government without ever finding anything to say critical about the regime in Hanoi?

Mr. BOGGS. I would say to the gentleman that the use of the word "brutal" is one that particularly galls me. Now, if you want a lesson in brutality, go to South Vietnam and see what the Communists do. Remember the fact that just days before the election there were literally hundreds of people murdered in order to terrorize the people so they would not go to the polls and vote. There is not a village in South Vietnam that has not been brutalized. There is hardly a family there that has not had a person murdered. There is hardly a place that has not been burned. You talk about brutality. Why, in the whole history of organized warfare I doubt seriously if there has been more deliberate brutality.

And, Mr. Speaker, I know that the United States and its troops are able to defend themselves. But I have been to South Vietnam. I have talked to many of our troops. I would venture to say—and I do not say this in any spirit of self-praise—but I would venture to say that there has never been a more humane army than the army which we have in Vietnam. The work of our soldiers in the villages and in the towns and in the hamlets in taking care of children, in their efforts to establish hospitals and to build schools, as well as to do the things needed to build a nation and to build a society, will in my judgment go down in history as one of the great endeavors for humanity in all of recorded time.

Mr. HALL. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BOGGS. I am happy to yield to my friend, the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. HALL].

Mr. HALL. Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the gentleman from Louisiana yielding. I compliment the gentleman upon bringing this subject to the well of the House for discussion at this time.

However, I would especially like to associate myself with the last remarks which the gentleman has made since the distinguished majority leader, the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. ALBERT], spoke. I compliment the distinguished majority whip.

I have three simple questions for the leadership of the House:

First, who granted this fellow's passport?

Second, why has it not been picked up?

Third, why is not the head of the Department of Justice prosecuting him under the Logan Act?

Mr. BOGGS. I am not in a position to answer those questions. I would suggest to the gentleman from Missouri that he direct his questions to the proper legal departments. I am not asking for anyone to be prosecuted. We have an open society. We can stand dissent. But I think it is very important that we answer these charges.

The SPEAKER. The time of the gentleman from Louisiana has expired.

Mr. O'NEILL of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, I yield the gentleman 5 additional minutes.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BOGGS. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Speaker, the House of Representatives has, in my opinion, been favored with a most judicious and extraordinarily revealing series of remarks by the distinguished gentleman in the well of the House at the present time, the gentleman from Louisiana [Mr. Boggs].

Mr. Speaker, I wish to associate myself with the remarks of the gentleman and with the philosophy which the gentleman has enunciated.

I thank the gentleman for the information which he has furnished to the House of Representatives today.

Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BOGGS. Of course, I shall be happy to yield to the distinguished minority whip.

Mr. ARENDS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. ARENDS. I, too, have been concerned with reference to the exact truth of various statements which have been made as we read them in the newspapers. It is my opinion that we have to read between the lines.

Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased the gentleman from Louisiana has made this statement here in the well of the House today, because it raises in my own mind the question which has been brought to the fore by my colleague, which is the thing that disturbs me. I hope that in the future there will be taken a constructive position with reference to this situation and that someone will pay more attention to who should be given permission to make some of these missions during the time in which we face a catastrophe like this.

Mr. Speaker, it is my opinion that someone must pay much more attention to the characteristics of these people that we permit to go abroad and to go into areas such as North Vietnam and South Vietnam but who come back and make statements like this.

Mr. BOGGS. I thank the distinguished gentleman from Illinois for his contribution.

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BOGGS. I am happy to yield to the distinguished gentleman from New York.

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Speaker, I want to commend the gentleman from Louisiana, our distinguished majority whip, for his comments. I was particularly

pleased that the gentleman presented to the Members of the House the editorial which appeared in the Washington Post this morning, an editorial which was critical of Mr. Ashmore and his charges. But I wonder if the gentleman from Louisiana would not agree with me that it was most unfortunate that such an outstanding newspaper as the Washington Post, one that has generally supported our Nation's position with respect to Vietnam, should have featured these irresponsible charges in such a sensational manner on page 1 of that paper upon yesterday, but when the case was put into perspective, and particularly, when the charges have been refuted, the refutation of those charges was printed on page 18 in an article by its own correspondent, Mr. Chalmers Roberts, revealing the fact that the President had already explored in great depth the de-escalation which Mr. Ashmore charges him as having brutally destroyed.

Mr. BOGGS. I thank the gentleman from New York for his contribution.

Mr. Speaker, I feel that the gentleman makes a significant observation. (I have found it difficult at times to delve into the minds of some of my journalistic friends.)

But let me conclude by saying that I thank the distinguished gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. O'NEILL] for yielding this time to me.

Mr. Speaker, the war in Vietnam is something that all of us would like to see concluded and over.

I do not believe there are any differences between Democrats, or Republicans, or members of different religious faiths or different sections of our country in the universal desire for peace. I know that all of us desperately want peace on earth, as the encyclical of the Pope called for. But, my colleagues, all of you know there is a profound difference between peace and surrender. To my way of thinking—and I bow to each man in his right to have a contrary opinion—the one thing that surrender in Vietnam would not do would be to bring peace. Of that I am sure.

It would send the word everywhere that the commitment of our country, the greatest country on earth, was worthless. I believe Southeast Asia would be lost in a matter of months. I believe that everywhere the power of an open society would be curtailed. I believe the Chinese Communists would increase in their stature and in their power tremendously. I believe the impact would be felt everywhere—in Thailand, in Cambodia, Laos, down into New Zealand, in Africa and in South America. Yes, Mr. Speaker, the world would be quite different if the United States surrendered, and it would not be a world at peace.

Difficult as it is, as hard as it is to stay, as many sacrifices as are required, I am for staying until we get an honorable peace.

I am sorry Mr. Ashmore takes the position he takes. I guess that is his business. But the way I read what he says is that for all practical purposes we surrender. The day we do that the world in which we live will be quite different from this great, open, free, magnificent coun-

try every one of us enjoys today as Americans.

(Mr. BOGGS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks, and include extraneous matter.)

(The matters referred to follows:)

THE UNENDING STRUGGLE: PROBLEMS OF PEACE
IN VIETNAM
CHRONOLOGY

February 8, 1967: President Johnson's Letter to President Ho Chi Minh.

February 14, 1967: Ho Chi Minh's Letter to Pope Paul VI.

February 15, 1967: Ho Chi Minh's Letter to President Johnson.

March 14, 1967: U Thant's Message to the Parties Involved in the Viet-Nam Conflict.

March 18, 1967: United States Reply to U Thant's Message.

March 19, 1967: South Vietnamese Reply to U Thant's Message.

March 27, 1967: North Vietnamese Foreign Ministry Statement on U Thant's Message.

His Excellency HO CHI MINH,
President,

Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I am writing to you in the hope that the conflict in Viet-Nam can be brought to an end. That conflict has already taken a heavy toll—in lives lost, in wounds inflicted, in property destroyed, and in simple human misery. If we fail to find a just and peaceful solution, history will judge us harshly.

Therefore, I believe that we both have a heavy obligation to seek earnestly the path to peace. It is in response to that obligation that I am writing directly to you.

We have tried over the past several years, in a variety of ways and through a number of channels, to convey to you and your colleagues our desire to achieve a peaceful settlement. For whatever reasons, these efforts have not achieved any results.

It may be that our thoughts and yours, our attitudes and yours, have been distorted or misinterpreted as they passed through these various channels. Certainly that is always a danger in indirect communication.

There is one good way to overcome this problem and to move forward in the search for a peaceful settlement. That is for us to arrange for direct talks between trusted representatives in a secure setting and away from the glare of publicity. Such talks should not be used as a propaganda exercise but should be a serious effort to find a workable and mutually acceptable solution.

In the past two weeks, I have noted public statements by representatives of your Government suggesting that you would be prepared to enter into direct bilateral talks with representatives of the U.S. Government, provided that we ceased "unconditionally" and permanently our bombing operations against your country and all military actions against it. In the last day, serious and responsible parties have assured us indirectly that this is in fact your proposal.

Let me frankly state that I see two great difficulties with this proposal. In view of your public position, such action on our part would inevitably produce worldwide speculation that discussions were under way and would impair the privacy and secrecy of those discussions. Secondly, there would inevitably be grave concern on our part whether your Government would make use of such action by us to improve its military position.

With these problems in mind, I am prepared to move even further towards an ending of hostilities than your Government has proposed in either public statements or through private diplomatic channels. I am preparing to order a cessation of bombing against your country and the stopping of further augmentation of US forces in South Viet-Nam as soon as I am assured that infiltration into South Viet-Nam by land and

by sea has stopped. These acts of restraint on both sides would, I believe, make it possible for us to conduct serious and private discussions leading toward an early peace.

I make this proposal to you now with a specific sense of urgency arising from the imminent New Year holidays in Viet-Nam. If you are able to accept this proposal I see no reason why it could not take effect at the end of the New Year, or Tet, holidays. The proposal I have made would be greatly strengthened if your military authorities and those of the Government of South Viet-Nam could promptly negotiate an extension of the Tet truce.

As to the site of the bilateral discussions I propose, there are several possibilities. We could, for example, have our representatives meet in Moscow where contacts have already occurred. They could meet in some other country such as Burma. You may have other arrangements or sites in mind, and I would try to meet your suggestions.

The important thing is to end a conflict that has brought burdens to both our peoples, and above all to the people of South Viet-Nam. If you have any thoughts about the actions I propose, it would be most important that I receive them as soon as possible.

Sincerely,

LYNDON B. JOHNSON.

HO CHI MINH'S REPLY TO POPE PAUL VI

YOUR HOLINESS: I wish to thank Your Holiness for his message of February 8, 1967. In his message Your Holiness expressed the wish to see an early peaceful solution to the Viet-Nam question.

Our people sincerely love peace in order to build our country in independence and freedom. However, the U.S. imperialists have sent to South Viet-Nam half a million U.S. and satellite troops and used more than 600,000 puppet troops to wage a war against our people.

They have committed monstrous crimes. They have used the most barbarous arms such as napalm, chemical products and toxic gases, to massacre our compatriots and burn down our villages, pagodas, churches, hospitals, schools. Their acts of aggression have grossly violated the 1954 Geneva agreements on Viet-Nam and seriously menaced peace in Asia and the world.

To defend their independence and peace the Vietnamese people are resolutely fighting against the aggressors. They are confident that justice will triumph. The U.S. imperialists must put an end to their aggression in Viet-Nam, end unconditionally and definitively the bombing and all other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, withdraw from South Viet-Nam all American and satellite troops, recognize the South Viet-Nam National Front for Liberation and let the Vietnamese people settle themselves their own affairs. Only in such conditions can real peace be restored in Viet-Nam.

It is my hope that Your Holiness, in the name of humanity and justice, will use his high influence to urge that the U.S. Government respect the national rights of the Vietnamese people, namely peace, independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity as recognized by the 1954 Geneva agreements on Viet-Nam.

With my high regards,

HO CHI MINH.

His Excellency MR. LYNDON B. JOHNSON,
President, United States of America.

YOUR EXCELLENCY: On February 10, 1967, I received your message. This is my reply.

Viet-Nam is thousands of miles away from the United States. The Viet-namese people have never done any harm to the United States. But contrary to the pledges made by its representative at the 1954 Geneva Conference, the U.S. Government has ceaselessly intervened in Viet-Nam, it has unleashed and intensified the war of aggression in South

Viet-Nam with a view to prolonging the partition of Viet-Nam and turning South Viet-Nam into a neo-colony and a military base of the United States. For over two years now, the U.S. Government has, with its air and naval forces, carried the war to the Democratic Republic of (North) Viet-Nam, an independent and sovereign country.

The U.S. Government has committed war crimes, crimes against peace and against mankind. In South Viet-Nam, half a million U.S. and satellite troops have resorted to the most inhuman weapons and the most barbarous methods of warfare, such as napalm, toxic chemicals and gases, to massacre our compatriots, destroy crops, and raze villages to the ground. In North Viet-Nam, thousands of U.S. aircraft have dropped hundreds of thousands of tons of bombs, destroying towns, villages, factories, schools. In your message, you apparently deplore the sufferings and destruction in Viet-Nam. May I ask you: Who has perpetrated these monstrous crimes? It is the United States and satellite troops. The U.S. Government is entirely responsible for the extremely serious situation in Viet-Nam.

The U.S. war of aggression against the Vietnamese people constitutes a challenge to the countries of the socialist camp, a threat to the national independence movement, and a serious danger to peace in Asia and the world.

The Vietnamese people deeply love independence, freedom and peace. But in the face of the U.S. aggression, they have risen up, united as one man, fearless of sacrifices and hardships. They are determined to carry on their resistance until they have won genuine independence and freedom and true peace. Our just cause enjoys strong sympathy and support from the peoples of the whole world, including broad sections of the American people.

The U.S. Government has unleashed the war of aggression in Viet-Nam. It must cease this aggression. That is the only way to the restoration of peace. The U.S. Government must stop definitively and unconditionally its bombing raids and all other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, withdraw from South Viet-Nam all U.S. and satellite troops, recognize the South Viet-Nam National Front for Liberation, and let the Vietnamese people settle themselves their own affairs. Such is the basis (sic) content of the 4-point stand of the government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, which embodies the essential principles and provisions of the 1954 Geneva agreements on Viet-Nam, it is the basic (sic) of a correct political solution to the Viet-Nam problem.

In your message, you suggested direct talks between the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and the United States. If the U.S. Government really wants these talks, it must first of all stop unconditionally its bombing raids and all other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam. It is only after the unconditional cessation of the U.S. bombing raids and all other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam that the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and the United States could enter into talks and discuss questions concerning the two sides.

The Vietnamese people will never submit to force, they will never accept talks under the threat of bombs.

Our cause is absolutely just. It is to be hoped that the U.S. Government will act in accordance with reason.

Sincerely,

HO CHI MINH.

SECRETARY GENERAL U THANT'S AIDE MEMOIRE
TO THE PARTIES INVOLVED IN THE VIET-NAM
CONFLICT

On many occasions in the past, the Secretary General of the United Nations has expressed his very great concern about the conflict in Viet-Nam. That concern is in-

tensified by the growing fury of the war resulting in the increasing loss of lives, indescribable suffering and misery of the people, appalling devastation of the country, uprooting of society, astronomical sums spent on the war, and last, but not least, his deepening anxiety over the increasing threat to the peace of the world. For these reasons, in the past three years or so, he submitted ideas and proposals to the parties primarily involved in the war, with a view to creating conditions congenial to negotiations, which, unhappily, have not been accepted by the parties. The prospects for peace seem to be more distant today than ever before.

Nevertheless, the Secretary General reasserts his conviction that a cessation of the bombing of North Viet-Nam continues to be a vital need, for moral and humanitarian reasons and, also, because it is the step which could lead the way to meaningful talks to end the war.

The situation being as it is today, the Secretary General has now in mind proposals envisaging three steps: (a) A general stand-still truce, (b) Preliminary talks, (c) Reconvening of the Geneva Conference.

In the view of the Secretary General, a halt to all military activities by all sides is a practical necessity if useful negotiations are to be undertaken. Since the Secretary General's three-point plan has not been accepted by the parties, he believes that a general stand-still truce by all parties to the conflict is now the only course which could lead to fruitful negotiations. It must be conceded that a truce without effective supervision is apt to be breached from time to time by one side or another, but an effective supervision of truce, at least for the moment, seems difficult to envisage as a practical possibility. If the parties directly involved in the conflict are genuinely motivated by considerations of peace and justice, it is only to be expected that earnest efforts will be exerted to enforce the truce to the best of their ability. Should a public appeal by the Secretary General in his personal capacity facilitate the observance of such a truce, he would gladly be prepared to do so. Appeals to that effect by a group of countries would also be worthy of consideration.

Once the appeal has been made and a general stand-still truce comes into effect, the parties directly involved in the conflict should take the next step of entering into preliminary talks. While these talks are in progress, it is clearly desirable that the general stand-still truce should continue to be observed. In the view of the Secretary General, these talks can take any of the following forms:

(1) Direct talks between the United States of America and the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam.

(2) Direct talks between the two governments mentioned in (1) above, with the participation of the two Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference of 1954.

(3) Direct talks between the two governments mentioned in (1) above, with the participation of the members of the International Control Commission.

(4) Direct talks between the two governments mentioned in (1) above, with the participation of the two Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference of 1954 and of the members of the International Control Commission.

The Secretary General believes that these preliminary talks should aim at reaching an agreement on the modalities for the reconvening of the Geneva Conference, with the sole purpose of returning to the essentials of that Agreement as repeatedly expressed by all parties to the conflict. These preliminary talks should seek to reach an agreement on the timing, place, agenda and participants in the subsequent formal meeting—the reconvening of the Geneva Conference. The Secretary General deems it necessary to stress that the question of participants in the formal negotiations should not obstruct

the way to a settlement. It is a question which could be solved only by agreeing that no fruitful discussions on ending the war in Viet-Nam could take place without involving all those who are actually fighting. Since the Government in Saigon, as well as the National Front of Liberation of South Viet-Nam, are actually engaged in military operations, it is the view of the Secretary General that a future formal conference could not usefully discuss the effective termination of all military activities and the new political situation that would result in South Viet-Nam, without the participation of representatives of the Government in Saigon and representatives of the National Front of Liberation of South Viet-Nam.

In transmitting these proposals to the parties directly concerned, the Secretary General believes that he is acting within the limits of his good offices purely in his private capacity. He hopes that the divergent positions held by the parties both on the nature of the conflict and the ultimate political objectives will not prevent them from giving their very serious attention to these proposals. Indeed, he takes this opportunity to appeal to them to give their urgent consideration to his proposals.

U.S. REPLY TO UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY GENERAL U THANT'S AIDE MEMOIRE ON VIET-NAM

As the Secretary General knows, the United States and other Governments have, over many months, approached Hanoi, both publicly and privately, with proposals to end the conflict in Viet-Nam. To date, all such efforts have been rebuffed. The Government of North Viet-Nam has refused to agree to discussions without pre-conditions or to take reciprocal actions leading toward a cessation of hostilities.

For this reason, the Government of the United States would be most interested in learning whether Hanoi is willing to enter into such discussions or to take reciprocal actions leading to peace in Viet-Nam. The United States has been, and remains willing to enter into discussions without pre-conditions with Hanoi at any time.

To this end, the United States accepts the three-step proposal in the aide memoire of the Secretary General of March 14, 1967 envisaging: (a) A general stand-still truce; (b) preliminary talks; (c) reconvening of the Geneva Conference.

The United States believes it would be desirable and contributory to serious negotiations if an effective cessation of hostilities, as the first element in the three-point proposal, could be promptly negotiated.

It would, therefore, be essential that the details of such a general cessation of hostilities be discussed directly by both sides, or through the Secretary General, the Geneva Conference Co-Chairmen or otherwise as may be agreed. The United States is prepared to enter into such discussions immediately and constructively.

The United States is also prepared to take the next steps in any of the forms suggested by the Secretary General to enter into preliminary talks leading to agreement as to the modalities for reconvening of the Geneva Conference.

Of course, the Government of South Viet-Nam will have to be appropriately involved throughout this entire process. The interests and views of our allies would also have to be taken fully into account.

The United States again expresses its appreciation to the Secretary General for his untiring efforts to help bring about a peaceful settlement and an end to the conflict in Viet-Nam.

REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM'S REPLY TO U THANT'S PROPOSAL

The Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam has carefully examined the aide memoire which His Excellency U Thant, Secre-

tary General, handed to Ambassador Nguyen Duy Lien, observer of the Republic of Viet-Nam to the United Nations.

The Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam is thankful to His Excellency U Thant for his untiring search for an early end to the conflict in Viet-Nam and appreciates the constructive spirit in which the Secretary General's proposals were made.

The Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam agrees in principle with the main points of the Secretary's proposals, but in order for these proposals to be more easily implemented, the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam submits the following:

1—A military truce cannot be effective without prior agreement on details and control. Therefore, in order to discuss the details of the truce, the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam proposes that representatives of the high command of the Hanoi Government forces and those of the Republic of Viet-Nam Armed Forces should meet at the demilitarized zone, or at any other place the Hanoi Government may choose.

If the Government of North Viet-Nam agrees to this proposal, the representatives of the high command of the Republic of Viet-Nam Armed Forces will be ready to meet with them within a week's notice.

2—The Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam is in full agreement with the Secretary General when he states that an international conference is necessary to find a permanent political solution to the Vietnamese problem. But in order to gain time and thus achieve an earlier settlement, the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam proposes that, instead of holding preliminary talks prior to the full-fledged conference, a Geneva-type international conference be held as soon as possible after the truce is effectively enforced. Such a conference should have the participation of all interested governments.

This, however, does not preclude the holding of preliminary talks as provided for in the Secretary General's aide memoire if these should prove necessary. These preliminary talks shall include the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam, the Government of North Viet-Nam, the Government of the United States, among other interested governments.

SPOKESMAN OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM'S REPLY TO QUESTIONS ON NEWS REPORTS AS BROADCAST BY RADIO HANOI

1—Bulletin number 24 of the Information Service of the United Nations in New Delhi, India, in its issue on 6 March 1967 quoted U Thant, Secretary General of the United Nations, as declaring that Hanoi views the hostilities as a civil war in South Viet-Nam, with Hanoi helping one side and the United States the other. Hanoi held that if the United States was willing to withdraw support for Saigon, there might be a possibility of reciprocity.

2—Of late, Western reports also made known that U Thant had proposed a solution to the Viet-Nam problem. It consists of an appeal for an over-all cease-fire followed by a preliminary meeting of a number of parties concerned to discuss the reconvening of the Geneva Conference and finally by the reconvening of the Geneva Conference.

The spokesman of the Foreign Ministry of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam declared: It is as clear as daylight that the United States is committing aggression against South Viet-Nam and bombing and shelling the DRV and that the Vietnamese people are victims of the aggression. The whole world has vehemently condemned the U.S. imperialists' war of aggression and strongly supported the patriotic struggle of the Vietnamese people. The reports by the U.N. Information Service do not tally with reality in Viet-Nam and are contrary to the views of the Government of the DRV. As the United States is committing aggression

against Viet-Nam, the correct way to settle the Viet-Nam problem is that the United States must stop its aggression. That is the basic spirit of the four-point stand of the Government of the DRV and the five point statement of the NFLSV. The world's people fully support this just stand.

To call on both sides to cease fire and hold unconditional negotiations while the United States is committing aggression against Viet-Nam and taking serious steps in its military escalation in both zones of Viet-Nam is to make no distinction between the aggressor and the victim of aggression, to depart from reality, and to demand that the Vietnamese people accept the conditions of the aggressors.

By the way, it is necessary to underline once again the views of the Government of the DRV, which has pointed out that the Viet-Nam problem has no concern with the United Nations and the United Nations has absolutely no right to interfere in any way in the Viet-Nam question.

[From the Paris editor of the New York Times-Herald Tribune, May 31 or June 1, 1967]

THE UNPEACEFUL MEETING

There was no "peace on earth" at the Pacem in Terris conference in Geneva. There was, instead, a verbal war against the Americans, who had few defenders and many critics.

The emphasis was on Vietnam. Insofar as there is popular as well as intellectual suspicion and criticism of the United States' role in this war, the Geneva conference was to that extent a reflection of world opinion. However, the often strident tone of the denunciations and the unwillingness to listen to the American arguments before attacking them created an atmosphere that was neither academic nor judicial.

Sir Thaddeus McCarthy, a New Zealand judge, put the situation well when he argued that although the U.S. might be wrong in its Vietnam policy, he did not accept that it was "evil." He was undoubtedly using the term "evil" in the sense of a deliberate intention to be wicked and to do something harmful. The results of the Vietnam policy are open to attack along with the errors of the Johnson and previous administrations, but the emphasis in Geneva was too exclusively on moral grounds and was confined to U.S. failings. Issues of the complexity of the Vietnam war are not one-sided nor all black and white, as so many critics seemed to think.

The conference showed the extent to which the United States is being judged in terms of Vietnam. This distorts the image of a nation which is now the greatest power on earth, with manifold interests and responsibilities and with policies that are right as well as wrong.

The United States is going through a phase of history that resembles the experience of Great Britain, especially in the 19th century, when the sun never set on her empire. The contributions of Britain in the three centuries that began with Queen Elizabeth I were—and, indeed, are—incalculable. Dozens of countries and uncounted millions of people in Africa, Asia, the Middle East and the South Pacific owe much to whom? To Great Britain. But gratitude was never asked, and it certainly was rarely given.

The United States is doing a great many things in the contemporary world, some good and some bad, but its image is not seen clearly or in balance—because of Vietnam. At the Pacem in Terris conference Vietnam often seemed to monopolize the picture.

Pope John XXIII, who gave the Center for the Studies of Democratic Institutions the title for its conferences, wrote in his encyclical: "Truth further demands that the various media of social communications made

available by modern progress, which enable the nations to know each other better, be used with serene objectivity."

What happened to "serene objectivity" at the conference in Geneva?

PACEM IN TERRIS II CONFERENCE, GENEVA, MAY 31, 1967

(Speech delivered by Sir Thaddeus McCarthy,
Justice of the Court of Appeals)

Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen: I am acutely aware that anyone of the name of McCarthy who dares to suggest in a gathering such as we have here that anything however small can be said in favor of the United States official policy in Vietnam incurs the risk of being branded as a reactionary.

But surely, Mr. Chairman, if we are to arrive at an objective and impartial judgment on this issue we must hear both sides of the question, and up till now we have heard only one; not even Senator Brooke has explained the reasons which actuated the American intervention and its continued presence in Vietnam or surveyed the evidence which is claimed to support that action. And yet we would be naive if we did not recognize that there is another point of view, one very different from that which has been advanced so persistently and emotionally over the last few days. It is a point of view which is held by many, perhaps even most, of the thinking people in Australia and New Zealand. It is the official viewpoint of most of the Governments in the South West Pacific, of Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, Malaya and the Philippines. This point of view does not see China and North Vietnam as being cruelly oppressed by a power and money-hungry United States. Rather they see and fear the southward march of an expansionist communist movement and they remember Tibet, Malaya, North West India, Vietnam and now Thailand—they see a pattern in all this. Now this viewpoint may well be wrong. That is a matter of private opinion, but it is an opinion which exists and it cannot be ignored as non-existent. How much better in these circumstances it would have been and how much more able we would have been to arrive at a balanced judgment on this question of American intervention, if some person had come forward to explain the reasons which actuated the United States policy and the evidence which it is said supports it. We in New Zealand agree, of course, that if possible an end should be put to the hideous slaughter which is going on by all sides, and we would like to see the whole question go to the United Nations, but Mr. Chester Ronning has put his finger on the difficulty of getting the dispute before that body. How do we get it there? Will someone answer that?

May I add a personal reflection. I have been distressed at the readiness of so many speakers at this conference to impugn the motives of the administration of the United States. The people of New Zealand do not take that stand. We remember with gratitude that some 20 years ago we were saved by American power and American blood from the march or what was certainly in that case, an expansionist Eastern power. I hope we will never forget that. We see the United States as a great and generous power and whilst many in my country may doubt the wisdom of certain methods or means adopted by the United States, nevertheless most New Zealanders have confidence in the integrity of that nation and its elected representatives. For myself I accept that the United States could possibly be wrong in its decision, but I do not accept that it is evil.

[Press release from the U.S. Department of State, No. 202, Sept. 18, 1967]

STATEMENT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

We have had a number of inquiries concerning news stories published today, based

on an article by Mr. Harry Ashmore in a publication of the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions (CSDI).

The facts concerning the Department's contacts with Messrs. Ashmore and Baggs are as follows:

1. During the summer of 1966, Mr. William Baggs told the Department that CSDI was planning a major conference in May of 1967 in Geneva, to follow up on the first *Pacem In Terris* meeting held in New York in February of 1965. Mr. Baggs disclosed to us efforts that the Center was making to invite North Viet-Nam to attend, and the Department responded sympathetically to the idea of the Conference and to these efforts. These initial contacts were with Mr. George Ball and Mr. William Bundy. The President and Secretary Rusk were informed, and Mr. Ball was directed to handle contacts with Mr. Baggs on behalf of the United States Government.

2. In mid-November and again in early December, Mr. Baggs was joined by Mr. Ashmore in calls at the Department. In these calls, the progress of the conference plans was reviewed, and the two visitors indicated that they had a tentative invitation to go to Hanoi, with Mr. Luis Quintanilla of Mexico. Messrs. Baggs and Ashmore also suggested that, if they were able to visit Hanoi, they might be able to conduct useful explorations of North Vietnamese views towards peace. Mr. George Ball having then left the Department, the primary responsibility for these conversations passed on his successor, Mr. Katzenbach, who kept the President and the Secretary of State informed as a matter of course.

In these conversations, Department representatives accepted the Baggs/Ashmore suggestion and undertook to cooperate fully. Accordingly, the position of the United States Government on key issues relating to peace was discussed at some length, so that Baggs and Ashmore could represent it accurately in Hanoi.

3. On December 23, Baggs visited the Department just prior to the departure of the three-man group on December 28. At that meeting, the basic understanding of the United States Government position was reaffirmed, and it was further agreed that Baggs and Ashmore would report confidentially what they were able to pick up in Hanoi.

4. Messrs. Baggs and Ashmore visited Hanoi from January 6 to January 14. They then returned to the U.S. and on January 18 dictated for the Department a full and confidential account of their conversations. This covered in particular a conversation with President Ho on January 12. In this conversation, Ho had insisted that there could be no talks between the U.S. and Hanoi unless the bombing were stopped, and unless also the U.S. stopped all reinforcement during the period of the talks. Ho was reported to be adamant against any reciprocal military restraint by North Viet-Nam. The record does not show that he solicited any USG response to these remarks.

5. Concurrently, prior to January 18, on United States initiative and without any connection to the Baggs/Ashmore actions, United States Government representatives had established a direct channel for communication with North Vietnamese representatives in Moscow. With the apparent agreement of both sides, this channel was being kept wholly confidential, and was therefore not revealed to Messrs. Baggs and Ashmore in their discussions at the Department. It is, of course, fundamental to the United States Government dealings with Messrs. Baggs and Ashmore that there existed at the time this direct and secret channel. Exchanges through this direct channel continued through January and early February and culminated in President Johnson's letter to President Ho of February 8 (mistakenly stated by Mr. Ashmore as

February 2). As has been stated by representatives of the Department, a wide variety of proposals was put before Hanoi in these Moscow contacts, without at any time producing any useful response.

6. Toward the end of January, Messrs. Baggs and Ashmore returned to Washington and expressed to the Department the strong hope that they could be given a message for transmission to Hanoi. The Department decided that, while the direct channel in Moscow was crucial and must at all costs be preserved, it would be useful to send a more general message through Messrs. Baggs and Ashmore, which would be consistent with the important messages being exchanged in Moscow. In view of this channel (of which Baggs-Ashmore were unaware) there was some question as to the further utility of detailed informal communications. It seemed clear from the account given by Messrs. Baggs and Ashmore that their channel of communication had been established with the primary purpose of exchanges concerning North Vietnamese attendance at the May conference. Nevertheless, Baggs and Ashmore said they could send any messages for Hanoi through the regular mail to a North Vietnamese representative in Phnom Penh, who in turn would relay it to a North Vietnamese official who had been the principal contact of Messrs. Baggs and Ashmore in Hanoi. Accordingly, the letter now published by Mr. Ashmore was worked out with the representatives of the Department, and authorized to be sent on February 5. We were subsequently informed by Mr. Ashmore that this letter reached Phnom Penh on February 15.

7. No useful purpose could be served by giving further details on what took place in the Moscow channel. We can say, however, that on February 7, while that channel was still open and in operation, separate discussions were initiated in London between Prime Minister Wilson and Premier Kosygin of the USSR. The combined reading of the Moscow channel and of these discussions led to the dispatch on February 8 of President Johnson's letter to President Ho. This letter was of course published unilaterally by Hanoi on March 21, and is a matter of public record. It rested on, and was of course read by Hanoi in relation to, the various proposals that had been conveyed in the Moscow channel. There was no change of basic position whatever between February 5 and February 8, but President Johnson's letter did include a specific action proposal that speaks for itself, as does the tone of his communication.

8. As already noted, Hanoi had not responded in any useful way to the variety of suggestions conveyed in the Moscow channel. Its sole and apparently final response was reflected on February 13, in a letter by President Ho to Pope Paul VI. This letter, in the words of one press account today, "coupled an unconditional end to the bombing with the withdrawal of American forces and the recognition of the National Liberation Front." On February 15, President Ho replied formally to the President in similar terms. At the same time, Hanoi broke off the Moscow channel.

9. Hanoi's attitude remained negative throughout. The Baggs/Ashmore efforts were necessarily handled by the Department with an eye to the direct and then-confidential channel that existed concurrently to Hanoi. The latter appeared to be by far the more reliable and secure method of ascertaining Hanoi's views.

10. Finally, we note with regret that Mr. Ashmore is apparently ignorant of the subsequently published reports of the Moscow contacts, and of their confirmation by Department representatives. We note with still greater regret that at no time since has he consulted with the Department in order to attempt to understand the interrelationship that necessarily obtained between the Moscow channel and his own efforts. As this case shows, the Administration has been prepared

at all times to cooperate with private individuals who may be in contact with Hanoi in any way, and who are prepared to act responsibly and discreetly. This policy continues, although it seems clear that the present disclosure will not reassure Hanoi that such private contacts will be kept secret.

[From the Washington Post, Sept. 17, 1967]

A COST ANALYSIS OF THE VIETNAM WAR—
"WIN" OR "LOSE"
(By J. R. Wiggins)

It is natural, logical and inevitable for a people to make periodic reexaminations of a struggle involving half a million fighting men, requiring \$27 billion a year and influencing domestic and foreign policy in every quarter.

Wars have their own dynamics and make and unmake issues as they go along, so we need to examine what now is the central issue of the war in South Vietnam, to study the consequences of having that issue settled one way or another and at least to enter conjectures whether the cost of influencing the settlement of that issue in accordance with our preferences is worth the pain and the burden.

In Vietnam, there is a host of subsidiary issues (by no means unimportant because subsidiary). But the central issue is now, as it has been for some time, quite clear.

A BEARABLE PRICE

The world is watching Vietnam to see if the rulers of one country, state sovereignty or territory, at an endurable risk and a bearable price, can impose a government and system of their choice upon a neighboring people by inciting internal subversion, supporting indigenous insurrection, engaging in infiltration and intervening and invading as necessary. This is the formula of the Communists' celebrated "wars of liberation."

The North Vietnamese so far seem convinced that the risk is endurable and the price bearable. The United States has intervened to make the price unbearable and the risk not endurable. The practical issue before the American people is simply whether the costs of preventing such a conquest or the costs of acquiescing in it are greater. That, for us, is the single, central issue of the conflict.

Since the ascendancy of Mao Tsetung it has been popular in the Communist world to call such conquests "wars of liberation"; in the diplomatic vernacular of any prior generation, they would have been identified as ordinary aggression.

American policy ought to proceed from decisions on what would be likely to happen if the conquest succeeded and what would be likely to happen if it failed. So what would happen if it succeeded?

PROOF OF A THEORY

To begin with the broadest philosophical consequences, it surely would give an impetus throughout the Communist world to the forces that are persuaded of the efficacy of "wars of national liberation." Such a practical demonstration of the minimal risks and relatively low costs of this kind of conquest would play into the hands of every doctrinal Communist hawk in every undecided Communist government, lending great force to the proponents of adventurous imperialistic policy in every arena offering any plausible opportunity for such conquest. It would greatly strengthen the Chinese Communists against the Soviet Communists and it would immeasurably fortify the hard-liners in the Soviet regime.

What this would mean for the United States and other non-Communist states, no one can say in any specific way, but it is safe to say that it would not mean a period of peaceful coexistence. On the contrary, it would probably usher in decades of political tumult and conflict, particularly in Asia, Africa and South America, and might even

propel us into a worldwide thermonuclear holocaust set off by wars in even more dangerous areas than Southeast Asia.

The effects in Southeast Asia of North Vietnam's success in South Vietnam are more foreseeable. It is clear that the military predicament of Laos would be totally untenable. It is plain that Cambodia could not long support an independent role. Thailand certainly would have to re-examine its position and might have to exercise its genius for accommodation with neighboring aggressors.

The failure of United States policy in South Vietnam would certainly prompt the reasonable conclusion in every government in Asia that the United States was unable or unwilling to defend countries threatened with this kind of aggression. It would be logical for many of them to make appropriate diplomatic changes.

It is quite clear that American power and influence would be at an end in South Asia. This adverse consequence might be diminished, of course, by a demonstration elsewhere (say in Thailand) that the United States retained its willingness and ability to defend Asian friends.

But to lay down the gauge in South Vietnam and pick it up elsewhere would be illogical and politically impossible. And the lesson of failure in South Vietnam might fatally prejudice any subsequent endeavor if it were made. It would be wise to write off South Asia for the time being.

NATIONALISM A FACTOR

Would this be fatal to American interests? Probably it would not be fatal, however damaging in the immediate future. It is possible to make a tenable argument that the removal of American power from the region would not permanently put all of the area into the control of forces hostile to American interests.

In the fullness of time, forces of nationalism and regionalism would undoubtedly assert themselves in Asia and produce states with differing degrees of independent sovereignty. There is no reason to suppose that the system which has failed to produce progress and peace in China would find it easier to impose peace and achieve progress in an even larger and less homogeneous environment involving the whole of non-Soviet Asia.

Whatever degree of submission to communism might temporarily prevail over much of Asia, from India to Japan, in the final unrolling of history, reassertion of national impulse and local interests could be expected. India and Pakistan might surrender or compromise their independence but a residual passion for national recognition and identity would linger within the body politic, "murmuring in the shell and waiting for the tide to return and flood it again."

LESS THAN AN ECLIPSE

It is reasonable to suppose that a century very different from the one hitherto foreseen would emerge from the triumph of North Vietnam and the humiliation of the United States. But it would be unfair to suggest that even a United States of vastly curtailed international influence and power would be fatally impaired or permanently diminished.

If its affairs in this vastly altered world were conducted with skill and prudence; if its international policy were realistically realigned in conformity with its diminished capacity to influence events; if its leaders accepted their liabilities philosophically; if its people cheerfully acknowledged the limitations on their power—then the nation might go on, its world role greatly changed but not necessarily eclipsed permanently.

And if North Vietnam's war against South Vietnam fails and there emerges in the South a viable state with a government that is reasonably representative of its people, will that usher in the millennium? No, it must be said in fairness that it will not do so.

The Philippines and Malaysia demonstrated that wars of liberation do not always succeed, but that did not prevent the war in Vietnam. The tragedy in Indonesia demonstrated that infiltration and subversion can fail with calamitous consequences, but no one supposes that that was the last of Communist China's efforts to subvert and overthrow regimes friendly to it.

But if this failure did not usher in the millennium, it might diminish the zeal of many Communist states for this kind of conflict. There would be fewer "wars of national liberation" than there would be if North Vietnam's attempt at conquest succeeded.

The scale of the Vietnam war already has demonstrated that the price tag on such wars is higher and the risk greater than the hawks of North Vietnam must have anticipated. If there occurs in Vietnam a demonstration that such wars involve an unendurable risk and an unbearable cost and are not likely to succeed, prospects for peace in the future will be increased.

Peace, however, in any sense that we have enjoyed it in the past, is not in our future, whatever happens or does not happen in South Vietnam. The world has yet to accomplish the accommodation between great historical forces that are at present antipathetic to each other and that proceed on paths that preclude any peaceful reconciliation.

Statesmen in our generation, and in generations immediately ahead, will vindicate their stature and make bold their claims on the gratitude of posterity if they succeed in holding this irrepressible conflict within such bounds that history in its patient unfolding may subject this rigidities of doctrine to the ameliorating influences of time's subtle and insidious solvent.

In this long and perilous interval, the peoples who survive will be those who keep awake to the disagreeable fact of our time: that there are no easy alternatives, no painless choices, no magic palliatives, no miracles that can spare us the anguish of struggle or guarantee us immunity to risk and danger.

[From the Washington Post, Sept. 18, 1967]

CHRONOLOGY OF VIET PEACE EFFORTS (By Chalmers M. Roberts)

The record indicates that the Ashmore-Baggs peace effort ran afoul of a change in American policy which occurred at the moment they were involved in Vietnam diplomacy.

This is the record, as far as it is now known, of the pertinent events:

Dec. 4, 1966—Poland reported to the United States that North Vietnam was prepared to send a man to Warsaw to meet an American representative and to do so without demanding as a pre-condition an end to the American bombing of the North.

American officials subsequently contended that independent checks showed this to be a Polish view, not that of North Vietnam.

Dec. 13-14—American planes raid near Hanoi. Poland later privately blamed the raids for ending chances for a meeting. After the raids Hanoi began to stress the demand that bombing must cease unconditionally before there could be talks.

Dec. 26-Jan. 6, 1967—Harrison Salisbury of the New York Times created a furor with dispatches from Hanoi picturing civilian destruction from the American raids. Officials here said Hanoi had let Salisbury in as part of a campaign to force an end to the bombing. Ashmore and Baggs arrived in Hanoi the day Salisbury left.

Jan. 12—Ashmore and Baggs met Ho Chi Minh who stressed an end to the bombing. Ashmore now writes that "we had not brought back" from this interview "any hard proposal" from Ho "beyond the reiteration of his unqualified commitment to enter into negotiations" if the U.S. halted the bombing.

Ashmore reported to State Department offi-

cials that he and Baggs felt that "Ho seemed prepared to consider a specific proposal based on a formula of mutual deescalation" of the fighting.

Early January to early February—The United States secretly sent four memoranda to Hanoi describing, officials say, possible methods of deescalation. These messages, yet to be made public, were handed by an American embassy official in Moscow to a North Vietnamese representative.

Jan. 27—Hanoi's man in Moscow gave a reply to the American official. Later the State Department described the reply as "a diatribe against the United States."

Jan. 28—North Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh in an interview with Australian Communist journalist Wilfred Burchett said that "it is only after the unconditional cessation of U.S. bombing and all other acts of war against the DRV (North Vietnam) that there could be talks between the DRV and the U.S."

Feb. 2.—President Johnson prepared a letter to Ho in which he took up the Burchett interview points. Mr. Johnson said he would order a "cessation of bombing" and also halt "further augmentation of U.S. forces in South Vietnam as soon as I am assured that infiltration into South Vietnam by land and sea has stopped." These "acts of restraint," he said, would make possible serious private discussions." This letter, however, was not turned over to Hanoi's man in Moscow until Feb. 8 and the delay has never been explained.

Feb. 4—Ashmore and Baggs met at the State Department with Undersecretary Nicholas deB. Katzenbach and other top officials but not including Secretary Dean Rusk.

A letter from Ashmore to Ho was drafted with Assistant Secretary William P. Bundy, whose area includes Vietnam, as the chief departmental draftsman.

The key sentence in the letter stated that "senior officials" at State "expressed opinion that some reciprocal restraint" was necessary along with a halt to the bombing and an end to the influx of American troops if talks were to take place.

Feb. 5—The draft letter was delivered to Ashmore at Fulbright's house. Ashmore mailed it that afternoon. The letter did not specify the "reciprocal restraint" although the President's letter of three days earlier had specified an end to North Vietnamese infiltration into the South.

In addition, on the day (Feb. 2) the Administration said the Presidential letter was drafted, Mr. Johnson told a press conference that "just almost any step" would be a suitable response from Hanoi. He also had said that "we would be glad to explore any reciprocal action." Sometime between Feb. 2 and 9 the official American terms were hardened.

Feb. 8—Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin, who was in London Feb. 6-13, said at a press conference that the Trinh interview with Burchett "boils down" to saying that if the U.S. unconditionally stopped the bombing, "then it would be possible" to open talks. Kosygin thus publicly changed Trinh's crucial word "could," into "would." He was never contradicted by Hanoi on this. Furthermore Kosygin passed the word to Washington, which had inquired as to when talks would begin, that they could start in three or four weeks.

Feb. 9—Secretary Rusk, at a press conference which had been announced by the White House, said that "for some time now there has been evident a systematic campaign by the Communist side to bring about an unconditional and permanent cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam without any corresponding military action on their side, in exchange for the possibility of talks—talks which are thus far formless and without content."

Rusk also distinguished between a "pause in the bombing (here he seemed to indicate he would agree to a pause in exchange for talks) and a "permanent cessation." For the latter to take place, he said, "we must know the military consequences." The U.S., he said, cannot stop the bombing without reciprocity for that would be "closing off one-half of the war while the rest of it goes on full force."

In short, Rusk was surfacing the central point of the President's letter to Ho, the contents of which were not made public until Hanoi broadcast it March 21.

Feb. 10—Ho said he received the Johnson letter on this day. Ashmore assumes it arrived before his own letter with the less specific request on the point of reciprocity.

During this period, Feb. 8-14, there was a pause in the bombing over the Tet holiday in Vietnam, including a Presidentialy ordered short extension.

Feb. 13—Ho in a letter to Pope Paul VI assailed the U.S. He coupled an unconditional end to the bombing with the withdrawal of American forces and the recognition of the National Liberation Front, the political arm of the Vietcong. In Washington this was taken as a reply to the President. Resumption of the bombing was ordered.

Feb. 15—Ho replied to the President in words similar to the Pope. "A little later," writes Ashmore, he and Baggs received a reply to the Ashmore letter saying there did not seem to be any point to their making a second visit to Hanoi.

[From the Washington Post, Sept. 19, 1967]

THE ARKANSAS TRAVELER

The differences between the letter which Harry Ashmore, with State Department advice, wrote to Hanoi on Feb. 5 and the letter which President Johnson sent on Feb. 8, do not seem to justify the harsh allegation that the Government has been guilty of "a devious course" and of "crude duplicity."

The Presidential letter is more specific than the Ashmore letter but not in basic contradiction with it. And even if a contradiction exists, there seems little reason to suppose this a deliberate sabotage of a possible peace. North Vietnam could have availed itself of the option exercised by President Kennedy in replying to the apparently conflicting Khrushchev letters in the Cuban crisis. The White House in that situation chose to reply to the letter that seemed most hopeful. It seems likely that a government in Hanoi really anxious for peace could have done the same thing.

It is not remarkable that the State Department and the President were pursuing peace through a Moscow channel at the same time that Ashmore was proceeding through his private and informal channel. There does not seem to be anything duplicitous about the failure to abandon all other explorations of peace until the Ashmore lead had been run out. Nor does there seem to be anything duplicitous about failure of the Government to take Ashmore wholly into its confidence as to alternative approaches. Events would seem to afford justification for not doing so. It is not customary or conventional for governments to yield exclusive negotiating rights to private citizens conducting unofficial and informal preliminary exploration of this kind.

Such inquiries as Ashmore and William Baggs made in Hanoi are extremely useful and helpful. While they do not often lead directly to peace or negotiations for peace, they are an alternative means of communication when formal channels of diplomacy are closed. Through such conversations ordinary private citizens often can perform an important and patriotic function. The honest purpose and good motive of these two able journalists entitle them to the praise of their countrymen.

Unfortunately, the Ashmore article in Center Magazine is tendentious and querulous and obscures more than it clarifies the efforts

of the Arkansas traveler and his companion. Its high tone and imperious posture conveys the somewhat embarrassing impression that the author regards the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions as a sovereign power. The article sounds like a communique from a greater to a lesser, and infinitely more stupid and worse governed, minor state.

The Ashmore article makes it clear that the word he has for the Johnson Administration is the word that Arkansas Traveler had for his critics in the 1850s: "You give me a pain." And that message has some political importance in 1967 but it probably does not much advance the prospects for peace on earth.

[From the New York Times, Sept. 19, 1967]
JOHNSON AND ASHMORE LETTERS TO HANOI COMPARED

Following is a comparison of highlights of a letter by President Johnson to President Ho Chi Minh of North Vietnam, sent Feb. 8, and a letter by Harry S. Ashmore, the editor, sent Feb. 5.

President Johnson wrote:

"I am prepared to order a cessation of bombing against your country and the stopping of further augmentation of United States forces in South Vietnam as soon as I am assured that infiltration in South Vietnam by land and by sea has stopped.

"These acts of restraint on both sides would, I believe, make it possible for us to conduct serious and private discussions leading toward an early peace."

Mr. Ashmore wrote: "They [high officials of the State Department] expressed particular interest in your suggestion to us that private talks could begin provided the United States stopped bombing your country and ceased introducing additional United States troops into Vietnam. They expressed the opinion that some reciprocal restraint to indicate that neither side intended to use the occasion of the talks for military advantage would provide tangible evidence of the good faith of all parties in the prospects for a negotiated settlement."

President Johnson: "There is one good way to overcome this problem [of communication] and to move forward in search for a peaceful settlement. That is for us to arrange for direct talks between trusted representatives in a secure setting and away from the glare of publicity. Such talks should not be used as a propaganda exercise, but should be a serious effort to find a workable and mutually acceptable solution."

Mr. Ashmore: "They [State Department officials] emphasized that the United States remains prepared for secret discussions at any time, without conditions, and that such discussions might cover the whole range of topics relative to a peaceful settlement."

President Johnson: "I make this proposal to you now with a specific sense of urgency arising from the imminent new year holidays in Vietnam. If you are able to accept this proposal I see no reason why it could not take effect at the end of the new year, or Tet, holidays. The proposal I have made would be greatly strengthened if your military authorities and those of the Government of South Vietnam could promptly negotiate an extension of the Tet truce."

Mr. Ashmore relate a possible agreement to the new year's truce in Vietnam.

Mr. Ashmore: "They [the State Department officials] reiterated that the Geneva accords might be the framework for a peaceful solution."

President Johnson did not mention the Geneva agreements of 1954 as a possible framework.

President Johnson: "As to the site of the bilateral discussions I propose, there are several possibilities. We could, for example, have our representatives meet in Moscow where contacts have already occurred. They could meet in some other country such as Burma. You may have other arrangements or sites

in mind, and I would try to meet your suggestions."

Mr. Ashmore's letter proposed no specific meeting place.

President Johnson: "If you have any thoughts about the actions I propose, it would be most important that I receive them as soon as possible."

Mr. Ashmore: "In the light of these concerns, they [the State Department officials] expressed great interest in any clarification of this point [about mutual restraints] that you might wish to provide through a communication to us."

[From the Washington Evening Star, Sept. 19, 1967]

STATE AND THE EDITORS

The State Department has come up with two reasoned and telling answers to the charge that the administration purposely scuttled the efforts of two American newspaper editors to bring Hanoi to the negotiating table.

First, according to the State Department, neither editor was aware that at the time of their meeting with Ho Chi Minh, the administration was itself in secret contact with Hanoi via Moscow—a channel that was understandably considered somewhat more important than the impressions of two private citizens. Second, the President's letter was not intended to pull the rug out from under anybody. It was, in fact, quite similar in content to the proposals advanced by the editorial emissaries.

There is no need to doubt the sincerity of the two editors, Harry S. Ashmore of the Arkansas Gazette and William C. Baggs of the Miami News. Unquestionably, they believed, as Ashmore charged in the accusatory magazine article, that President Johnson had moved in on their small, hopeful flame and poured cold water all over it.

But, at the same time, it should be clear that the two men were in no position to view their efforts against the background of the continuing diplomatic maneuvering with Hanoi. To Ashmore and Baggs, their visit to Hanoi was the sum total of their experience in the field of international diplomacy. To the President and his Secretary of State, it was one more piece in the complex Asian jigsaw puzzle.

As for the content of the two letters, Ashmore is critical of the President for what he terms "the most stringent demands yet made for advanced assurance that Hanoi would halt infiltration of troops into the South." In fact, what the President said was that he was prepared to stop the buildup of American troops and to halt the bombing of the North "as soon as I am assured that infiltration into South Vietnam by land and sea has stopped."

Ashmore, in his letter to Ho, suggested "some reciprocal restraint" to a halt in the bombing and in the American buildup, "to indicate that neither side intended to use the occasion of the talks for military advantage."

There is a fine line, indeed, between the two positions, and it should also be remembered that when the President's letter was made public by Hanoi last March, the general reaction was that it was the most conciliatory approach made until this time by the administration.

Ashmore's reaction to the incident is, in our opinion, understandable but mistaken. His choice of language—charging the administration with "an almost total lack of candor," claiming that the President "effectively and brutally canceled" an opportunity for peace talks, tossing out such terms as "crude duplicity" and "double dealing"—should also be no cause for concern. Ashmore is, after all, a former newspaper editorial writer. And editorial writers, it should be remembered, are not generally noted for restraint in the expression of their opinions.

Mr. LATTA. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. THOMPSON].

(Mr. THOMPSON of Georgia asked and was given permission to address the House out of order.)

Mr. THOMPSON of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, I would like to commend the gentleman from Louisiana, the Honorable HALE BOGGS, who has just spoken. I would like to state this: that, as a member of the minority party who does have some differences with the President on the means of taking the action that is being taken in Vietnam, I certainly feel, as I am sure all people feel, that no man in America or in the world today has done more to bring about negotiations and attempt to effect peace than has the President of the United States. He has attached only one condition for the talks, that the North Vietnamese show some good faith that they will in fact negotiate in good faith. He has only asked that North Vietnam stop their aggression against the people of South Vietnam. He has made very clear that we have no territorial aims or desires against North Vietnam, but only that we want the people of South Vietnam to be able to select their own government.

The President need bow his head to no man concerning his desire for peace and in his efforts to effect peace talks. Certainly the number of sincere efforts he has made during the last several years to bring about peace talks is evidence of this.

Mr. LATTA. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. ANDERSON].

(Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois asked and was given permission to speak out of the regular order.)

(Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. Mr. Speaker, I feel as many of my colleagues have already said that the distinguished majority whip, the gentleman from Louisiana, has indeed performed a public service by bringing before the House today for discussion this very important question that was raised by the charges by Mr. Ashmore and Mr. Baggs, that this administration had deliberately frustrated an effort to bring the war in Vietnam from the field of conflict to the negotiating table.

Certainly I can share with him much of the indignation he expresses over some of the malevolent and wholly exaggerated statements that were made—charges against our country, during the so-called Pacem in Terris Conference in Geneva last May.

There is, however, one very important facet of this problem to which the gentleman from Louisiana did not address himself and to me this is the most important and the most intriguing part of this whole story as it emerged on yesterday on the front page not only of the Washington Post but I think in the press in this country and probably all over the world.

If, I understand the chronology of the events as they were related in the press, it was on or about the second of February of this year that that celebrated

letter was dispatched through normal postal channels to Cambodia and then transmitted to Ho Chi Minh in Hanoi, it was presumably framed in very conciliatory language in which the author, Mr. Ashmore, expressed the hope that negotiations would ensue between this country and North Vietnam.

As we further understand his account, that letter was framed not in his own office but it was framed right downtown in Foggy Bottom in the State Department with the knowledge, aid and assistance, presumably of high ranking members of the Department of State—and I believe one other Member of the Congress, the junior Senator from Arkansas.

This is one part of the story—and the chronology as I have understood it, is that this letter was framed with the knowledge, help and collaboration of members of the Department of State.

Then, as I understand it, the other significant portion of this whole affair is that at or about the same time, a letter was being prepared by the President of the United States presumably also with the advice and assistance of the State Department which subsequently arrived in Hanoi. The charge is that it was framed and phrased much more stringently and in far harsher language than the Ashmore letter and rejected the idea that we could have negotiations unless we saw a reciprocal deescalation by North Vietnam of the war in Vietnam.

The point I want to make is this. I would like to have the gentleman from Louisiana address himself to this question. I would presume that in the letter sent by the President he certainly had the assistance and advice of the Department of State and presumably even of the Secretary of State himself. What I wonder, when I read this story, is do we have some factionalism resident within the Department of State today on this whole question of bringing the war to the negotiating table?

I think if there is any suggestion of such disarray or that we have this kind of fumbling, if you will, within the administration on this very important and overriding issue of bringing the war from the battlefield to the conference table, then I think we ought to show some real concern.

If there is this kind of disarray within the administration, and if there is this kind of factionalism among the various segments of the Department of State the executive branch of our Government should provide an explanation to the American people.

I wonder if the gentleman from Louisiana would care to comment on that point?

Mr. BOGGS. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. BOGGS. The gentleman from Illinois well knows that I am not in a position to give him any information relative to the internal organization of the Department of State or any other department of our Government.

In my judgment, however, and I think I am completely justified in my judgment, I do not think there has ever been a President who has held his own de-

partments in closer check than the present occupant of the White House. It may very well be that in any department there may be some disagreement, but in this particular instance I will address myself specifically to the question that the gentleman raised, and it is an important question, because this was the gist of Mr. Ashmore's complaint.

If the gentleman will read a comparison of both letters, which was published in the press today widely—and I have before me the New York Times of this morning—he will find that in both instances, paragraph after paragraph, the letters are totally conciliatory, and for anyone to adopt Mr. Ashmore's claim that there was something brutally harsh about the President's letter, as compared with the formal letter, I say is not a correct reading of the English language. In fact, the President went further in his letter in suggesting a modus operandi, namely, the Geneva Conference.

I know the gentleman asks the question in good faith, but there is the answer and it is very well spelled out.

Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. I appreciate the explanation the gentleman has offered, and also that he is probably in no better position than I—

Mr. BOGGS. Of course not.

Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. To comment on whether or not there are these factions within the State Department. But I would hope that by this discussion here publicly on the floor of the House of Representatives today we would serve notice that we do think that to find a formula for negotiations is the single overriding issue that confronts our Nation and our State Department, and we hope that we do not have this kind of internal dissension or bickering that might frustrate the achievement of that end.

Mr. BOGGS. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield further?

Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. Certainly.

Mr. BOGGS. I could not agree more. I associate myself completely, particularly with the latter statement which the gentleman has made. The search for peace—and by peace I mean an honorable peace—has got to be the main concern of the American people and those who represent them, whether they be in this party or in the executive branch.

Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. And it requires a unified effort.

The SPEAKER. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. O'NEILL of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New Jersey.

(Mr. JOELSON asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. JOELSON. Mr. Speaker, I wish to commend the gentleman from Louisiana on a very cogent and persuasive statement. I think we must not overlook the fact that in this trip of Mr. Ashmore to North Vietnam there was active participation in the matter by the head of the Foreign Relations Committee of the other body.

I think President Kennedy's wisdom in refusing to appoint this man as Secretary of State is becoming very clear now. This man has been crying crocodile tears.

I would say that any man who votes against civil rights and then complains about the fact that the Great Society is not taking hold due to our Vietnam involvement is like the boy who kills his parents and then pleads for mercy on the ground that he is an orphan.

Mr. O'NEILL of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, I hope the rule is adopted.

Mr. Speaker, I move the previous question.

The previous question was ordered.

The resolution was agreed to.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

MESSAGE FROM THE SENATE

A message from the Senate by Mr. Arrington, one of its clerks, announced that the Senate disagrees to the amendments of the House to the bill (S. 602) entitled "An act to revise and extend the Appalachian Regional Development Act of 1965, and to amend title V of the Public Works and Economic Development Act of 1965," requests a conference with the House on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses thereon, and appoints Mr. RANDOLPH, Mr. MUSKIE, Mr. TYDINGS, Mr. SPONG, Mr. COOPER, Mr. JORDAN of Idaho, and Mr. BAKER to be the conferees on the part of the Senate.

The message also announced that the Senate agrees to the report of the committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendments of the House to the bill (S. 953) entitled "An act to amend the Food Stamp Act of 1964 for the purpose of authorizing appropriations for fiscal years subsequent to the fiscal year ending June 30, 1967."

The message also announced that the Senate agree to the amendment of the House of Representatives to the text of the bill (S. 953) entitled "An act to amend the Food Stamp Act of 1964 for the purpose of authorizing appropriations for fiscal years subsequent to the fiscal year ending June 30, 1967," with an amendment as follows: In lieu of the matter proposed to be inserted by the House engrossed amendment insert:

That the first sentence of subsection (a) of section 16 of the Food Stamp Act of 1964 is amended by inserting after "June 30, 1967," the following: "not in excess of \$200,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1968; not in excess of \$225,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1969;".

Sec. 2. Section 16(a) of such Act is further amended by inserting at the end thereof the following: "This Act shall be carried out only with funds appropriated from the general fund of the Treasury for that specific purpose and in no event shall it be carried out with funds derived from permanent appropriations."

The message also announced that the Senate agree to the amendment of the House of Representatives to the title of the above-entitled bill.

PARTNERSHIP FOR HEALTH AMENDMENTS OF 1967

Mr. STAGGERS. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H.R. 6418) to amend the