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not believe that large-scale introduction of U.S. troops into South Vietnam would be necessary. Statements by President Kennedy, by Secretary of State Rusk and Secretary of Defense McNamara indicated that the South Vietnamese would be able to handle the situation themselves, that U.S. troops would not be needed in more than an advisory and training role, and that even those in a training role could begin returning home in late 1963 and in 1964.

Several statements by Secretary McNamara were optimistic about the termination of the U.S. military mission. A White House statement on October 2, 1963 included the following: "Secretary McNamara and General Taylor reported their judgment that the major part of the U.S. military task can be completed by the end of 1965." Several statements were made by President Kennedy and by Secretary McNamara dealing with the removal of a certain number of U.S. troops by the end of 1963. Some troops were removed, a large number of whom had completed their task of training South Vietnamese policemen. The impression remained, however, that this signified the beginning of the end of the U.S. training mission.

Secretary McNamara in 1963 and 1964 made other statements that could be classified as optimistic. On February 19, 1963, he indicated he thought it would take "maybe 3 or 4 years" to defeat the Viet Cong. In February 1964 he said that "I personally believe this is a war the Vietnamese must fight. I don't believe we can take on that combat task for them." By 1965, Secretary McNamara was more cautious in his statements on the duration of the war. In November 1965, he did say after returning from a trip to South Vietnam that "the most vital impression I'm bringing back is that we have stopped losing the war."

A statement by President Johnson in March 1964, made clear that a large portion of those military advisers who returned had been training guards and policemen in South Vietnam. President Johnson stated that others might return when their task was completed, but that additional men would be sent as required. Some early statements by President Johnson indicated that the Administration was still hopeful about the war's coming to an end: On January 1, 1964, in a New Year's message to the chairman of the Military Revolutionary Council in South Vietnam, he wrote: "As the forces of your government become increasingly capable of dealing with this aggression, American military personnel in South Vietnam can be progressively withdrawn." The statement he made in March indicated a gradually changing assessment of the situation. However, in September 1964, during the election campaign, President Johnson did not give the impression that U.S. troops would be used in combat. He said: "We don't want our American boys to do the fighting for Asian boys, we don't want to get tied down in a land war in Asia." Other statements by administrative officials in 1964, in 1965, 1966 and 1967 indicated a cautious assessment of how soon the war might be over. However, the Administration did make an arbitrary assumption in drawing up the fiscal 1967 budget "that the conflict would end by June 1967."

Statements by President Johnson during the past year indicate uncertainty about how long the war might continue. In December 1966, he said: "Just how long they will be required to do so, I am not able to predict. If I did predict it, I would have no doubt but what I would live to regret it." In March 1967, he said, "I think we have a difficult, serious, long, drawn-out, agonizing problem that we do not yet have the answer for."

Though Secretary Rusk apparently has not made any specific references, with dates, as to when the U.S. might withdraw from South Vietnam, he did in 1963 show some optimism over developments there. On Feb-

ruary 13, he said that "the momentum of the Communist drive has been stopped. The guerrillas are losing ground. . . . government forces have the initiative and are using it with growing effect." In April he said, "The Vietnamese are on their way to success" but "we cannot promise, or expect, a quick victory there." In February 1964, he said that the Vietnamese "can handle this problem primarily with their own effort."

On January 1, 1967 he noted that the Viet Cong "must surely now understand that they are not going to succeed in seizing South Vietnam by force . . . If I am pessimistic, it is simply because we have not yet seen any indication from the other side that they are prepared to give up their idea of seizing South Vietnam by force." On April 16, 1967, Secretary Rusk stated that "I think we have seen some very favorable signs that we are making headways on the military side, but that does not mean that the war is just about over."

SELECTED EXECUTIVE STATEMENTS ON VICTORY IN VIETNAM AND WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. TROOPS

*John F. Kennedy*

May 22, 1963: "I hope we could—we could withdraw the troops, any number of troops, any time the government of South Vietnam would suggest it. The day after it was suggested, we would have some troops on their way home. We are hopeful that the situation in South Viet Nam would permit some withdrawals in any case by the end of the year, but we can't possibly make that judgment at the present time. There is still a long, hard struggle to go . . . I couldn't say that today the situation is such that we could look for a brightening in the skies that would permit us to withdraw troops or begin to by the end of the year . . . As of today, we would hope we could begin to perhaps to do it at the end of the year, but we couldn't make any final judgment at all until we see the course of the struggle the next few months."

September 2, 1963: "I don't think that unless a greater effort is made by the Government to win popular support that the war can be won out there. In the final analysis, it is their war. They are the ones who have to win it or lose it. We can help them, we can give them equipment, we can send out men out there as advisers, but they have to win it, the people of Viet Nam, against the Communists."

October 31, 1963: "When Secretary McNamara and General Taylor came back from Viet Nam, they announced that we would expect to withdraw a thousand men from South Vietnam before the end of the year and there has been some reference to that by General Harkins. If we are able to do that, that would be our schedule. I think the first unit or first contingent would be 250 men who are not involved in what might be called front-line operations. It would be our hope to lessen the number of Americans there by 1,000, as the training intensifies and is carried on in South Vietnam. As far as other units, we will have to make our judgment based on what the military correlation of forces may be."

November 14, 1963: "We are going to bring back several hundred (troops from South Vietnam) before the end of the year."

*Lyndon B. Johnson*

January 1, 1964, New Year's message to chairman of the Military Revolutionary Council in South Vietnam: "As the forces of your government become increasingly capable of dealing with this aggression, American military personnel in South Vietnam can be progressively withdrawn. The U.S. Government shares the view of your government that 'neutralization' of South Vietnam is unacceptable. As long as the Communist regime in North Vietnam persists in its aggressive policy, neutralization of South Vietnam would only be another name for a Communist takeover."

VIETNAM

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, on Thursday, July 13, in announcing the decision to send more troops to Vietnam, President Johnson told the American people that—

We are generally pleased with the progress we have made militarily. We are very sure that we are on the right track.

The day before, Secretary McNamara, according to the Washington Post said:

Substantial progress had been achieved on virtually all fronts—political, economic, and military—since my previous visit to Vietnam last September.

According to the Post news story:

He pointed to "tremendous progress" in the political area, as reflected by the coming presidential election; a very substantial improvement in the economy, which is no longer in danger of being overrun by inflation, and a "dramatic change" at the Port of Saigon, no longer jammed with tons of undelivered goods.

This optimistic assessment of the situation brought to mind a long series of rosy predictions about Vietnam by Secretary McNamara and other Presidential advisors over the last 4 years. Members of the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the public, have heard that song before and the tune is no longer catchy. The track record of the President's advisors on Vietnam policy leaves much to be desired. It certainly provides ample reason to review this latest assessment with something less than total credibility.

In order to refresh the memory of my colleagues on the various optimistic statements made by administration officials along the pathway to the present morass in Vietnam, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record a compilation prepared by the Library of Congress. I also ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record an editorial from the July 14 Washington Post on the credibility question.

There being no objection, the compilation and editorial were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

[From the Library of Congress, Legislative Reference Service, June 6, 1967]

To: Senate Foreign Relations Committee. From: Foreign Affairs Division.

Subject: Selected statements by members of the executive branch on victory in Vietnam and removal of U.S. troops.

Statements by President Kennedy and his leading advisers in 1963 indicated they did



March 7, 1964: "I don't think that the American public has fully understood the reason for our withdrawing any advisers from South Vietnam, and I think they should. We have called back approximately 1000 people. A good many of those people, several hundred, were training guards, policemen . . . From time to time, as our training mission is completed, other people will be withdrawn. From time to time, as additional advisers are needed, or as people to train additional Vietnamese are needed, we will send them out there. But we see no reason to keep the companies of MP's out there, after they have already trained the Vietnamese who can perform the duty equally as well. I think that a good deal will depend on what Secretary McNamara advises concerning who is withdrawn, when they are withdrawn, and who is sent out, and when they are sent out . . . When his report is in, we will carefully evaluate it, and if additional men are needed, we will send them. If others have completed their mission, we will withdraw them."

March 17, 1964, on McNamara and Taylor report on trip to South Vietnam: "The policy should continue of withdrawing United States personnel where their roles can be assumed by South Vietnamese and of sending additional men if they are needed. It will remain the policy of the United States to furnish assistance and support to South Viet Nam for as long as it is required to bring Communist aggression and terrorism under control."

September 25, 1964: "There are those that say you ought to go north and drop bombs, to try to wipe out the supply lines, and they think that would escalate the war. We don't want our American boys to do the fighting for Asian boys. We don't want to get involved in a nation with 700 million people and get tied down in a hand war in Asia. There are some that say we ought to go south and get out and come home; but we don't like to break our treaties and we don't like to walk out and leave people who are searching for freedom, and suffering to obtain it, and walk out on them."

December 31, 1965, reply to news conference question on war strategy: "I think that we are making the plans that we believe are in the best interest of this country. I don't think anyone can say with any precision when the peace conference will come. We are preparing our people to protect our national interest and our agreements and commitments. Just how long they will be required to do so, I am not able to predict. If I did predict it, I would have no doubt but what I would live to regret it."

March 21, 1967, on how things look in Vietnam: "I think we have a difficult, serious, long, drawn-out, agonizing problem that we do not yet have the answer for."

Robert S. McNamara

February 19, 1963: "I hope for a gradual strengthening of the control of the Government over the activities of that nation, and a gradual weakening of the influence of the Viet Cong. I think this will go on for a substantial period in the future. I can't really put a number on the years involved, but I think it would be maybe 2 or 4 years."

October 2, 1963, White House statement: "Secretary McNamara and General Taylor reported their judgment that the major part of the U.S. military task can be completed by the end of 1965, although there may be a continuing requirement for a limited number of U.S. training personnel. They reported that by the end of this year, the U.S. program for training Vietnamese should have progressed to the point where 1000 U.S. military personnel assigned to South Vietnam can be withdrawn."

November 19, 1963: "It is our objective to provide the training and logistical assistance which the South Vietnamese Government has requested of us, and upon completion

of certain facets of that training, small numbers of the U.S. personnel will be able to return by the end of this year."

February 3, 1964: "Last fall I was not as optimistic perhaps about the course of the war as I was about being able to bring back our personnel in certain numbers by the end of last year and also in increments. I still am hopeful of doing that. We did, of course, bring back a thousand men toward the latter part of last year. I am hopeful we can bring back additional numbers of men. I say this because I personally believe this is a war the Vietnamese must fight . . . I don't believe we can take on that combat task for them, I do believe we can carry out training . . . The training, by the very nature of the work, comes to an end at a certain point."

May 14, 1964: "I firmly believe that the persistent execution of the political-military plans which the Government of Vietnam has developed to carry out that war with our assistance will lead to success."

Answer to question on number of US training personnel needed in Vietnam: "I think on balance the number is not likely to increase substantially."

March 2, 1965, reply to question on length of war: "I really can't say. I think the period of time required to counter effectively a substantially guerrilla effort of the kind that currently exists in South Vietnam is great, and whether it is 1 year, 2 years, or more, I really can't say, but a long period of time is required to reintroduce effectively peace and stability into a nation that has been torn apart as has been South Vietnam. . . . It is difficult for me to forecast the course of events in Southeast Asia, but I want to repeat what I said a moment ago: an effective opposition to a guerrilla campaign requires an extended period of time for the results to be clear. I don't believe that we can be effective in South Vietnam in a short period of time. We expanded our efforts at the end of 1961. We have been there now 3-plus years on an expanded basis. We have been there pursuing these objectives—the same objectives we have today—for 10 or 11 years, and I think that it will be more before we achieve them."

May 9, 1965: "Let me say that I think it is perfectly clear that the situation in Vietnam has deteriorated during the past year or a year and a half, both politically and militarily."

July 20, 1965, in Saigon: "In many aspects there has been deterioration since I was here last—15 months ago."

July 21, 1965: "The situation is serious today. I think, in several respects, it has deteriorated over the past 12 months. Vietcong strength has increased dramatically during that period, primarily as a result of the continuing infiltration of large numbers of soldiers—now regular army personnel from North Vietnam. That increased strength has allowed the Vietcong to expand and intensify their attacks on the political structure of South Vietnam and in particular to increase their campaign of terror against the civilian population. . . .

"I can't predict the future with accuracy. I do want to mention one thing about the future, however, that I think is very interesting. Within the last 3 or 4 weeks, Ho Chi Minh looked into the future, and he said it might take 20 years for them to win."

October 26, 1965, interview question: One of the generals in the field is quoted as saying that he once thought it was going to be a 10 year war, but now he is optimistic and leaning toward 8½ years.

Secretary McNamara: "I wouldn't make a prediction as to the duration of the war. I think it is important to recognize that progress has been made during the summer."

November 30, 1965, plane-side interview at Andrews AFB, returning from South Vietnam: "The most vital impression I'm bringing back is that we have stopped losing the war."

#### Drop Bomb

February 3, 1964: "There are some definitely encouraging elements. The rate of casualties between Government and Viet Cong forces, the rate of areas captured, at least between the two sides, the steady extension of the strategic hamlet program, the increasingly effective work of the messengers along the border areas—all these indicate some turning in the situation. . . . I think that in such a situation as we have in Viet Nam at any one time there are going to be both pluses and minuses in the situation."

February 13, 1963: "The momentum of the Communist drive has been stopped. Complete victory for South Viet Nam is not just around the corner, but the guerrillas are losing ground and the number of guerrilla attacks has declined significantly. Major deficiencies in training, intelligence and mobility have been repaired; government forces have the initiative and are using it with growing effect."

April 18, 1963: "The South Vietnamese themselves are fighting their own battle, fighting well."

April 22, 1963: "The Government forces are able to maintain the initiative and, increasingly, to achieve the advantage of surprise. The strategic hamlet program is producing excellent results. . . . The strategic hamlet provides strength against the Communists in the countryside. . . . The villagers are fighting when attacked. . . . Rice production is up. . . . Defections from the Viet Cong have risen. . . . The Viet Cong is losing more weapons than are the Government forces. Viet Cong attacks are running at less than half the rate of January 1963. . . . The Viet Cong has been unable to carry out its plan to escalate to larger military units and to mere conventional warfare. . . . We cannot promise, or expect, a quick victory there. . . . It took 5 years to wipe out the Communist terrorists in Malaya—and they were far from a major Communist base. But there is a good basis for encouragement. The Vietnamese are on their way to success and need our help; not just our material help—they need that—but our sympathetic understanding and comradeship."

November 8, 1963: "We were also concerned in May and June and July of this year when developments in South Viet Nam indicated that there was a growing gap between the government and people of that country, and there was some danger that the solidarity of the country itself in meeting this threat would be undermined by differences within the country. . . . We believe that the present regime has moved promptly to consolidate public effort, that they will be able to resolve some of the internal difficulties that grew up, and that there will be a possibility that the people of that country will move in greater unity on behalf of the total effort."

February 24, 1964: "I think the resources and the capabilities are there to get this job done on the present basis of assistance to the Vietnamese so that they themselves can handle this problem primarily with their own effort."

July 1, 1964: "I think they (the Viet Cong) have very serious problems—not only in fees, in terms of losses, disruptions, but in terms of morale. So I am not pessimistic about the situation. It is difficult, it is going to take some time, it is going to take more of the heroic job being done by South Vietnamese and Americans and others in that situation. But I don't feel any sense of despair whatever."

June 12, 1965: "I think they (the South Vietnamese) have been encouraged by the clear evidence of the United States support and the clear evidence that we have our commitments seriously and that we are getting major assistance from us and getting assistance from others. I think that has had a good deal to do with strengthening their

July 18, 1967

hand and sustaining their morale in what has been a very difficult and mean situation over a period of time."

August 25, 1966: "We are beginning to see some signs of success of this strategy. The Viet Cong monsoon offensive, which we know from captured documents it was their intention to carry out during the period May to October, has not materialized because of Westmoreland's tactics of carrying out spoiling operations based on intelligence he has received as to concentrations of Viet Cong . . . The number of defections this year has doubled compared to the past year. No doubt this is a sign of erosion of morale."

January 1, 1967, on the prospects for peace in Vietnam in 1967: "I think there is a possibility. The task of diplomacy is to proceed on the basis of optimism. And I never close the door to the possibility that this situation will change. I do believe that one basis for optimism is that the other side must surely now understand that they are not going to succeed in seizing South Viet Nam by force. Now, maybe that will bring about a significant change in their political approach to this question.

But if I am pessimistic, it is simply because we have not yet seen any indication from the other side that they are prepared to give up their idea of seizing South Viet Nam by force."

April 16, 1967: "I think we have seen some very favorable signs that we are making headway on the military side, but that does not mean that the war is just about over . . . I am reluctant to put dates on (winning conventional warfare phase of the war), but I would think we made very, very substantial headway during 1966 on the conventional type of warfare. Now, the pacification effort against the guerrillas is almost by nature a slower task . . . But that is beginning to move now, and I think that behind the cover of the military success against the large units can come an increased pace against the guerrillas. I must say that I have been impressed by the doubling of the rate of defectors from the other side."

M. T. HAGGARD,  
*Analyst in Asian Affairs.*

[From the Washington Post, July 14, 1967]  
WHAT'S GOING ON?

Once again, President Johnson has received from his Secretary of Defense an on-the-spot report on Vietnam at a time when confidence about the course and conduct of the war is faltering. And once again, a genuinely concerned American public is being suffocated in optimistic generalities—progress is "tremendous," improvement is "substantial," change is "dramatic" and current policy, strategy and tactics are all beyond reproach.

It is time to change this public relations ritual—the confident briefings in the White House Fish Room, the capsule appraisals at airport arrivals, the echoes from congressional committee rooms. It is time for the President to tell us where things stand.

When our military chiefs in Saigon and the Pentagon have been arguing for weeks, often out loud, for large and specific numbers of additional troops, and the public has been led to believe a decision is imminent, it is not enough to be told on Wednesday by Mr. McNamara that "some more" men will be needed but that "we haven't arrived at any final conclusion and we don't know when we will." Especially when the President tells us on Thursday that General Westmoreland will get what "he needs and requests and what we find acceptable."

When Premier Ky has just been deposed as a candidate for president after abusing the electoral procedures, and his replacement, General Thieu, is giving no assurances he doesn't intend to go right on doing many of the same things, it is a bit much to claim that the forthcoming elections reflect "tremendous progress, when one looks back" to

the political shambles nine months ago. When one looks far enough back, one sees the government of President Diem, "freely" elected and firmly entrenched until its repressions against political opponents began the process which brought it down.

When most American citizens can see nothing but an expanding United States force tied down in a military stand-off, it does not reassure them much to be told that the idea of a military "stalemate" strikes field commanders as "the most ridiculous statement they have ever heard." Not when United States casualties this past week were the third highest on record and sizable American units have been all but wiped out.

When a wire service dispatch is reporting a new burst of inflationary price increases and a new threat of economic trouble, it is hard for Americans to believe that a "dramatic change" in the efficiency of the Port of Saigon has brought a "very substantial improvement" in the economy.

This is the heart of the matter—not what Mr. McNamara may genuinely believe, but what the American public, at this point, can realistically be expected to believe. Mr. McNamara calls it a multi-faceted war and by that test some facets can be found that are doubtless going reasonably well. But it is also a war of attrition, in General Westmoreland's phrase, and it is quite unbelievable that in the past year "we have achieved all of our objectives while the enemy failed dismally," as the General contends. Attrition must be measured not only by Vietcong and North Vietnamese dead but by the ebb and flow of military-political-psychological struggle for the allegiance of the populace. And here is one "facet," Mr. McNamara will admit, where progress is "very slow."

That this is also the key "facet," which will very likely determine the duration and the outcome of the conflict, makes it all the harder to credit the cacophony of "progress" reports.

It is time for a candid, forthright, report on progress or lack-of-progress, that takes frank account of difficulties and shortcomings, that compliments the intelligence of the American public by acknowledging failures and errors and that credits their maturity by explaining how hard and how long a struggle confronts the Nation.

#### COST OF THE VIETNAM WAR— JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE'S REPORT IS CORRECT

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to be allowed to proceed for 5 minutes in the morning hour so that I may engage in a short colloquy with the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. STENNIS] on the cost of the Vietnam war.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, the Department of Defense has just sent me a letter over the signature of Assistant Secretary Anthony which raises a question about the Joint Economic Committee's report on the "Economic Effects of Vietnam Spending." This report was filed with the Senate on Friday, July 7.

The Department of Defense alludes to the Joint Economic Committee's conclusion that there will be an appreciable increase over the original estimate in spending for Vietnam for the coming year. The report states that a \$4 to \$6 billion increase for the fiscal year 1968 seems probable and that even additional amounts may be required.

The Department of Defense does not contest these conclusions but they ex-

press concern because of the implication, to use their words, in the committee statement, that spending will rise by \$4 to \$6 billion in fiscal 1968 independently of any changes in Vietnam plans.

The letter refers to the fact that the committee based its view largely on the excellent testimony of my distinguished colleague, Senator STENNIS. They point out that my distinguished colleague based his estimate on a probable increase in troop commitments in Vietnam.

Mr. President, that is true. My colleague, who presented the committee with a very reasoned and logical explanation of the situation, expressed the view that we would be forced to exceed the level of troop commitments approved when the fiscal budget was submitted. He indicated that he expected it would be necessary to commit many thousands of additional men to Vietnam and that the cost of the war in terms of materiel would rise.

I am going to ask my distinguished colleague to verify his statement and expand upon it if he desires because it is so vitally important to the whole question of economic policy. But, first, I would also like to mention another point raised in Senator STENNIS' testimony before our committee; namely, his reference to the fact that the fiscal year 1968 budget was tight and gave rise to doubts about its adequacy—Independently of the issue of a step-up in troop commitment in Vietnam.

It is my impression, and I think it may be Senator STENNIS', that the budget is overly tight even without reference to the question of troop commitment.

I note that Dr. Arthur Okun, a member of the President's Council of Economic Advisers, indicated 2 weeks ago that the military budget might be \$3 billion higher than the January figure, and, if I understand it correctly as reported in the newspapers, he was referring to current troop commitments in Vietnam. It is also to be noted that Secretary Fowler, in testifying on the debt ceiling before the committees in both Houses of Congress, indicated that Defense expenditures would be \$1½ billion higher. I presume that he was speaking of current commitments and not of prospective increases.

Mr. President, at this point I should like to yield to the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. STENNIS] for his comments.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I thank the Senator for yielding to me. Let me first highly commend him and the membership of the Joint Economic Committee for what I think is very signal and outstanding service that they are rendering in probing into these very important problems.

With regard to the military budget for fiscal year 1968, when it was my privilege to appear before the Senator and his joint committee on April 15 of this year, I made the statement that I thought that it was almost inevitable that it would be increased. I based that reasoning on two major points. First, I thought the fiscal year 1968 military budget as approved and presented to the Congress by the Department of Defense was very tight. I referred to military items being

hand and sustaining their morale in what has been a very difficult and mean situation over a period of time."

August 28, 1966: "We are beginning to see some signs of success of this strategy. The Viet Cong monsoon offensive, which we know from captured documents it was their intention to carry out during the period May to October, has not materialized because of Westmoreland's tactics of carrying out spoiling operations based on intelligence he has received as to concentrations of Viet Cong. . . . The number of defections this year has doubled compared to the past year. No doubt this is a sign of erosion of morale."

January 1, 1967, for the prospects for peace in Vietnam in 1967: "I think there is a possibility. The task of diplomacy is to proceed on the basis of optimism. And I never close the door to the possibility that this situation will change. I do believe that one basis for optimism is that the other side must surely now understand that they are not going to succeed in seizing South Viet Nam by force. Now, maybe that will bring about a significant change in their political approach to this question."

But if I am pessimistic, it is simply because we have not yet seen any indication from the other side that they are prepared to give up their idea of seizing South Viet Nam by force."

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It is time for a candid, forthright, report on progress or lack-of-progress, that takes frank account of difficulties and shortcomings, that compliments the intelligence of the American public by acknowledging failures and errors and that credits their maturity by explaining how hard and how long a struggle confronts the Nation.

#### COST OF THE VIETNAM WAR— JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE'S REPORT IS CORRECT

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to be allowed to proceed for 5 minutes in the morning hour so that I may engage in a short colloquy with the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. STENNIS] on the cost of the Vietnam war.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, the Department of Defense has just sent me a letter over the signature of Assistant Secretary Anthony which raises a question about the Joint Economic Committee's report on the "Economic Effects of Vietnam Spending." This report was filed with the Senate on Friday, July 7.

The Department of Defense alludes to the Joint Economic Committee's conclusion that there will be an appreciable increase over the original estimate in spending for Vietnam for the coming year. The report states that a \$4 to \$6 billion increase for the fiscal year 1968 seems probable and that even additional amounts may be required.

The Department of Defense does not contest these conclusions but they ex-

press concern because of the implication, to use their words, in the committee statement, that spending will rise by \$4 to \$6 billion in fiscal 1968 independently of any changes in Vietnam plans.

The letter refers to the fact that the committee based its view largely on the excellent testimony of my distinguished colleague, Senator STENNIS. They point out that my distinguished colleague based his estimate on a probable increase in troop commitments in Vietnam.

Mr. President, that is true. My colleague, who presented the committee with a very reasoned and logical explanation of the situation, expressed the view that we would be forced to exceed the level of troop commitments approved when the fiscal budget was submitted. He indicated that he expected it would be necessary to commit many thousands of additional men to Vietnam and that the cost of the war in terms of materiel would rise.

I am going to ask my distinguished colleague to verify his statement and expand upon it if he desires because it is so vitally important to the whole question of economic policy. But, first, I would also like to mention another point raised in Senator STENNIS' testimony before our committee; namely, his reference to the fact that the fiscal year 1968 budget was tight and gave rise to doubts about its adequacy—independently of the issue of a step-up in troop commitment in Vietnam.

It is my impression, and I think it may be Senator STENNIS', that the budget is overly tight even without reference to the question of troop commitment.

I note that Dr. Arthur Okun, a member of the President's Council of Economic Advisers, indicated 2 weeks ago that the military budget might be \$3 billion higher than the January figure, and, if I understand it correctly as reported in the newspapers, he was referring to current troop commitments in Vietnam. It is also to be noted that Secretary Fowler, in testifying on the debt ceiling before the committees in both Houses of Congress, indicated that Defense expenditures would be \$1½ billion higher. I presume that he was speaking of current commitments and not of prospective increases.

Mr. President, at this point I should like to yield to the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. STENNIS] for his comments.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I thank the Senator for yielding to me. Let me first highly commend him and the membership of the Joint Economic Committee for what I think is very signal and outstanding service that they are rendering in probing into these very important problems.

With regard to the military budget for fiscal year 1968, when it was my privilege to appear before the Senator and his joint committee on April 15 of this year, I made the statement that I thought that it was almost inevitable that it would be increased. I based that reasoning on two major points. First, I thought the fiscal year 1968 military budget as approved and presented to the Congress by the Department of Defense was very tight. I referred to military issues being



March 7, 1964: "I don't think that the American public has fully understood the reason for our withdrawing any advisers from South Vietnam, and I think they should. We have called back approximately 1000 people. A good many of those people, several hundred, were training guards, policemen . . . From time to time, as our training mission is completed, other people will be withdrawn. From time to time, as additional advisers are needed, or as people to train additional Vietnamese are needed, we will send them out there. But we see no reason to keep the companies of MPs out there, after they have already trained the Vietnamese who can perform the duty equally as well. I think that a good deal will depend on what Secretary McNamara advises concerning who is withdrawn, when they are withdrawn, and who is sent out, and when they are sent out . . . When his report is in, we will carefully evaluate it, and if additional men are needed, we will send them. If others have completed their mission, we will withdraw them."

March 17, 1964, on McNamara and Taylor report on trip to South Vietnam: "The policy should continue of withdrawing United States personnel where their roles can be assumed by South Vietnamese and of sending additional men if they are needed. It will remain the policy of the United States to furnish assistance and support to South Vietnam for as long as it is required to bring Communist aggression and terrorism under control."

September 25, 1964: "There are those that say you ought to go north and drop bombs, to try to wipe out the supply lines, and they think that would escalate the war. We don't want our American boys to do the fighting for Asian boys. We don't want to get involved in a nation with 700 million people and get tied down in a land war in Asia. There are some that say we ought to go south and get out and come home, but we don't like to break our treaties and we don't like to walk off and leave people who are searching for freedom, and suffering to obtain it, and walk out on them."

December 31, 1966, reply to news conference question on war strategy: "I think that we are making the plans that we believe are in the best interest of this country. I don't think anyone can say with any precision when the peace conference will come. We are preparing our people to protect our national interest and our agreements and commitments. Just how long they will be required to do so, I am not able to predict. If I did predict it, I would have no doubt but what I would live to regret it."

March 21, 1967, on how things look in Vietnam: "I think we have a difficult, serious, long, drawn-out, agonizing problem that we do not yet have the answer for."

*Robert S. McNamara*

February 19, 1963: "I hope for a gradual strengthening of the control of the Government over the activities of that nation, and a gradual weakening of the influence of the Viet Cong. I think this will go on for a substantial period in the future. I can't really put a number on the years involved, but I think it would be maybe 3 or 4 years."

October 2, 1968, White House statement: "Secretary McNamara and General Taylor reported their judgment that the major part of the U.S. military task can be completed by the end of 1965, although there may be a continuing requirement for a limited number of U.S. training personnel. They reported that by the end of this year, the U.S. program for training Vietnamese should have progressed to the point where 1000 U.S. military personnel assigned to South Vietnam can be withdrawn."

November 19, 1963: "It is our objective to provide the training and logistical assistance which the South Vietnamese Government has requested of us, and upon completion

of certain facets of that training, small numbers of the U.S. personnel will be able to return by the end of this year."

February 3, 1964: "Last fall I was not as optimistic perhaps about the course of the war as I was about being able to bring back our personnel in certain numbers by the end of last year and also in increments. I still am hopeful of doing that. We did, of course, bring back a thousand men toward the latter part of last year. I am hopeful we can bring back additional numbers of men. I say this because I personally believe this is a war the Vietnamese must fight . . . I don't believe we can take on that combat task for them. I do believe we can carry out training . . . The training, by the very nature of the work, comes to an end at a certain point."

May 14, 1964: "I firmly believe that the persistent execution of the political-military plans which the Government of Vietnam has developed to carry out that war with our assistance will lead to success."

Answer to question on number of US training personnel needed in Vietnam: "I think on balance the number is not likely to increase substantially."

March 2, 1965, reply to question on length of war: "I really can't say. I think the period of time required to counter effectively a substantially guerrilla effort of the kind that currently exists in South Vietnam is great, and whether it is 1 year, 2 years, or more, I really can't say, but a long period of time is required to reintroduce effectively peace and stability into a nation that has been torn apart as has been South Vietnam. . . . It is difficult for me to forecast the course of events in Southeast Asia, but I want to repeat what I said a moment ago: an effective opposition to a guerrilla campaign requires an extended period of time for the results to be clear. I don't believe that we can be effective in South Vietnam in a short period of time. We expanded our efforts at the end of 1961. We have been there now 3-plus years on an expanded basis. We have been there pursuing these objectives—the same objectives we have today—for 10 or 11 years, and I think that it will be more before we achieve them."

May 9, 1965: "Let me say that I think it is perfectly clear that the situation in Vietnam has deteriorated during the past year or a year and a half, both politically and militarily."

July 20, 1965, in Saigon: "In many aspects there has been deterioration since I was here last—15 months ago."

July 21, 1965: "The situation is serious today, I think, in several respects. It has deteriorated over the past 12 months. Vietcong strength has increased dramatically during that period, primarily as a result of the continuing infiltration of large numbers of soldiers—now regular army personnel from North Vietnam. That increased strength has allowed the Vietcong to expand and intensify their attacks on the political structure of South Vietnam and in particular to increase their campaign of terror against the civilian population. . . .

"I can't predict the future with accuracy. I do want to mention one thing about the future, however, that I think is very interesting. Within the last 3 or 4 weeks, Ho Chi Minh looked into the future, and he said it might take 20 years for them to win."

October 26, 1965, interview question: One of the generals in the field is quoted as saying that he once thought it was going to be a 19 year war, but now he is optimistic and leaning toward 9½ years.

Secretary McNamara: "I wouldn't make a prediction as to the duration of the war. I think it is important to recognize that progress has been made during the summer."

November 30, 1965, planeside interview at Andrews AFB, returning from South Vietnam: "The most vital impression I'm bringing back is that we have stopped losing the war."

*Dean Rusk*

February 1, 1963: "There are some definitely encouraging elements. The ratio of casualties between Government and Viet Cong forces, the ratio of arms captured or lost between the two sides, the steady extension of the strategic-hamlet program, the increasingly effective work of the montagnards along the border areas—all these indicate some turning in the situation. . . . I think that in such a situation as we have in Viet Nam at any one time there are going to be both pluses and minuses in the situation."

February 13, 1963: "The momentum of the Communist drive has been stopped. Complete victory for South Viet Nam is not just around the corner, but the guerrillas are losing ground and the number of guerrilla attacks has declined significantly. Major deficiencies in training, intelligence and mobility have been repaired; government forces have the initiative and are using it with growing effect."

April 18, 1963: "The South Vietnamese themselves are fighting their own battle, fighting well."

April 22, 1963: "The Government forces are able to maintain the initiative and, increasingly, to achieve the advantage of surprise. The strategic hamlet program is producing excellent results. . . . The strategic hamlet provides strength against the Communists in the countryside. . . . The villagers are fighting when attacked. . . . Rice production is up. . . . Defections from the Viet Cong have risen. . . . The Viet Cong is losing more weapons than are the Government forces. Viet Cong attacks are running at less than half the rate of January 1962. . . . The Viet Cong has been unable to carry out its plan to escalate to larger military units and to more conventional warfare. . . . We cannot promise, or expect, a quick victory there. . . . It took 8 years to wipe out the Communist terrorists in Malaya—and they were far from a major Communist base. But there is a good basis for encouragement. The Vietnamese are on their way to success and need our help; not just our material help—they need that—but our sympathetic understanding and comradeship."

November 8, 1963: "We were also concerned in May and June and July of this year when developments in South Viet Nam indicated that there was a growing gap between the government and people of that country, and there was some danger that the solidarity of the country itself in meeting this threat would be undermined by differences within the country. . . . We believe that the present regime has moved promptly to consolidate public effort, that they will be able to resolve some of the internal difficulties that grew up, and that there will be a possibility that the people of that country will move in greater unity on behalf of the total effort."

February 24, 1964: "I think the resources and the capabilities are there to get this job done on the present basis of assistance to the Vietnamese so that they themselves can handle this problem primarily with their own effort."

July 1, 1964: "I think they (the Viet Cong) have very serious problems—not only in fact, in terms of losses, disruptions, but in terms of morale. So I am not pessimistic about the situation. It is difficult, it is going to take some time, it is going to take more of the heroic job being done by South Vietnamese and Americans and others in that situation. But I don't feel any sense of despair whatever."

June 13, 1965: "I think they (the South Vietnamese) have been encouraged by the clear evidences of the United States support and the clear evidence that we take our commitments seriously and that they are getting major assistance from us and growing assistance from others, I think this has had a good deal to do with strengthening their