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




Shots That Hit



A Study of
U.S. Coast Guard
Marksmanship
1790 - 1985



by
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Preface

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R. L. Scheina, Historian

Introduction

The weapons history of the United States Coast Guard, and its primary predecessor, the United States Revenue Cutter Service (RCS), has been unique among the military forces of the United States. It is not unique in weapon type or technology, but in application. The Coast Guard, a military organization with legislated civil law enforcement authority, has used its weapons in more civil functions than military. It continues to do so today.

The founding principle of arming the Coast Guard was assertion of authority, self protection, and later the national defense. Without an armed potential, the Coast Guard in its modern context would lapse into a simple regulatory and emergency service agency.

Advancements in shipboard weapons systems will continue for the Coast Guard. The thrust of this work centers on the most prevalent of the Coast Guard's arsenal—its small arms and small-arms training.

The records of the Coast Guard and Revenue Cutter Service are a confused mass where weapons records are interspersed with letters and bills for sails, cookstoves, paints, and medicines. At least two major fires destroyed many of the service's early records. Despite the losses and confusion there are enough available sources to give some idea of the earliest weapons.

The Coast Guard had no formal ordnance section, or department, until the 1920s. From 1790 until the 1870s cutter captains, customs collectors, and a long line of Treasury secretaries selected the weapons from whatever was available. During the 1870s desirable types of weapons were identified, often without giving specifics. Full standardization of weapons did not occur until the 1930s. Small-arms training also suffered from a long history without standardization.

This work was prompted, as many works are, by a question from a third class gunner's mate, "How were things [small-arms training] done in the old days?" There was a difference in personal perception of the word "old," but the question piqued my interest. I am thankful for the question.

It also occurred to me that there is a lack of, as termed by E. D. Hirsch, Jr. in his *Cultural Literacy*, intergenerational information. There has been no information passed to succeeding generations of Coast Guardsmen on the topic of small-arms training. Until World War II, the small size of the Coast Guard and the Revenue Cutter Service guaranteed that younger people would learn the past through a continuation of customs. However, in the present no one can assume that younger people will have any knowledge of the past. Coast Guard personnel need to be informed of their service's uniqueness.

Without specific knowledge of past procedures the same mistakes have been made time and time again. The rote knowledge of past procedures will in itself not ensure understanding writings on the subject. Procedures must be understood in the context, or the time period, in which the writings developed. It is not enough to understand the causes of failures and successes. One must

understand why and how the social, organizational, economic, and personal factors affected those making training decisions.

As mission areas changed throughout Coast Guard history, so did ideology toward weapons. The acquisition of weapons and amount of training rose and fell with these influences. An effort was made to demonstrate that marksmanship training was not a singular item of Coast Guard development, but was enmeshed in all of its programs. Marksmanship has been one of the consistent components of the Coast Guard since 1790.

To illustrate the non-singular nature of the transitions of weapons and training through the fiscal, political, and social changes, I used the chronological method. Also I made no attempt to highlight every detail, nor every name connected with small arms and small-arms training, however the crests and troughs were explored. This book is intended to bridge intergenerational gaps and provide a record of and guide to past practices. Moreover, I intended this work to be a reference source for future training development keeping in mind that *the only shots that count are the ones that hit*.

The search for information carried me to many areas and I wish to thank all those lending their support and guidance. Marie Capps of the U.S. Military Academy (West Point) Library found the records of the cutters' first arms. Other valuable guidance and support was provided by Terry Machette, National Archives; Dr. Robert Scheina and Dr. Robert Browning, Coast Guard Historians; Mrs. Florence Kern; U.S. Marine Corps Historical Center; U.S. Naval Historical Center; the Augusta College Library; the late CHGUN Melvon O. Wilson, USCG; the late GMC Stanley Loyer, USCG; YN2 Peggy Ricciuto; CWO(WEPS) S. J. Clarino; and all old, and new, friends and shipmates who put up with constant questions and requests for information. Most of all I want to thank all those who taught me the importance of knowing.

Fitted for Sea Service

The United States Coast Guard operates under a unique blend of military and civil law enforcement training theories and procedures. No better example of this can be found than in its development of small arms and small-arms training, both of which trace their roots to the United States Revenue Cutter Service.

In 1789, when the first Federal Treasury secretary, Alexander Hamilton, proposed the establishment of ten boats to protect the revenue interests of the United States, he insisted that they be armed. Land-based customs officials were unarmed. Hamilton knew that only armed vessels would command respect, not only from honest traders in disagreement with the new customs laws, but also from smugglers.¹ If captured, smugglers faced high penalties that could include hanging. Most smugglers were armed and did not hesitate to use force to resist capture.

Hamilton kept a tight budget on the building and equipping of the cutters. He did not spend money buying items that could be procured at no cost from other sources. Therefore, the first firearms of the service were an odd collection of English, French, and American-made muskets and pistols. All were leftovers from the Revolutionary War in various states of repair and disrepair.

Secretary of War Henry Knox issued the revenue service its first arms from the arsenal at West Point, New York, on 1 October 1791. The exact number of muskets and pistols issued was not mentioned in the receipts, but 1,200 musket and 800 pistol cartridges were set aside for cutters in northern waters.² However, in a letter to Otho H. Williams, the customs collector at Baltimore, Maryland, Hamilton noted, "The Collector at New York was directed to furnish each cutter with ten muskets and bayonets, twenty pistols, two chissels [sic], one broad axe and two lanthorns."

The small arms were delivered to the cutters after considerable delay and were in such poor condition that Hopley Yeaton, the first commissioned officer of the revenue service, made his first cruise from Portsmouth, New Hampshire, without them. He sent them to a Boston gunsmith to be "fitted for sea service."³ However, Yeaton did not sail unarmed. He borrowed the needed firearms from the arsenal at nearby Fort Constitution.

Available records conclude that the first ten cutters carried 12 muskets and "twelve pair" pistols, and some cutters had larger pieces of ordnance, but no cannon or swivels. As part of the 1791 West Point arms issue, a number of wall or rampart arms were provided to the cutter *Vigilant*, Master Pat Dennis. Other cutters may have been so equipped.⁴

These 54-inch-long muskets had a bore diameter of nearly an inch (.96-caliber) and were mounted on a swivel base.⁵ Even mounted, the guns

were too heavy, (c. 50 pounds) and awkward to be held and fired by one man. They were, however, far from being a cannon and evidently saw no use, and Dennis returned them to the army's West Point Arsenal the next June. No records have been uncovered to indicate that any of the other cutters received wall guns.

Tench Coxe, assistant to Hamilton, clarified the question about cannon in a letter to Master Simon Gross, of the cutter *Active*, in May, 1791. Coxe relayed, "It is not His [Hamilton's] intention to fit the Cutters with cannon. Muskets and blunderbusses he considers as sufficient in a season when no vessels arrive armed in our ports."⁶

There was little or no training with any of the weapons. The crews were usually hand-picked by the vessel's master and usually veterans of some military service. Experience and common knowledge of weapon use had to suffice. Gunpowder use for practice was limited by the Treasury Department's stringent fiscal controls. Drills were limited because no time could be spared from patrol. Cutter masters and their supervisors, the customs collectors, received a commission on each cargo surveyed; their very jobs often depended on active revenue patrols.

The cutters not only enforced customs laws, but also served as the nation's only naval force during the eight years before the inception of a Federal navy. In defending United States territorial seas, cutters sometimes took on much more powerful opponents. The cutter *Virginia* seized the privateer *Unicorn* in mid-1794. Like the flea chasing the elephant, the revenue schooner *Argus* was ordered to chase the 64-gun British ship-of-the-line *Africa* out of United States territorial waters.⁷ Luckily for *Argus*, *Africa* departed before the cutter arrived to fulfill her duties. Although small and underarmed, the cutters went to their duties with great zeal, establishing a tradition of facing overwhelming odds in both peace and war.

The first wartime challenge for the revenue cutters came in 1799. The United States had become embroiled in what would later be known as the Quasi-War with France, while trying to preserve neutrality in a European conflict. This became the first military action in which the president of the United States directed revenue cutters to operate under the control of the newly formed United States Navy. The cutters working with the navy, most assigned to the West Indies Squadron, were rearmed and given larger crews.

Some cutters received the same types of arms first issued in 1791. On 22 September 1797, the cutter *Virginia* received from the military store at Philadelphia "twelve Brass mounted Com[mon] French muskets complete."⁸ Other cutters received relatively new arms such as the Springfield Model 1795 musket. Additionally, at Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, the cutters were issued their first cannon. Collector Sharp Delany was issued six-pound shot for the *General Greene* and three pounders for the *Virginia*.

During the war the cutters used naval regulations. These rules included drilling-at-arms regulations drawn from the British navy for cannon and from the French navy for musket.⁹ On board the cutters, each watch was drilled at

their particular arms under the guidance of the officer of the watch or the sergeant of marines.

The *General Greene* is a good example of the war outfit of one cutter. In March 1798 the *General Greene* was issued 120 musket cartridges, with a like number for pistols, leaving little for training.¹⁰ During May, the *General Greene* received an additional “ten muskets, ten pistols, ten cutlasses and twenty boarding pikes,”¹¹ and the following January it received ten brass mounted French muskets, ten more pistols, ten Grenadiers swords, and 20 more pikes.

The revenue cutters performed well in their first period of conflict during the Quasi-War with France. However, once released from naval service, the cutters reverted to Treasury regulations, and rigorous naval training standards were discontinued. The Treasury Department sensed the need for some type of training and decided to follow the lines established by the navy. It directed the crews to be exercised at arms at least once a week. Whether this was an indication of a maturing organization or of fewer experienced crewmen is not known, but this exercise did not include the actual firing of weapons. Practice firing was still considered too expensive and of little value except for developing loading skills.

The limitations of the weapons of the day determined how they were used in action. Muskets and pistols of the late eighteenth century had no rear sights, and accuracy was always doubtful. Some muskets had front sights, which indicated the direction where the muzzle was pointing rather than providing an accurate aim. The lack of accuracy, especially from a swaying deck, led most cutter commanders to favor the buckshot or buck-and-ball cartouch along with the standard one-ounce lead ball. This permitted the deck of an adversary to be swept with a larger amount of shot.

After the initial shot was fired, edged weapons became more useful and necessary, as close-aboard engagements did not allow time for reloading. Many crewmen were armed with two muskets, two pistols, a cutlass, a pike or a battle-ax. Paintings of the era often show naval officers armed with eight or more pistols, demonstrating the inability to reload quickly and the unreliability of the action and accuracy of the weapons.

A prime example of a well-armed cutter facing heavy odds was during the June 1813 night battle of the cutter *Surveyor*. Its 25 men fought an attacking party of over 70 sailors and Marines, commanded by Lt. John Crierie, from the HBMS *Narcissus* near Hampton, Virginia.¹² Alerted to an impending attack by the sound of oars, Capt. Samuel Travis armed each of his men with two muskets and ordered them to hold their fire until the English barges came alongside. Then the cutter crew opened fire.¹³ At very close range they fired some 50 rounds of buckshot, buck and ball, or single ball, but the British Marines boarded and captured the *Surveyor* after a fierce deck fight.¹⁴

Considering the closeness of the action the casualties were light, with three killed and six wounded for the British and five wounded for the Americans. The number killed and wounded by musket fire is unknown. Edged weapons

played a larger part in the boarding and resulted in more injuries than did the initial shock of the gunpowder weapons. The focus of training remained on the proficient use of edged arms.

The call for more arms for revenue cutter crews lasted for many years. In June 1835 the revenue cutter *Ingham*, under Capt. Ezekiel Jones, fought a one-day engagement with the Mexican navy schooner *Montezuma*. This and the previous engagements led Jones to call for more arms for his crew.¹⁵ He held the opinion, "No man in naval service is considered properly armed unless he had two pistols in his belt."¹⁶ Jones continued with an addendum that his cutter and others should be "above all...well armed."¹⁷

There had been only a handful of publications printed by Americans on the subject of drilling with arms prior to the War of 1812. Frederick William Baron von Steuben's drill regulations were approved by the Congress in 1779 and used until 1794, when superseded by a new edition which remained in effect until 1812. The army considered Baron von Steuben's regulations near biblical in their importance.¹⁸

In 1812 an American work, written by the Adjutant General of the Army, William Duane, replaced Baron von Steuben's regulations, but it too followed European guidelines. There is no evidence that the revenue cutter captains used this manual for training, but through their bonds with local navy, army, and militia officers they probably knew the manual. These bonds were typified by the help the revenue cutter *Eagle* received from a militia company on the day the cutter was lost to the British during the War of 1812. The militia company, all volunteers, sailed in the *Eagle* as support artillerymen.

As weapons technology developed, the similarities in weapons types between the United States Revenue Cutter Service and the other services changed—the cutter service fell behind. As the nineteenth century unfolded, improvements in cutter construction and service organization followed the emergence of industrialization. Small arms in service did not advance as quickly. Despite the failure of the Treasury Department to keep astride weapons improvements, it found itself drawn, at times unwillingly, into accepting the newer types of weaponry for the revenue cutters.

Technology forced the older inventory of revenue weapons into obsolescence faster than the Treasury Department anticipated or wanted. Operational overhead was a major concern to the department. However, officers knew from experience that future operations would require better weapons to allow revenue cutters to perform viable military and law enforcement service.

The rifled barrel provided a major technological improvement to standard service firearms. Accurate shooting became possible, changing the face of warfare. Improvements made in gunpowder and ballistics added even further to accuracy. Weapons innovators performed a constant array of experiments to perfect better and more accurate arms for military use. Generous contracts associated with the supply of arms to the Federal government provided necessary inducements to private industry.

Among the most prominent innovators were Samuel Colt and John Hall. In 1836, inventor, businessman and constant self-promoter Samuel Colt opened his first firearms manufacturing plant at Paterson, New Jersey. He was soon busily using political and military influence to convince those in government that his arms were superior to those used by the army and navy. While Colt pursued contracts, another weapons innovator, John Hall, already had government approval. He worked at the National Arsenal at Harpers Ferry, Virginia, attempting to perfect his concept of interchangeable parts. There were many others in the arms field that were making vital contributions to weapons improvements.

It would seem logical that each weapons improvement caused changes in training. Unfortunately, the ideology of weapons use and training did not develop as quickly as the technology. The exercises and movements of former years did not fit the new weapons. The 16 steps of drill and loading in William Duane's 1812 instructions were reduced to 12 in the U.S. Army's 1836 instructions.¹⁹ Both sets of regulations stressed position and loading more than accuracy with the musket whether rifled or not. Both defined aiming as "glancing" or "directing" the right eye (left-hand shooting was not recognized) along the barrel. One could suppose this was an improvement over Baron von Steuben's directions; he taught "sinking the muzzle a little below eye level, and with the right eye looking along the barrel."²⁰ Accuracy was, at best, still a hit-and-miss situation.

The future presented by the improved technology was bright, but the Treasury Department clung to its older equipment and made only partial and begrudging attempts to improve its small-arm inventory. The fault was not solely with the Treasury Department. Serious financial depression in the 1830s caused large Treasury losses, forcing cutbacks in all areas except in cases of desperate need.

The Seminole Wars in Florida were one such area requiring funds in spite of budgetary shortfalls. Revenue cutter crews and officers assisted the army, navy, and Marine Corps in this conflict and actively engaged in boat and landing operations.²¹ During October 1838, First Lt. Napoleon L. Coste, commanding *Campbell*, reported that he and two divisions, about 24 men, had "fallen in with a party of Indians" who fired on Coste's men. The returning fire killed three Indians and Coste's men chased the remainder into the swamp.²²

The cutters had been quickly equipped with the Hall breech-loader rifle from army warehouses and some officers privately purchased Colt revolvers. The Hall rifle was easily obtainable because the army abandoned its use. The rifles were surplus and were obtained from the army at no cost. The army abandoned the rifle because the rifle's breech did not always close tightly, causing injuries when its 100-grain powder charge blew up when fired.²³ There were no reported injuries among the cutter crews from a malfunctioning weapon; however, it is uncertain how many of the rifles were used. Infrequent use may account for the light casualty rate; the cutter crews in Florida did not use their weapons every day. Perhaps cutters used their older muskets or

possibly shotguns like the army. The army issued many of its men with "double-barrelled shot guns of the calibre of the United States musket."²⁴

The military experience gained during the Seminole Wars prompted many officers to request updated weapons. The first major request to the Treasury Department for weapons to be purchased from a commercial firm came in 1841. Capt. Lewis C. Fatio requested Colt's pistols and argued, "A pistol is actually requisite for each man, and no vessel in this or any other Gov[ernmen]t Service can dispense with an arm so truly requisite."²⁵ New York customs collector Edward Curtis agreed with Fatio and added that all five pistols required could be purchased for a bargain 125 dollars, noting the cost "to others than the Government would be two hundred dollars."²⁶ It appeared the argument and cost were acceptable. As Fatio noted in the cutter *Jackson's* log for Thursday, 15 July 1841, "Rec[eive]d on board 500 gun & pistol flints...4 boxes percussion caps."²⁷ The old-style pistols were for the crew—the officers carried Colt's pistols.

The choice of Colt's pistols was no accident. Samuel Colt was a frequent guest of the revenue officers and of Curtis. On Saturday morning October 16, 1841, as a guest of Capt. Nicholas Bicker on the cutter *Wolcott*, Colt demonstrated his pistol to a number of naval officers in a fresh wind. To bolster sales and to help demonstrate his weapons, he brought some along with his new "waterproof cartridges" for testing.²⁸ The presentation impressed many of the officers, and word of the improved ammunition spread. In August 1842, Capt. Alexander Fraser requested five Colt-Paterson revolvers and carbines for the year-old cutter *Ewing* to replace older condemned models.²⁹ Fraser had the same problems with small arms as had Hopley Yeaton and noted during outfitting at Baltimore that the following small arms were issued:

...a large number of Old Muskets, Pistols, &c, which had accumulated at the Lazaretto from various vessels...[and] were put on board. They were of different calibres, some wanting locks, some Stocks broken, and most unfit to be repaired.³⁰

Acting for Treasury Secretary Thomas Ewing, McClintock Young did not approve the request when first tendered. With a tone of apology, Young responded:

The state of the Treasury obliges me to withhold my Sanction to all charges on the Revenue except such as are unavoidable:—and hence I am compelled to postpone the requisition.³¹

Five days later, August 18, 1842, Young approved the requisition, but for the revolvers only.³² Young was a powerful force in the Treasury Department; for 17 years he often controlled cutter operations, including every detail of their requisitions. Young approved the request not because of an enlightened outlook or advanced technology, but because they could be obtained for 15 dollars less than the original 40-dollar asking price. The

department purchased the revolvers from John Ehlers, in New York City, who obtained Colt's entire stock when the Paterson business failed.³³

The Colt revolver was found to be a decided improvement over the single-shot pistol, and more were purchased. Following the *Ewing* purchase, the captains of the cutters *Van Buren*, *Madison*, and *Jefferson* made similar requests.

The same period was also the beginning of the transition from flintlock to percussion weapons in the RCS. Young's approval of the revolver request did not extend to "revolving carbines." He ordered 36 standard "common" muskets drawn from U.S. Army stocks at Fort Jay on Governors Island, New York, instead. The purchase of Colt's weapons only added to the profusion of weapons types in the service. The many types nullified any attempts at standardizing training. Small arms differed from cutter to cutter, and although the basic operation of the weapons would remain the same, any training conducted was individually inspired.

The late 1840s saw many arms that had been introduced at the turn of the century still in service on revenue cutters. Not all cutters had access to replacement arms like *Ewing* and *Jackson*. Some arms had been captured from the British during the Revolutionary War and the War of 1812. *Vigilant* reported arms on board captured from the British privateer *Dart* in 1812. The cutter *Hamilton*, at Boston, used cannon captured from General Burgoyne's troops at Saratoga in 1777, and a French "culverin" dated 1704 served on the *Van Buren* until its transfer to the U.S. Navy in 1841.³⁴ Surplus army arms from many foreign countries were the most common in use.

The Treasury Department could not always rely on the army to supply the arms. When the new iron-hulled, steam-powered (Hunter's Wheel) cutters were under construction in 1842, the department turned to a commercial source for firearms. However, purchases came only after a thorough search of every customs house for any serviceable arms. The department, not finding the arms needed, took the advice of the army and navy Ordnance Boards and ordered 144 Jenks Patent carbines and pistols from Nathan P. Ames of Cabotville, Massachusetts.³⁵

The Ames contract was the first large order of small arms from a private manufacturer. The contract also included swords (1841 NCO type), cutlasses, boarding pikes, and battle axes. Older types were still relied upon to fill the gaps in cutter allowances. Capt. William A. Howard, superintendent of construction of the new steam cutters noted that he had "Forty Short Percussion muskets, hinged barrels—24 balls to the pound—also Forty Pistols, 24 balls to the pound," for issue.³⁶ The order demonstrates that even with the improvement of the more rapid-firing breech-loading weapons, the service still depended heavily on edged weapons.

Training was accorded the same treatment as the purchase of improved weapons—just enough was done to get by. The techniques of training were basically the same as those used in the late eighteenth century: drilling in the movements of loading and firing was emphasized rather than firing itself.

In 1834 the RCS received its first printed regulations. The regulations made little reference to training except that the crew was to be “exercised weekly at the guns” by the first lieutenant. The service maintained its former unwritten policy of relying on personal experience to carry its training. The older, more seasoned crewmen taught the younger ones—a traditional seagoing posture. These decades had no shortage of veterans, American or otherwise, who were well versed in the use of martial arms.

The second printing of the service’s regulations in 1843 was more specific. Under Article 8 of Chapter IV, the commander of the cutter was ultimately responsible for small-arms training:

Article 8. He shall, when it can be done without great inconvenience, cause his crew to be exercised at the guns at least twice a week. He shall cause his crew to be exercised at general quarters once a week. He shall cause the whole of the crew to be drilled in the use of small arms. General exercises at the guns shall occasionally take place at night. Detailed reports of these exercises to be made to the Department.³⁷

The key statement in the regulations, “when it [training] can be done without great inconvenience,” left a very large loophole. Most captains who found the drills inconvenient neglected training, and none submitted reports. This attitude was not due to a lack of care or to a misplaced sense of duty but was brought about by the constant pressure to be more “active” in enforcement of the revenue laws. Revenue service involvement in five major conflicts between 1800 and 1850 and the resulting need to be proficient in small-arms use was largely dismissed as a navy problem. Alexander Hamilton’s well-entrenched tradition of cost conservatism continued and hampered any real growth. This posture would extend over a 200-year period.

Fiscal conservatism or not, the revenue cutters frequently used their small arms. However, few Treasury secretaries dictated policy concerning the more military features of the service, and with good reason. Military attributes were not the primary features of the service; tariff collection was. Since small arms proficiency was considered to be a military concern rather than a revenue collection matter, it was neglected.

The personalized management style of many Treasury secretaries created other problems as well. Most wanted close oversight of every detail of a vast network of ports and cutters; but the affairs of the Treasury were far too complex for one man to manage successfully. To be successful, the Secretary had to rely on the judgment of cutter captains or customs collectors or both.

Many of the captains had 40 or more years’ experience and some had been officers in the United States Army, Navy, or Marine Corps. All were well acquainted with naval procedures. Officers experienced in military matters were not always available as a newer generation of officers joined the cutters.

The third lieutenants were given the task of drilling the crew at arms. Some drills, especially when cruising coastal waters, took on a very practical application of marksmanship. The cutters would occasionally come upon a

flock of ducks or geese (domestic and wild) or a watering deer. These "marks," as training targets were called, were suited to the lieutenants' training program and the crew's and officers' mess table. The idea of adding to their normal rations was a good incentive for proficiency at arms and was often done at the captain's insistence to supplement normal rations.³⁸

Concern for the adequacy of each cutter's small-arms outfit was not totally ignored by the Treasury Department. Within two weeks of taking office, Robert J. Walker issued a circular to each cutter requesting "a schedule of the armament on board and belonging to the vessel."³⁹ Walker was specific in the information he wanted included in the report. He called for "specifying the number, calibre, and size of bore of the large guns whether brass or iron—muskets, pistols, and carbines, cutlasses, boarding pikes &c &c [sic]."⁴⁰ It was the first ordnance inventory in the service's history. Walker tried to bring some organization to the cutter service. He received answers, but not entirely in the form he wanted.

Some captains included more detail than others. The *Crawford* at Savannah, Georgia, included "16 Halls Patent rifles—Load at the Breech"⁴¹; *Jackson*, Lt. Stephen Connelly at Newport, Rhode Island, noted the 12 muskets on board were in good condition in "Extreme length of each 4 ft. 6 inches." He added the barrel length as 3 feet 3 inches with a bore 5/8 inch.⁴² Henry D. Hunter, a captain since 1824, was not about to yield too much information and reported *Ewing's* arms as "Seven Muskets—good order."⁴³ Capt. Robert Day, steam cutter *Legare*, listed "Twenty four Jenks patent Carbines" and "twenty four Ames Pistols."⁴⁴

The list continued, probably to the wonderment of Secretary Walker, describing a great variety of non-uniform weapons comprising cutters' armaments. He knew he could not arbitrarily replace all the service's weapons for the sake of conformity, but he could at least manage the procurement of serviceable ammunition. Not surprisingly, Walker turned to Samuel Colt.

On April 15, 1845, Walker issued another circular, "A contract having been made with Saml Colt Esqr of New York City to Supply Vessels of the U.S. Revenue Marine with his Waterproof Cartridges, for cannon and small arms..."⁴⁵ Each cutter submitted their requisitions to the Treasury Department with special attention given to the description of cannon and small arms bore size.⁴⁶ This was a landmark for cutter arms requisitions. It centralized expenditures and removed the cutter captain and local customs collector as purchasing agents. The requisition process gave at least one captain, Napoleon L. Coste, of the cutter *Van Buren*, at Charleston, South Carolina, an excuse to expend his older ammunition "in the practice of target firing."⁴⁷

By August 1845 on the eve of the Mexican War, most of the cutters had received their new supplies of Colt's ammunition. Secretary Walker was concerned with the adequacy of the cutters' armaments. The first inventory had been disappointing, both from the descriptions given and from the results.

On 11 August 1845, Secretary Walker called for another inventory of the 16 cutters. He had a standard report form printed in the hope that more accurate accounting would result. Walker asked for the numbers and condition

of armaments, including amounts of ammunition. The reverse of the form asked for the internal dimensions of each cutter's gun ports, perhaps in an attempt to standardize the types of cannon. The result of the gun port inventory was as discouraging as the weapons response. No two cutters had the same measurements. The weapons reports echoed previous ones. The cutter *Wolcott*, constructed in 1830 at New York, had "12 lb. Carronades cast in 1811," and "old U.S. Muskets (that) carry 1 oz ball [sic]."⁴⁸

Lt. Thomas Stoddard reported the cutter *Alert* at Eastport, Maine, had three different kinds of muskets on board. One type carried markings "Kings Arms, Stamped 'Tower'...the barrels are worn very thin...they are not to be relied upon for effective service."⁴⁹ As a side note, Stoddard added, "The bayonets do not fit the muskets and are useless."

Stoddard, with some courage, offered his opinion about *Alert's* arms and echoed the thoughts most officers had on the subject, "These muskets seem to have been taken on board from time to time as occasion required, without regard to uniformity & the accompanying accouterments without regard to adaption."⁵⁰ It was an indictment of both his former captains, customs collectors and the Treasury Department.

Stoddard continued, "...for purposes of daily practice & discipline, without regard to effectiveness in case of actual service or uniformity the armament of this vessel has answered to keep up appearances..."⁵¹ He wanted all the arms replaced for the sake of "uniformity and effectiveness," and while requesting new arms he asked for a new stove; the old one was as worn out as the weapons.

The reports distressed Walker. The organization of the revenue cutters was poor and standards left entirely to the local captain and collector. Walker made another attempt to seize overall control of the service. The relative autonomy of captains is illustrated by the painting of the cutters. In September 1845, Walker wrote Capt. Andrew Mather, *Ewing*, noting Mather had "altered the paint work" of the cutter. Angrily Walker directed Mather to "restore it to the original colours [sic] making use of black and white paints only."⁵² Walker added, "hereafter allow no alterations to be made without the approbation of the Department."⁵³ Mather answered five days later: "The *Ewing* is now painted black with a white streak."⁵⁴

Furor over the painting of cutters was a matter of efficiency of organization. Walker issued an order on November 1, 1845, stating that black and white were to be the colors for revenue cutters (red lead was allowed for iron vessels). The use of gold leaf was prohibited except for use on the head and stern carvings. Walker warned, "With a view to economy, and the establishment of uniformity, a strict compliance with this order is required."

Walker attempted to bring his personnel into some form of organized behavior. The past practice of appointment of warrant officers, including gunners, by the individual captains and collectors of the ports ceased. They now had to be personally approved by the Treasury secretary. Walker knew unqualified men obtained positions solely because they were personally or politically associated with the cutter captain, customs collector, former

Treasury secretaries or other politicians. Walker instituted a provisional program where he would “withhold Warrants, until the officer shall have served faithfully in such capacity twelve months.”⁵⁵

Not all of the cutter captains were pleased with Walker’s attempts. Capt. John A. Webster commented “that it appears to be the intention to keep the Commander [of the cutters] in mind of the regulations.”⁵⁶ Walker replied that “such is decidedly the intention of the Department,” and that all other forms of directives would be obeyed and “a departure from these will not be sanctioned.”⁵⁷

Walker built for the future both in materials and personnel. The officer corps was as mismatched as the cutters’ armaments and training policies. Straightening out the arms problem was the easiest to correct; the other problems would take more time. Secretary Walker began by ordering new armaments, including cannon, for any new vessel under construction and for those condemned on the older cutters. His first large order for small arms went again to Nathan P. Ames.⁵⁸

On May 15, 1846, Navy Secretary George Bancroft requested from the Treasury secretary the numbers of revenue steamers that could be “placed under the orders of this Department” for service in the war against Mexico.⁵⁹ Walker had serious doubts about the reliability of the new steam-powered cutters; however, he saw an opportunity to have the service function as a unit for the first time. Walker informed Bancroft that it would be best to have the cutters serve under the direction of the Treasury Department and assist the navy wherever they could.⁶⁰ Bancroft agreed. On May 19, Walker appointed Capt. John Webster to command “the movements and operations of the revenue vessels employed in the Gulf of Mexico.”⁶¹

The steam cutters had inherent machinery problems, but there were other problems as well. Secretary Walker’s attempt to standardize included the replacement of the majority of the service’s cannon with two “short 32 lb. cannon.” He miscalculated the fragility of the sailing cutters. None had the structural qualities to withstand the recoil of the heavier guns.

By the fall of 1846 Capt. Winslow Foster replaced Webster as the revenue service commander in the Gulf of Mexico. In December Foster requested a naval inspection of the cannon aboard the cutters *Ewing* and *Forward*. On December 30, 1846, navy lieutenants William Green, H. B. Huger, and David D. Porter reported the results of their survey at New Orleans, Louisiana. They found that the cannon were “inefficient for nautical purpose.”⁶² “The carriages are so constructed that the lee battery cannot be of any service if there is any breeze blowing,” and are “so fitted that the decks will be cut up every time the gun is fired;” both recommended rejecting the guns and placing them on larger naval vessels.⁶³ All felt that the small guns the cutters previously mounted were better suited to the vessels.

The naval officers also reported that the “bulwarks of the vessel are entirely too light to stand the recoil” of the great guns.⁶⁴ The final recommendation was either to refit the older battery or to purchase guns of smaller size for both cutters. The Treasury Department made no comment to the report. Walker

spent over 8,000 dollars for new guns and would not revert to lighter types. However, by the late 1850s nearly all the 32-pounders lay, some never fired, at the Brooklyn Navy Yard.⁶⁵

The cutters in the Gulf of Mexico were not the only ones having difficulties. Capt. Andrew Mather of the steam cutter *Jefferson* at Oswego reported his Paixhan 64 pounder “cannot be discharged without Whipping so[me] 60 feet of the bulwarks;” in addition it was too large and exceeded “the occasions of the service.”⁶⁶ Mather wanted a 12- or 18-pound carriage gun. Another reason Mather did not want the Paixhan gun was that it left no room on deck to carry a launch. It was a matter of practicality: a small boat was more useful than a gun.

After the Mexican War, the routine of purchasing improved arms for newly constructed vessels continued with the ordering of 12 Colt “patent repeating Pistols” in 1848 for *C.W. Lawrence* built at Washington, D.C., for service at San Francisco, California.⁶⁷ In addition to these arms, 20 Jenks carbines, 40 Model 1843 Ames pistols, 20 swords, and 20 boarding pikes were added to the inventory.⁶⁸ However, most cutters saw little action that called for the use of weapons. They actively enforced the revenue laws, assisted distressed vessels, and tended aids to navigation. Weapons like Mather’s cannon became a bother and large guns a hindrance on deck. Many captains saw no reason to keep them mounted and placed them below deck for ballast. The small arms also saw little use and lay in the arms’ chest unattended.

This routine of non-use was more prevalent in the northern cutters than their counterparts in the southern United States. Southern revenue captains still encountered pirates, smugglers, and slave runners with enough frequency to warrant arms maintenance and training.

In 1849 Robert J. Walker left the Treasury secretary post and the positive attempts to bring organization to the service ended. His work to standardize weapons types simplified training for the officers. They could transfer between cutters and have a working knowledge of a group of weapons. However, Walker failed to promulgate written operational or training procedures to ensure standardized practices. Without written guidelines practices were still left to the captain and the third lieutenant.

By the 1850s, the west coast revenue cutters were more active in revenue duties than their east coast counterparts. Small arms were needed in the frontier atmosphere as much as sails, but the Treasury Department was still reluctant to purchase and arm the crews with anything other than the single-shot carbine (such as the Jenks) or common musket.

Walker’s replacement, Thomas Corwin, returned to the former practice of requesting arms from the War Department. The cutter *Hamilton* at Charleston, South Carolina, received new arms from the Watertown Arsenal in New York.⁶⁹ James Guthrie replaced Corwin during 1853. Guthrie, a railroad promoter and lawyer, took another avenue to arms procurement and simply purchased those not wanted by others. An example was the purchase of carbines and pistols from the Perry Arms Company of Newark, New Jersey, in 1853.⁷⁰

Regardless of origin, the arms used by the cutter crews continued to be single-shot weapons. The prevailing military thought was, and had been, that if a man had a "repeating arm," he would unnecessarily waste expensive ammunition. Not all cutter captains agreed with this premise, but they would not risk the loss of their position to argue too forcibly with the Treasury Department.

The west coast cutters were respected but not feared by smugglers and merchants. Accustomed to what they considered permissive and corrupt Latin-American customs systems, the lawbreakers, at times, were more aggressive than those of the east coast. Greater profits were at stake, especially in the commodities of opium and Chinese females, both smuggled into the gold fields and labor camps. There was also trouble in the Northwest Territories from hostile Indian tribes and British fur traders.

Repeating firearms were in huge demand in the western gold towns and settlements. In 1850, T. Butler King, collector at San Francisco, reported pistols (Colts) were priced at 250 to 500 dollars each depending on size (caliber) and offered the testimonial that the pistols "were undoubtedly of the greatest service in enabling Americans to maintain their superiority among greatly superior numbers of Mexicans and other foreigners...the foreigners outnumbered the Americans three or four to one." He added, "They were equally useful in keeping the Indians in check."⁷¹ King did not consider the Americans in California to be a foreign element.

If King worried about foreigners, his successor, R. P. Hammon did not. In July 1853, Treasury Secretary James Guthrie authorized Hammon to hire a "Japanese" on the revenue boat *Argus*. The Japanese man had been rescued from a sinking junk by the merchant vessel *Emma Parker*. Guthrie attempted to get Commodore Perry to take the man on his expedition to Japan but the Navy Department said the man could be of "no service." Guthrie feared that the man "left to his own resources...must necessarily suffer." This was the beginning of hiring Japanese to serve on the western revenue cutters.

The cutters patrolling the northwest often assisted the U.S. Army in their campaigns to check the "hostiles." Men from the cutters manned the forts, often taking their own cannon, while army patrols were in the field. Second Lt. James E. Harrison of *Jefferson Davis*, commanded by Capt. William C. Pease, led a detachment of men from Company C, 4th Infantry from Fort Steilacom, Washington Territory.⁷² These 1855 expeditions included suppressions in Oregon as well as the Washington Territory. Harrison eventually left the revenue service for a commission in the U.S. Army and ultimately became a brigadier general in the Confederate States Army.⁷³

The rush for arms, except for the cutters transferred to the west coast, was over. Purchases and other acquisitions of previous years satisfied the immediate need. Cutters such as *Shubrick*, built in 1857, carried 51 Colt pistols and 30 rifles to California in 1861.⁷⁴ However, the *Jefferson Davis*, by the time Georgia Senator Howell Cobb became Treasury Secretary in 1858, was "in want of small arms" on the Puget Sound station in Washington Territory. Cobb purchased "12 Minnie Rifles and 24 Holster Pistols with requisite

ammunition," from the War Department. Cobb had begun, like Robert J. Walker before him, to take an interest in the arms of the cutters, especially the southern cutters.

In the previous three years, the cutters *Jackson* at Eastport, Maine, and the *Washington* at New York were the only northern cutters to request new weapons.⁷⁵ The *Washington's* First Lt., Edgar O. Murden, requested Jenks or Sharps carbines, six navy percussion pistols and six Colt revolvers, all to replace the Perry arms that were "unfit for sea use." In addition he requested four "Officer Cutlasses with belts" and "eighteen belts fitted for both Cutlasses and pistol." Murden evidently anticipated trouble on his patrols and added a request for "Six pair of 'police' handcuffs and Six ditto feet irons." It is doubtful if Murden's request was approved. The Perry arms purchase would have to do for the cutters. Perry-manufactured small arms were used because the United States Army's regulation musket would not fit in the cutter's four-and-a-half foot arms chest.⁷⁶

By 1861, national tensions had erupted into war. At the beginning of the American Civil War, no real improvements had been made in small-arms training in the cutter service. Some cutters did possess modern arms, such as the Sharps rifles, Maynard carbines and the Colt 1858 pistol. However, these arms, with some purchases of new cannon by Cobb went mostly to the southern cutters.⁷⁷ The cutter *William Aiken*, at Charleston, was rearmed with a new 12 pounder in 1858.⁷⁸

The other cutters maintained, often still in the hold, older arms received over the past two decades or before. In 1860, two nine-pound guns reported to bear the date "1813 with the Lion and Unicorn upon them and...captured at the Battle of New Orleans," were transferred from *Ewing* to the *William L. Marcy*.

Regardless of weapon age, weapons training was based on the tactic of one-shot-then-board, or repel boarders with sword, axe or cutlass. This training regimen continued in the service. The multi-shot revolver was also still in the officers' hands and the musket and bayonet, pistol, pike, and cutlass combination stayed with the average crewman.

Despite heavy weapons usage, the War Between the States produced few standards of training for the Revenue Cutter Service. Standardization was nearly impossible because of the 85 or more different types of small arms in use by all service branches, from Revolutionary War flintlocks to metallic cartridge weapons of the latest design. Revenue cutters received arms from a variety of sources and exemplified the diversity of arms.

In the spring of 1861, Capt. William A. Howard was again equipping ships with arms at New York. Salmon P. Chase, Secretary of the Treasury since March, ordered Howard to take "150 percussion muskets with accouterments and 15,000 Ball cartridges," from the arsenal at New York [Fort Jay].⁷⁹ However, these arms would not fill the need, and Howard solicited a purchase quote for the Sharps Rifle Manufacturing Company. On May 31 the president of Sharps, J. C. Palmer, wrote back stating, "We can furnish 200 Carbines in 10 days, [for] the price of \$30 [each] [sic]."⁸⁰ On 21 June 1861, Sharps

delivered the carbines which were distributed to the cutters. *Varina, Crawford, Jackson, Campbell, Bibb, and Corwin* received 21 each with 25 cutlasses and *Henrietta* and *Hope* were issued ten each with 13 and 12 cutlasses, respectively.⁸¹

The war required extra patrol duties for the cutters. There were not enough hulls afloat to handle all of the duties, and a recommendation came for the use of yachts for war service. Secretary Chase asked whether "their services will be of sufficient importance to justify such an expenditure as manning arming and provisioning them." However, he added, "I understand that these yachts were to be sailed without other expenses to the Government [other than] the arming."⁸²

Henrietta and *Hope* of the New York Yacht Club both were issued arms, naval uniforms and equipment, and joined the blockading fleet.⁸³ Interestingly, the yachts received a set of mini-regulations that included weapons exercises. Capt. James Gordon V. Bennett, Jr., a yacht club member and *Henrietta's* owner, received instructions:

You will during your cruise exercise your men daily (when the weather and duties of the Vessel will permit) at the Great Guns & small arms. Practice them once a week with shot and shells to the extent (in all) of twenty rounds per week.⁸⁴

During the war great gun training superseded small-arms training. These guns required a well-coordinated team to work them in action. The training was individualized rather than a collective duty of the Revenue Cutter Service. The captains usually established and carried out their own standards of training, which often exceeded any requirement mandated by naval regulations during the war.

The war had not changed the relationship between the United States Treasury, Navy, or War Departments. The Treasury Department, like that of the other departments, made its own contracts for arms and ammunition. It often had to compete with other federal department contract agents as well as with the individual states. Like all wars, the Civil War was a boon for the arms industry. A price list furnished the Treasury Department by the Ames Manufacturing Company listed prices ranging from \$2.25 for the six-pounder shot, shell, and canister, including cartridges, to \$32.12 for the 400-pounder (solid shot weighed 414 pounds, the shell 338 pounds) in quantities of 580. Powder charges were extra for the shell over six pounds.⁸⁵ Bronze cannon listed at 46 cents per pound. Rifling the same gun cost 50 dollars extra and sighting 20 dollars more.⁸⁶ Ames noted they did not make iron cannon, but they could furnish them for eight to ten cents per pound.

The Treasury Department took the lowest costs and ordered four bronze rifled cannon, two each for *Henrietta* and *Hope*.⁸⁷ One notable increase caused by the war was the doubling of the 1858 cutlass price to \$4.50 each. In September 1861, the Treasury Department bought 36 more Sharps carbines.

The competition for arms typified the disjointed methods of procurement of arms and the lack of cohesion in training. Daily training lapsed to once a week, then once a month. The initial surge of interest in the war made carrying out training easier, but as the war progressed training lagged. Conduct of training became more a matter of entertainment than usefulness. However, the RCS emerged from the Civil War a military force far superior to any time since 1799. It had gained the respect of the other services, and more importantly, had effectively demonstrated its power.

Centralization of authority had increased the efficiency of the service—for a time. Experience at coordinated operations and good working knowledge of newer and more advanced weapons enhanced the service's military posture. Many older and younger officers learned, at least in wartime, the necessity of proper and complete training. They realized that more powerful, technologically superior weapons had brought the point, shoot, and board period to an end.

With peace settling over the nation, the general resolve for better training was forgotten as the revenue cutters moved back to their former duties. Criminal activities to evade the customs continued as they had before and during the war. The revenue cutters, however, now faced different types of enforcement and duties.

With the acquisition of the Alaska Territory from Russia in 1867, revenue cutters had to patrol and enforce the Federal laws in a greatly expanded area. This included the enforcement of the 1868 act that prohibited the unauthorized killing of fur seals. Fur seal hunting and smuggling were long-standing activities.

In the 1790s Russian Governor Alexander Baranov had outlawed the sale of liquor and firearms to the Alaskan Indian population; smuggling of these articles followed soon after.⁸⁸ A succession of governors had attempted various methods and treaties to prevent smuggling before the sale of Alaska to the United States without success. The sale did not stop the smuggling from becoming "a significant economic activity—an activity that grew and prospered under United States" administration.⁸⁹

The law enforcement task in Alaska assigned to the revenue cutters was nearly hopeless. The expanse of the patrol areas required swift mobility; instead the Treasury Department sent the ill-maintained cutters *Lincoln* and *Reliance*. Both cutters were unfit in material condition and in manpower for their assigned jobs. *Reliance*, suffering from poor rigging, a sprung mainmast, and leaky decks, by 1870 lay at anchor at Sitka, Alaska Territory, half-afloat; *Lincoln* was in similar condition.⁹⁰ Requests for a steam cutter in Alaska were unheeded by the Treasury Department because the cost of maintaining a steam cutter would more than offset the "amount of revenue derived through the complete suppression of smuggling."⁹¹ It was less expensive to allow the smuggling than to enforce the law.

The troubles in Alaska brought the problems within the revenue service into the limelight of congressional discussion.⁹² Treasury Secretary George S. Boutwell selected various men to overhaul the service. These 1869

committees were established to place the service "on a proper footing." This was a major reorganization. The two primary committees handled personnel and cutters. The committees recommended that the administration of the RCS should be centralized, personnel should no longer depend on political support for appointment or promotion, and the cutters should be designed specifically for revenue work.⁹³ Secretary Walker had tried similar changes, but they were not successful until Reconstruction when congressional support was greater.

The committees ultimately evolved into a single head of the revenue-marine. Sumner I. Kimball was selected by Boutwell to administer both the revenue cutters and lifesaving stations. His first task was to revise the old regulations of the RCS. The guidelines were particularly important in Alaska. From 1867, poachers, like their smuggler counterparts, looked upon the revenue service as a hindrance to their "rights" to harvest seals. The poachers reportedly maintained a general rule of carrying a ten-gauge shotgun for the seals and a repeating rifle for the revenue officers; however, incidents between poachers and service personnel revived an interest in small arms.

The new head of the Revenue Cutter Service promulgated no formal training routine at arms other than a general statement. This could have been caused in part by Kimball's ideal of putting the life-saving institution first in his list of priorities. Kimball's influence led to making humanitarian activities the service's primary duty, a resumption of the 1840s outlook.

The 1871 Treasury Department Regulations for the revenue-marine gave the captain of each cutter clear-cut orders:

217. He Shall not fail to exercise and cause to be exercised the officers and men at the great guns, and with small arms, cutlasses, pikes, and other weapons which may be furnished to the vessel, until they become proficient in their use; and thereafter there shall be an exercise of all arms by all the officers and crew of not less than *one hour of one day of each week* (emphasis added) unless prevented by bad weather or duty of a pressing kind.⁹⁴

These orders for drills were very similar to the ones issued by individual captains approximately eight years before and reflected two main features. First, the regulation openly indicated the lack of a regular issue of arms by the phrase, "other weapons which may be furnished to the vessel." The Treasury Department, as in the past, was unaware, or uninformed, of the types of arms on its cutters. The 1871 regulations used only generic terms for weapons in its established allowance lists. Secondly, the regulations offered an escape clause to not conduct training. The excuse "duty of a pressing kind" was readily used by the captains, and training fell into the nuisance category.

However, the service did adopt the 1871 infantry drill regulations of the U.S. Marine Corps for small arms and navy instructions for the great guns. Some degree of standardization of training began to evolve. It is not known why the department chose the Marine Corps regulations rather than army instructions, but it can be surmised that past, and possible future, relationships with the Marine Corps caused the choice.

There was no improvement of the situation in Alaska: lawlessness continued, especially in illegal sealing. On September 1, 1884, Lt. John E. Lutz, USRCS, seized the German schooner *Adele* at anchor of Saint Paul Island for illegal sealing.⁹⁵ Lutz held the *Adele's* crew at rifle point while Lutz's boarding party sailed the prize to port. Upon arrival Lutz was told of another sealing schooner nearby. He took the *Adele*, with a "native crew," and chased the poacher.

Approximately nine or ten miles off shore, the poacher hove to and awaited for Lutz's arrival. Lutz saw the schooner's name was painted out and hailed it. Flying the revenue ensign Lutz moved to within 100 yards, and ordered the schooner to heave-to. He ordered two rounds (presumably rifle) fired across the other's bow and for good measure ordered two rounds fired in its rigging. The other paid no attention and only "muttered imprecations" at Lutz. Lutz then directed his men to aim lower and "rake the decks of the other vessel." The other vessel fired five or six shots back and Lutz returned 50 or 60 rounds. Neither vessel suffered any damage; darkness and rising seas prevented a capture.

The smuggling of liquor and opium also grew in volume and sophistication. The smuggling techniques used in this period would be reborn and expanded after enactment of the Volstead Act. Liquor smuggling in Alaska was only suppressed by the gold rush of the 1890s. The repeal of prohibition on liquor in Alaska came in 1899, but not before establishing a heritage of RCS authority in Alaska.

Armed incidents were not confined to Alaska. In early 1890 the Mayor of Cedar Keys, Florida, William Cottrell, with a "band of adherents" took over the town of 20,000 inhabitants.⁹⁶ Cottrell's actions were nothing short of a reign of terror. He appointed his own men to law enforcement positions and had "hideous orgies" at night. He and his men routed people from their homes and forced the citizens to dance "under the muzzles of leveled revolvers." Cottrell was well known. He had at least 18 criminal indictments against him in New York State.⁹⁷

Cottrell's rule of Cedar Keys continued uninterrupted until May 1890, when he took over the U.S. Customs House. When word reached Washington, D.C., of the capture, the Treasury secretary ordered the revenue cutter *McLane* at Tampa, Florida, to immediately cruise to Cedar Key and retake the customs house. The order missed the sailing of the *McLane*. The *McLane's* captain, Thomas S. Smyth, had already received the news and sailed without orders.

Smyth was ready for such an action. He always demanded a well-trained infantry division aboard his ship. On May 17, the *McLane* nosed into Cedar Keys Harbor and put two boats of seamen infantry ashore on the beach. The officer-in-charge of the landing force, Second Lt. Orin D. Myrick, assisted by Third Lt. Godfrey L. Carden, noted his men dressed in "seaman infantry" uniforms were "great brawny fellows, and carried their pieces [rifles] with a businesslike air."

Once ashore they "strode along in magnificent unison, their bright cutlasses swinging at their sides." They trotted at the advance with Springfield Model

1884 rifles at full-cock. Each man had four cartridges in his mouth for quick reloading. They formed an open skirmish formation and entered the town.

Cottrell and his men retreated in front of the "long blue line" into the swamps and keys. The landing party pursued Cottrell and came out on a bluff overlooking the water. There the landing party saw a boat with about six men rowing away. Someone in the boat fired at the landing party causing all to take to the ground. All the shots were short and no one was hurt. Lt. Myrick ordered his men, "Give them five hundred yards elevation," and his men began to fire. The landing party fired three well-placed rounds and the men in the boat surrendered, but not Cottrell. He made his escape to the mainland and was ultimately shot to death by the Chief of Police in Montgomery, Alabama. The crew of the cutter *McLane* "liberated" the town of Cedar Keys and remained a month longer to help restore the civil government.

The RCS continued to use force to enforce the Federal law in Alaska. During 1892, the cutter *Rush* twice fired into the bows of fast-sailing sealers with its breech-loading Hotchkiss cannon.

Individual captains trained their crews in their own methods of law enforcement. It was training of necessity and personal preference rather than by organizational design. The theories of weapons practice were as mixed as were the vessels of the service. Vessels were both sail and steam, veterans of the Civil War reaching the end of their useful lives, and a few former naval vessels, armed and unarmed. It was a confusing system that somehow stayed together, not by consensus but by individual will. By 1894 the rules and regulations of the service had become more complex and abundant than the equipment.

The Marine Corps rules for conducting small arms were replaced with the *Instructions for Infantry and Artillery, U.S. Navy* and the *Ordnance Instructions, U.S. Navy*. The new instructions required an infantry force of 16 men for all "commissioned cutters of the first and second class." They also officially delegated the vessels's third lieutenant as "responsible for the proper instruction and efficiency of the small-arms division."

Interestingly the Treasury Department made ordnance or gunnery an individual "division" on the cutter. The cutter's third lieutenant personally instructed the men of this division and exercised them at least one hour each week to ensure proficiency, and supervised all target practice with small arms. In a departure from past practices, the new regulations included actual firing of weapons for practice. These duties required the most junior commissioned officer to understand all the duties of an infantry officer and small-arms instructor. The cutter's gunner [warrant or petty officer] also assisted if the cutter had one—not all did.

Although regulations improved, attitudes toward military training declined. The orientation toward the lifesaving role owed much to the writings of late nineteenth-century romantic authors. Articles and stories published about the heroic exploits of the service appeared as regular features in the popular journals. Life saving appliances—not armaments—became the principal concern of the service. A general decline of interest in armaments evolved in

the service during the mid-1890s at a time when the world's major powers began major naval expansion and construction.

The beginning of the war with Spain found all of the cutters inadequately or completely unarmed, except for small arms.⁹⁸ The cutter *Hudson* carried no armament at the outbreak of the war.⁹⁹ Cutters were hurriedly fitted with guns for duty in Cuba and the Philippines. The *McCulloch*, at Hong Kong, added two navy three-inch, breech-loading rifled (B.L.R.) field howitzers, securing them on deck by passing a wire strap through the carriage wheels, before joining Admiral Dewey at Manila.¹⁰⁰

Although the service had existed for over a century, its arms, especially small arms, remained as widely assorted as ever. Cost effectiveness meant using what was available or that which could be bought for little or nothing. The list included small arms such as the 6mm Lee rifle, 30-40 Krag rifle Model 1898, Winchester .45-.70-caliber Model 1886, Spencers and Sharps rifles and carbines, and some 1863, 1873, and 1884 Springfield muskets and rifles. The Model 1892 .38-caliber Colt revolver, aside from a number of other government and privately owned makes and models, served as the standard sidearm.

At the start of the Spanish War, all United States forces found themselves outgunned by the more modern and advanced rapid fire capability of the 7mm Spanish-Mauser. The Spanish were able to lay a heavy volume of fire against the "single shot" American forces. This decided disadvantage stirred the government to produce more and better arms, but training methods, as in the past, did not advance with the weapons.

The Treasury Department issued General Order No. 41 on 31 December 1898, slightly amending the 1894 regulations by changing the reference manual to *Drill Regulations, U.S. Navy, Infantry and Artillery, 1898*. The new navy manual incorporated a few changes from experience gained in the brief war with Spain.

Riflemen were still being trained to fire "at the foot" which meant the entire body of the enemy was visible above the front sight.¹⁰¹ This training tactic was a carryover from the era of black powder weapons and usually resulted in a large number of misses on the battlefield. The advent and use of smokeless powder weapons, especially the machine gun, by European countries again changed the face of warfare.

Revenue service vessels worked closely with the U.S. Army, Navy, and Marine Corps to clear out pockets of Spanish resistance in Cuba and the Philippines. They continued to assist after the war in the Philippines. The United States, in its adopted isolationism, had not been a participant in any form of large-scale foreign hostility. Change in military procedures came slowly and was often held back by the conservative nature of the general staffs and small military budgets. The RCS was no different. It was now dependent on the rules and regulations of the other services and would not change training policies or procedures until they did. The brief war with Spain once again shocked the Revenue Cutter Service into being an armed service—but only temporarily. The temporary and short condition of the war coupled with

several small European and Asian conflicts only nudged but did not awaken the United States.

Notes

1. Letter from Philadelphia collector Sharp Delany to Alexander Hamilton, February 15, 1790.

2. *The Ordnance Waste Book, West Point 1791-1795*, U.S. Military Academy Library, U.S. Military Academy, West Point, New York. The regulation number of cartridges per musket in 1792 was 24, but the number varied depending on who and where the cartridge boxes were made. Berkeley R. Lewis, *Small Arms and Ammunition in the United States Service* (Washington: Smithsonian Institution, 1956):69-74.

3. *Ibid.*, letter dated September 8, 1791; and letters received by the Secretary of the Treasury, National Archives Record Group 26, Entry 318, (Portsmouth, N.H.) Letter dated October 25, 1791 (National Archives Record Group 26; hereafter cited as NA, RG 26).

4. *The Ordnance Waste Book, West Point 1791-1795*, Order dated June 1, 1793.

5. Harry L. Blackmore, *Guns and Rifles of the World* (New York: Viking Press, 1965):figure 245.

6. Dixon, Robert. "Captain Gross's Arms & Stores," *Coast Guard Alumni Bulletin* (April-May, 1966):96. *Ibid.* Florence Kern, *Simon Gross's U.S. Revenue Cutter ACTIVE* (ALISED Enterprises, Washington, D.C., 1977):21. The lack of cannons on the first cutters refutes the popular myth of the "Black Maria."

7. Robert Scheina, "Coast Guard Predecessor Only Navy for New Republic," U.S. Coast Guard, *Commandant's Bulletin*, 32 (1981).

8. NA, RG 92, Entry 2117, *Waste Book*, vol. 69, 1797-1800.

9. William Duane, *A Hand Book for Infantry: Containing the First Principles of Military Discipline* (Philadelphia, 1813):6. For an excellent illustration of the movements see: James E. Hicks, "United States Military Shoulder Arms, 1795-1935," *American Military History* (1938).

10. NA, RG 45 Entry 464. Letter from James W. Henry to John Harris, March 30, 1798.

11. NA, RG 45 Entry 464. Letter from James W. Henry to John Harris, May 10, 1798.

12. The crew complement was 16; however, four were on the cutter's small boat on patrol in the York River and were not engaged in the battle.

13. Report of Captain J. R. Lumley to Admiral Sir John B. Warren, June 12, 1813. This information was researched by John H. Robertson and tendered to the Coast Guard Historian, Washington, D.C.

14. Joseph Allen, *Battles of the British Navy*, vol. 2., (London: Henry G. Bohn, 1852):431-2. The bravery of Captain Travis was rewarded with his release on parole about two months later; this is a well recorded fact. However, the remainder of Travis' captured officers and crew spent at least a year at Halifax in prison. The only officer not released until the war was over was 1st Lieutenant John Hebb who was imprisoned at Dartmoor, England.

15. *The New Orleans Bee* (July 13, 1835):2.

16. NA, RG 26 Entry 151. Ezekiel Jones to James Breedlove, November 14, 1834.
17. Ibid.
18. Baron von Steuben, Frederick W. *Regulations for the Order and Discipline of the Troops of the United States* (I. Thomas and E. T. Andrews, Boston, 1794); (Facsimile Reprint, Dover Publications, Inc, New York, N.Y., 1985).
19. Berkeley Lewis, 311.
20. von Steuben, 17.
21. American State Papers, Military Affairs no. 67, vol. III, March 1, 1837-March 1, 1838. NA, RG 26 Entry 151, 1836.
22. NA, RG 26. Ezekiel Jones to James Breedlove, October 27, 1838. The incident took place near Tea Table Key in Florida. The expedition may have been led by Third Lieutenant John Faunce. Faunce regularly commanded such forays and was in charge of two more barge operations in that week. Good information lines the *Campbell's* logs.
23. Arcadi Gluckman, *United States Muskets, Rifles and Carbines* (Harrisburg: The Stackpole Company, 1959):209.
24. "Seminole War," *Army and Navy Chronicle*, vol. 5, no. 5 (August 3, 1837):72.
25. NA, RG 36 Entry 895. Letter from Captain Fatio to Edward Curtis, July 10, 1841.
26. NA, RG 36 Entry 895. Letter from Edward Curtis to Thomas Ewing July 10, 1841.
27. NA, RG 36 Entry 895. Weekly Report from the Journal of the U.S. Revenue Cutter *Jackson*.
28. NA, RG 36 Entry 895. Extract of Journal of U.S.R.C. Wolcott for the month of October 1841.
29. NA, RG 36 Entry 895. Letter to Edward Curtis from McClintock Young, August 11, 1842.
30. NA, RG 36 Entry 895. Captain Alexander Fraser to Edward Curtis, August 16, 1842.
31. NA, RG 36 Entry 895. McClintock Young to Edward Curtis, August 13, 1842. The constant rotation of Treasury Secretaries often hurt the organization and operation of the Revenue Cutter Service. Assistants in the Treasury often did not have authority to issue directives, leaving the districts confused as to the best courses of action.
32. NA, RG 36 Entry 895. Letter from McClintock Young to Edward Curtis.
33. P. R. Phillips and R. L. Wilson, *Paterson Colt Pistol Variations* (Dallas: Jackson Arms.):154.
34. The *Van Buren* was transferred back to the Treasury Department in July 1842.
35. NA, RG 26 Entry 143. Order for weapons, J. C. Spencer to N. P. Ames, November 18, 1843. On January 23, 1844, Ames received an order for Pouches (cartridge), powder flasks and sword belts.
36. NA, RG 26 Entry 151. W. A. Howard to J. C. Spencer. The muskets in question may have been the Hall-North, U.S. Carbine Model 1838. Total length about 40 inches and had a smoothbore diameter of .52 and used a .54-caliber ball. The issue of this weapon to the Revenue Cutter Service was likely. Some 10,000 were manufactured.

37. Chapter IV, Duties of the Commander, Article 8, *Rules and Regulations for the Government of the United States Revenue Marine* (Washington: J. & G. S. Gideon, 1843):5.

38. NA, RG 26 Entry 151. Lt. John M. Jones to Robert J. Walker, October 17, 1846. Letter charged Lt. Levy C. Harby, acting commander of the cutter *Crawford* of Savannah, with approving of the killing of eight "West India Geese" and Moscovy ducks belonging to a J. G. C. Rogers. Similar situations have occurred in the modern Coast Guard.

39. NA, RG 26 Entry 156. Circular addressed to Lt. W. B. Whitehead dated March 20, 1845.

40. *Ibid.*, Walker also wanted to know whether the arms were on board, in "public store" (not all cutters carried all their arms), or condemned.

41. NA, RG 26 Entry 156. Report of Lt. W. B. Whitehead, March 29, 1845.

42. NA, RG 26 Entry 141. Report of Lt. Stephen Connelly, March 30, 1845.

43. NA, RG 26 Entry 151. Report of Capt. Henry D. Hunter, March 31, 1845. Hunter did list other types just as the other captains, but with an unusual amount of brevity. In 1834 Hunter had made an extensive inspection tour of all the cutters and lighthouses and gave a very detailed report, including any discrepancies.

44. NA, RG 26 Entry 151. Report of Capt. Robert Day, April 13, 1845.

45. NA, RG 26 Entry 143. Circular dated April 15, 1845.

46. The requisitions tended to offer a more clear picture of the huge variance for arms types.

47. NA, RG 26 Entry 151. Letter from Capt. N. L. Coste to R. J. Walker, April 30, 1845.

48. NA, RG 26 Entry 151. Letter from Lt. J. J. Morrison to R. J. Walker, August 19, 1845.

49. NA, RG 26 Entry 151. Letter from Thomas Stoddard to R. J. Walker, August 25, 1845.

50. *Ibid.*

51. *Ibid.*

52. NA, RG 26 Entry 143. Letter from R. J. Walker to Andrew Mather, September 13, 1845.

53. *Ibid.*

54. NA, RG 26 Entry 151. Letter from Andrew Mather to R. J. Walker, September 18, 1845. Mather attempted to explain the former painting of the *Ewing* as "similar to that of some Vessels in the Naval Service and if I am Correctly informed, not unlike some Vessels in the Revenue Service, being black with a narrow red streak."

55. NA, RG 36 Entry 656. Letter from R. J. Walker to Collector of Customs, Newport, February 26, 1846. Over appointment of Gunner Hugh [Nacine] of the cutter *Jackson*.

56. NA, RG 36 Entry 656. Letter from R. J. Walker to Collector of Customs, Newport, April 17, 1846.

57. Ibid.

58. NA, RG 26 Entry 143. Letter from R. J. Walker to N. P. Ames, March 10, 1846. The number of weapons was not given in the letter but in later orders; the number amounted to hundreds.

59. NA, RG 26 Entry 156. Letter from George Bancroft to R. J. Walker.

60. NA, RG 26 Entry 156. Letter from George Bancroft to R. J. Walker, 18 May 1846.

61. NA, RG 26 Entry 143. Letter to all revenue cutter captains in the Gulf of Mexico from R. J. Walker, May 19, 1846. Although Webster disagreed with some of Walker's procedures, he was given complete charge of the operation of the cutters in the Gulf of Mexico. Ironically under era laws the individual nature of the revenue service in the war made the majority of the revenue cutter officers and men ineligible for bounty grants of land. The law required participation in "naval service," and the revenue cutters were not seen as in that service.

62. NA, RG 26 Entry 151. December 31, 1846, report of navy officers in relation to 32 lb. guns.

63. Ibid.

64. Ibid. The average weight of a short 32-pounder was approximately 3,300 pounds.

65. NA, RG 26 Entry 143, vol. 1849 (Jan-June). Letter, June 22, 1849, from Treasury Secretary W. M. Meredith to the Secretary of the Navy. Meredith offered 28 of the 32 Pounders to the navy. The use of these cannon being discontinued on the revenue cutters because "being too heavy for the small vessels, of which the service is now composed."

66. NA, RG 26 Entry 150, May 25, 1846. Letter to R. J. Walker, Secretary of Treasury.

67. NA, RG 26 Entry 143. Letter from McClintock Young to Samuel Colt, April 28, 1848.

68. NA, RG 26 Entry 143. Letter from McClintock Young to Gunner George A. Booth at New York, April 28, 1848. The Colt pistol was for the officers and the single-shot Ames pistols were crew weapons.

69. NA, RG 156 Entry 153. Chief of Ordnance Letters. Evidently Corwin was not as persuadable as other Treasury secretaries. He had to pay \$370 for the 12 muskets, 12 pistols, nine cartridge boxes for each weapon type, six cutlasses, and two arms' chests. The manufacture of the weapons was not listed.

70. NA, RG 26 Entry 143. Letter from James Guthrie to Captain W. C. Pease, October 12, 1853. Perry Arms was never successful at gaining a War Department contract and this purchase for 48 carbines and 48 pistols may have been one of the largest government contracts. The Army had flatly rejected the pistol as being of no interest. C. E. Chapel, *U.S. Martial and Semi-Martial Single Shot Pistols* (New York: Coward-McCann, 1962):243-45.

71. James E. Serven, *Colt Firearms* (Harrisburg: Stackpole Books, 1958):50. It was interesting to note that all those not "Americans" were considered foreigners in a land only recently acquired, by force, from Mexico. The list of foreigners included British, French, and Russian fur trappers and seal hunters. However, the Indians were not included in the list.

72. NA, RG 26 Entry 151. Letter from Capt. W. C. Pease to James Guthrie, October 1855. Captain Pease also stationed ten of his men at the fort to protect it while the Army troops were in the field.

73. NA, RG 26 Entry 143. Letter from James Guthrie to Secretary of War Jefferson Davis, February 16, 1856. Guthrie recommended Harrison for an Army commission based on his conduct "in two battles, in which he acquitted himself with coolness and bravery." Mark M. Boatner III, *The Civil War Dictionary* (New York: David McKay Co., 1959): 379.

74. Florence Kern, *Captain Pease: U.S. Coast Guard Pioneer* (Bethesda, Md., Alised Enterprises, 1982):71.

75. NA, RG 36 Entry 474. Letter from James Guthrie to Boston collector Charles H. Peaslee, July 22, 1856. The *Jackson* received the contact Perry carbines and pistols.

76. NA, RG 26 Entry 151. Letter from Lt. R. K. Hudgins to James Guthrie, May 16, 1856.

77. NA, RG 36 Entry 143. Letter from Howell Cobb to Collector Augustus Schell, New York, November 2, 1859. The *Lewis Cass*, New Orleans, received 15 Maynard rifles; the *Henry A. Dodge*, Galveston, 15 Maynard rifles; 15 to Mobile for the *Washington* and 25 for the *Harriet Lane* at New York. Ralph W. Donnelly, "Revenue Marine Service: The Nucleus of the Confederate Navy," *The American Neptune* 68 (spring 1988):93. The *William Aiken* also carried "a number of Maynard rifles," probably 15 as the other cutters. Most likely at least 60 of the 100 Maynard rifles went south.

78. NA, RG 26. Misc. letters Apr-June 1858. F. K. Murray, USN Ordnance Department to Capt. John Rudd, Commander, U.S. Navy Yard, Washington.

79. NA, RG 26 Entry 143. Letter from S. P. Chase to Capt. W. A. Howard, May 23, 1861.

80. NA, RG 26. Misc. letters on revenue cutters, Jan-June 1861. J. C. Palmer to W. A. Howard, May 31, 1861. The price included a ball mold for each five rifles and a cleaning rod, brush cone wrench, screw driver cartridge stick, extra [case], and extra primer spring for each rifle. Considering the coming need for weapons, it was a handsome deal.

81. NA, RG 26 Entry 143. Letter from S. P. Chase to Capt. W. A. Howard, June 21, 1861.

82. NA, RG 26 Entry 143. Letter from S. P. Chase to Hiram Barney, Collector at New York, June 12, 1861.

83. Florence Kern, *U.S. Revenue Cutters in the Civil War* (Bethesda: Alised Enterprises, 1989):8-5. The yachts did get expense money, \$353 a month, and a crew of two non-commissioned officers and ten seamen.

84. Ibid.

85. NA, RG 26. Misc. letters on revenue cutters. Letter from J. T. Ames to George Harrington, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, August 3, 1861.

86. Ibid.

87. NA, RG 26. Misc. letters on revenue cutters, Oct.-Dec., 1861. Ammunition for each yacht-cutter consisted of 100 shot, 200 shell, and 300 powder cartridges.

88. Roland L. De Lorme, "Liquor Smuggling in Alaska, 1867-1899," *Pacific Northwest Quarterly*, 66:4 (1975):145.
89. Ibid.
90. Ibid., 146.
91. Ibid.
92. Evans, *U.S. Coast Guard*, 90.
93. Ibid., 91.
94. Regulations of the U.S. Revenue Marine, 1871, 28.
95. Wood, Samuel A., "Some Typical Rescues by the Revenue-Cutters," *Scribner's Magazine*, 11 (February, 1892):218.
96. Carden, Godfrey L., "United States Revenue Marine Service," *Harper's Weekly*, 36 (January 9, 1892):35.
97. Ibid.
98. NA, RG 26 Entry 175. Acting Navy Secretary Charles H. Allen to Secretary of Treasury, August 12, 1898.
99. Ibid.
100. *The United States Revenue Cutter Service in the War with Spain, 1898* (Washington: GPO, 1899):13. The guns were received, one each, from the USS *Baltimore* and *Raleigh*. Naval mounts were not available for the guns and were not fired by the *McCulloch*. The guns were turned over to the Army at Manila Bay.
101. J. T. Dickman, "Modern Improvements in Firearms and Their Tactical Effects," General Service & Staff College lecture, Fort Leavenworth, KS, No. 10, September 26, 1902.

A Flower from the Nettle

The turn of the twentieth century was a continuation of the boisterous, rambunctious growth of the previous 20 years. Nationalism, imperialism, Social Darwinism, and the fulfillment of manifest destiny were the causes and goals of international policy. The partnership between soldier, statesman, and entrepreneur, combined with a heavy dose of adventurism, led the United States from a non-world power into at least sixth place.

Naval power was the key to, and symbol of, a nation's standing in the world. Proponents of superior sea power like Alfred T. Mahan and Germany's Kaiser Wilhelm II kept the fires of naval competition fueled. It was the combination of international competition, militarism, and the exploits of men like Theodore Roosevelt, and the heroic efforts of the revenue cutters *Bear*, *Corwin*, *Rush*, *Hudson*, and *McCulloch* that helped the Revenue Cutter Service grow. Although a shortage of funds for large improvements resulted from sporadic depressions in the economy, the stage was set.

The Spanish-American War and the ensuing insurrection in the Philippines demonstrated the need for better small-arms training. After the Spanish-American War ended, cutters were generally disarmed. Most returned to their legislated duties, which took precedence over any training for war.

The return to peacetime standing, however, did not prevent the military preparedness concerns of army and navy officers from filtering into the RCS. Small-arms training was a particular concern. Its development had been at a standstill for many years. Deficiencies became apparent by the most disastrous of methods—by revelation in conflict. Thus the U.S. Army reviewed its marksmanship training methods.

Captain T. C. Dickman, 8th Cavalry, U.S. Army, lectured on the subject for the U.S. Army Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.¹ He felt that former methods of instruction had no scientific or practical basis. Dickman encouraged the use of what would later be known as "center mass shooting." The technique replaced a long-standing method based on outdated assumptions.

The method of "firing at the foot" or "firing into the brown" was obsolete. The army had taught firing low for at least two reasons. The thick smoke caused by black powder weapons made seeing the opposing force difficult after the battle commenced; therefore, the feet of the opposing force became the only visible target. Second, command leaders knew that inexperienced troops in their fear and excitement often jerked the weapon upwards when firing initial rounds; thus instead of shooting high, the troops were given lower targets. The whole idea was based on massed unaimed fire, hoped-for hits, and assumed that the enemy was upright and advancing.

Military tactics were changing. Some planners projected the abandonment of massed lines of armed men facing each other. The model provided by the

few European wars in the last half of the nineteenth century emphasized mobility and maneuver. Additionally, the perfection of the machine gun made the line assault costly and impractical. The ongoing struggle with the insurgents in the Philippine Islands proved the hazards of the traditional way. However, old habits and tactics were hard to break. The army continued drilling in ranks and buying horses for the cavalry. The navy was little different; its line of battle theory was over a hundred years old.

Dickman was not the only proponent of improved training. It was claimed that about 75 percent of the quarter-million men that volunteered for the Spanish-American War knew nothing about marksmanship.² Without improvements in weapons training, the United States was in danger of being “wiped off the face of the earth because nobody could shoot.”³

New methods in rifle and pistol marksmanship were recommended—the more practical in implementation the better.⁴ Pistol firing would prove the hardest method to teach.

The pistol captured the American psyche. Had not Samuel Colt tamed the West with his revolvers? The pistol was also the favorite weapon of the hundreds of shooting clubs around the country. Men and women participated in shooting contests for over 20 years. A whole system of *proper* shooting methods were devised mostly in the name of national pride. United States clubs practiced hard to beat their closest, and better, international rivals—the French.

In 1893 W. R. Pryor wrote that the “American and his revolver have become as much a national association as the Mexican and his machete.”⁵ Pryor added, he believed at least “three-fourths of the men in the United States own some form of revolver.” Owning a revolver and knowing how to shoot it were two different things; most recruits entering the army during the Spanish-American War did not know how to shoot anything.

Lack of knowledge did not diminish the love affair the United States had with hand guns in both varieties: single shot revolvers and “self-cockers” or automatics. The self-cocker was considered appropriate for emergency situations when speed of shot was needed. But an individual who was “fond of revolver shooting and appreciates the capabilities and beauties” of revolvers “always selects a single action of fairly large caliber.”⁶

Accuracy with big, heavy projectiles (between .38 and .44 caliber, weighing about 146 grains) were the important features. Since many of the clubs were also military organizations, or mostly made up of military men, it is only natural that most of the techniques and ideology fell into military service use.

The clubs emphasized good shooting techniques of stance, trigger pull, and sights. One author advocated that each man in the military should be trained with the pistol to supplement the rifle and shoot at the greatest distances possible. In 1897, marksmanship training in the military services was still fairly poor.

The civilian clubs continued to exceed. Motivational and economic differences explained the difference. The proficient use of a revolver in target shooting had become more than a goal in the realm of sport. It became the

mark by which many men measured each other. Standards and ideals at civilian clubs became so strong that many scoffed at military training.

The target shooter of 1897 held the theory that "exact measurement made in a radial line from the true centre of the bull's-eye to the centre of the shot-hole constitutes distinctly the best possible method for determining which shot is nearest thereto, and by this means the aggregated excellence of long strings can be compared exactly."⁷ This pattern of scoring a target continues into the present. Not all considered this the test of an expert marksman, but the military did.

One competition scoring method produced notably inaccurate results. During the Sea Girt (New Jersey) shooting matches in 1897, the military revolver contest used a reduced target composed of an elliptical bullseye of "captivating proportions" counting five points, surrounded by a line about a foot away, which counted four points.⁸ One observer reported that "an altogether ordinary marksman could wander thither and yon, with 4 points to his credit every shot...if he by happy fluke managed so much as to nip the big bull, he would score 5 good points equally with a man whose shooting all lay very near the true centre."⁹

Competition shooting was done at 20 yards but the shooting purist of the era held out for deliberate aim at 12 yards. Twelve yards was the traditional range for duels; target practice at this range had made sense in an age when duels were still commonplace. However, with few duels being fought in the United States, some moved to increase the range of revolver target shooting to 50 yards.

During the 1890s the modern stance for revolver shooting was perfected. Chevalier Paine used a stance that most shooters considered worthy of copying. He stood erect, evenly balanced with both feet about 15 inches apart. His body was almost directly in line with the target. With the revolver firmly grasped, Paine extended his arm fully with no crook at the elbow. He drew his sights and pressed the trigger all the way through the shot. Shooting club members recommended a trigger weight of about four pounds or more. The theory was that an overly light trigger weight caused inadvertent shots and a heavier weight prevented the "tendency to hope for the best and bang away."¹⁰

The influence of the private clubs on the military, along with Colonel Dickman and others, evidently convinced the U.S. Army to revamp its small-arms training procedures in 1903. The timing of the call for change may have also played an important role. There had been no "systematic target practice" from 1898 through 1901 because of "demands on the service." In 1902 the army resumed casual target practice.¹¹ In 1903 the U.S. Navy followed suit, as did the RCS.

The RCS added instructions for conducting infantry drill and small-arms drill in 1905.¹² These instructions directed the selection of a 27-man landing force from within the cutter's crew. All crewmembers except cooks and stewards received infantry and small-arms training.

Landing force training included development of land combat skills and the basic military skills of marching and movement. The landing force consisted of one officer, three petty officers, and 24 men. Boatswains or gunners, referred to as chief petty, forward, or non-commissioned officers, could now act as junior officers and conducted the infantry drill training.

Training followed the navy's 1905 instructions, the most logical and comprehensive directions issued to date. The instructions' primary objective was "to develop as many good shots with the rifle and pistol as possible among the commissioned and enlisted personnel of the ship." All crewmen trained with rifle, pistol, and Colt automatic gun (6mm). Interestingly, enlisted men now trained with the pistol. Previously reserved for commissioned and non-commissioned officers, the pistol entered the average seaman's world.¹³

These regulations also prescribed "a regular progressive course of instruction" and did not permit any man to actually fire a weapon without preliminary instruction. Without basic instruction, most considered practice firing "a waste of time and ammunition, and productive of no good."¹⁴

Within the next four years, the "shoot and hope for hits" outlook was replaced with a near religious dedication to small-arms fire superiority and control with emphasis placed on deliberate control of aim. Economics certainly played a significant role in this determination. A faster firing rifle caused 1908 army instructions to note that the "the number of hits made, not the number of shots fired" was the most important feature of training.¹⁵

From this "one round, one hit" philosophy, rifle training became a series of measured steps. Each man had to complete certain qualifying steps before progressing to the next. He first qualified in sighting, position (positions of fire) and aiming drills, on the "A" course. From this phase he progressed to the "B" course, or gallery practice. This practice used a special ammunition suitable on outdoor firing ranges. The cartridge was a short, semi-pointed lead projectile, weighing only 107 grains. The trainee fired from the standing, kneeling, sitting, and prone positions. This "B" course fired from 50 feet required a qualification score of 20 out of 25. Once the trainee completed "A" and "B," he could then move on to actual range firing with ranges out to, and including, 300 yards. Longer firing distances came later.

Firing ranges were difficult to procure. Treasury headquarters encouraged all commanding officers to find land suitable for firing ranges and obtain the owner's permission to use it. If land was found, commanding officers used the *Firing Regulations for Small Arms, U.S. Army, 1904* to build "targets of the revolving or hoisting pattern."¹⁶ Unfortunately, there was a catch: the Treasury Department did not allow or authorize the expenditure of any funds for landowner compensation or construction until detailed descriptions, including sketches, arrived for approval.

Increased attention to training techniques required more paperwork to report it. Reports of training were required twice a year and each man had "to participate in the record practice once in this period of six months, either at slow fire or rapid fire."¹⁷

In 1910, RCS General Order No. 11 amended the 1905 instructions. It stated the "manner of conducting range firing shall be prescribed in Tables A, B, and C of the *Landing Force and Small Arms Instructions, U.S.N. 1907.*"¹⁸ The navy's 1907 instructions were a reprint of its 1905 regulations. The RCS added chapters relating to sighting drills, position, aiming, and gallery practice taken from *Firing Regulations for Small Arms, U.S. Army, 1904.*

The interchangeability of training procedures and firing courses illustrates the cooperation and similarity of military purpose between the services. The commonality of purpose and practice provided a reference point for the growing popularity of competitive rifle matches. Although the military services used many of the same standards, quality of the shooters and instruction varied greatly.

The 1910 order outlined "A", "B", and "C" courses and, like the 1905 rules, easily led the trainee into competent marksmanship. As the regulations directed, "the practice shall be progressive as far as possible and it is desirable that the range firing be always preceded by gallery or subtarget gun practice."¹⁹

Marksmanship awards and medals recognizing qualification were mentioned in print for the first time in Order No. 11. However, surviving examples at the U.S. Coast Guard Academy, New London, Connecticut, indicate the issuance of awards at least two years earlier. The awards required that:

Each officer or man who attains 80 percent or more of the highest possible score in the marksman course will be classified as a marksman and will receive from the department a marksman's medal. Each man who holds the qualification of marksman and who qualifies as a sharpshooter will receive from the department a sharpshooter's medal. An officer or man who holds a sharpshooter's medal will receive a date plate for each additional year in which he qualifies as a sharpshooter.²⁰

There was no "expert" rating associated with marksmanship in this period. The sharpshooter award remained the most prestigious non-competitive award and classification of the day.²¹ Biennial small-arms qualification also changed—"to permit each man to participate in the record practice at least once." The twice-a-year requirement changed because of the increasing difficulty in getting men to the firing ranges. Vessel operations often precluded opportunities for range practice. In 1910 emphasis shifted solely to rifle training. The pistol became once again the province of the commissioned and non-commissioned officers.

The commonality of rifle course content was a stabilizing factor in training, but weapon type was not. In 1911 at least seven west coast cutters, the *Tahoma*, *Thetis*, *Manning*, *McCulloch*, *Snohonish*, *Bear*, and *Rush* continued to carry the "1898 model magazine rifle."²² This meant, as in the past, that the RCS clung to its older issue weapons only for economy.

The RCS benefitted by following army and navy training regulations. The U.S. Navy supported all expenses for training ammunition, including great

guns. Therefore, cost was not the problem as it had been in the past. With the Navy Department purchasing all the ammunition for the RCS, the cutter service did not find it necessary to establish formal training allowances. Each revenue vessel could fire as much as it wanted without regard to expense. It was the best of all possible shooting worlds.

The entry of the United States into the First World War was still a few years off, but the forces advocating preparation and those pushing continued isolation were in constant conflict. The war in Europe gave reasons to increase military budgets and seek other methods to improve weapons training.

In late 1914, the Treasury Department issued new instructions for target practice. The instructions included rapid fire gun (six-pounder) drills as well as small arms. The significance of these instructions over others was the detail and decisiveness not found in past instructions. For the first time the RCS mandated weapon type as the "standard small arms."²³

The small arms copied those used by the navy: the "United States magazine rifle, model 1903, and the Colt .38-caliber double-action revolver, navy type."²⁴ The choice of weapons was same as the navy. The .38 caliber revolver was far from the heavy calibers recommended by the shooting clubs. Although the instructions called for specific weapons there was no immediate transition to the mandated weapons; some of the older weapons continued in service until the 1940s. The Treasury Department continued to feel the conservative pull of Alexander Hamilton.

Other changes in the era concerned infantry drill. The changes deleted the olive-drab uniform, but retained cutlass training.²⁵ Marksmanship awards now included the expert riflemen and expert pistol designation as well as sharpshooter. Only expert marksmen received a medal and an expert pin with date bar for routine uniform wear.

Alignment to military style organization was a precursor to the January 1915 act that established the United States Coast Guard. The Coast Guard, as a separate entity, was the flower that grew from the nettle of individualism of the Life Saving and Revenue Cutter Services. Under one roof the two services reached, in time, some coordination of purpose.

As a part of the United States military forces, the Coast Guard began receiving intraservice cooperation—something not often enjoyed in previous years. The new organization also brought new regulations within the first year. Eleven days before the end of 1915, the Treasury Department issued an order amending certain parts of the 1914 small-arms training regulations and by January 1, 1916, the Coast Guard adopted the navy's *1916 Firing Regulations for Small Arms*.²⁶

The amendment authorized, rather than recommended, commanding officers to arrange competitions with other cutters and stations. However, there were no "public monies" to pay any cash prizes for excellence in marksmanship. Treasury Secretary William G. McAdoo noted in the order that "funds otherwise obtained by commanding officers of vessels and stations" may be used to pay the prizes. McAdoo did not explain how funds could be "otherwise obtained," but in some areas the cutters and stations had large public support

and could accept contributions. The non-payment of cash prizes probably soured some men, but pride of accomplishment meant much, and the chance to receive recognition for their individual shooting skill with a service medal was usually incentive enough.

Official small-arms competition helped the Coast Guard establish itself as part of the military community. It gave access to military training from the other services.²⁷ Coast Guard personnel on invitation attended a formal small-arms coaches' training course at the navy range at Winthrop, Maryland.²⁸ The U.S. Marine Corps performed the actual range instruction.

McAdoo urged every commanding officer to make the best use of this opportunity to obtain formal instruction. Attendance at the course may have been a problem for some cutters. The Winthrop course only operated from the first of April to mid-December each year—the busiest season for the Coast Guard. However, to the officers and men who did attend, it was a great step forward. This training was the beginning of the Coast Guard's modern small-arms instructor training program and the beginning of a long training association with the Marine Corps.

Shortly after issuing the December general order, the Coast Guard issued new regulations for 1916. Cutters were to hold infantry drill once a week for all enlisted men with the exception of cooks and stewards. Pistol drill rejoined the monthly exercise as did joint infantry drills whenever two cutters were together. The navy's Landing Force Manual remained the guide for all infantry drills.²⁹

Small-arms training now extended to shore units of the former Life Saving Service as well as the cutters. The shore units received standard service rifles, from whatever the service had in store, but instead of the semi-automatic pistol, these units received a variety of M1903, M1907 or M1911 .38-caliber Colt revolvers.

The revolver remained the main sidearm of the Coast Guard as a whole, but in June 1915 the War Department began larger shipments of the M1911 .45-caliber semi-automatic pistol to Baltimore, Maryland, for further distribution.³⁰ The distribution was generous and not unlike those of a hundred years before—except that these pistols were new. The cutters *Androscoggin*, *Gresham*, *Mohawk*, *Seneca*, *Onondaga*, *Apache*, *Seminole*, and *Yamacraw* received 20 each and the cutter *Pamlico* received 12.

Training conducted for the Coast Guardsmen followed the same lines and same philosophy learned from the Marine Corps and was competitive in nature. Firing at targets at known distances of 600 yards was a normal practice for the rifle, 50 yards for pistol and revolver. Emphasis remained on the marksmanship fundamentals used by the infantry.

The practical side of small-arms firing and training had again been largely ignored or forgotten. Combat-style shooting would have an intermittent effect on the U.S. military services. The U.S. Army tried in 1906 to implement a training program that taught practical combat style shooting, which included firing under all different weather and range conditions. It did not meet with great favor and passed into history. During World War II, calls for practical

training came again, but were dismissed as too impractical to teach on a large scale. In 1953, after the Korean War, combat style shooting was brought up again and became known as Trainfire by the U.S. Army, but its practical applications in theory or concept escaped the notice of the Coast Guard.

The Coast Guard, greatly influenced by the training practices of the navy and Marine Corps, followed their lead and remained with competitive-style training. Just prior to the United States entering World War I, the Coast Guard dropped its own 1914 small-arms training regulations and incorporated the navy's training policies. The adopted rules offered more consistency with the training at Winthrop, Maryland, and with the infantry drill of the navy's Landing Force Manual.

The rules still stressed fundamentals, with particular attention to supported position shooting for the advanced phase of training. In other words, the navy began teaching to shoot from behind cover. As before, rifle training was divided into three separate courses: marksman, sharpshooter, and expert. The marksman course became a requirement for all newly enlisted men or those who did not qualify in the previous year. The course was fired totally at the 200-yard range without the use of a parapet (earthen embankment) or any other rest. The course consisted of:

POSITION	SLOW FIRE	1ST RAPID FIRE (1 String of)	2ND RAPID FIRE (1 String of)
Prone	5 shots	5 shots	5 shots
Kneeling	5 shots	5 shots	5 shots
Squatting	5 shots	5 shots	5 shots
Standing	5 shots	5 shots	5 shots
Total shots	20	20	20
Possible Score	100	100	100
Aggregate Number of Shots -- 60			
Possible Aggregate Score --- 300			
Aggregate Score Necessary to Qualify as Marksman -- 200			
or, a Total Score on Second Rapid Fire of ----- 70 ³¹			

The navy authorized an extra prize of two dollars pay each month for qualification on this course. Another year would pass before the Coast Guard was allocated the funds to pay the prize.

The rifle courses were progressive; those qualifying as marksman fired the sharpshooter course. Unlike the marksman course procedure, the sharpshooter

was allowed to have arm, hand, or rifle touching the parapet. Parapet firing was the precursor to the sandbag-supported prone position used in later years by the U.S. Army. Regulations required a parapet height of 12 inches for 500-yard prone firing, 24 inches for the 400-yard sitting position, 30 inches for the 300-yard kneeling (either or both knees allowed) position and vertical posts (for support) of at least five feet in height for the 200-yard standing position.

Each trainee fired 15 rounds from each position: five at slow, five at rapid and five at skirmish fire. Skirmish fire, emulating combat training, consisted of exposing the target for a 30-second time period. Scoring was identical to the marksman course, but the reward (prize money) increased to three dollars each month.

The expert course was a test of the skill learned in the two preceding courses, but was authorized no prize money. A useful spin-off of the expert course was to select the very best marksmen for the competitive rifle matches. The competitiveness of the expert remained consistent with match rules. Neither the expert or match rules allowed parapets or rests. The details of this course consisted of:

RANGE	POSITION	KIND OF FIRE	SHOTS
200	Any	Preliminary slow	5
200	Begin standing, 1 string Begin prone, 1 string	Changing positions	10
200	Kneeling, two strings	Changing targets	10
200	Squatting	Moving targets	10
600	Prone	Preliminary slow	5
600	do [ditto]	Slow	10
600	Prone, two strings	Moving targets	10 ³²

Qualification on the expert course required a score of 200, out of 300 total, of the 60 rounds fired. The course was intentionally difficult. The five-second target exposure for the movable targets on strings, such as the second 200-yard position, required speed and precision. The use of standard scores for all courses reduced confusion over the variety of courses and provided a consistent goal. The navy had not yet allowed the 1,000-yard range for qualification. However, it felt that same principles of marksmanship used at 600 yards held true at 1,000 yards. Although true in concept, the actual reason came from the difficulty in finding suitable firing ranges.

Pistol training was a different matter. Designed as "mini" rifle courses, the Pistol Preliminary and Pistol Expert courses used the same rifle "B" Target. But scoring fell only in the "5" and "4" rings. All other hits were misses. The

“5” and “4” rings amounted to a 37-inch diameter circle. The 25- and 50-yard targets developed later had much smaller dimensions, adding difficulty and attesting to the influence of competition.³³

The course allowed the use of any pistol or revolver, including privately owned weapons, even though training instructions clearly pictured the semi-automatic M1911 pistol. If the pistol courses used the same target for practice, then it followed that the qualification courses would also be similar. Passing the preliminary course was mandatory before attempting the expert. Fired completely from the 25-yard range the preliminary course consisted of:

POSITION	SLOW FIRE	1st RAPID FIRE	2nd RAPID FIRE
Prone	5 shots	5 shots	5 shots
Kneeling	5 shots	5 shots	5 shots
Squatting	5 shots	5 shots	5 shots
Standing	5 shots	5 shots	5 shots
Total shots	20	20	20

Each man needed an aggregate score of 240 of the maximum 300 to qualify. The qualification score represented a high 80-percent mastery level, but was later reduced to ease training. During the rapid-fire strings, a 15-second time limit was imposed. The pistol expert course was identical to the preliminary, except fired entirely from 50 yards. The course authorized no prizes, as the pistol was not considered a primary weapon.

The United States entered World War I in 1917 and the Coast Guard once again operated with the U.S. Navy. During the war, the Coast Guard made considerable small-arms training improvements over the previous decade and moved closer to an era of standardization in both weapons and training techniques.

Two years before the United States entered the war, the Coast Guard had taken on more warlike duties, protecting War Department materiel. Under the authority of the Act of 1879, the War Department supplied small arms to the Coast Guard to fulfill this mission.³⁴ The Coast Guard’s inventory swelled with (exact figures are not available) the Model 1903, .30-caliber Springfield rifle for the cutters and other vessels actually involved in the war. The Coast Guard, however, made no changes in the training regulations for the next year and a half.

In April 1917, the army issued, on request, some 590 rifles and 60 pistols that were “urgently needed to augment the outfits of vessels of the Coast Guard.”³⁵ Within a few months these weapons sent to Baltimore were on patrol with the six cutters making up Squadron Two in the Atlantic Fleet Patrol Forces’ Division Six.³⁶ Other units not directly in war-related duties

used Treasury Department-purchased arms. During the spring of 1917, the Coast Guard Academy, falling into the non-war related group, received 50 rifles, with all equipment at a cost of \$1,800.³⁷ Later issues of weapons included the Winchester Repeating Arms, modified Lee-Enfield Model 1917 rifle. More than a thousand of these rifles came from naval stores, a decided improvement over former models.

These rifles, plus access to no-cost government-owned spare parts, did not reach all Coast Guard units. Some still carried the 1890s Lee and Krag rifles through the war. The influx of new weapons allowed the replacement of older models like the 6mm Colt automatic gun; but following the practices of over a century of fiscal conservatism, the Coast Guard stored, but did not forget the old weapons.

Under navy control the Coast Guard received new rules for small-arms training in 1917. Navy control allowed the payment of cash prizes the Treasury Department could not afford in previous years. Small-arms training under the navy's pre-war regulations continued throughout the war. After the war cooperation between the navy and Coast Guard changed with regard to small-arms training. In May 1919, Commandant Ellsworth P. Bertholf issued a circular canceling the awarding of cash prizes.³⁸ The Coast Guard came out from under the navy's umbrella and could no longer afford the extra expense. However, the Coast Guard made no changes in the training regulations for the next year and a half.

In April of 1921, Coast Guard Headquarters issued a circular containing additional regulations for small arms and infantry drill. Warrant officers (gunners and boatswains) still filled junior officer positions for conducting infantry drill, but their participation did not relieve the third lieutenant, now called ensign, of overall training responsibility.³⁹ The most noticeable element missing from the 1921 circular was the absence of the cutlass. Although still carried by many of the cutters for decoration and as damage control tools, their original usefulness in the service passed into the romantic past.

The 1921 circular changed the small-arms training performance regulations for the Coast Guard, mandating conformance with the navy's 1919 regulations. These firing regulations stressed the importance of the trainee understanding the basic principles of aiming, setting sights, operating the rifle, rifle hold, and trigger squeeze, just as had all previous instructions.

The new regulations shifted the responsibility of training from the untrained ensign to trained officers or enlisted Coast Guardsmen. They placed a special responsibility on the coach: "If he [the trainee] had not been instructed and has no coach to supply the deficiency, it is better that he should not shoot, because practice without benefit of any instruction is worse than useless; worse habits are acquired, men do not improve, and it becomes more difficult to teach them." This echoed the 1905 instruction and indicated a consistency of thought about ideal training. It also showed signs of growing maturity and seriousness in the development of beneficial programs of small-arms training.

The Coast Guard matured as a military service. From a fiscal standpoint, the service realized that small-arms training for all men on all cutters and

stations was neither necessary nor practical. The circular outlined six cutters that did not have to hold small-arms practice, unless they had small arms, and exempted stations with less than eight weapons.⁴⁰ However, this did not mean that a cutter or station could not borrow weapons and participate in training.

The lack of firing ranges continued to compound training problems. Therefore, by 1921 the Coast Guard began to establish its own firing ranges and took steps to provide for more. The concise 1921 circular dictated that no awards would be given for passing navy qualification courses. Coast Guard Headquarters encouraged all officers to become proficient and "strive to excel in marksmanship as an incentive to the men." It is doubtful that the officer's example was incentive enough.

Without cash payment incentives, Headquarters followed the navy lead and authorized enlisted men qualifying as expert rifleman to wear a special patch. Expert riflemen could add a one-inch-square block with a bull's-eye-type target on the right sleeve, about three inches above the cuff, on their coat, jumper, overshirt or flannel shirt. Uniform regulations later allowed sharpshooters to wear the sleeve insignia, although the sharpshooter insignia included only a single outer ring surrounding the bull's-eye center instead of the two for expert.⁴¹

In addition to the new regulations, 1921 was also the first year that the Coast Guard issued the .22-caliber M1 (M21) Springfield rifle. It was intended for use primarily in northern areas where the weather precluded outside training. However, scores obtained with the .22-caliber rifles could not be used toward awards.

Handguns were still a varied collection. The Coast Guard continued the transition from the .38 revolver to the .45 semi-automatic pistol. However, the process was slow; many units carried older revolver models such as Colt Models 1892, 1903, 1907, 1911, and 1917, which became increasingly difficult to repair. The Colt Fire Arms Company helped where it could and forwarded an illustrated guide to Coast Guard Headquarters titled "Component Parts of Obsolete Colt Revolvers" to assist in the identification of repair parts.⁴² Additionally, Smith and Wesson revolvers, Models 1907 and 1917, in both .38 and .45 (ACP)-calibers, remained in use, left over from World War I.

One wartime feature of operation with the navy did not carry over. During 1921 the navy decided that it would no longer support the Coast Guard with small-arms ammunition, but would continue to supply "great gun" ammunition for practice and service allowances. This move forced the Coast Guard to establish small-arms ammunition allowances and create a staff to manage and procure these allowances as well as all ordnance equipment.

The average amount of small-arms ammunition for a typical first-class cutter was 17,400 rifle and 11,600 pistol rounds. On the extreme side, the cutter *Tampa* carried 24,000 rounds of ball ammunition for rifle and 16,000 for pistol. Other cutters carried far less. The cutters *Pamlico*, *Apache*, and *Comanche* carried 12,000 for rifle and 8,000 rounds for pistol.⁴³ These amounts did not include 10,000 to 20,000 rounds of gallery practice ammunition.

The allowances remained generally unchanged in 1923 and increased in some cases because of the additional ships and boats acquired by the Service for enforcement of the Prohibition laws. The allowances for *Tampa*-class cutters were 20,400 rounds for rifle and 12,000 for pistol, and added 12,000 rounds for the .30-caliber Lewis machine gun. The three other cutters were reduced by 2,000 rounds of pistol ammunition, but received 12,000 for their machine guns. The Treasury Department purchased over 25,000 rounds of rifle ammunition for each of the 25 destroyers added to the Coast Guard inventory for prohibition patrol work.

The ample ammunition allowances shored up interest in small-arms training for the Coast Guard after World War I. Interest had waned in small-arms practice but was rekindled, at least at Headquarters, with the increased use of weapons caused by the passage of the Volstead Act, establishing national liquor prohibition. Despite Prohibition, the average Coast Guardsman's interest in small-arms training still focused primarily on prize money.

During 1921-22 Headquarters issued numerous instructions to Coast Guard units on the subjects of small-arms training and infantry drill. On August 17, 1921, President Warren G. Harding issued an executive order that all expert riflemen should receive an additional three dollars per month and sharpshooters one dollar per month for the entire training year. The training year extended from July 1 to June 30 of the following year.⁴⁴ To ensure fairness and honesty, observation of scores was close. Officers in charge of the training ensured that no one became "pencil qualified."

A few dollars breathed life into a sagging program, and training took on an air of fierce competition between individuals and individual commands. Pride in a command's prowess in arms often became the subject of debates afloat and ashore, especially among liberty parties. Proper funding and competition, plus the active use of arms, caused the Coast Guard to step forward and become a leader in the small-arms training community.

With the eye on competition, the instructions for small arms were regulated as before, but now helpful hints were applied. The suggestions spoke on pistol training. A 1922 instruction praised the effects of dry firing: "Expert pistol shots do a great deal of snapping (dry firing) instead of a great deal of firing." This was an obvious attempt to encourage more practice without actually firing the weapon.⁴⁵ It was sound, as well as economical, advice.

The Coast Guard received a major portion of the funds appropriated for the enforcement of Prohibition. Treasury Secretary Andrew W. Mellon found he did not have sufficient men or equipment "suitable for effective work in the prevention of liquor smuggling" and requested additional funds from Congress. Congress granted his request and awarded over \$13 million. A portion of these funds purchased more weapons from the War Department.

The Coast Guard attempted to simply draw weapons from government stocks, but the War Department refused, noting that the peacetime functions of the Coast Guard did not fall under the provisions of the 1917 Espionage Act. This is a far cry from the days of Alexander Hamilton when the secretary

ordered the needed arms from the War Department head General Henry Knox. Knox, knowing that all of his funds came through Hamilton, had complied.

The Coast Guard, as a result partially of Prohibition and partially because of its military mission, quickly became a sizable naval organization. The former navy destroyers added for Prohibition patrols provided more sea billets, but more importantly, they gave the Coast Guard advanced gun systems like the four-inch gun. A few years later the technologically superior 3"/50 gun replaced the four-inch gun. These additions of ordnance equipment helped the Coast Guard take its place in the overall military community.

The addition of modern equipment caused many problems. Trained men to maintain the complicated gunnery and fire control equipment were few, with most being former navy. The gunner's mate rating, although mentioned in the service since 1798, was practically non-existent. Gunners and gunner's mates of the revenue cutters in the first 50 years of the service's history received their ratings primarily because of whom they knew, not necessarily what they knew.

Warrant gunners, usually the only ordnancemen on board a cutter, learned their trade by experience. They were not prepared to handle the complexities of modern gunnery. Formal training would not come for a few more years. In the meantime, the gunner, on his own initiative, learned what he could from publications, ordnance pamphlets or personal assistance obtained from the army and navy.

Within this era of the growing importance of Coast Guard ordnance, the early 1920s saw the role of marksmanship in the Coast Guard reemphasized. The imposition of Prohibition and its enforcement, caused more daily use of small arms than had been seen in the First World War.

Despite the need for training, internal problems threatened efficiency. The Coast Guard still struggled with its own organization; two years under navy control had not assisted in creating a separate military identity. To solve some of the service's internal problems, Coast Guard Headquarters undertook a reorganization that attempted to delineate specific duties to the commandant and his five divisions.⁴⁶ The ordnance section within the operations division was responsible for all areas of ordnance with the added duties of "supervision of morale...charge of medals...and the Weekly Bulletin."⁴⁷

In 1923, Lieutenant Frederick A. Zeusler became the Coast Guard's first military ordnance chief and reported on the condition of his section to the commandant.⁴⁸ Zeusler made rapid changes and additions to Coast Guard ordnance and shifted training emphasis to the preparation of officers for their roles in ordnance. The addition of a full-time staff to oversee ordnance affected the organization positively, but many individual officers resented the monitoring of their actions.

Officer education was the key to future growth and leadership in the Coast Guard. Zeusler outlined what he thought each officer should be required to do. Each should

prepare to be able to handle and control efficiently the secondary and intermediate batteries of any vessel in the Navy: for every man to be instructed so as to be able to become an efficient part of a gun's crew, ranging from 3-inch to 8-inch.⁴⁹

There were other requirements, but this one encompassed all the weapons including small arms. Zeusler wanted ordnance officers trained to meet every contingency including "a properly instructed and efficient landing force." Ordnance officers should lead a small-arms training program to "develop as many expert riflemen as possible."⁵⁰ It was the beginning of the twentieth-century Coast Guard, some twenty years late.

Coast Guard Headquarters struggled to develop a professional officer corps and to impose updated theories and technical equipment on a service that clung in part to the nineteenth century. Old equipment was allowed to remain on cutters, especially on the west coast, which always seemed to receive everything last, or use it longer. For example, the cutter *Thetis* still had four Model 1886 45-70 Winchester rifles in its 1923 inventory. The old, often rusty, equipment was a constant reminder of the last century.

The 1920s, an era of great social, cultural, and political upheaval, brought a new dimension to the character of Coast Guard small-arms training. As resistance to Prohibition grew, criminals began organizing and resisting officers of the law. The Coast Guard responded with better weapons training, increasingly moving toward standardized courses and weapons and increasing recruitment. By June 1924, enlisted men numbered 5,000, an increase of 1,255 men from the year before.

The rapid influx of new men taxed Coast Guard recruit training resources. The navy, besides allowing its recruiting stations to enlist men for the Coast Guard, opened its training centers at Hampton Roads, Virginia, and Newport, Rhode Island, to Coast Guard recruits.⁵¹ Dressed and trained in navy blue, the adoption of navy training standards was a logical choice and certainly not a difficult one.

Zeusler's ordnance section became willing to "conform to modern practices" in ordnance regardless of origin, and in 1924 Coast Guard ordnance regulations were "revised...[to] conform in every respect to navy practice."⁵² Conformity also meant updated ammunition allowances. Each destroyer was allowed 37,200 rounds of ball ammunition for rifles plus 24,000 rounds of gallery ammunition.⁵³ Machine guns were allowed 12,000 each and automatic rifles 2,000 rounds.

Allowances were also set for small cutters, picket boats, and 75-foot patrol boats. The picket boats carried two rifles, two pistols, and one machine gun. Each four-man crew received an ammunition allowance of 1,200 rounds for rifle, 1,000 rounds for pistol, and 1,500 rounds of machine gun ammunition. The 75-foot patrol boats had the same ammunition allowances, but were issued two more pistols.⁵⁴ The arms and ammunition used by picket boats, patrol boats, and bases were not Coast Guard-owned. The navy loaned them to the Coast Guard under the same agreements as larger guns.⁵⁵

With the loan of arms, a trail of paperwork followed, and Coast Guard Headquarters embarked on a course of accountability, especially for ordnance material and training. In 1923 Zeusler reported his disappointment in the attempts at accountability. He found his results no better than those of the past.⁵⁶ He noted that he gave "specific directions to hold the practice," and was pleased that "one division office," Norfolk, attempted to carry them out. His error was in providing a loophole through which most of the cutters passed: Zeusler directed that training "must not interfere with the regular rescue work or duties of the Coast Guard." He reported that those commanding officers interested in training made "honest attempts" and those not interested simply found excuses not to.

Zeusler cited the *Modoc* as an example of a busy cutter that was able to complete some long- and short-range gunnery training plus part of its small arms. The *Modoc* was busy, completing an ice patrol, a shipyard period, winter cruising, and then more ice patrol. He listed the cutters not participating in training and their reasons:

<i>Algonquin</i>	No opportunity
<i>Comanche</i>	Lack of facilities
<i>Gresham</i>	No opportunity
<i>Modoc</i>	Unable to complete on account of ice patrol; over half the crew completed the marksman's course
<i>Seneca</i>	No opportunity; on account of ice patrol, derelict hunt, and patrol off New York
<i>Ossipee</i>	Unable to complete as range was taken
<i>Tuscarora</i>	Insufficient number of officers and men
<i>Morrill</i>	Insufficient number of officers and men
<i>Tallapoosa</i>	No range available
<i>Unalga</i>	No range available

Tampa gave the same excuse of "no opportunity." Zeusler, in considering that excuse, found it "inconceivable...that progressive training in gunnery could not constantly be under way and the first opportunity taken that presented itself, whether the vessels were on ice patrol, Bering Sea patrol, or on general cruising, to hold gun target practice."⁵⁷ His 1923 solution to the problem made the division commanders more responsible and answerable for training. However, old habits died hard.

The number of weapons in the Coast Guard grew to unmanageable proportions; and the ordnance section began a program to have a list made of weapons by type, serial number, and caliber.⁵⁸ By 1927 commanders found solutions to the many management problems, but few found the time to conduct ordnance training. During the 1927 training season, only 2,388 men trained with the rifle.⁵⁹ The lack of training caused large amounts of ammunition to lay in the magazines and deteriorate. Headquarters noted that "its replacement has been a serious drain on the [annual] appropriation."⁶⁰

Loans of navy small arms continued as the Coast Guard grew. The weapons were needed: in July 1927 the enlisted force nearly doubled to 9,924,

with a large number coming from the navy or reenlisted Coast Guardsmen.⁶¹ Not all the weapons acquisitions were loans. Throughout 1926 and 1927, the Coast Guard purchased Lewis machine guns, Browning automatic rifles, M1918, M1903 rifles, and pistols from both the army and navy. The increased numbers of arms filled the needs of the new patrol boat allowances. Frederick C. Billard, Commandant since 1924, authorized weapons increases to:

Vessel Types	Rifles	Pistols	Officers	Men
75-foot Patrol Boats	5	8	1	7
100-foot Patrol Boats	14	16	2	14
125-foot Patrol Boats	14	17	3	14 ⁶²

These small arms came in addition to the machine guns already authorized for the two hundred 75-foot patrol boats, the twenty-three 125-foot, and the thirteen 100-foot patrol boats along with 21 various other boats. The Coast Guard purchased the 1,633 rifles and 1,679 pistols required from a fund marked "Contingent Expenses, Coast Guard, 1928." Lieutenant Zeusler also replaced 1,200 revolvers with the M1911 automatic service pistol in his tour of duty as ordnance chief.

The 1928 Headquarters ordnance section under Zeusler purchased and issued additional .22-caliber rifles and constructed .22-caliber firing ranges at Cape May, New Jersey; Staten Island, New York; and New London, Connecticut. The range at Port Angeles, Washington (Ediz Hook), was rebuilt. The crowning accomplishment was a plan to establish a 1,000-yard firing range at Cape May.

The 1928 report was positive in tone. It claimed a rise of 30 percent in the number of units firing small-arms practice. The "extra compensation" paid for expert and sharpshooter rifle qualifications accounted for the rise. The number of men involved in small-arms practice increased to 4,644, doubling from the year before. Lastly, but more importantly, 40 Coast Guardsmen had completed training as rifle and pistol coaches with the Marine Corps at Parris Island, South Carolina.

In the spring of 1928 Commander Russell R. Waesche transferred to Coast Guard Headquarters to begin an assignment as chief of the ordnance section. A 1906 graduate of the Revenue Cutter Service School of Instruction, forerunner of the U.S. Coast Guard Academy, Waesche brought with him over 17 years of sea service and a keen interest in gunnery and small-arms training. Within a month of Waesche's arrival he gave an appraisal of Coast Guard ordnance and attitudes toward it to the commandant. Waesche's memorandum read:

There is considerable apathy among Coast Guard officers in the field towards gunnery and practices. Last week in New York, a commanding officer of a first

class cutter stated in substance that while this gunnery 'stuff' was all right, we must remember that the Coast Guard is an emergency service and should not stress too much gunnery work. A number of Coast Guard officers are of similar mind.⁶³

It was not his intention to place these officers "on report" for their lack of interest in gunnery and small arms. The memorandum merely illustrated the view held by some field commanders and highlighted the general deficiency in ordnance training.

Waesche appealed to Commandant F. C. Billard to set aside one month each year solely for the purposes of gunnery, small arms, and battle practice for destroyers and 20 days for first-class cutters. He tried to increase the overall proficiency in gunnery and battle practice by setting a mandatory training period when nothing would interfere, including matters of emergency service. The emergency service requirement hindered gunnery and small-arms practice more than any other cause, just as it had in the nineteenth century.

Waesche prepared the Coast Guard for its role as a military service by shifting the emphasis of the service toward military preparedness. He placed this preparedness on the top of the growing list of Coast Guard functions. Waesche sought to correct administrative factors that created inactivity in training.

The reporting periods for ordnance training were awkward administrative requirements. They coincided with the fiscal year of July 1 to June 30. This reporting schedule was difficult to meet because most of the training traditionally occurred in May and June. If inclement weather or some other unforeseen event took place, training lapsed to the next fiscal year.

Waesche recommended a reporting period to coincide with the calendar year, which would also coordinate with small-arms qualification standards. But there were problems with this plan, since the navy used the fiscal-year system. An alternate plan was approved: hold practice in July and August and consider it part of the previous fiscal year.⁶⁴

At the insistence of Waesche, ordnance moved to the forefront of Coast Guard policy decisions. He stressed, in the following years, that service efforts in all phases of ordnance, including aircraft, would become vital to the nation. The commandant agreed. Just two months after his arrival, Waesche issued a new circular, *Circular No. 80*, outlining the required ordnance training. The circular gave no option to the cutter's commanding officers; it required that training be held as mandated. Waesche convinced the commandant to authorize the alteration of Coast Guard regulations to give his new instructions force of internal law.

Circular No. 80 placed great stress on planning. Each step of training was calculated well in advance. Small-arms training, for instance, was scheduled six months in advance of actual firing. Plans for this training were submitted to Headquarters. Waesche closely watched the plans. At the completion of the training, units submitted more reports. However, Waesche made the same error as Zeusler by declaring, "No other duty shall interfere with gunnery and small-

arms training during the allotted period *except distress calls or other unforeseen necessities* [emphasis added].”

The increased number of accidental discharges with the pistol emphasized the need for more training. During 1928, two enlisted men had been wounded by improper arms handling. It was concluded that “enlisted men were not receiving proper instruction or that in spite of such instructions they are not exercising proper care in the handling of pistols.”

Circular 80 directed all commanders to familiarize all enlisted men, including cooks and stewards, with the *Landing Force Manual, United States Navy, 1920* and *Small Arms Firing Regulations, U.S. Navy, 1923*. Small-arms instructors and coaches in the Coast Guard were by this time well grounded in rifle training, but comprehensive pistol training had not yet begun. The semi-automatic M1911 pistol was still considered unadaptable to Coast Guard functions, as well as too difficult and inaccurate to teach enlisted men.

Commander Waesche looked for ways to improve small-arms training. Having seen the positive effect competitive shooting appeared to have on the other services, he encouraged the implementation of a similar program within the Coast Guard.

In June 1928, when the Coast Guard prepared its 1929 budget, funds were set aside specifically for a team or squad for the Coast Guard National Rifle Team. However, fearing that the funds could not be used for transportation and entrance fees, these items were listed within the contingency fund.⁶⁵ There was good reason to be fearful: the navy had similar items disallowed by the comptroller general in 1928.⁶⁶

Expenses for the Coast Guard’s first team in 1928 had been gleaned from normal operating funds. Before 1928, Coast Guardsmen competed in civilian or military rifle matches largely at their own expense or from funds collected from the cutter or station crew.⁶⁷ Attendance at matches was through an individual effort, not part of a coordinated servicewide effort. Headquarters lauded these efforts and wanted all to participate. To build interest, Headquarters felt marksmanship should be rewarded with cash prizes. Estimating cost was difficult because there had been no interdivision matches held. However, such matches were thought to “encourage our men to strive to excel in small-arms competition.”⁶⁸

The drive for effective training was only one reason to become involved in competitive marksmanship. As a military service, the Coast Guard felt obligated to participate alongside the other services. Modern military pride in the Coast Guard began to surface.

Neither Commander Waesche nor his staff was overly optimistic about the first team’s chances for success in official national competition against more experienced teams. However, they believed that after a few years they would be able to hold their own with anybody, “bringing credit to the service.”

Approval of the 1929 fiscal year came and in September 1928, Commander Waesche submitted his plan to field the Coast Guard’s national rifle team. His plan called for assembling approximately 60 men at the Marine Corps Base at Parris Island, South Carolina.⁶⁹ Ten men were eliminated each month and

replaced by ten from the field until June 1, 1929. The 40 finalists in the squad would then move to the Marine barracks at Quantico, Virginia. The weather in Quantico was better in the summer months. Quantico was also close enough to Headquarters so that Waesche could keep a watchful eye on the chosen shooters. Further training eliminated five more men, bringing the total squad strength to 35.

The final eliminations took the entire month of June; on the first of July, the team moved to Camp Perry, Ohio. Fifteen other men, all apprentice seaman or seaman second class, were added to work the butts (targets). Some thought the men eliminated from the team should perform this duty. Waesche disagreed with this idea. He felt it would be a form of punishment for those failing to make the team and would cause a decline of interest in a program that had only begun. Waesche also knew that although these men failed to make the team this year, it did not mean they would not make it the next.

To provide further incentive for winning a spot on the team, and perhaps as a result of Marine Corps influence, the team wore a special uniform. It consisted of the khaki Marine Corps uniform with a large woven Coast Guard shield worn on the left shoulder. The team's campaign hat became the symbol of a Coast Guard competitive shooter for the next 60 years.

Commander Waesche reported the results of the 1928 Camp Perry Matches to the commandant.⁷⁰ He noted that the Coast Guard team was "outclassed" by the other services because the other teams trained year round for the competitive matches. They had no other jobs to perform. The Marine Corps demonstrated its desire to win by bringing two men from China specifically for the Camp Perry matches. Waesche recommended the same form of training for the Coast Guard. This idea evidently received a negative response from the commandant. The Coast Guard's limited budget could not afford men performing non-service-related jobs year round.

Waesche stated that, "as a matter of educating the country as to what the Coast Guard is and how it functions, that alone was worth sending a team to Camp Perry."⁷¹ In 1928, some of the participants thought the Coast Guardsmen came to Camp Perry in connection with Prohibition enforcement. The second appearance at the Camp Perry competition was not met with as much suspicion and misunderstanding as the first year.⁷² Others were surprised to learn that the Coast Guard routinely used the rifle and thought the Coast Guard was primarily a life saving service with no military connections or history.

Despite the identity crisis, the Coast Guard had some successes in 1928: Chief Gunner's Mate Albert V. Walton placed third against 681 competitors in the Crowell match; Ensign Stanley C. Linholm captured 13th place of 1,453 entered in the national individual match. The team, as a whole, placed third of 39 teams in the enlisted men's match and 16th of 95 teams in the national rifle team match (a two-day competition). The team nearly placed sixth in the latter match, but their shooting at the 1,000-yard range was not, as Waesche noted, "what it should have been."⁷³

As the rifle team began training and firing its competitive rounds, the rest of the Coast Guard battled rum runners and other smugglers. The need for Prohibition enforcement weapons also filtered into Coast Guard Headquarters. The operations division purchased five Colt .32-caliber pocket pistols for its staff.⁷⁴ The arming of staff personnel demonstrated a renewed interest in arming the growing Coast Guard.

Open and hostile engagements occurred around the nation. At many stations the beach patrol routinely encountered smugglers. Often the patrols met groups landing their illegal wares, and more often than not, the arms of smugglers were superior to those of the Coast Guardsmen. As a result, officers in charge of the stations armed their patrols with enough fire power to overcome any trouble. The beach patrols carried the 25-pound Lewis machine gun. Its length and weight, including the 97-round magazine, made it too cumbersome for a man to carry for any great distance.⁷⁵ A normal beach patrol beat was about one-half to four miles in length. C. H. Abel, commander of Section Base 12, Anacortes, Washington, believed the numbers of smugglers caught would increase and patrol distance lengthen if the patrols used the lighter Browning Automatic Rifle. Oddly, no one requested horses—a probable carryover from the Life Saving Service and its tradition of foot patrols.

Headquarters agreed with Commander Abel and made a request to the War Department to purchase M1918 .30-caliber Browning Automatic Rifles. This rifle, with 100 rounds of ammunition, still weighed over 20 pounds, but was less cumbersome to carry than the Lewis gun. Headquarters purchased other weapons types as well for the ongoing law enforcement crisis. It contacted Colonel M. H. Thompson, general manager of the Auto-Ordnance Corporation and builder of the Thompson rapid-fire gun for bids for the weapon.

Thompson's gun, capable of firing both ball and birdshot ammunition, had definite advantages for law enforcement work. Thompson demonstrated the gun in 1926 to a group of Coast Guard officers at New York. The officers appeared as impressed as their 1840s counterparts had been by Samuel Colt's revolver demonstration. However, the Coast Guard could not afford the \$200 cost for each weapon. The ordnance section declined Thompson's bid and opted to continue purchasing less expensive surplus military weapons from the War Department.

In August 1929, however, arming policies and funding situations changed and the Coast Guard bought its first five .45-caliber M1928 Thompson submachine guns. The term "submachine gun" was a marketing tool coined by Thompson who quickly capitalized on the Coast Guard's first purchase by advertising a boat-mounted model in October 1928.⁷⁶ Another purchase in June 1929 included only three weapons, but this marked the beginning of a long relationship between the Auto-Ordnance Corporation and the Coast Guard.

The purchase of these weapons caused problems because no training courses or spare parts were available from the military. The Coast Guard

required that spare parts be included in the purchase agreement. Training reverted to the best judgement of local commanders.

By early 1929, changes occurred in small arms as well. The Office of the Chief Coordinator, an office within the Bureau of Budget, ordered the continued replacement of all .38 caliber revolvers in the Coast Guard inventory.⁷⁷ This bureau ordered 800 revolvers transferred to other government agencies such as the Department of Agriculture and the National Zoo.⁷⁸ Previously used only by shore stations and picket boats, the revolver was replaced by the M1911 pistol. The Coast Guard could now implement complete standardization of training, ammunition, and maintenance for pistols.

The year 1929 was a milestone year for the Coast Guard, in that comprehensive competition and general service shooting programs began. The service gained new weapons, ships, and self-pride. However, experience with the new equipment, especially the new deck guns, soon indicated that little progress had been made in maintenance training.

The growing inventory of technical ordnance equipment required specialized training. The first people to receive formal ordnance training were the warrant officers (gunners). Headquarters scheduled four classes a year, three months in length, at the Naval Gun Factory at the Washington Navy Yard. The four gunners of each class received extensive training in all aspects of large guns on the cutters.

Small arms were not forgotten. Headquarters arranged for one enlisted man to attend the Marine Corps armorers' course at Philadelphia. These Marine Corps-trained armorers formed the nucleus of instructors for the Coast Guard's own armorers' course held at Curtis Bay, Maryland, in the late 1930s.

Once the weapons were acquired and maintained, the nagging question of where to practice shooting remained a sore point for Waesche. The Coast Guard borrowed firing ranges or depended upon the good will of the army or Marine Corps. Waesche wanted Coast Guard-owned-and-operated firing ranges.

One of the first full-size ranges under construction was at Cape May, New Jersey. Funds for the project were small, and items like new target carriers for the rifle range were expensive. Waesche found the 15 carriers needed for Cape May at the Virginia Military Reservation at Virginia Beach, Virginia. He wrote to the officer in charge, Captain Jackson, and was able to procure the carriers for little more than shipping costs.⁷⁹

The Cape May range, opened for firing later that year, trained part of the growing 10,800-man enlisted force. The town of Cape May supported the range. The Cape May city council welcomed the idea of the range and even suggested that the training center become the central training point for all the cutters from Virginia to Maine.

Waesche also ordered small arms and machine guns for aircraft. For use on the Fokker "seaplane" or "flying boat," Headquarters chose the Lewis machine gun over the Browning machine gun because of weight. The Lewis, with magazine, weighed 15 pounds less than the Browning, which totaled, with ammunition, nearly 40.⁸⁰

The Coast Guard ordnance section grew beyond even Waesche's expectations. As a result, he assigned three additional warrant officers (gunners) to the ordnance section to monitor weapons, training, ammunition, and optical equipment (for gunnery fire control). With more assistance, the ordnance section could now spend time describing the position of the Coast Guard in relation to the roles and missions of the U.S. Navy.

The Coast Guard found that not all of its functions were carbon copies of U.S. Navy functions, especially where naval gunnery regulations were concerned. With the differences between service missions in mind, the Coast Guard issued its own instructions under the title: *Ordnance Instructions, United States Coast Guard, 1929*. This was the first Coast Guard ordnance manual, and although the bulk was made up of navy material, it was specific to the Coast Guard. For example, section six dealt solely with small-arms training and competition. It outlined prize money and courses of fire, and, for the first time, made officers ineligible for prize money. Additionally, it stipulated that vessels with more than 40 men could compete for prizes and classified certain types of shore units as eligible.

There were rapid changes during the first years of Waesche's control of the ordnance section. By the end of 1930, Coast Guard ordnance was well managed. However, deficiency of reporting from the districts still plagued Headquarters.⁸¹ The 1930 annual report stated, "While only one district had submitted a small-arms practice report, there is every indication that interest in small-arms training is increasing."⁸² The report continued with a description of the new firing range constructed on Egmont Key, offshore of St. Petersburg, Florida, also known as Camp Dade.

This firing range had 20 firing points and could accommodate firing distances of 200 to 1,000 yards. Plans in the report specified the enlargement of the range at Port Angeles, Washington, to 20 firing positions and 1,000-yard shooting. Although the Coast Guard owned firing ranges at Cape May, New Jersey, and at Virginia Beach, Virginia, it needed more.

One thousand-yard firing ranges were also sought. For the Coast Guard, these ranges had no practical purpose other than training for the rifle teams; qualification courses rarely extended beyond 600 yards. The Coast Guard still made use of Marine Corps ranges and personnel at Quantico and Parris Island, as well as some National Guard ranges.

As the Depression loomed over the nation, the commandant became alarmed when notified of many lost and stolen small arms. Between 1 January 1928 and 6 March 1930, 122 pistols were lost, an average of over three per month. Coast Guard Base 12 at Anacortes, Washington, lost six—three by one man. The Commandant worried that the pistols would land "in the hands of the criminal class of the country."⁸³

He also wrote that "less than five percent of the losses are excusable" and did not know how to correct the problem. The commandant settled for instituting a reimbursement plan for those men losing a pistol (or any weapon). But he did remind the Coast Guard as a whole that, "In cases of gross carelessness or negligence, additional disciplinary action may be taken." This

last line proved to be an idle threat. Most men paid the \$13.28 for each pistol and the matter was forgotten.

As the Depression deepened, the number of pistols lost quadrupled. Because Coast Guard units varied to such a large degree, Headquarters hesitated in dictating definitive security standards and handed the matter of security and accountability to the commanding officer.

In 1931, although the country sank deeper into the Depression, the Coast Guard's small-arms ammunition expenditures reached a record high of \$106,589, up from \$79,762 the year before. The increase attested to the emphasis given small-arms training. In addition, Headquarters allocated more funds to improve the barracks on Egmont Key to accommodate the many men sent to train. Improvements included the luxury of running water directly to the firing line.

Cape May joined Virginia Beach and Egmont Key as a firearms coach training facility after 1930. Headquarters stipulated that with the increased number of instructors, scores of the men should rise to meet expectations. Nearly every station from the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Coast Guard Districts sent a man to the coaches course at Cape May or Virginia Beach.⁸⁴ The shooting style of general training and competitive shooting melded with the shooting style of Camp Perry and was emulated by the field personnel and the field instructors.

Firing coaches began to expect all these men to perform just as if they were competing at a rifle match. Preparation for the shooting match became the motivation behind training. Gone was the expert disclaimer of a few years before. By the end of June 1931, over 90 percent of the stations and most of the cutters held small-arms practice.⁸⁵

Success bred its own problems. The popularity and increased interest in earning awards and cash prizes caused the Coast Guard to look for ways to reduce the costs of training. The service found one way to reduce costs in the .22-caliber Colt ACE pistol. This twin of the M1911 service pistol was issued in limited numbers in 1931. It simulated the function of the full-grade model including recoil. There were technical problems with the new pistol, but after Colt Firearms corrected the problems, Headquarters bought more. Although the ACE or M2 Springfield rifle may not have been cheaper, they opened the door to the small-bore category of competitive shooting.

The Coast Guard's national shooting team continued during these years. Noting the success of past rifle teams, the Coast Guard expanded and readied itself for the 1931 national matches by including the service pistol. The team had the full support of the commandant and of Assistant Commandant Captain Benjamin M. Chiswell, who approved all weapons purchases. But it was Waesche who made the weapons selections and orders. He contacted Colt Firearms Company for a bid for .45-caliber match-conditioned pistols. The bid was no contest; he accepted Colt's \$27.80 bid each for five national match pistols.⁸⁶

Waesche also ordered reworked rifles to make the teams more competitive. Forty national match and five Style "T" heavy rifle barrels and five Fecker

Telescope sights were bought from the Springfield Armory. The barrels and telescopes cost an estimated \$2,100.00, an enormous amount for 1931.⁸⁷ The purchase of specialized weapons for competition in a time of national economic chaos indicates the seriousness and fervor of the Coast Guard and Waesche for marksmanship matches. Morale also fueled the interest in competition. The ordnance section still handled morale functions, and during the 1930s all services used sports to build morale. Shooting and football remained the two favorites because of the depth of participation.⁸⁸

In less than 20 years following the First World War the Coast Guard surpassed all other periods of growth. It became a well-armed, well-organized military service with an internal spirit based on acknowledgement of its own self-worth and without a supporting war. The marksmanship programs, both general and competitive, were outward extensions of that self image. The hit-and-miss procedures of 30 years before evolved into precise aim and control of shot. Just as changes in technology had advanced the cutters from sail to steam turbine, the changes in national politics, economics, and social ideals had changed the Coast Guard.

Notes

1. T. C. Dickman, "Modern Improvements in Firearms and Their Tactical Effects," General Service and Staff College Lecture No. 10, September 26, 1902, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas.
2. Albert S. Jones, "Marksmanship in America," *Outing* 40 (1902):674.
3. *Ibid.*
4. Walter Winans, "Practical Revolver Shooting," *Outing* 38 (1901):37.
5. Pryor, W. R., "Revolver Shooting," *Harper's Weekly*, 37 (March 11, 1893):243.
6. *Ibid.*
7. Brennan, Alfred L., "Revolver Shooting," *Harper's Weekly*, 41 (October 2, 1897):992.
8. *Ibid.*
9. *Ibid.*
10. *Ibid.*
11. *Small Arms Firing Regulations for the United States Army* (Washington: GPO, April 20, 1908).
12. *Infantry Drill and Small-Arm and Great-Gun Target Practice in the U.S. Revenue Cutter Service*, General Order No. 97 (Washington: GPO, November 6, 1905).
13. *Ibid.*
14. *Ibid.*, 3. This basic philosophy would change with ensuing decades. The use of "prior instruction" would depend on service budget, national emergencies, and departmental policies.

15. U.S. Army, *Small Arms Firing Regulations, 1908*, War Department Document No. 322 (Washington: GPO, 1908).
16. USRCS General Order 97, January 25, 1906, 5.
17. *Ibid.*, 6.
18. Treasury Department, USRCS General Order No. 11, Washington: July 11, 1910.
19. The modern equivalent of this would be the use of computer-generated training equipment and programs by the U.S. Army in the 1980s.
20. *Ibid.*
21. In competitive shooting, whether civilian or military, the Distinguished Marksman Award was the highest shooting award in national competition. There were other individual trophies and awards.
22. Letter to San Francisco USRCS purchasing officer from Commandant E. P. Bertholf, August 14, 1911.
23. Treasury Department, USRCS, *Instructions for Drills and Target Practice in the U.S. Revenue Cutter Service, 1914* (Washington: GPO, September 23, 1914).
24. *Ibid.*, 19.
25. Infantry drill procedures was contained in the Navy's 1912 landing force instructions and also included small arms. The olive-drab uniform may not have been widely used; some vessels did not have them. The uniform and other equipment was shown in U.S. Army, Ordnance Pamphlet No. 1719, plate XII.
26. Treasury Department, *Small-Arm Target Practice*, General Order No. 29 (Washington: GPO, December 20, 1915).
27. Another reason could have been the influence McAdoo had with the president. McAdoo had been Assistant Secretary of the Navy in 1895. During this time he advocated registering yachts for possible wartime service, but the best influence came from McAdoo being Woodrow Wilson's son-in-law.
28. *Ibid.*
29. Treasury Department, *Regulations for the United States Coast Guard, 1916* (Washington: GPO, 1916):183-84.
30. NA, RG 36. Unsigned copy letter to Coast Guard Depot, Ord. File 463, June 11, 1915.
31. *Firing Regulations For Small Arms, U.S. Navy, 1915* (Washington: GPO, 1914). Although the Coast Guard required the Navy's 1916 regulations, there was little, if any, difference in course content or qualification requirements.
32. *Ibid.*
33. The size of the 25- and 50-yard target used remains the standard at 21 X 24 inches. This measurement is consistent with human torso dimensions.
34. Act of March 3, 1879, 20 Stat. 412. The Act allowed the Secretary of War to issue arms and ammunition for the protection of public money and property. However, the issues were to be returned once the "necessity for their use has expired." Any arms not returned had to be paid for by the borrowing agency.

35. NA, RG 36 File 462. E. P. Bertholf to U.S. Army Ordnance, April 17, 1917.
36. Kensil Bell, *Always Ready: The Story of the United States Coast Guard* (New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1943):209.
37. NA, RG 36 File 463. E. P. Bertholf to U.S. Army Ordnance, May 5, 1917.
38. Navy Department, U.S. Coast Guard, Circular Letter No. 99. Washington, May 29, 1919.
39. Treasury Department, U.S. Coast Guard, Circular Letter No. 189. Washington, April 11, 1921.
40. *Ibid.*, paragraph 8. The cutters named were the *Achusnet*, *Kankakee*, *Pequot*, *Shawnee*, *Snohonish* and *Yocona*.
41. *Ibid.*, paragraphs 27-29.
42. Colt Fire Arms, D. S. Phelps to U.S. Coast Guard, October 5, 1921.
43. Circular Letter No. 189, paragraph 52, April 11, 1921.
44. Treasury Department, U.S. Coast Guard, Circular Letter No. 10., Washington, February 28, 1924.
45. Treasury Department, U.S. Coast Guard, *Instructions for United States Coast Guard Stations, 1922* (Washington: GPO, 1922).
46. Undated draft copy titled, "Organization." The draft gave the primary divisions: operations, material, construction and repair, engineering, and inspection. Under each division were various subdivisions and responsibilities. It can be assumed the report was made in 1922 because of comparable division descriptions of 1923.
47. *Ibid.*
48. NA, RG 26 File 460. "Report of operations, Ordnance Section, Fiscal Year 1923," F. A. Zeusler, July 9, 1923.
49. *Ibid.*, 4-5. The Coast Guard had no guns larger than three-inch at this time, but it seems that Zeusler had larger plans. There were plans to replace the obsolete six-pounder with three- and five-inch guns.
50. *Ibid.*, 5.
51. Treasury Department, U.S. Coast Guard, *Report of the Coast Guard, 1924*, 34. The use of Navy recruiting offices was an expeditious arrangement since the Coast Guard had no regular recruiting stations.
52. *Ibid.*
53. NA, RG 26 File 460. U.S. Coast Guard, letter dated September 5, 1924, "Ammunition allowance," 2.
54. NA, RG 26 File 460. U.S. Coast Guard, letter dated October 28, 1924, "Ordnance reports; picket boats, patrol boats and bases." The pistols allowed for the picket boats were in all likelihood older issue .38-caliber revolvers.
55. *Ibid.*, 2.
56. NA, RG 26 File 671. Memorandum to the Commandant, December 18, 1923.
57. *Ibid.*, 5.

58. NA, RG 26 File 463. Letter to Coast Guard Depot, November 19, 1925.
59. Treasury Department, U.S. Coast Guard, *Report of Gunnery Exercises and Small Arms Target Practice, 1925-40*. Only 476 men qualified on any course of fire giving a 20% qualification rate, the smallest in Coast Guard history.
60. Treasury Department, U.S. Coast Guard, *Report of the Coast Guard 1927*, 32.
61. *Ibid.*, 33.
62. NA, RG 26 File 463. "Increase of small arms, patrol boats," October 5, 1927.
63. NA, RG 26 File 671. U.S. Coast Guard "Memorandum for Commandant," April 6, 1928.
64. NA, RG 26 File 671. U.S. Coast Guard, "Memorandum for Commandant," March 31, 1928.
65. "Memorandum for Admiral Billard," J. P. Farley, June 5, 1928, 1.
66. *Ibid.*, 2.
67. *Ibid.*, 3.
68. *Ibid.*, 3.
69. "Memorandum for Commandant," September 18, 1928. R. R. Waesche. Tentative plans for training rifle team, 1929. The members for this team were not the best the Coast Guard had to offer. CWO Jim Alligood, USCG (Ret.) noted most couldn't "hit a barn." Alligood was a member of the 1930 and successive teams to 1940.
70. "Memorandum for Commandant," September 17, 1928, R. R. Waesche, National Rifle Matches.
71. *Ibid.*, 2.
72. "Memorandum for Commandant," R. R. Waesche, September 17, 1928.
73. *Ibid.*
74. NA, RG 26 File 463. Letter to George A. Emmons, October 23, 1928. The pistols cost \$119.00 total with 2,000 rounds of ammunition.
75. The length and weight of the Lewis machine gun is comparable to the 7.62mm, M-60 machine gun of contemporary times.
76. *Coast Guard Magazine*, 1 (October, 1928):34.
77. NA, RG 26. John Marston, Asst. Chief Coordinator to Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, January 12, 1929. The idea of the coordinator's office was to eliminate waste and redundancy. However, it carried a heavy club and was not well received.
78. A similar event took shape in 1976 after the results of a General Accounting Office (GAO) report claiming that the Coast Guard owned too many small arms. The Coast Guard surplused or destroyed a wide variety of match conditioned weapons and others that were considered museum pieces.
79. NA, RG 26 Entry 283 File 462, March 6, 1929. Waesche did not use Captain Jackson's first name in the letter and the letter was a follow-up to a telephone conversation, typical of the Coast Guard method of procurement.
80. "Memorandum for Engineer-in-chief," File 463, March 9, 1929.

81. Treasury Department, *Report of the Coast Guard 1930*. In this respect the traditions of the individualism of the Revenue Cutter Service lived on. Many officers failed to understand the importance of reports on the modern budgetary process.

82. *Ibid.*, 56.

83. NA, RG 26 File 463. "All Units Letter," March 10, 1933.

84. The ideal of an instructor (coach) for every station resurfaced in the early 1980s. The difference in the two periods was that the 1930s Coast Guardsman had a higher level of competence with weapons than his 1980s counterparts. The quality of instruction was much higher, as was incentive, in the 1930s.

85. Treasury Department, *Report of the Coast Guard 1931*, 47.

86. NA, RG 26 File 463. Colt Fire Arms letter dated December 31, 1930.

87. NA, RG 26 File 463. Letter to U.S. Army Chief of Ordnance, November 14, 1930. The items were not received until after January 1931.

88. An interesting story about the Coast Guard's 1931 football team that won the Marine Corps Cup by "enlisting" letter men from various colleges just to play football. The squad was known as the "Plum Island team" because that is where they practiced in secrecy. The use of "ringers" was calculated to, and did, produce a winning team.

Eternally on a War Footing

The Coast Guard continued expanding its small-arms training program during the lean years of the Depression. By 1932 the nation's unemployed numbered between 12 million and 15 million people. Another estimated 30 million people depended on some form of charity.¹

The widespread unemployment and availability of men allowed the Coast Guard to alter its enlistment and recruitment policies. The new policies increased the quality of its enlisted force.² The chief of the personnel section noted, "There is a constant flow of highly desirable applicants...." many with full or partial college educations.³ Furthermore, Headquarters allowed the reenlistment of former Coast Guardsmen only if they had at least a partial high school education. The Coast Guard anticipated smaller budgets for the next few years. Educationally qualified men eased some of the problems caused by illiteracy in years past.

The Coast Guard's 1932 personnel roster listed 439 commissioned officers, 974 chief warrant officers and cadets, and 11,099 enlisted men. From these, the service maintained armed infantrymen and machine gunners who justified much of its small-arms training and competition. The Coast Guard claimed to have 3,057 men armed with rifles, 89 with pistols, and 1,291 machine gunners with pistols.⁴

During 1932 the Coast Guard wrestled to find another mission as its Prohibition role ended. The service used Prohibition to justify expanded training by claiming increased law enforcement duties. Although the figures may have resulted from a new reporting method, they validated an increase in the number of people qualified in arms afloat and ashore.

Despite unemployment, the Coast Guard encountered a massive turnover of men, especially on its ships. One 1932 gunnery report noted "beginning over again for each practice with a large percentage of men."⁵ This report noted the problems in large-gun training as well as small-arms and landing-party training. With some resignation it concluded that with the constant rotation of crews, "progress beyond a certain limit would seem difficult if not impossible of realization."

In 1932, general service small-arms training expenditures for ammunition shrank by only \$3,100. National trophy matches were suspended between 1932 and 1934, although local and regional matches continued.⁶

Coast Guard Headquarters questioned some field units on the true number of expert riflemen in the 1932-1933 training year. Of the 4,227 men firing the rifle for qualification, 946 qualified as expert. This high number exceeded the total number of sharpshooters, "a condition the reverse of that normally expected."⁷ Headquarters felt that only 10 to 20 percent should attain expert

status and "it is obvious that the high percentage of qualification must be to some extent the result of improper supervision."⁸

Personal recognition of marksmanship remained a key ingredient in the Coast Guard's small-arms program. The sleeve insignia for enlisted men helped, but the program needed a more visible form. During 1932, Headquarters authorized the expert rifle and pistol shot medals to replace the older RCS medals.⁹ In the same year, Headquarters issued trophies and plaques to recognize group efforts.¹⁰ The winners for the unit awards for 1932 were the following:

<i>Pamlico</i>	Trophy for cutters; plaque for cutters under 1,000 tons
<i>Yamacraw</i>	Plaque for cutters over 1,000 tons
<i>Porter</i>	Trophy for destroyers. (Out of Commission 1932)
<i>Argo</i>	Plaque for 165-foot patrol boats
<i>Diligence</i>	Plaque for 100-foot and 125-foot patrol boats
Base 6	Trophy for bases; plaque for bases
Twelfth District	Trophy for districts; plaque for districts

Recognition of group and individual efforts through medals, trophies, and plaques helped build pride; prize money helped supplement Depression-era incomes.

More changes were in store when Franklin D. Roosevelt took office in January 1933. Nearly a year later Henry Morgenthau became Treasury Secretary replacing William Woodin. Upon taking office, Secretary Morgenthau, following presidential desires to professionalize the eight regularly armed agencies under him, ordered an inspection of all bureaus' small-arms training and maintenance. Except for the Coast Guard, the inspectors found all the bureaus deficient in knowledge of use and maintenance in their weapons.

In the following months more inspections revealed many weapons in such poor maintenance that it was doubtful they would fire.¹¹ Morgenthau ordered the Coast Guard to begin training all Treasury civilian employees who carried weapons. Rear Admiral Harry G. Hamlet, Commandant since 1932, obliged the secretary by assigning trained instructors where they were needed.

Coast Guard small-arms instructors traveled to all parts of the nation and territories, training agents from Customs, Border Patrol, Secret Service, Internal Revenue, mail carriers, and other agencies.¹² The instructors chosen for this highly mobile assignment were past and present members of the competitive rifle teams. The assignments gave these competitors year-round access to range-firing practice as Waesche wanted for his 1929 team.

The training responsibilities undertaken by the Coast Guard had unseen benefits. Experienced instructors were reexposed to the aspects of marksmanship practices that targeted survival as the purpose of training. Unfortunately, apart from a purposeful attitude, the civilian styles of shooting varied little from those of the military. The shooting stance advocated by the

civilian shooting clubs in the late 1890s became the only approved Coast Guard stance.

The Coast Guard instructors used a new form of target for training: the standard 20-yard bull's-eye target taught fundamentals and basic technique. New man-shaped silhouette targets provided realism in training and gave practice on a human-sized target. The silhouette, or Colt silhouette, required the center-hold, or center mass shooting, technique described by Captain Dickman 30 years earlier.

The average Coast Guardsman continued to receive training which improved competitive skills. This included all surf station personnel. For two weeks each summer, they shot daily with small arms. Instructors assigned to these areas came from a traveling team that had originally trained civilians in the Treasury Department. Instructors such as Chief Gunner Victor A. Johnson and Surfman Stanley L. Loyer visited many stations each summer.¹³

Life station personnel were generally better rifle marksmen than those on cutters. Regulations called for each station to hold infantry drill and small-arms practice outside the two-week summer training course, although most ignored the requirement.¹⁴

The two-week course produced some able marksmen, but "the 45 [pistol] training was a disaster... Recruits and many old surfmen shot into the ground half way to the target...very few surfmen qualified."¹⁵ The rifle course used a version of the standard qualification course. This course basically followed the national match rifle "A" course, but reduced the third position from 300 to 200 yards. The expert rating required a score of 215 of 250 possible.¹⁶

POSITION	TIME	ROUNDS	RANGE	TARGET
Offhand (standing)		10	200	A
Standing to sitting-rapid (2 strings)	1 min 10 sec	5	200	A
Standing to prone (2 strings)	1 min 10 sec	(10) 5	200	A
Prone	(15 min)	(10) 20	500	B ¹⁷

The rifle remained the chosen weapon of the Coast Guard. During 1934 the number of weapons issued to vessels remained generous. Each of the five *Escanaba*-class 165-foot patrol vessels received 30 rifles and 12 pistols, all from Coast Guard stocks at Curtis Bay, Maryland.¹⁸

By 1935 small-arms training focused on competitive shooting. Cape May, New Jersey, and Wakefield, Massachusetts, became the home bases of Coast Guard competitive marksmanship teams. There the Coast Guard fired large and small-bore rifles and pistols against military and civilian teams.

The Coast Guard, as a service, competed for seven years either in national, regional, or local matches and could now field three four-man pistol teams from Cape May alone. One man on Cape May's pistol "A" team and the 1935 national rifle team (where he earned a bronze medal) was Ensign Willard J. Smith, who would become Commandant in 1966. Ironically, during his tenure as Commandant, the Coast Guard withdrew from competitive shooting.¹⁹

Competitive training increased, as did general small-arms and infantry training. Shipboard-style infantry squads developed at the stations on the Great Lakes as ski platoons. The Coast Guard trained and armed cross-country ski troops to operate on the frozen lakes and snow during the winter months.²⁰

Apart from ski equipment, the Coast Guard purchased more specialized equipment for the rifle and pistol teams. The Coast Guard reintroduced the revolver, not for general service use but for competition, a result of the close association with the Treasury civilian training and shooting teams. The Colt .38-caliber officer's model and the Smith & Wesson military and police (M & P) models were bought and especially rebuilt at the Small Arms Repair and Supply Base at Curtis Bay, Maryland.²¹

Headquarters purchased other match revolvers from the Army Ordnance Department, including eight "special heavy" Colt officer's model with Partridge sights and four more Smith & Wesson, M & P models, both types with six-inch barrels.²² For a time the Winchester .30-caliber M54 sniper rifle replaced the standard issue M1903 Springfield rifle. However, the Winchester was shortly replaced by the Springfield Armory-built M1914A4 rifle with heavy "T" barrel.²³ The competitive matches were still popular whether for trophies or prize money.

During the Great Depression, small Coast Guard salaries made the money won at matches welcome.²⁴ Extra income was particularly appreciated as Headquarters counseled its men to stay free of indebtedness. To Headquarters debt was a fault of character that "clearly illustrates a lack of initiative...and leaves an impression of irresponsibility."²⁵ Congress helped the Coast Guard by officially authorizing participation in the national matches. Thus the Coast Guard could budget for the equipment and fees of competitive shooting without resorting to using contingency funds.²⁶

The increased effort put into competition did not reduce the amount of general service training. Headquarters still cited increasing law enforcement activity as justification; no one questioned it. The Anti-Smuggling Act of 1935 helped the Coast Guard nearly eliminate organized liquor smuggling by sea. This act made the Coast Guard, through the statutory authority, the prime maritime law enforcement agency.²⁷

The Anti-Smuggling Act changed training. By the end of 1936, the Coast Guard had trained over 6,000 Treasury civilians.²⁸ This training, mandated but unfunded by the Treasury secretary, burdened Coast Guard resources. Headquarters requested, and finally received, an additional \$25,000 for men and material to cover civilian training costs.

During the Depression, lost and stolen weapons plagued the Coast Guard. The reimbursement plan did not deter loss. In December 1936, J. Edgar

Hoover, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, requested that the Coast Guard inventory their pistols (including serial number) because of an increased use of military weapons in crimes. He asked only for the number of M1911 pistols, and no revolvers, lost by the Coast Guard. Captain P. W. Laureiat supplied a list of 599 pistols. Despite the large number of pistols lost or stolen, Headquarters was unable to resolve the problem; no further steps were taken to ensure against future losses.

General ordnance training improved as Headquarters minimized the impact of time and personnel rotation problems. It encouraged commanding officers to assist in training by studying past gunnery practices and "seizing every opportunity while on regular duty to give the rudimentary training."²⁹

The 80 percent qualification rate in rifle practice showed the emphasis placed on training. On average the figures looked very good, but some units still could not qualify their men. The eight-man intelligence unit at New Orleans qualified no men with the rifle in the 1935-36 season, but they fired well with the pistol. However, training figures were based on rifle performance only, not the actual weapon carried. Those attempting qualification with pistol amounted to one-fifth of those with the rifle.

Technical training at the Marine Corps Armorers' School and the Naval Gun Factory in Washington, D.C., changed. In 1932, enlisted men attended classes at the Naval Gun Factory, separated from the officers. The Coast Guard also recommended curriculum changes instead of accepting the navy's offerings because the Coast Guard did not need everything the navy taught.

Beginning in 1936, ensigns and lieutenants (j.g.) received six weeks of training: one week touring production and repair shops, three weeks in optical school, and the last two weeks studying rangekeepers, deflection convertors, and directors (Vickers). Gunner's mates spent eight working weeks at the Naval Gun Factory: two weeks in the study of general gun construction, gas ejection systems, sights and sighting and battery preparation; one week studying ammunition and powders at the Powder Factory; one week at the fire control school with the Mark II rangekeeper and deflection converter; three weeks at the optical school, and one week at the proof shop that included two days at the proving grounds testing Coast Guard-related guns.³⁰

Apart from the Marine Corps school, 12 men received training at the Coast Guard Armorers' School at Curtis Bay. Officers studied required ordnance pamphlets prior to arriving at the school. The similar training received by both officer and enlisted created a shipboard ordnance team consistent in thought, and more importantly, in attitude. An accord of pride bonded the two groups.³¹

By January 1937, with general recovery from the Depression imminent the Coast Guard prepared its 1938 budget request. In previous years, the budget cuts, including a ten percent reduction in military pay, had hit hard on all of the services. A Coast Guard recruit in 1933 made 19 dollars a month and may not have received a "full sea bag" for a year. Headquarters issued a lengthy report appealing for more funds dedicated for ordnance equipment and ordnance training.

In order that the Coast Guard may be prepared to operate with the Navy, it is necessary that we train our men in the use of weapons of war. Our training, to be most effective, must be similar in character and in quantity to that being applied to naval personnel; namely, that system of training which has been found through the experience toward the maintenance of international tranquility.³²

The report further noted that the Coast Guard

is at a serious disadvantage in its training for coordination in that duty, inasmuch as our days and nights, Sundays and holidays included, are filled to overflowing with other routine peacetime duties, which, needless to say, are always fully as arduous, and more than often hazardous, as our duties in time of war...eternally on a war footing—against the elements of ocean, weather and lawlessness in peacetime, and a foreign enemy in wartime.³³

Its author reminded that

the Coast Guard cannot operate without [military] discipline... Imagine an organization charged with lifesaving, law enforcement, and national defense, whose ship and shore crews would strike instead of hastening to answer a call without question, no matter how hopeless the occasion, well knowing that there is always a change of their not being able to get back.³⁴

The Coast Guard appealed for more funding at a time when the arms budget of the United States had increased 220 percent since 1913, despite economic downturns. Until 1935 the Coast Guard had received negligible increases. Further, the report maintained that ordnance training is “essential for carrying out the Coast Guard’[s] dual peace and war mission to further the Good Neighbor Policy with the moral persuasion of the big stick in competent, trained hands.” Much of the additional funding was earmarked for small-arms training which had peace and wartime uses. Both missions in the late 1930s were worthy of both small-arms training effort and headquarters’ planning.

In anticipation of the budget’s approval, Headquarters issued an updated version of the 1929 ordnance manual. The *Ordnance Instructions, United States Coast Guard, 1938* included new equipment, allowances, and updated gunnery techniques. They were also more explicit and were suitably promulgated by Rear Admiral Russell R. Waesche, now Commandant. Waesche’s interest in weapons, training, and practice remained active in his new position.

Small-arms training remained slanted toward members of the landing force and required all officers below the rank of commander, except Public Health Service doctors, to receive rifle and pistol training. Also “All enlisted men of the landing force (or 30 percent of the allowed complement if no landing force is prescribed) shall be given training in the rifle and pistol courses, except that hospital corpsmen need not be so trained.”

The instruction made two important points. First, pistol training was included as a normal requirement, and second, a training quota of men was established instead of "all except cooks and stewards." The instruction also prescribed training with automatic rifle, machine guns, and submachine guns.

As in the former instructions, the new ones included law enforcement training. Men on picket boats and at districts "shall be given training in these arms (any they may carry) whether they are members of a landing force or not." Additionally, the instruction authorized that: "officers and men not required to fire may elect to do so and shall be eligible for credits, insignia, and extra compensation."

This elective allowed anyone to fire *if* they wanted to, which, in effect, kept a ready pool of personnel trying out for the competitive teams. The reestablishment of training quotas and a covering statement allowing nearly anyone to participate became a feature of Coast Guard training policy for the next 50 years.

Small-arms maintenance training continued into 1937. The Coast Guard constructed a new ordnance building at Curtis Bay to replace the one destroyed by fire. Construction was not complete when its first students reported for training in the now six-months-long armorers' course.³⁵ These students berthed during September and October 1938 on the decommissioned ship *Beta*.³⁶ They learned to disassemble all the weapons, sandblast and parkerize [refinish], gauge, inspect, reassemble, then test fire all small arms. Their education extended beyond correcting problems encountered in the field although not to the critical elements of gunsmithing.

The more critical and technical matters, such as rifle chamber gauging and reaming, were overseen by two experienced armorers. In 1938, GM1c Einar K. A. Talen and GM1c Paul F. Johnson, the armorer/instructors, both participated as members of the Coast Guard rifle team. Commanded by Lieutenant D. H. Dexter, the ordnance building was a complete two-story complex. Its offices and student living quarters were on the second floor, weapons work space on the first floor, and firing ranges and weapons vault in the basement.³⁷ The facility was as modern as any in the nation and the Coast Guard used it to full capacity.

Staff and students kept busy at the Curtis Bay ordnance depot producing rifles for the rifle matches and repairing general service weapons. Match weapons had priority. Each team member used two rifles, one Springfield Armory national match and the other accurized at the Coast Guard Armorers' School.³⁸ Each competitor used the rifles at different ranges. The accurized rifle fired a 150-grain bullet at the 200- and 300-yard targets; the national match fired a 172-grain bullet at the 600- and 1,000-yard targets. This was a dramatic change from the use of the standard issue service rifles just ten years before.

As budgets improved, the Coast Guard procured additional weapons for the shooting teams' general training and recreation. Smith & Wesson K-22 and Colt, Official Police .22-caliber revolvers, purchased for Treasury civilian training, entered general service practice as did Winchester .300 H & H

magnum rifles. The Coast Guard still purchased small arms from the navy and received 27 more Lewis machine guns for its 125-foot patrol boats.

Coast Guard Headquarters ordnance section included weapons when planning new aircraft. The addition of bomb sights, bomb racks, and machine guns were planned for the Hall aluminum PH-3 aircraft.³⁹

As aircraft in general became better armed, the defenses against them improved. During 1938 the Coast Guard received its first shipments of the Browning-designed, water-cooled .50-caliber machine guns for use as auxiliary anti-aircraft guns on its cutters. Although the army used the heavier .50-caliber machine gun since 1918, the Coast Guard stayed with the lighter .30-caliber Lewis and Browning machine guns until the late 1930s.

The introduction of a new machine gun to the fleet of cutters caused some operational problems, especially for older, illiterate petty officers. One first class gunner's mate (GM1) on the cutter *Bibb* learned about the new gun the hard way in 1938. When the *Bibb* received its new .50 caliber machine guns, the GM1 laid the new machine gun on the armory's work bench to figure out how it worked.

As the .50 caliber was similar to the .30 caliber version, the GM1 figured how to load a belt of ammunition into the gun. After closing the cover, he gave the retracting handle "good pulls" and after about three tries he unknowingly loaded a round. To support the unmounted weapon during the pulls, he had placed his hand over the backplate, where the trigger is located, a step he repeated for the next pull. He fired two or three rounds through the partition bulkhead before he managed to stop it. Accidental pistol shots had been explained away in the past, but accidental machine gun firing, especially on the interior of the ship, was somewhat harder to explain.⁴⁰

These accidents were inevitable because of the lack of supervision at sea. The Coast Guard, in an effort to reduce expenses, did not fill many of the chief petty officer vacancies. First-class petty officers filled most of the chiefs's billets. Advancement was difficult, compared to the navy, and Depression budgets made promotion nearly impossible in all ratings except yeoman, cook, radioman, and mess attendant. Many of those finally making temporary (also known as acting or provisional) chief petty officer rank had 25 or more years of service. In 1941 this created some animosity when first class petty officers (CPO) with only 17 or so years became CPOs.

Despite budget problems and personnel shortages, cutters began duties that would serve them and the nation well in the coming years. Two cutters stationed at Halifax, Nova Scotia, maintained "a constant ice patrol;" another at St. John's, Newfoundland, performed oceanographic duties. Ice patrol and oceanography were peacetime activities but as the Second World War began and America sought to remain neutral, the cutters assigned this duty took on more responsibility.

Cutters were sent to the North Atlantic, "designated as a special patrol." They assisted distressed vessels and made 363 armed boardings in enforcement of the federal neutrality law.⁴¹ The cutters were so badly needed at sea that

they only spent 10 days in port for each 30-day patrol. This time in port would be considered generous compared to wartime standards.

During these war-preparatory times of 1939, the small-arms training qualification rate with rifle jumped to 84 percent. The rifle team won several competitions at the Camp Perry National Matches. Rudolph Jones, Sea1c, won the Pershing Trophy; Melvon O. Wilson, GM1c, won the Dupont Trophy All-Around Match; L. W. Parish, RM1c, placed third in the Coast Guard Trophy Match; and the pistol team took fifth in the National Pistol Team Match and third in the National Rifle Team Match. Winning trophies was a good way to enter a new decade.

With Europe at war and the poverty of the Great Depression over, the United States prepared itself for the coming struggle. All cutters necessarily increased the amount of gunnery practice.

To meet the need for more trained men, Headquarters established a four-month-long gunner's mate school at Curtis Bay in addition to the armorers' school. The first class to complete the gunner's mate school graduated in 1940. One member of that class remarked that the training was outstanding in presentation and quality. However, few thought their training would ever be used. Fifty years later he noted "those were the days of innocence; for war was not a thing understandable."

The days of innocence would not last long; in December 1941 the United States entered the Second World War. The Coast Guard once again operated under the Navy Department, but for the first time in its history the service entered a war prepared. Rear Admiral Waesche had steadily increased the Coast Guard's sea, air, and land capabilities to make ready for the coming struggle.

As early as January 1941, Waesche put the Coast Guard on a war footing, acting on the reports prepared by his field commanders, especially those involved in Atlantic operations during the past two years. He noted the state of the Coast Guard's preparations: "Whenever the time comes, the Coast Guard will pass to the navy and dovetail into its organization, plans, and policies easily and readily."

In March 1941, headquarters increased training ammunition allowances for all .50- and .30-caliber machine guns to 1,800 and 8,000 rounds, respectively, per year.⁴² Headquarters armed more aircraft. For \$10,000 it bought three Curtis SOC-4 *Seagulls* and armed them with two machine guns and bomb racks each.

This was part of the material support the Coast Guard received but it was not enough for its missions. Admiral Waesche obtained popular support for the Coast Guard by speaking about its accomplishments and requirements. Addressing the fourteenth annual convention of the Propeller Club and the American Merchant Marine convention at New Orleans, Louisiana, Waesche declared, "the period of transition of the Coast Guard from normal peacetime to a state of war is a gradual one. At present, we are in a so-called second stage—a period of national emergency."⁴³

Armed Coast Guard inspectors at the time of the Commandant's speech had already sealed the radios of over 5,000 ships and inspected the armament of some 600 more in the enforcement of the neutrality law. Waesche added, "in New York alone over 200 officers and men and 13 boats are engaged solely upon this duty."⁴⁴ Waesche noted that "the work we are doing for the State Department in Greenland has made demands upon our fleet of cutters which can ill be spared from other duty."⁴⁵

The members of both the Propeller Club and the Merchant Marine knew full well of the lifeline that extended east from Greenland to Great Britain. They were receptive as Waesche lobbied for more new ships to protect this lifeline. Three months later United States forces occupied Greenland, largely with Coast Guard help, avoiding potentially provocative use of army and navy units.

The Coast Guard seized German and Italian ships interned in United States ports on March 29, 1941. Customs inspectors had discovered several ships being sabotaged by their crews. To prevent further damage, President Roosevelt ordered the Coast Guard to seize the ships.

Crew members of the cutter *Bibb*, at Norfolk, Virginia, like others around the country, formed boarding parties to seize these ships. Told that the Axis merchant crews might resist seizure, the Americans prepared "to shoot or bayonet them." Various crew members were assigned specific target areas of each merchant ship and the raids took place at first light.⁴⁶ The years of infantry drill and small-arms practice plus the use of surprise saved German, Italian, and American lives.

At New Orleans the boarding parties from the cutter *Tampa* seized the Italian ships *Ada O* and *Monfiore* and the French tanker *Sheherazade*. *Tampa's* crew boarded the Italian ships by grapnel and found the Italians preparing to scuttle both ships. The Italian crews were jailed in the U.S. Mint. The French *Sheherazade* was allowed to proceed upriver to Baton Rouge. Instead of proceeding upriver however, the tanker turned south and reached the Gulf of Mexico.

The only obstacle between the tanker and the open sea was the Coast Guard patrol boat *AB 20*, from Mobile, Alabama. Earl C. Jones was officer-in-charge. *AB 20* fired a shot from its one-pounder across the bow of the tanker with the threat that the next round would be through the wheel house. The tanker's captain conceded to Jones' orders to heave to and returned to port.

The demands of the war halted competitive shooting in 1942. The Coast Guard would not resume competition on the national level for another 12 years. The awarding of cash prizes for marksmanship stopped during the same period. On 7 February 1942, Amendment No. 4 to the *Ordnance Instructions, 1938* restricted the payment of the cash prizes to only those personnel qualified prior to 1 November 1941. However, they were only to receive the three dollars per month for either the expert rifle or pistol, but not both. The Coast Guard could not afford to pay the extra money to the thousands of extra members that would swell its ranks in the coming years.

The massive infusion of new personnel into all the military services caused a severe shortage of weapons of all descriptions. On 4 March 1942, Assistant Commandant Lloyd T. Chalker sent a confidential letter to all the senior Coast Guard officers in the First to Fourteenth Naval (the term Coast Guard District was not used yet) Districts directing the substitution of .38-caliber revolvers for the M1911 pistol.⁴⁷ He directed that

stocks of .45-caliber pistols are exhausted, but .38-caliber revolvers may be obtained in limited quantities and Headquarters is of the opinion that revolvers would be satisfactory as pistols for the work of many shore establishments, especially in view of the fact that the revolver is more accurate than the pistol when fired by a man of limited experience. (It is understood, of course, that special instruction would be required to assure safe handling, due to the difference in action of the two arms.)

After the years of experience and competition with the .45-caliber pistol, Headquarters still considered it a difficult weapon to teach and shoot. This may have been because of personal preferences within Coast Guard Headquarters and the close association with training of the Treasury Department civilians, whose primary arm was the .38-caliber revolver. The revolver preference remained strong in spirit and the influence of the Treasury bureaus continued for many years.

Chalker also directed that "units review their needs to determine whether revolvers may be substituted for pistols in their work." Headquarters wanted to keep the revolvers within the continental limits of the United States and to reserve the M1911 pistol for combat and overseas areas.

During the early days of the war, the Treasury secretary recommended additional regulations to strengthen the Coast Guard's control over ships and persons using the navigable waters and ports of the United States. President Roosevelt approved the recommendation; broad authority was given to the captains of the ports, especially in the area of loading of munitions. This authority included providing security, not only for ports and waterways but for other important maritime facilities such as dams controlled by the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) and locks operated by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.

Admiral Woesche did not rely entirely on inexperienced enlisted men to perform this vital port security work. He enrolled a special force, drawn from civilian police forces and other organizations, with expertise in security operations.⁴⁸ The Coast Guard also established the Coast Guard Police at navy plants and shipyards.⁴⁹ This may be another reason for the revolver preference. The men were "pre-trained" in the use of their arms and the Coast Guard only had to provide target practice and issue arms, ammunition, and equipment.

On the whole the nation's armed forces were ill-prepared and ill-equipped at the beginning of the war. Most of the arms were old and only small numbers of the new service rifle, M1 Garand, had been produced. The Coast

Guard, although similarly armed, was in somewhat better condition, in part because of the requirement that the Coast Guard be "eternally on a war footing."

The pre-war practice in landing force (party) techniques was used extensively during the war. Coast Guard landing parties took part in every major landing of the war. Some all-Coast Guard landing parties captured enemy forces on shore. Coast Guard personnel within the United States protected against dangers such as sabotage.

For port security work, reserves and volunteer port security personnel supplemented active service Coast Guardsmen. With the influx of men and women from other professions, it was inevitable that an alternative form of small-arms training would evolve in the Coast Guard. This alternate form had been developed by the Coast Guard and used for many years in the training of Treasury civilians. It was introduced and used only by the U.S. Coast Guard Volunteer Port Security Force during the war.

The volunteers had close ties to civil law enforcement. From this association the volunteers adopted combat techniques more quickly. The Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) practical shooting style also influenced the Coast Guard. The FBI influence in Coast Guard small-arms training would resurface again 30 years after the war. Ironically, the first members of the FBI came from the Treasury Department in 1934, and it is likely many of these same men were trained by Coast Guard instructors.

The volunteers realized, like Walter Winans in 1901, that the purpose of training was not to develop "excellent target shooters," but rather "to develop practical combat marksmen."⁵⁰ After initial training, the man-sized silhouette replaced the standard round bull's-eye-type target, as was the Treasury civilian training course routine. This training extended to male volunteers only; some female volunteers received weapons training, limited to competitive style of marksmanship.⁵¹ They often competed against units of navy WAVES.⁵²

Volunteer training combined basic shooting fundamentals with emphasis on speed, accuracy, and the use of cover. The *Guardsmen*, as they referred to themselves, trained with all standard small arms of the service in this period. The Colt or Smith & Wesson .38 revolver was the preferred handgun of the volunteer force. *Victory* model .38-caliber revolvers replaced the older pre-war models. Guardsmen received additional training with the .30-caliber M1903 Springfield and M1 Garand Rifles, the .45-caliber Thompson and Reising submachine guns, and occasionally with automatic rifles and machine guns.

The reintroduction of large numbers of revolvers to the Coast Guard caused a rebirth of the negative attitude for the .45-caliber M1911. Despite the volunteer's progressive attitude toward training, they voiced the popular theory about this pistol that it was "poorly balanced, has an exceptionally heavy recoil and shows a marked tendency to twist away from the wrist when fired."

The volunteers' approach to combat training was more practical than that of the active service. The active Coast Guard followed the U.S. Navy's Landing Force Manual to conduct training. The volunteer force taught the use of protective cover wherever it could be found. Chief Gunner's Mate John G.

Hanna, a small arms and combat style trainer, wrote “the first shot to sing overhead will teach a novice a book full. No one will have to advise him of how or when to duck.” Positions of fire taught by the volunteers were only guides, not a set dogma like the competitive or military styles. The Marine Corps agreed with this open-minded approach and by 1943 advocated that “modes of firing, like types of weapons, should be governed by the situation and purpose of the firer.”⁵³

World War II placed more armed men in the Coast Guard than at any time. Unfortunately, training and education techniques made few advances and generally regressed. The rush of the war and the need for ammunition kept training to a minimum. With over 100,000 active and 150,000 reserve Coast Guardsmen, training became mass oriented and less attention was given to the individual.

Coast Guard recruit training was reduced to five weeks or less with little or no time given to individual arms.⁵⁴ Further training became the responsibility of the ship or shore unit, a method similar to the training methods of the nineteenth century.⁵⁵ Rifle training techniques were altered to accommodate the semi-automatic M1 Garand rifle. It could be fired faster, loaded easier, and carried three more rounds than the bolt action Springfield M1903. However, most instruction used the marksmanship fundamentals stressed the decade before the war, performed at a quicker pace.

To help bolster the inductee’s confidence in the American rifle, unofficial publications outlined the same information given by the U.S. Army, but included the some propaganda. One such book, *How to Shoot the U.S. Army Rifle*, published the *Infantry Journal*, outlined very complete procedures for conducting training.

The booklet compared the American rifle to those used by the enemy: “It [the M1 rifle] can shoot straighter and faster than standard rifles issued to Japs and Germans.” In actual fact, an experienced marksman is still a better shot than an inexperienced marksman regardless of weapon type. This was the core of a somber warning given later:

Your rifle should give you an advantage over the enemy. But actually, your rifle is no better than the man who shoots it. If you can’t shoot your rifle accurately, you might just as well meet the Axis with your fists.

The publication did not define the term “accurately.” To some it meant the standard well-aimed shot, and to others it meant hits regardless of the number of shots. This latter theory was part of General George S. Patton’s training to shoot in the direction of the incoming fire whether targets were visible or not.⁵⁶ This suppression fire technique and attitude became a conceptual part of future practical courses.

During the war Coast Guardsmen played many roles, from transporting army units across the Rhine River to landing operations with the U.S. Marine Corps in the Pacific Islands. They captured the enemy in Greenland and the Mediterranean Sea. Some Coast Guardsmen, during the North African, Pacific,

and Normandy operations, became infantrymen when their landing craft were disabled on the beaches by enemy fire or mines. For these men, proficiency with arms became a grave matter of survival, a much greater incentive than awards or cash prizes.

Other men, such the beach masters, found the proficient use of small arms another tool of the job. Often they were within only yards of the front and had to take care of enemy stragglers. Other Coast Guardsmen joined army and Marine Corps personnel in active battles.

The war continued with few improvements in small-arms training for the Coast Guard, but provided more and newer varieties of weapons. The new weapons were an appropriate symbol of the end of an older mind set in the Coast Guard. Older weapons were replaced, as were most of the older officers and men who had their roots in the procedures and attitudes of the RCS.

The end of the war marked the end of service for many of the service's former competitive marksmen. Many of these men, such as CWO (Gunner) Melvon O. Wilson, retired from active service, leaving some of their experience to future competitors and instructors. The war, however, did not resolve the growing dispute between those factions that would influence not only small-arms training but the selection of future weapons as well.

One school of thought wanted to remain with the traditional, more conservative, methods of marksmanship instruction. The other, having seen the actual application of the traditional method in combat, called for a change of training methods which leaned toward more realism (greater emphasis on practical aspects) and less formal structure. It was a replay of the aftermath of the Spanish-American War. The traditional school became predominant in the Coast Guard for financial as well as philosophical reasons.

The end of the war also reduced the grade of many of the Coast Guardsmen who had been actively engaged in instruction and competition before the war. Those who had been chief petty officers were now reduced to first or second class petty officers or lower. Some left the Coast Guard for the Army Air Force when it offered better pay grades. Without a senior gunner rating, the service could not rebuild the prewar shooting programs. Many of these men filled the instructor positions left vacant by discharged reservists at the firing ranges of the Treasury, Bureau of Engraving, and Bureau of Printing.

The assignment at the range "under the lawn" of the Treasury Building offered an excellent opportunity to continue practice, but the work was often difficult. The Coast Guard assigned only two gunner's mates for weapons repair and instruction at the main Treasury range. In addition they reloaded over 40,000 rounds of .38-caliber ammunition each month. The various agencies trained by these men included the Bureau of Narcotics and Alcohol Tax, the Internal Revenue Service, White House Police, and the Secret Service.

The Secret Service was the most demanding. Secret Service head U. E. Baughman required each agent to practice every month. Their monthly allowance consisted of 180 rounds of .38-caliber ammunition. The White House detail in the middle 1940s, was composed of 30 to 40 Secret Service

agents and approximately 130 White House Police. The Coast Guard instructors also maintained the weapons within the White House.

The massive discharges of trained men from the Coast Guard led to an active, but much smaller scale of recruitment.⁵⁷ The war's end allowed more time for basic training, which was expanded to 12 weeks. The 1938 *Ordnance Instructions* were still in effect, but infantry training included ceremonial and parade aspects rather than offensive military tactics. Small-arms training continued with a plentiful supply of weapons and ammunition. Rifles, as in past decades, remained the mainstay of training. Active duty Coast Guardsmen, not using the pistol daily, fired it only at target practice.

With the war over, small-scale competition within the Coast Guard grew again. Some who competed before the war competed again; however, the five-year break in competition proved too much for many. All of the services were in a similar situation, but the Coast Guard would not again promote or support a service-wide team. Match competition became an individual or unit responsibility again. The Coast Guard assisted with weapons, ammunition, and equipment. Many old competitive weapons were dusted off and tried on the range; outdated ones were discarded and new ones built.

The Colt .45-caliber National Match and Gold Cup Models of the M1911A1 and the National Match M1 Garand replaced the .30-caliber Springfield and Colt .38 revolver of the 1930s. This did not mean abandonment of the .38 revolver; on the contrary, Headquarters purchased more and newer .38 and .22 target revolvers.

As the competitive shooters were supplied with new arms, war arms replaced the total Coast Guard inventory. Thousands of surplus arms enabled the Coast Guard to standardize its small-arms inventory for the first time in its history. These surplus arms permitted weapons allowances and training never possible before.

Small-arms trainers of all services spent the remainder of the 1940s discussing the problems encountered in small-arms training. The army developed and introduced courses in 1949 that modified the old.⁵⁸ Army marksmanship courses dictated the requirements for awards and trophies in local and regional matches. The navy followed later, as did the Marine Corps and the Coast Guard.

Repeating the past, criticism of the lock-step approach to training appeared. Debates within the Coast Guard over course composition continued for more than three decades. By following the lead of the navy, army, and Marine Corps, the Coast Guard was less able to adjust to new methods and ideas.

The practical training conducted so readily at Treasury firing ranges was impractical for the Coast Guard's law enforcement role. The logic of practical shooting ended with the war.

The failure to act in the 1940s haunted future small-arms training managers. Fervor for the old military and law enforcement roles of the previous four decades was lost. The philosophical trend, never really gone, leaned toward the lifesaving mission. Decreased emphasis on law enforcement and military duties damaged two of the Coast Guard's primary missions. The

resulting imbalance caused the service to no longer be “eternally on a war footing.”

Notes

1. Arthur M. Schlesinger, “The First Hundred Days of the New Deal,” in Isabel Leighton, ed., *The Aspirin Age, 1919-1941* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1949):277.
2. The rush for manpower to deal with Prohibition caused many men to be enlisted who could neither read nor write. The lack of education did not mean automatic discharge, and many remained in the Coast Guard until retirement. The Coast Guard used the reductions caused by the Depression to “clean house,” including reducing some officers to enlisted status to force them out of the service.
3. “Personnel News,” *Coast Guard Magazine*, September 1932, 58.
4. NA, RG 26 Entry 283 File 461. Letter to State Department, Noel H. Field, October 29, 1932, listing armaments and tonnages to Coast Guard vessels.
5. *Report of Gunnery Exercises, 1931-32*, U.S. Coast Guard (Washington: GPO, March 9, 1933).
6. *Report of Gunnery Exercises, 1932-33*, 25. The rifle teams continued to fire at Wakefield, Ma., Quantico, Va., and Fort Sheridan, Ill., in the summer 1932.
7. *Ibid.*, 21.
8. *Ibid.*
9. The design of the new medals, which was similar to the old, came from Mr. Oscar H. Kee of the communications section in Coast Guard Headquarters. *Coast Guard Magazine* (September, 1932):58.
10. Unit awards had been awarded since 1929, but a different method of determining the merit points was introduced in 1932.
11. Inspectors noted the state of training in the use of arms matched maintenance.
12. Mail robberies were common especially from trains.
13. Surfman Loyer transferred to the Coast Guard and became a gunner’s mate on the cutter *Bibb* before the start of World War II. After the war he served as instructor at the Treasury range in Washington.
14. Letter from Stanley L. Loyer, CGM, USCG (Ret), June 19, 1984.
15. *Ibid.* Loyer was stationed in Michigan from his enlistment in 1934 to his transfer to the Coast Guard in 1938.
16. *U.S. Navy, Landing Party Manual, 1960*, OPNAV P 34-03, Washington, November 25, 1960, 635.
17. *Ibid.* From memory, Loyer provided the course, but was unable to remember some details 50 years after the fact.
18. NA, RG 26 Entry 283. Letter to CG Depot, Baltimore, L. C. Covell, January 11, 1934. This class vessel also carried the Lewis machine gun and .22-caliber (M2) rifle.

19. Willard Smith was not the only notable figure who gave Coast Guard shooting credibility and notoriety. BM1(L) Melvon O. Wilson; BM1 Earl C. "Porky" Jones; CBM James Q. Alligood; BM1 Marcus N. Cobb; CBM Paul Goulden; QM1 Dwight A. Brown; CGM W. H. Kopp; Surfman Raymond H. Whittaker; and Sea1c J. H. Williams were all expert marksmen and well-known competitors.

20. *Coast Guard Magazine*, 8 (March, 1935).

21. NA, RG 26 Entry 283 File 463. "Memorandum to Ordnance Officer, Headquarters," Lt. L. C. Morine, January 4, 1935. Special shooting supplies were also purchased from P. J. O'Hare in Maplewood, N.J.

22. NA, RG 36 Entry 283 File 463. Letter from Captain J. S. Crawford, U.S. Army, January 31, 1935. The revolvers were issued from the Springfield Armory.

23. NA, RG 26 Entry 283 File 463. Letter from John W. Hession, Winchester Arms Company, June 17, 1935. The rifle weighed 12.5 pounds and cost \$111.00 each, without telescopic sight. Problems with the metal hardness of the rifle forced a return to the Springfield rifle.

24. Interview with Mrs. Eudora Wilson, March 1988. Mrs. Wilson noted that her husband, M. O. Wilson, had to sell some of his silver shooting awards to pay doctor's bills in this period.

25. *Coast Guard Magazine*, 8 (September, 1935), 24.

26. "An Act to Amend the National Defense Act," April 11, 1936, [S. 3860], Public, No. 512.

27. *Report of the Secretary of the Treasury Review since 1933*, 256.

28. *Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury on the State of the Finances of the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1936* (Washington: GPO, 1937):116.

29. U.S. Coast Guard, *Report of Gunnery Exercises and Small Arms Target Practice, 1935-36 and 1936-37* (Washington: GPO, 1938):31.

30. NA, RG 26 Entry 283 File 464. "Memorandum to Chief of Personnel," J. E. Stika, December 14, 1936. Optical repair men were included in the training and spent 48 weeks in training. Many of the men selected for the optical school were machinist's mates.

31. Beginning in the 1960s, technical ordnance training fell solely to enlisted men. Few officers received gunnery training and had less knowledge in gunnery matters than their nineteenth-century counterpart.

32. Coast Guard Ordnance Estimates, 1938 Appropriation, J.E. Stika, January 21, 1937.

33. *Ibid.*, 3.

34. *Ibid.*, 2. This was a variant on the "You have to go out, but do not have to come back" theme.

35. Long-time competitive shooter and rifle team commanding officer Lieutenant D. H. Decker commanded the ordnance shop and armorer's courses. He was assisted by Gunner Wilfred Mitchell, a long-term team member, and by Gunner L. T. Toner.

36. S. L. Loyer letter of June 19, 1984, 5.

37. This building housed Coast Guard Group Baltimore in the 1980s.

38. *Ibid.*, 3.

39. NA, RG 26 Entry 283 File 463. Letter to Coast Guard Inspector, Hall-Aluminum Aircraft, Co., December 14, 1938. L. T. Chalker. The aircraft was later authorized two .30-caliber machine guns and 1,200 rounds of ammunition. It also had the capability to carry one 1,000, one 500 and two 100-pound bombs.

40. This incident was recounted by S. L. Loyer, CGM, USCG (Ret.) who was a GM3c on the *Bibb* in 1938.

41. *Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury on the State of the Finances for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1939* (Washington: GPO, 1940):108-09.

42. NA, RG 26 Entry 283 File 463. Letter from Commandant to All Units, March 4, 1941.

43. R. R. Waesche, "World Affairs and The Coast Guard," *Coast Guard Magazine*, 14 (January 1941):5.

44. *Ibid.*

45. *Ibid.*

46. Letter from Stanley L. Loyer, June 19, 1984, 8.

47. NA, RG 26 Entry 283 File 463. Commandant letter of Senior Coast Guard Officers, March 4, 1942.

48. Russell R. Waesche, "Some Defense Duties of the Coast Guard," *Coast Guard Magazine*, 15 (February 1942):16.

49. "Plant Guard Enrollment in Coast Guard Police Is Substantially Complete," *Coast Guard Bulletin*, 2 (February 1943):101. The enrollment included over 20,000 civilian guards in 500 Navy shipyards, ordnance, and other plants nationwide. The guards were made either Chief Boatswains, Boatswains, or Chief Boatswain's mates in the Coast Guard temporary reserves. Only key men in the guard force were given commissions in the regular Coast Guard Reserve and received the same pay and allowances.

50. John G. Hanna, "The Use of Small Arms," Lecture II, United States Coast Guard Volunteer Training Institute, 1945.

51. "Volunteer Port Security Force to be Augmented by Women Enrollees," *Coast Guard Bulletin*, 2 (April, 1943):122. Mrs. William J. Clothier, Valley Forge, Pa., was selected to head the women's unit and commissioned a lieutenant. Like their male counterparts, they received no pay. The temporaries uniform differed from those of the SPARS. Mrs. Clothier was chosen because she supervised the over 150,000 member Pennsylvania Council of Defense during World War I.

52. John F. Gummere, *The History of the Philadelphia Volunteer Port Security Force* (Philadelphia: International Printing Co., 1946):52.

53. Stephen Stavers, "Hip Level Quick Firing," *The Marine Corps Gazette*, 27 (July 1943):25.

54. Interview with Henry W. Wilson, SFC, U.S. Army (Ret.) October 1, 1988. Mr. Wilson spent the years 1941-44 as a Coast Guard electrician's mate. He enlisted and was sent directly without any training to his station at Georgetown, S.C., from where he and others began installing telephone lines and switchboards for the beach patrols. Mr. Wilson said he never received any weapons training nor training on how to wear the uniform. Mr. Wilson had been working for Southern Bell when the war started.

55. The Coast Guard was not the only service to shorten training. The U.S. Army devoted only 82 hours for basic infantry weapons training whereas in the 1980s allowed over 360 hours.

56. Thomas L. McNaugher, "Marksmanship, McNamara and the M16 Rifle: Organizations, Analysis and Weapons Acquisition," The RAND Paper Series, 1969, 16.

57. "Nearly 195,000 Demobilized By The Coast Guard Up To May 15," *Coast Guard Bulletin*, 3 (May-June, 1946):211. The Coast Guard released on a daily average about 520. On April 24 the highest daily discharge of 711 occurred. By May 1946, 933 were totally mobilized among whom 7,281 were officers.

58. Louis R. Moore, "The New Rifle Marksmanship Course," *Infantry School Quarterly*, 35 (October 1949):7.

Life Lines, Not Firing Lines

During and immediately after World War II, the Coast Guard assumed additional responsibilities. The Bureau of Marine Inspection and Navigation merged with the Coast Guard, and in 1946 President Harry S. Truman made the Coast Guard responsible for coordinating with the search and rescue efforts of the International Civil Aviation Organization. Neither new mission had anything to do with military readiness, but both helped reshape the Coast Guard's postwar attitudes.

Following the war, Headquarters placed greater emphasis on the Coast Guard's regulatory and emergency service aspects, but the tensions of the Cold War prevented the service from an expected postwar disarmament. Cutters continued to carry their wartime armament, but had only their reduced peacetime crew complements to maintain and fire them. More weapons systems were added to the cutters after the war, which further complicated maintenance and crewing problems. The "additions without compensating increases in personnel" resulted in maintenance and operation problems to both vessel and aviation units.¹ Some of these problems were solved by adding more people, providing refresher training, and coordinating antisubmarine warfare training for aviation units with the navy.

Within Coast Guard Headquarters the ordnance section changed its name, the first of many such changes, to the Office of Ordnance, Gunnery, and Readiness (OGR). The office was responsible for all equipment, training, and military readiness that fell into the nuclear, chemical, biological, and conventional warfare areas, including allowance lists and publication reviews. The workload on OGR's reduced staff was tremendous and the staff could not keep pace.

Without emphasis on military or law enforcement missions, OGR left the small-arms program to manage on its own. In spite of lessons learned during the war, the Coast Guard continued to follow the *1938 Ordnance Instructions* and utilized previous navy sources for all small-arms weapons and training. Contingency plans to arm the inshore patrol boats in time of war were the greatest concern.

Dealing with larger problems, OGR had no time to deal with the issue of small arms and small-arms training. However, it realized that the old Coast Guard ordnance instructions needed revision. However outdated, no one in Headquarters had the time or expertise to revise the instructions. An acceptable solution was found when the gunnery personnel at the Coast Guard Academy volunteered to undertake the work.² This use of volunteers to perform Headquarters-related ordnance functions illustrates the decline of ordnance in Headquarters's priorities.

The revisions went slowly but Headquarters became better organized. The redesignated *Ordnance Instructions (CG-272)* manual was promulgated in December. Headquarters wanted the new instructions issued sooner to start the new training year. In the interim, it issued an advance circular covering small arms and training to provide some guidance. This circular superseded and canceled all previous instructions pertaining to small arms including Part J (small-arms training section) of the 1938 instructions.³ The circular and new instructions relegated the ordnance ideas of Woesche's Coast Guard into history.

The small-arms section was released early in expectation of the national matches resuming in the summer. Although general service small-arms training could have waited another year, a group of influential men from past teams promoted the return of competitive shooting in the Coast Guard.⁴ Unfortunately for Coast Guard trophy cases, the list of qualified competitors was far smaller than before the war. Many shooters had lost the zeal for competitive marksmanship.⁵

In preparation for the resumption of competitive rounds, Headquarters realigned regulations by combining general service small-arms allowances, training requirements, and ammunition allowances—both training and service—into a single chapter. The instructions also included a new section for the “protection against loss” of small arms.

Weapons security concerns became an official part of the manual, removing security standards from the discretion of individual commanding officers. The manual firmly integrated Coast Guard ordnance with that of the navy. It was no coincidence that the small-arms chapter had the same number, Chapter 13, as the small-arms section in the navy's 1950 Landing Party Manual. The navy's manual and its successor became the guide for all firing courses, including the competitive course, for the next 25 years.

The Coast Guard's new manual authorized weapons allowances that were still generous in number but smaller than prewar and wartime highs. For example, in 1938 cutters manned by about 74 men carried 60 rifles.⁶ Under the new instructions allowances were computed for ship or station type rather than complement (crew) size. In 1953, the allowances for cutters of the WAG, WAGB, WPG, and WAVP classes were 40 M1 rifles, five .30-caliber carbines, seventeen .45 pistols, two .45 Thompson submachine guns, and two .30-caliber machine guns.

These allowances concerned martial arms, but recreational firearms were also issued by the Coast Guard. The navy continued to supply major ordnance items. To clarify the definition of small arms, the new manual cited the navy's definition: “Small arms are defined as those weapons of 0.60-inch caliber and smaller, including all shotguns, which are normally carried by foot soldiers.”⁷

A reference to “normally carried by foot soldiers” was later deleted because the .50 caliber machine gun was still carried by soldiers in the field. Some cutters carried .50-caliber machine guns, although below the .60-caliber requirement, all were, and remain, navy owned, and were not placed on small-arms allowances lists.⁸

The allowances for unit small arms remained fairly constant for the next decade. However, the infantry training in the use of those arms for cutter and station crews almost disappeared. Most of the landing party equipment disappeared as well. Allowances were reduced to normal ancillary equipment for the weapons; ammunition belts, holsters, bayonets, and helmets were the most common items. Anticipating some form of national emergency, district Headquarters stored the infantry-style items. Following 1956, reductions in allowances stabilized.⁹

The largest changes came in ammunition allowances. Weapons were widely distributed but ammunition was not. Millions of rounds remained from war stocks, but time and inadequate storage facilities caused much of it to deteriorate and become unserviceable. Ammunition was no longer issued in the tens of thousands of rounds.

The Coast Guard now required the maintenance of a minimum amount of ammunition at all times for each weapon. The amounts allowed for rifles and carbines was 300; for pistols, 100; submachine guns, 600; Browning machine guns, 9,000 (included a 2:1 ball/tracer ratio); and for 12-gauge riot shotguns, 25.¹⁰ These service allowances, once established, remained constant—some into the 1980s. Training allowances were, however, the unpredictable portion of ammunition expenditures. A sudden surge of interest in small-arms training could decimate an annual budget.

Small-arms training for 1953 depleted amounts allowed from previous years, but the 1953 circular requested each district commander to submit a plan, not unlike Waesche's, for expected expenditures. The report aimed to provide "complete information...avoid overstocking and uneconomical purchase of small-arms ammunition."¹¹ Headquarters required two tables to be submitted based on the following parameters:

Course	Caliber of Ammunition	Rounds fired/man
A	.30 rifle	72
B	.30 rifle	136
C	.30 carbine	210
D	.45	60
E	.45	80
F	.38	80
G	.45	105

The first table provided Headquarters with each district's needs, and the second reported present inventory amounts. The reports were designed to prevent units from stockpiling ammunition. The method caused some

mathematical problems for the districts. The circular and others through the decade mandated the following maximum allowances:

Rifle	Caliber .30, ball	300 rounds
Carbine	Caliber .30, ball	250 rounds
Pistol	Caliber .45, ball	200 rounds
Revolver	Caliber .38, ball	200 rounds
Machine Gun	Caliber .30, ball/tracer	320 rounds
Submachine Gun	Caliber .45, ball	150 rounds ¹²

The rifle “A” course usually required 50 rounds to complete, leaving 22 rounds with which to sight [or zero] the rifle. The rifle “B” course required 42 rounds and the first table allowed enough to shoot the course three times. However, the differences in numbers between the per-man allowance to be reported and the alternate amounts had more to do with logistics than reason.

Ammunition could only be procured in standard packs of ammunition, and whole numbers made accountability easier. The standard-pack syndrome of World War II carried into the 1950s and beyond.

To compound the computational problems, individuals competing in unit or district competitions were allowed an additional 300 rounds for the rifle and 200 for pistol. Additional amounts of .22-caliber ammunition were authorized at the rate of 150 rounds times the *total* district complement of personnel. Districts purchased and issued hundreds of thousands of rounds of .22 ammunition during the 1960s.¹³

Establishing weapons and ammunition allowances was an effortless managerial function. There was no more debate over the allowances than choosing would-be training courses. Headquarters, without hesitation, copied the courses laid out by the navy. However, choosing those who were to receive training and calculating their numbers was a different matter.

In the 1930s and 1940s Headquarters encouraged generally everyone, except Public Health Service doctors and hospital corpsmen, to practice with small arms. However, during the 1950s the missions of the Coast Guard did not need such a commitment to training. Since November 1949 the Coast Guard had been, by law, a *branch of the Armed Forces of the United States at all times*. This did not automatically change the service, however. The enactment of Title 14 of the United States Codes allowed the Coast Guard to write in the authority to carry out the missions it had traditionally performed. The law gave the Coast Guard the primary responsibility of maritime law enforcement and authority to “engage in life-saving activities in the broadest possible terms.”¹⁴

The Korean War caused the service to consider small arms in passing, but Coast Guard participation in the war was negligible. The Coast Guard was not integrated into the navy, but did increase port security patrols. Therefore the emphasis in small-arms training turned toward port security and its law enforcement function, but only marginally. The predominant mission of the service became the lifesaving role.

The purpose of small-arms training for whatever reason, according to the 1953 circular, varied little from the past. Small-arms training was “prescribed for the service in order that all personnel who handle arms in the conduct of their duties or who may be required to do so in war or other emergency will use them safely and effectively.” Safety and effectiveness were two attributes of good riflemen, but could not replace the ideal of the competent marksman.

Although the purposes and subjects of training were defined, the questions of who and how many were to be trained had not been addressed. Not everyone needed training. Therefore, Headquarters devised a formula that authorized a percentage of men at various units to participate in small-arms training. The formula was straightforward with no conflicting numbers.

Course	Port Security Units	Other Operating Units
A (Rifle Marksman)	50%	25%
B (Rifle Expert)	All qualifying on Course A	
C (Carbine)	20%	10% if unit so armed
D (Pistol Marksman)	50%	25%
E (Pistol Expert)	All qualifying on Course D	
F (Revolver)		All personnel issued revolver
G (Machine Guns)		5% if unit so armed ¹⁵

Training for port security was twice that of the other operating units. Most units trained only enough men for limited internal security and law enforcement work. Within different levels of training, Headquarters encouraged all units, except logistic and administrative, to practice within the percentages of the quota system. Thus active service training and interest ebbed. Nevertheless, the next year the Coast Guard Reserve included itself in annual small-arms training. Funding itself, the Reserve maintained a program almost entirely separate from the active service.

In 1956, instructions further altered the levels of training to not only differentiate between operating and other units but between groups of men. The change in policy resulted from field complaints that small-arms training caused a “significant drain of personnel from field units during the small-

boating season.”¹⁶ Men away from their boats on the firing range hampered the enforcement of the Motorboat Act of 1940. Headquarters announced, “It is now necessary for the Coast Guard to curtail its small-arms training for field personnel somewhat drastically.”

The lack of cash awards for qualification lessened the appeal of small-arms training, but a general negative attitude had greater effect. In the next sentence, Headquarters proposed to study the possibility of increasing small-arms training for recruits as a means of supplying qualified marksmen. However, Headquarters enacted neither the study or the plan.

It appeared that the purpose of small-arms training had been forgotten. Instead of decisively halting the 1956 program, it continued piecemeal. Those districts that had already made plans to complete them, continued unit training and competed in local matches. A *personnel to fire* paragraph in Circular 15-56 outlined the type of units that district commanders could select for training and the specific types of personnel to be trained. The paragraph was so general that essentially any units could train based on this listing and the courses that encouraged competitive-style shooters. The following paragraphs attempted to clarify the first:

a. Course	COTP and PSU	Other Operating Units
A Rifle Marksman	X	X
B Rifle Expert	X	X
C Carbine	X	
D Pistol Marksman	X	X
E Rifle Expert		X
F Revolver		X
G Submachine Gun		X
H or J Machine Gun	X	X

b. Officers below rank of commander and under forty years of age (including boatswains, gunners, chief boatswains, and chief gunners) who have not previously fired courses A and D: *fire courses A and D.*

c. Security watchstanders, guards, port security boarding forces, intelligence forces, members of landing party, gunner’s mates and other persons required to instruct in small arms: *fire weapon with which armed or in which required to instruct, unless such courses were fired the previous year.*

d. Personnel working towards a distinguished medal: *fire for practice and earn additional “legs” as practicable.*

e. Personnel who qualify on courses A and D: *fire courses B and E, respectively.*

f. Crews of armed port security boats: *fire course H or J as practical, otherwise fire as realistic substitute as conditions permit.*¹⁷

During the next 20 years the targeting of specific groups for training became a battleground scattered with the remains of plans and counter plans. Many units continued to practice as much as they wanted. The *emergency service* syndrome became more prevalent as rescues such as those performed by the ocean station vessels *Coos Bay*, *Pontchartrain*, and *Chincoteage* in 1955 and 1956 received publicity. Life lines, rather than firing lines, became more popular within the Coast Guard.

The mandated training courses contained in the *U.S. Navy Landing Party Manual, 1950* disclosed few differences between the marksman and expert courses used in the early 1900s. It was still necessary to have a good understanding of marksmanship fundamentals to qualify prior to attempting any *expert* course. Competition continued as the underlying concept of all training procedures and philosophy.

In 1953, Army Chief of Staff General J. Lawton Collins, expressing a view similar to the Coast Guard's purpose of marksmanship training, stated, "The primary job of the rifleman is not to gain fire superiority over the enemy but to kill with accurately aimed rifle fire."¹⁸ Collins changed the U.S. Army's 1909 definition of *fire superiority*. In 1909, accuracy or number of hits made was fire superiority. The most hits with the fewest possible shots was the aim—an economical viewpoint much like the Coast Guard's. Massive firepower replaced accurate fire during World War II, just as it did during the First World War, and would replace it again in Southeast Asia.

However, no amount of weapons theory and training philosophy could save the Coast Guard general service small-arms training program. Competition only maintained a relative position of prestige because a few men were still anxious to achieve or complete the required matches for the Distinguished Marksman Badge. With this prestige in mind, the competitive matches continued, but on a limited scale.

The competitive spirit of the 1930s had been dispersed by time and circumstance and never completely regained momentum. Skilled men for the 1953 national matches remained, but the results compared to the 1929 team. After a 12-year absence, the team placed third in rifle and eighth in pistol, a respectable showing which fueled enthusiasm for next year's team.

In 1953, Headquarters encouraged all commanding officers "to conduct rifle and pistol competition to the fullest extent..."¹⁹ However, with limited budgets, prize money for winning teams was paid only once a year. By 1930s standards some prizes were considered handsome, but by 1953 they appeared trivial. The highest amount a man could win was \$25. The amount for annual expert rifle qualification in the 1930s was \$60, \$36 for sharpshooter, and the Coast Guardsman never had to fire one competitive round.

The lack of awards did not prevent Headquarters from soliciting district commanders for recommendations for the 1954 Coast Guard teams.²⁰ Each district supplied the names of five men before 20 May 1954. Leading the list of requirements for selection to a team were personal interest and qualifications with certain or all weapons. These same qualities would be the

consistent factors throughout the 1950s. However, the manner of selection changed in 1957.

Headquarters established a quota system for each district because some districts thought the previous system was not fair. Some districts had larger populations than others. Therefore, Headquarters developed the representative, or ratio, system to bring parity, but more importantly to bring harmony. Under the quota system each district was to submit names for at least the number allowed.

1st District	9
2nd District	2
3rd District	8
5th District	6
7th District	5
8th District	4
9th District	5
11th District	3
12th District	4
13th District	5
14th District	4
17th District	3
AR & SB, Elizabeth City	1
Training Station Groton & Institute	1
Receiving Center, Cape May Academy	3 (Three officers from the graduating class)

Out of practicality, Headquarters advised that it could not supply a replacement for any man participating. This undoubtedly affected commanding officers' decisions. The solicitation for names and the reaction by various districts showed some spark, but only of recognition for a sport or a particular Coast Guard district. Competition stemming from an efficient service-wide training program was forgotten.

The training routine remained the same for all the years except 1954. On August 10, the pistol team bypassed Cape May and went directly to Camp Perry. As in previous years the rifle team assembled near the end of May or early June at Cape May. All participants practiced until elimination firing chose the team. Once picked, the rifle team joined the pistol team in August. The entire team consisted of 42 officers and men including logistics and administrative personnel.

The competition at Camp Perry grew stiffer with each year. Teams long out of the national trophy matches worked hard all year building individual skills and teams to win. The Coast Guard's team was together for only brief periods. Despite their lack of practice, from 1955 to 1959 they fired respectable scores in team and individual events. The rifle team placed first, eighth, ninth, and eighth again, against competing teams that grew in number from 53 in 1955 to 133 in 1959. Their performance in pistol matches was also satisfactory for

their experience. They placed twelfth, eleventh, nineteenth, ninth, and fifteenth. The teams neither won nor lost—they participated.

The Coast Guard's participation in the matches became a tradition, and perhaps Admiral Waesche's idea about educating the nation about the Coast Guard was worth fielding the team. With only nine Coast Guard-owned firing ranges, the old problem of finding available firing ranges remained. The nine ranges were located at Cape May, New Jersey; Fort Macon, North Carolina; Egmont Key, Florida; Erie, Pennsylvania; Grand Haven, Michigan; Alameda, California; Fort Stevens, Oregon; Port Angeles, Washington; and Ketchikan, Territory of Alaska.

Another tradition continued from the 1930s was the team uniform. The 1954 team members furnished their own uniforms consisting of one pair of high-top shoes (black or brown), two sweatshirts, two pairs of khaki work trousers, two khaki shirts, and one black tie. After 1955 the Coast Guard furnished the uniforms, except to officers and chiefs. In 1956, the service deleted the khaki uniform and with it some of the team's image, but in 1957 it reinstated the uniform, including the khaki tropical helmet.²¹ The vacillation on uniform policy mirrored the service's uncertain attitude toward all marksmanship training.

The reentry and marginal success of the Coast Guard in competitive shooting prompted the 1958 establishment of two trophies for intra-Coast Guard competition: the Rear Admiral Frederick C. Billard Pistol Trophy and the Admiral Russell R. Waesche Rifle Trophy. These awards, along with the Small Arms Cutter Trophy, were internal achievement awards.

To spread competition, Headquarters authorized postal matches to allow teams to compete that could not physically shoot together. Moreover the use of postal matches in 1959 was intended to "promote interest in small-arms target practice and to encourage personnel to qualify as experts with the service rifle and pistol." However, with the reduced amount of training, the actual goal became the receipt of points toward marksmanship badges.²²

Group Gray's Harbor (Westport, Washington) won the Waesche Rifle Team Trophy with an overall score of 1,834.²³ This was the second year Group Grays Harbor won the trophy, and John C. Webb was the high scorer for rifle in 1959.²⁴ The Billard Pistol Trophy went to another west coast team. The 12th Coast Guard District Office won with a total 1,360 score.²⁵ The high pistol score for the competitive year, 366, was fired by EN1 Secondine Harrison of Base Sand Island.

These were postal matches, and few units conducted head-to-head firing, which would have made a difference. All the top-placing teams and individual shooters were from shore units. The availability of practice time was a result of individual initiative rather than from command sponsorship. As the years continued, the maintenance and scoring of targets by the district readiness offices became another administrative burden.

The year before establishing the Coast Guard trophies, the U.S. Navy invited the Coast Guard to send men to the navy rifle and pistol competitions. These matches sponsored the best shooters of the navy and Marine Corps and

provided warm-up competition for the national matches. The next year the Coast Guard established and presented the United States Coast Guard Memorial Trophy to the National Board for the Promotion of Rifle Practice. This trophy went to the highest scoring reserve team, regardless of service branch, in the national trophy pistol team match.

The decade of the 1950s drew to a close with no remarkable changes to training for the general service. The Coast Guard still maintained a competitive side to training, but without the dedication or support to make it a strong effort.

Once again it reemerged that good competition brought about effective general service training, but the service still did not make its most experienced shooters available for general training. The annual gathering at Camp Perry presented effective publicity for the Coast Guard, but the ability to transform the shooting knowledge and experience of a few individuals into improved techniques for overall training failed.

With no real incentive to improve or update, training courses did not change. Even the lessons learned in Korea, dubbed a *rifleman's war*, went unheeded by the Coast Guard. During the 1950s, practical marksmanship became a standard training tool for most law enforcement agencies. The FBI's practical pistol course was widely copied, but in general the Coast Guard forgot practical small-arms training.²⁶

The 1950s saw the priority of Coast Guard small-arms and general ordnance training fall behind boating safety and lifesaving missions. It was a decade unlike any in the service's history: no single issue gave focus and purpose. During this era, the Coast Guard switched mission priorities. The shift to causes, such as lifesaving and boating safety, caused the service to question its military history and future, in particular, small-arms training. Small-arms marksmanship was seen by many to be a personal pursuit or important only as a sport. Too few argued that small-arms proficiency is one of the most fundamental requirements of a military service.

Notes

1. Unsigned statement of problems, U.S. Coast Guard, OGR, June 15, 1950.
2. *Ibid.*, OGR, December 20, 1951.
3. U.S. Coast Guard Operations Circular No. 1-53, "Small Arms Training, 1953," OGR, January 6, 1953.
4. The leaders promoting competition included: Captain Leon H. Morine, 1931, 1932 rifle team member and captain in 1936; Captain Dwight H. Dexter, team member and captain; Captain Stanley C. Linholm, 1928 team member; Commander Willard J. Smith, team member 1936; Commander Christian R. Couser, 1938 team member; Commander Walter S. Bakutis, member 1938 team; Lieutenant Manson E. Meekins, a surfman on the 1938 team; Lieutenant Donald A. Brown, a QM1c on the 1938 team. Others included veteran shooters CHBOSN Earl C. Jones, GMC Paul F. Johnson and EM1(Tel) Raymond H. Whittaker.

5. There were local competitions in the Washington, D.C. area between the Coast Guard and Treasury Department teams during 1950. In January, 1950, Lt.(j.g.) S. H. Hatch, Commander C. R. Courser, GM1 John Jewett, GM1 J. E. Pinnix and GM1 S. L. Loyer took five gold medals in the nation-wide treasury pistol match. In the following August the Coast Guard Headquarter's Pistol Team, lead by Lt(j.g.) Hatch, won the "A" League championship title for the 1949-50 Washington (D.C.) Gallery Pistol League. The team won 18 of the 23 league matches. The only national competition came at the National Trophy Matches at Fort Sheridan, Illinois, in the fall of 1949. The team lead by LCDR Lucius E. Wadman placed 17th with an overall score of 937, well behind the winning Marine Corps score of 1,085. The Coast Guardsmen placed in the lower half of the 248 participants.

6. *U.S. Coast Guard Ordnance Instructions, 1938, 41.*

7. *U.S. Coast Guard Ordnance Instructions, CG-272, 1953, 13-3.*

8. The allowance list for publications did not specifically mention the .50-caliber machine gun but listed the Army field manual covering machine guns in general. Ironically, the same list allowed manual for the 3.5-inch rocket launcher, M20, (commonly known as the "Bazooka"), an item not in the Coast Guard inventory.

9. U.S. Coast Guard, Comptroller Instruction No. 32-56, F-3, September 17, 1956.

10. *U.S. Coast Guard Ordnance Instruction, CG-272, 1953, CG ORD LIST NO. 5, August 1953.*

11. U.S.C.G. Operations Circular No. 1-53 Enclosure (2), 6.

12. *Ibid.*, para. 4 (b), 2.

13. The greatest demands for .22 ammunition came usually in the fall of the year. This was the season of the greatest number of long-tailed moving objects that were considered desirable targets for training. Additionally, a box of 500 rounds became known as the ".22 Brick" and was considered, outside a tin of coffee, the best work order in any shipyard in the country.

14. "Coast Guard To Operate Under 'Coherent' Law First Time in History," *U.S. Coast Guard Bulletin*, 5 (September, 1949):177-178.

15. U.S. Coast Guard, Operations Circular No. 2-54, "Small Arms Training, 1954." OGR, February 2, 1954.

16. U.S.C.G., Operations Circular No. 15-56, "Annual Small Arms Training Program," OGR, April 10, 1956, 1.

17. *Ibid.*, 2-3.

18. John T. Corley, "New Courses for Old Traditions," *Combat Forces Journal*, 3 (June 1953):15.

19. OC No. 1-53, Enclosure (2), 15.

20. U.S.C.G. Operations Circular No. 3-54, "National Rifle and Pistol Matches, 1954, Coast Guard Participation In," OGR, March 11, 1954.

21. U.S.C.G. Operations Instruction No. 21-56, National Rifle and Pistol Matches, 1956, OGR, May 3, 1956.

22. U.S.C.G. Operations Instruction No. 9-60., "Results of 1959 Commandant's Competitions," OGR, February 26, 1960. The instruction was signed by Leon H. Morine. The postal matches were open to all Coast Guard personnel on active duty for over 90 days.

23. The team members and their scores were: CHBOSN R. W. Dowell (Captain and Coach) - 303; John C. Webb BM1 - 323; Jerry D. Fisch EMT [telephone] 319; Bruce D. Davis BM1 - 317; William C. Quigley BM1 - 314; Thomas M. Creighton YN2 - 258.

24. Ibid., 2.

25. The team members and their scores were: CHELEC Peter S. Fredriksen Jr. (Captain and Coach) - 324; James H. Holiday EN1 - 363; Larry J. Nelson YN2 - 323; Alan R. Barber SK3 - 350.

26. Walter R. Walsh, "Practical Pistol Shooting," *American Rifleman*, 115 (May 1952):25-27. Walsh was a longtime friend of the Coast Guard. He competed against, and with, GM1c Melvon O. Wilson in 1938.

M16s and the Alphabet Soup Era

Lack of interest in most weapons training demonstrated the declining role of military readiness during the decade of the 1950s. As a sport, small-arms competition affected only a small handful—fewer men than had participated in the 1929 rifle team tryouts. However, small-arms training was not totally forgotten. In 1960, Captain Leon H. Morine continued to promote small-arms competition and general service small-arms training.¹

In February 1960, Admiral Alfred C. Richmond, Coast Guard Commandant, released a new instruction canceling the 1956 small-arms training directions. The 1960 instruction freed the Coast Guard from rules that severely limited small-arms training.² The instruction opened with a salvo against former opinions on small-arms training. “Proficiency with small arms is a professional requirement of all military men.” Admiral Richmond directed his remark at the officer corps, particularly those embracing the less than military perspective toward the Coast Guard.

The background of this statement dated to the early 1900s when many RCS officers shifted from the military and law enforcement attitude to the more publicly accepted search and rescue role. However, by 1960, unlike the beginning of the century, the use of small arms in daily functions all but disappeared.

Richmond noted that “small arms are furnished to Coast Guard units with the intention they be used.”³ This simple statement was made in reaction to the drastic reductions in training between 1956-1959, where most weapons languished in arms’ rooms and lockers. No particular purpose was specified by Richmond.

Richmond said, “Whether this use is official armed guard duty, recreational, or for target shooting, men equipped with small weapons [arms] must be qualified.” Headquarters dropped this last line from the next year’s instruction and added a caveat to the opening proficiency remark: “particularly those whose specific duty requires them to carry arms.”⁴

In 1960, recognizing the traditional problems of the busy summer season, Richmond advised his district commanders “to take advantage of the favorable weather conditions which generally prevail at this time.” For those not finding the time or good weather to hold small-arms training, Headquarters authorized additional qualification courses.

In addition to the Commandant’s encouraging words, the June 1960 instruction revisited the subject of .22-caliber training courses for 50-foot indoor ranges.⁵ The instruction advised that such ranges were to be found “in nearly every community throughout the country,” but echoed the 1930s by pointedly stating that this range should be used *only* “when others are not

readily available.” The Commandant expected the units to train throughout the year to minimize interference during peak operational times.

As in the past, scores fired with .22-caliber weapons were for qualification only and not acceptable toward marksmanship awards. Even with no award incentives, the popularity of the .22 courses grew because they were faster and cleaner to arrange and conduct and remained as much fun as they were 30 years before.

An element of the June instruction recommended but did not mandate the maximum use of all qualified instructors. The notation “Persons who have served with the Coast Guard rifle and pistol team are particularly well qualified and generally certified,” was the first official mention of the use of competitive shooters as instructors. In previous years their use was assumed; they willingly assisted when and where needed. The phrase *generally certified* meant certified through the National Rifle Association.

The Coast Guard’s association with the National Rifle Association dated to 1927. Headquarters allowed this certification for Coast Guard instructors for two more decades.⁶ The use of qualified instructors had gone full circle from 1915, when the first U.S. Marine Corps-trained instructors taught small-arms use through competition. To substantiate the place of the competitive shooter, Headquarters allowed an additional 2,000 rounds of rifle and 1,000 rounds for pistol to any team practicing for the annual commandant’s competition. The amount was a token of the amount needed by any serious team.

The active service, using these amounts, made plans for the upcoming national matches. During April 1960, following the Commandant’s expression of interest in small-arms training, the reserve division solicited candidates for all-reserve staffed teams for the national matches.⁷ The reserve division planned for seven- to ten-man teams to build reserve teams “capable of competing on an equal footing with other armed services in national matches.”⁸ The reserves often sought the Coast Guard Memorial Trophy.

The designated reserve uniform for the matches was now standard dungarees for enlisted personnel and work khakis for officers and chiefs.⁹ The old special uniform went the way of the cutlass. The reserves, just as in general training, paid their own way for the competition and did not depend on the active service budget.

The active-service Coast Guard continued to call competition a powerful training stimulus, and expected it to be an integral part of annual small-arms training. But instructions to the field remained vague. The 1956 instruction created levels of training that satisfied no one. To correct the instructions, Headquarters attempted to redefine and clarify the requirements.

Headquarters developed a percentage principle for field units. It determined the number of people who would receive training on any particular course of fire. Appended to each course were the scores of qualifying and expert. Although the intent of the principle was to prevent confusion, the instruction had the opposite effect: it equalized the training between the various unit types and *reduced* the number trained.

Course	Qualifying Score	Expert Score	COTP & PSU Units	Other Operational Units
A (Rifle Markman)	130	306	20%	20%
B (Rifle Expert)	--	None	a	a
C (Carbine)	--	300	10%	As desired
D (Pistol Marksman)	165	None	20%	20%
E (Pistol Expert)	--	None	a	a
F (Revolver)	100	None	--	As desired
G (Submachine Gun)	100	None	--	As desired
H or J (Machine Gun)	260 (Course H)	None	b	b
K (.22 Rifle)	246	None	As desired	As desired
L (.22 Pistol)	220	None	As desired	As desired

a - Personnel who qualify on courses A and D; fire courses B and E.

b - Crews of armed port security boats; fire course H or J as practicable.

Ammunition allowances for general training remained the same as those of 1956, and no changes occurred in the district ordnance officer's responsibility to procure the amounts necessary to support the training program into the next year.

The 1961 small-arms training instruction provided information on the U.S. Navy use of a new version of the Landing Party Manual. The Coast Guard instruction now required the use of the navy B rifle course for the Waesche Rifle Team Trophy Match, the development of standardized .22 rifle and pistol courses, and a machine gun boat course.

The rifle "B" course was a 60-round course instead of 50. It was fired at distances to 600 yards.

Course B—Rifle Expert Course					
Range (yds)	Time Limit	Shots	Target	Position	Sling
200	5 min	5	A	Standing	Parade or Hasty
200	5 min	5	A	Sitting	Loop

Course B—Rifle Expert Course					
200	5 min	5	A	Kneeling	Loop
200	50 sec	10	D	Standing to sitting	Loop
200	50 sec	10	D	Standing to kneeling	Loop
300	60 sec	10	D	Standing to Prone	Loop
600 or 500	15 min	15	B	Prone	Loop

Maximum Score—300; Expert—270; Sharpshooter—250; Marksman—220.¹⁰

The instruction required all those who had fired the old “B” course to fire the new course to be eligible for the Waesche trophy. However, Headquarters expanded the courses eligible for the Coast Guard expert rifle or pistol medal, now authorizing the A, B, or C rifle course, and for pistol either the D or E courses.

Additionally, in a change from previous policy, the Pistol and Rifle Expert Shot Medal could be awarded for scores obtained during excellence-in-competition matches. The expert medal had provided proof of marksmanship skill before members were accepted for any shooting team. This was designed to reinvolve the Coast Guard in small-arms training and competition.

Apart from entertainment, the .22 courses were miniature versions of the full courses. The main aim of the courses continued, just as in the 1920s, was to teach shooting positions and general marksmanship fundamentals, but it was never intended to substitute for military qualification courses.

The shooting positions with the Springfield .22 rifle using the sling were just as arduous and challenging as the .30-caliber model. For the .22-caliber rifle from 50 feet, the total shots was 68; maximum score, 240; and qualifying score, 246. For the .22-caliber pistol from 50 feet, total shots was 40; maximum score, 400; and qualifying score, 220.¹¹

Machine gun shooting was no longer practiced on shore firing ranges as in years past. Few ranges were capable of supporting machine gun fire. Former firing ranges had open-water spaces to absorb the fired rounds, but competing civilian uses precluded their utilization; recreational boating and waterside development brought people to formerly remote locations.

Additionally, since World War II, the encroachment of commercial fishery and oil businesses into offshore operating areas severely limited many stations' conduct of underway training. This was further compounded by Coast Guard regulations requiring a safe firing distance equal to the maximum range of the weapon.

Not following a navy lead, Headquarters designed a training course to give small boat crews practical experience in firing machine guns while underway.

However, Headquarters also required familiarization training with the .30-caliber M1919 Browning machine gun on the G course.

The at-sea boat course specified no target; anything served which would give an acceptable point of aim. If feasible, the boat crew buoyed the targets at 200-yard intervals. The firing run started at 900 yards with a boat speed of five knots. Headquarters recommended three separate runs instead of one. Boats were to fire no more than 50 rounds during any one run or stage.

The basic boat course, once established, remained practically unchanged for the next 20 years. The machine-gun course, however, was as susceptible to external forces as any other. Busy boating seasons, boat overhauls, constant crew rotation, fuel shortages, and apathy toward weapons all affected training.¹²

The levels of training also changed in 1961 to reflect navy changes, but training percentages remained fairly equal throughout the Coast Guard.¹³ The preliminary firing courses used to develop consistency and understanding of marksmanship fundamentals was eliminated. The carbine "C" course received no attention because the .30 caliber carbine was not used in any competitive match. It was occasionally fired from a cutter's fantail. The carbine "C" course would provide the base for the future M16 rifle training course.

After two years of attention from Headquarters, small-arms training followed a somewhat consistent pattern of training based on the percentage of participation methods, graphs, charts and, of course, the ever-present navy courses. Although interest in competition continued to grow because the national match courses could be legally practiced as official training courses, interest failed to match the standards of the 1930s. Those in military readiness appeared pleased, although they lowered qualification standards from those of the 1950s to meet the pressures of other duties.

In 1961, preparation for competitive shooting reached a higher point than any other since 1940 and with good reason. Chief Gunner's Mate Stanley Hulstrom won the National Individual Pistol Championship, giving the Coast Guard a national champion at Camp Perry for the first time in 20 years. With his success in mind, a primer was written and given to all shooters attending the pre-match training school at Cape May.¹⁴ Its contents were calculated to produce a confident competitor in the pistol matches.

In relation to pistols, the booklet tried to dispel the rumors about the .45-caliber service pistol's inaccuracy. The training guide did admit that without serious refit on the pistol "accuracy was never one of its strong points." However, they touted the revolver as "one of the finest handguns to own as a target weapon." The prestige of the revolver continued, but the guide admitted certain adjustments were also necessary to make the revolver a competitive weapon. The 1961 team used ammunition reloaded by the team just as it had in 1959 and 1960.¹⁵ The pre-match school lasted 12 days, a far cry from the earlier standard of two to three months of practice. The school included classes, firing the various courses, and physical conditioning.

With new courses and training parameters in place for a competitive program, the Coast Guard continued on a stable course until October 1962,

when as a result of the Cuban Missile Crisis, several Coast Guard cutters joined the naval blockade of Cuba in a limited state of military readiness. This crisis and the abortive Bay of Pigs episode made the nation aware of the nearness of a hostile regime to the American southern coast. Many government agencies became increasingly alarmed at the prospect of the incursion of saboteurs and espionage agents. The Coast Guard received orders, because of its legislated position, to undertake a study of possible preventative measures.

In June 1963, Headquarters distributed an instruction for planning and information purposes.¹⁶ Under the title *Prevention of Smuggling and Illegal Entry Affecting the Security of the United States*, the intent of the instruction was to

develop a coordinated interagency program to prevent clandestine entry of saboteurs and espionage agents and the smuggling of weapons and devices for sabotage, including nuclear or other mass destruction weapons, into the United States from the sea.¹⁷

The Coast Guard consulted all concerned agencies and designated possible saboteur entry points. The instruction was reminiscent of the Rum Wars and World War II beach patrol days. It required that all field personnel “would be alert to detect and report any unusual or suspicious activity along the coast.”

Many took the cold war alert instruction very seriously, especially within the Coast Guard Reserve. The Reserve used the alert notice as authority to make plans for creating specially-trained “coastal forcemen.”¹⁸ The alert notice sent reserve Coast Guardsmen who met the physical requirements of the U.S. Marine Corps to Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, and Camp Pendleton, California, for 30 days of individual combat training. The training utilized the best features of landing party infantry and beach patrol training.

To house these members of the coastal force, the reserve division in May 1963 commissioned two Organized Training Units Coastal Forces (ORTUFs) at Bakersfield and Santa Barbara, California. The commissioning took place a month before issuance of the study instruction. For the east coast the reserve leadership planned one unit. All three would form the nucleus for further development of this new program. The program, however, ended not from lack of spirit or enthusiasm, but from the simple lack of authorization.¹⁹ In July 1963, the Commandant directed a news release designed to put many of the rumors to rest.²⁰ He stated that because

of the large number of Coast Guard lifeboats, Loran and other stations along the coast, the Coast Guard was designated as the agency to coordinate existing facilities into a unified coastal reporting network.

In the last line of the release, Admiral Roland emphasized that “the Coast Guard’s action is purely administrative and does not now involve additional personnel or facilities.” The study was just that—a study and no more. The Coastal Force Program had neither authority or funding. Twenty years later,

the Coast Guard again attempted to establish a coordinated, unified program, not to combat spies and saboteurs, but for Alexander Hamilton's reasons—to prevent smuggling.

The 1962 crisis and its aftermath were an interesting interlude and change from mundane ocean stations, but by 1964 operations normalized with no changes or effects on small-arms training. The 1964 training year began, like others, with a notice announcing the selections for the Coast Guard rifle and pistol teams.²¹ With pride, it also proclaimed the successes of past teams, stating, "Our teams have always been highly regarded by our sister services for talent, sportsmanship and pure effort." The three latter qualities may have been well known, but from lack of practice as a team, the Coast Guard could not produce a cohesive winning team.

Following the now traditional pattern, the team members assembled at Cape May, with eliminations made on the first of July and the final team going to Camp Perry in August. One departure from the past was the prohibition of inexperienced shooters from the team. The notice indicated, "In order to field as strong a team as possible, it is essential that the top shooters be made available" from their normal duties.²² No longer would a portion of the team be made up of men who were able marksmen but lacked experience in competition. The Coast Guard abandoned the program of building a cadre of well-trained marksmen who could assist in general training for the pursuit of competitive awards. To accomplish this feat, the 61-man detachment would be away from their parent commands for nearly four months; not long enough to improve.²³

The team grew larger in both staff and competitors and by 1964 consisted of:

1	Commanding Officer	Lieutenant Commander
1	Executive Officer	Lieutenant
4	Armorsers	GMC (2), GM1 (2)
2	Yeomen	YNC, YN2
2	Storekeepers	SKC, SK2
1	Hospital Corpsman	HM1
30	Rifle Team Candidates	
20	Pistol Team Candidates	

Ironically, despite the SAI (small-arms instructor) code, Headquarters continued having difficulty identifying qualified men to serve as small-arms instructors. Headquarters did, however, compile a listing of 106 officers and men they considered experienced competitors.²⁴ The list amounted to an invitation, and each man was requested to respond to Headquarters before February 15, 1964, stating whether he (there were no female competitors) was interested or available to compete.

While preparations were made for the Camp Perry matches, some expressed concerns about the inadequacy of general small-arms training. The Roles and Missions Study of 1962 concluded that the Coast Guard had not met its

military readiness requirements nor maintained a minimum number of its personnel qualified in small arms to meet those requirements.²⁵ The study considered about 8,000 qualified men necessary for current missions, but listed no exact figures. The military nature of the Coast Guard was considered a secondary function.

In March 1964 the Coast Guard outlined its objectives.²⁶ The preface to the pamphlet described the Coast Guard as "unique among the nations of the world in developing a military service." But it took an unmilitary stance by saying that the service's "reason for being is basically humanitarian." The authors considered this position the true heritage of the Coast Guard, and presumably of the RCS.

This viewpoint failed to consider the historical background of the service. Lifesaving functions came about gradually and were no more than a reflection of the "growth of the American [United States] system." Devoid of historical knowledge, the authors placed modern missions into the past. None included among the objectives reference the development of a military-like service.

The statement of objectives assumed continued growth of Coast Guard budgets. In 1964 the annual allotment of funds for each officer and enlisted man for small-arms training was approximately \$10, an adequate sum, but the perceived shortfall came from a lack of qualified instructors to conduct training. The \$160,000 and 16 man-years spent during the 1964 national matches competitions was less than the \$210,000 spent in 1959.²⁷

With all the funds spent in competition, no system to utilize experienced men as instructors was developed. In a touch of irony, part of the competition training costs supported the Marksmanship Training Detachment at Cape May. The detachment was intended to train qualified marksmanship instructors to assist in the "annual qualification practice."²⁸

Headquarters explained the failure to use competitors as instructors, stating, "their skills have not been fully exploited because they were not identified and publicized as instructors... Therefore, the investment in the Marksmanship Training Detachment did not fulfill its primary mission."²⁹ Yet Headquarters continued to identify so many names in Coast Guard-wide instructions.

To Headquarters the mission was to train marksmanship instructors *and* competitors, but to the shooters themselves it was only competition. Few of the men attending the course at Cape May went back to their units and volunteered to be instructors. Headquarters also admitted there was "no connection between the All-Coast Guard rifle and pistol teams and the rank-and-file Coast Guardsman." The reason was that only about ten percent of the total service qualified with small arms. The double-edged nature of the All-Coast Guard matches enhanced the Coast Guard's image as an armed force and law enforcement agency only externally—but not within the service itself.

An unofficial study by Headquarters (OOR) identified five main training categories, which involved 8,000 officers and men. The categories consisted of landing parties, boarding parties, own unit security, port security, and law enforcement.³⁰ Regulations required all units to train 20 percent of their personnel for a week, without regard for the individual's task aboard the unit

or his prior marksmanship talent. However, less than one-third of that number re-qualified. An additional 25 percent over the 8,000 would be necessary to meet all the current requirements.

The recurrent problem of a lack of firing ranges became acute. The Coast Guard now owned only two rifle ranges and a few for pistol. The training courses required ranges to 500 yards or the modified 200-yard course. The ranges were not available. Whatever training was conducted, as in the past, was on borrowed firing ranges.

In 1965, the lack of ranges led to a search for alternative training methods which would not overly increase costs. The Coast Guard purchased 44 U.S. Air Force-developed Crossman Arms pellet gun training systems.³¹ Supposedly the system was to help those who had difficulty gaining access to ranges and to give those in need of more marksmanship training an inexpensive way of achieving it. The system was not an alternative to qualification practice but an enhancement to general, combat, and law enforcement marksmanship. Within five months the Reserve Division followed and purchased 32 more sets for its use.

The Coast Guard adopted the Crossman Model 600 semi-automatic pistol instead of the Air Force's revolver model, and a year after the Coast Guard's first purchase, the Air Force released the results of their tests with the pellet gun in preliminary training.³² The results were positive and the Coast Guard asked for reports from its districts on the results of their training. No Coast Guard reports have been uncovered.

The Pellgun [Pellet Gun] system was similar to the .22 gallery practice of the 1930s but not as effective. It required a room of 25 feet in length and about an hour to assemble and dismantle—if the guns worked. However, despite early enthusiasm, this system disappeared from wide use in 1968. Equipment changes, without alteration of policies, would not help improve training. Meanwhile, the problems worsened as lists of qualified small-arms personnel were not maintained.

The identity of those persons who have minimum marksmanship qualifications is soon lost and our marksmanship investment disappears until they get another opportunity to qualify. Thus, a unit commander has the laborious process of leafing through service records to discover those personnel who are qualified to handle small arms.³³

This archaic administrative procedure remained in effect for another 20 years, despite the 1964 objective to automate data. Another 1964 objective reduced paperwork to ease the administrative workload on the operational units. This paperwork reduction project resulted in a serious lack of needed information. During the 1980 Cuban boat lift it became necessary to requalify hundreds of Coast Guardsmen because records of weapons qualifications could not be obtained.³⁴

Headquarters also identified small-arms training for recruits as another problem area. Each recruit at Alameda, California, and Cape May, New Jersey,

was supposed to receive eight hours of lecture and a full week of firing-range practice. But often the weather and other commitments interfered, resulting in less than 20 percent of the recruits being qualified with small arms prior to graduation. Their non-qualified condition burdened field units.

Some districts provided better small-arms training themselves. In 1964, for the second year, the Ninth Coast Guard District (Cleveland, Ohio) made arrangements to send three details to the U.S. Marine Corps Recruit Depot at Parris Island, South Carolina. Each 66-man detail spent three weeks in training with the Marines. The training season at Parris Island extended from 13 January through 13 March 1964, well ahead of the boating season on the Great Lakes.

The program was highly successful. The Coast Guardsmen trained in every facet of the M1 Rifle and M1911A1 Pistol. They spent the first week in familiarization and pre-range indoctrination. During the second and third weeks, all men fired the navy "B" course daily with record fire at the end of the week.

The training differed from what the Coast Guard was used to; it was complete and physically demanding. The daily routine required physical training *before* breakfast each morning. Trainees marched to all meals and classes. Marine Corps tutelage resulted in 84 percent qualification with the rifle and 82 percent with the pistol. Unfortunately, the three-week course of instruction was not a cost-efficient alternative for the relatively low numbers of men qualified. Therefore, Chief of Operations for the Ninth District, Captain G. H. Miller, recommended shortening the course to two weeks the following year.³⁵

Funding problems also crept into the competitive program. Although expenditure of funds had been authorized by law since the 1930s, the Coast Guard budgeted no resources and funds came from other operating areas. Also the assignment of shooters for four to five months of temporary additional duty during the busiest season was unpopular. Some noted that the team was expensive, depleted units of manpower, created family problems for the shooters and was not cost effective.³⁶

These same factors had existed during the 1930s but had been overcome with prize money and personal recognition of accomplishment. The best marksmen did not compete in the matches. An intra-headquarters study observed, "The experience and talent level of the candidates had been poor at the start of the last several seasons." No incentive was offered to become a team member.

District competitions were plagued by apathy. In 1964 only three districts had any formal internal competition. The Small Arms (Cutter) Trophy, established in 1932, was another disappointment.³⁷ The Headquarters study reported "that half of the cutters give 'lip' service to the competition." In 1929 Waesche had made similar remarks over the disinterest in training.

The year 1964 was the first time when Headquarters drew a distinct line between general marksmanship instruction and competition. In years before, they had been one and the same.

General training and competition created one positive innovation for the weapons field. The call for better maintenance led to the creation of district-controlled, small-arms repair shops and a specialized repair shop at Brooklyn, New York. The Brooklyn shop was designed to "rehabilitate weapons which were beyond the capabilities of the district repair shop personnel."

Headquarters established a special armorer skill indicator for these repair personnel. But few considered that this special skill was required for those assigned to the district repair shops. No plans were made to send these men to the required schools. Vacancies remained for want of qualified men. The Brooklyn shop performed many of the same functions as the Curtis Bay ordnance shop in the 1930s, but on a much smaller scale. Despite the creation of the armorer designation, many of the gunner's mates at the Brooklyn shop still awaited the armorer designation three years later.

During 1967 Headquarters proposed a plan to establish an All-Coast Guard team at Cape May dedicated to year-round training. The plan called for redirecting the 20 sonarman billets, removed from the 95-foot patrol boats, and combining them with the 13-man staff at Cape May. Like a similar plan suggested by Waesche in 1929, this was not instituted. In the meantime, many other problem areas arose but few solutions evolved.

The spring of 1965 brought two conflicts that did not immediately affect Coast Guard training but which impressed future leaders. The first was the Coast Guard's involvement in the Dominican Republic; the second was in South Vietnam. Both conflicts demonstrated shortfalls in military readiness. Vietnam particularly pointed out serious deficiencies in small-arms training.

On 16 April 1965, Secretary of the Navy Paul H. Nitze wrote Treasury Secretary Henry H. Fowler requesting the use of Coast Guard patrol boats for interdiction work in South Vietnam.³⁸ Thirteen days later, President Lyndon B. Johnson approved the request with a quick *LBJ*.³⁹

The navy wanted patrol boats but did not want crews: the Coast Guard sent both. This marked the beginning of the Coast Guard's involvement in South Vietnam. The unit, designated Coast Guard Squadron One, would ultimately consist of 26 of the Coast Guard's "A" and "B" Class 82-foot patrol boats. Each vessel received refitting with an increased armaments allowance, and the crews assembled for proper indoctrination and training.

A second unit, Coast Guard Squadron Three, made up of high endurance cutters, arrived in May 1967. The cutters of Squadron Three were trained as normal Coast Guard units in the traditional marksmanship mode. Their limited use of small arms did not present the same opportunities for learning as in Squadron One.

Small-arms training for these men and the others who followed in successive years consisted with the equipment. The term *training* was loosely applied to the navy-sponsored indoctrination course at Camp Pendleton, California, and to the Coast Guard's own attempts at Alameda, California.

The Coast Guardsmen were placed in navy training groups numbering from 100 to 150 men. Training consisted of rushed introductory information and production line-like weapons firing; no one was qualified with any weapon.

There was not enough time to train the men in the week at Camp Pendleton. Duty in South Vietnam did not require weapons qualification.⁴⁰

The majority of the Coast Guardsmen within navy training groups understood small arms, despite training shortfalls, better than their navy counterparts. However, after the M16 rifle became the primary weapon in South Vietnam, no time was spent in training with the rifle. Coast Guardsmen in Vietnam, like their stateside counterparts and others, did not understand the singular, more individualized, nature of the new rifle.⁴¹

Vietnam 82-footer armament included four .50-caliber machine guns and a combination developed by the Coast Guard: an 81-millimeter mortar with a piggy-back mounted .50-caliber machine gun. Otherwise the arms remained, as they had in earlier conflicts, primarily small arms. In the first years of Vietnam duty, the M1 Garand rifle was the primary small arm. The M1911A1 pistol, Thompson submachine gun, and the 12-gauge shotgun used for boarding, supplemented the cutter's inventory.⁴² The weapons were used during hundreds of daily sampan boardings. Experience gained during the boardings provided models for future law enforcement missions.

Much of the experience gained during boarding and interceptions went unrecorded, dismissed as useful for wartime duties only. Some claimed weapons use had no relationship to the Coast Guard's peacetime missions.

The Coast Guard was not immune to the social disturbances caused by the war. The growing unpopularity of the war caused public perceptions of all the military services to suffer as the war and protests against it continued. The Coast Guard removed itself from the domestic fray by not publicizing its involvement in Vietnam. It continued to advertise itself in the lifesaver role.

The number of press releases concerning the Coast Guard's combat role dropped dramatically after the service transferred to the Department of Transportation in 1967. After 1967, the Coast Guard primarily released information concerning the more humanitarian functions of its service in Vietnam.

The beginning of wartime service had no effect on general Coast Guard training. Most continued to follow the *1959 Ordnance Manual (CG-272)* and the navy's Landing Party Manual. However, by the end of 1965, the older ordnance manual became obsolete and Headquarters promulgated a revised manual on 7 December 1965. Small arms and small-arms training remained in Chapter 13, still validating the Landing Party Manual.

This revised manual did not contain any new regulations for small-arms training, but consolidated all those issued by past instructions, allowing more space and time for competitive firing. Four months later another instruction outlined the 1966 competitive season and repeated the purpose of the competition:

to increase the military readiness of the Coast Guard by stimulating the interest of Coast Guard personnel in developing general excellence in the basic military skill of proficiency in small arms.⁴³

The only major change in the competition from previous years disallowed postal matches for Commandant's competitions. However, the instruction did not specify those authorized to use postal matches. It only advised that it was preferable for teams to fire *shoulder to shoulder* with other teams to qualify for either of the Coast Guard trophies, although postal matches and .22-caliber weapons were allowed for district competition.⁴⁴ The start of war in South Vietnam had little effect on those in the Coast Guard responsible for military readiness.

There may have been confusion in training, but during June 1966, the Coast Guard made a bold move in hardware. It announced the replacement of the .30-caliber M1 carbine with the controversial 5.56-millimeter M16 rifle.⁴⁵ The Coast Guard never adopted the 7.62-millimeter M14 rifle—the standard service rifle of the U.S. Army, Navy, and Marine Corps—as a service weapon.

The new arms were purchased outright, not issued from another service, the first such purchase since the Thompson models in 1928. It was a milestone decision for the Coast Guard to abandon the navy's lead and adopt a nearly unproven rifle. The announcement (a Commandant's Instruction) also indicated that this new rifle was to replace the .30-caliber Browning automatic rifle (BAR) and the .45-caliber M3A1 submachine gun. However, it made no mention of replacing the ever-popular M1 Garand.

The M16 rifle was thought to be suitable only for use in Vietnam rather than as a full-service rifle for use in the United States. Like the .30-caliber carbine, it was considered unsuitable for competition. However, because it was capable of automatic fire and could logically substitute for the BAR or any other submachine gun, eventually the M16 replaced the M1 Garand and the Thompson submachine gun.

The move to the M16 rifle generated controversy. Adverse reports on its performance were common. Because of its metal alloy components and plastic stocks, many viewed it with suspicion. It became the brunt of many jokes. The M16 rifle had not yet proven itself, as had the M1 Garand, now in its third U.S. war. Although there were technical problems with the M16, most were corrected before 1970. The majority of the problems came from the non-acceptance of newer technology, poor maintenance, or inadequate training.

As the transition from one weapon to another took place, the Coast Guard transferred to another executive agency. The long relationship between the Treasury Department and the Coast Guard ended in 1967. The President created the Department of Transportation. The Coast Guard became the largest agency within the new department.

The transition to Transportation occurred smoothly. The change had no immediate effect on programs and training. The only significant change was the loss of the instructor positions held for the past 33 years at the Treasury Department. In accordance with the Coast Guard ever present thrift, *Treasury Department* was removed from letterheads and replaced with *Transportation Department* by rubber stamp.

The M16 rifle caused problems in the field. Was it a rifle or was it a carbine? Issued solely as a replacement for the carbine, it certainly could not

compete at the longer ranges of the M1 Garand. In February 1967, Headquarters responded with a compromise. It ordered that

Units conducting firing practice with the M16 rifle shall fire Course C-Carbine Expert Course-(See Article 13-41 of the U.S. Navy Landing Party Manual). Scores fired on this course with the M-16 rifle are for *qualification only* and are *not acceptable for awards*.⁴⁶

Article 13-41 outlined the course.

Range	Time Limit	Shots	Target	Position (yds)
100 yds	50 sec	10 (2 mags, 5 ea)	A	Fire 5 rounds standing, reload, fire 5 rounds sitting
100 yds	50 sec	10 (2 mags, 5 ea)	A	Fire 5 rounds standing, reload, fire 5 rounds kneeling
200 yds	50 sec	10 (2 mags, 5 ea)	B	Fire 5 rounds standing, reload, fire 5 rounds sitting
200 yds	50 sec	10 (2 mags, 5 ea)	B	Fire 5 rounds standing, reload, fire 5 rounds kneeling
200 yds	60 sec	10 (2 mags, 5 ea)	B	Standing to prone

Despite the service's adoption of the weapon, the M16 was not considered an appropriate competitive weapon for the All-Coast Guard match held in October 1967. Whatever the reason, the Coast Guard attitude towards the rifle was damaged for years to come. The service had a love affair with another weapon type, the M1 rifle.

The M16 rifle was the first technological change of weapon type since the Civil War and the first caliber change in more than six decades. Few wanted to break with the comfortable past. For example, the rifle marksmanship firing positions illustrated in the 1967 edition of the *Coast Guardsman's Manual* were identical to the ones used in the navy's 1943 *Blue Jackets Manual*, and featured the Springfield M1903 rifle. No editor had changed the weapons illustration despite two service rifle changes.

The firing positions illustrated in the new manual were standard for all competitive rifle firing, including the first All-Coast Guard matches held in October at Cape May. Commandant Willard J. Smith sponsored the event and the training center's commanding officer, Captain Ralph M. West, hosted. Six district teams (the Third, Fifth, Ninth, Twelfth, Thirteenth and Seventeenth) were finalists in their respective area competitions. The individual rifle championship was won by J. E. Shafer, EMC(P), and the individual pistol

match was won by Lieutenant E. W. Lacroix. The Third District won both the rifle and pistol team matches.

The second annual All-Coast Guard competitions were announced on July 17, 1967, in *Commandant Notice 3590*. The notice outlined extremely complicated rules using the guidelines of the National Rifle Association. The individual rifle champion winner was Lieutenant (j.g.), Merrill R. Menlore; Lieutenant Erwin F. Chase, Jr, took the pistol championship. The Thirteenth District won the rifle team award, and the pistol teams award went to the Seventeenth District.

While the competition took place at Cape May, Coast Guardsmen in South Vietnam were involved in combat firing with little or no similarity to range firing. They were not trained to act upon quick targets, especially when firing over water.⁴⁷

In 1968 the small-arms training program began again to show the effects of disinterest. The Headquarters Office of Military Readiness (OMR) made an effort to shore up the sagging small-arms program. Using words reminiscent of Admiral Roland's—

Small-arms marksmanship proficiency is important to every Coast Guardsman as a member of the armed forces, and to all petty, warrant and commissioned officers as federal law enforcement officers. Better than 4% of our military personnel are now daily engaged in military operations in Southeast Asia—a combat area.⁴⁸

The last line was only official reference made to the Coast Guard's operations in Southeast Asia, never mentioning South Vietnam by name. The remark reminded everyone it was a combat area—some Coast Guardsmen did not know the Coast Guard was even there. This was also to be the last instruction that spoke of small-arms training as a military requirement.

Competition continued to be stressed as the method for better training. Admiral Smith, who had personal knowledge and experience as a Coast Guard competitive shooter in the late 1930s, noted, "Since marksmanship training is best stimulated by a spirit of competition, commanding officers should stress competition in every type of marksmanship effort." Lending his personal support, the instruction concluded under the *Action* paragraph saying,

I expect each commanding officer to fully support marksmanship training by encouraging individual and unit participation at all levels, and by according due recognition to individuals who demonstrate proficiency with arms.

He gave his personal support, but it was too late. Too many years had gone by without support for the program to recover its former high standards. In July 1968, after three years of combat experience in South Vietnam, Headquarters authorized the Coast Guard the use of the U.S. Marine Corps rifle marksmanship "C" course for re-qualification with the M1 Garand.

This was the standard requalification course of the U.S. Marine Corps and authorized only for those Coast Guardsmen trained at Marine Corps firing ranges. It represented a departure from previous courses, a change in marksmanship outlook brought about by the conflict in Vietnam. The course used the "E" silhouette target and its modification. This was the first time Headquarters had authorized a silhouette target for general Coast Guard training and qualification since before World War II.⁴⁹ The course was a combination of both basic and competitive fundamentals. The Marine Corps described the "C" course as:

Stage	Range	Time	Shots	Target	Position	Sling
1	200	120	10 ^a	E (mod)	Standing	Hasty or Parade
2	200	120	10 ^a	E (mod)	Kneeling	Loop
3	200	50	10 ^a	E (mod)	Sitting	Loop
4	300	80	20 ^b	E (mod)	Prone	Loop
5	500	180	10 ^c	E (mod)	Prone	Loop

^a Locked and loaded with 2 rounds, will commence fire when target appears.

^b Locked and loaded with 4 rounds, will commence fire when target appears.

^c Locked and loaded with 2 rounds, will commence fire when targets appear.

This was a multiple target course. A trainee had to distribute his fire among two or three targets, and more than four hits on one target would not be counted in Stages 1, 2, and 3; seven hits per target in Stage 4 and no more than five hits in Stage 5. Scores were determined by multiplying the number of hits by silhouettes hit.⁵⁰

There are no definite records of how many Coast Guardsmen participated in this training course, but it was not allowed for the upcoming and final All-Coast Guard small-arms competition. Headquarters had not solved the firing range problem. It attempted to resolve some district's difficulties by allowing the use of reduced targets for the rifle "A" and "B" courses, additionally authorizing the use of "S-R" (short range) and "M-R" (mid-range) targets for "advanced marksmanship training and competitions." It also continued the use of standard targets for "basic rifle marksmanship" retraining that did not exist. Headquarters also reduced the qualification scores for the "A" course: Expert—50, Sharpshooter—400, and Marksman—350.⁵¹

By the late 1960s, the Coast Guard marksmanship program became an alphabet soup of courses, targets, weapons, instructions, and notices. The metaphor also extended to the small-arms training managers. Between 1961 and 1969 approximately 11 different men authorized training regulations and other segments of the small-arms program. The lack of consistency in

leadership and, more importantly, knowledge of past practices damaged the program.

While floundering to find the best approach to solve the many training problems, Headquarters announced the 1968 small-arms competitions. Held between September 27 and 30, the 35 rifle and 30 pistol competitors from the Seventh, Ninth, Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Seventeenth Districts plus the Cape May Training Center Team had marginal success. Lieutenant(j.g.) Merrill R. Menlore again captured the rifle title, and GMCS Stanford H. Hulstrom won the pistol championship. The Ninth District went home with both the team rifle and pistol trophy.

Without fanfare, the competitive side to the Coast Guard's small-arms training ended nearly 40 years to the day after its first competitors fired their off-the-rack rifles at Camp Perry, Ohio. Just as competitive shooting ended, the last year of the decade drew to a close without any official mention of small-arms training. It was as if when the competitors stacked rifles, so did the entire Coast Guard. However, there were others, especially the Coast Guardsmen in Vietnam, who would never miss the competitive programs. Once discontinued, those not interested in competitive shooting or aware of its deficiencies, could return to the basic fundamentals of general training so strongly stressed until World War II.

The 1960s had been an era unto itself. The decade's beginning saw the return to traditional training with older weapons. However, the end reflected an inconsistent organization with a varying identity.

Notes

1. U.S.C.G. Operations Instruction No. 9-60, Leon H. Morine, OGR, February 26, 1960.
2. U.S.C.G. Operations Instruction No. 15-60, "Annual Small Arms Training Program," OGR, May 9, 1960.
3. Ibid.
4. U.S.C.G. Operations Introduction No. 13-61, "Annual Small Arms Training Program," OGR, R. D. Schmidtman, June 22, 1961.
5. The USN Landing Party Manual, 1950, Chapter 13, Section VIII was used as a guide. However, in November 1960 the Navy revised the manual and deleted the .22 qualification courses.
6. Coast Guard ceased allowing the NRA certification in the 1980s. The lead reasons were certification was too easily obtained, it no longer fit Coast Guard needs, and these instructors not trained in Coast Guard philosophy of training were too difficult to manage. In 1960 to keep track of who was a certified instructor, the designator SAI was added to the rating; for example, GM1SAI. Although this designated an instructor, it did not designate knowledge or quality.
7. U.S.C.G. Reserve Instruction No. 4-60, "All Coast Guard Reserve Rifle and Pistol Team," PR-3, Henry J. Wuensch, April 20, 1960.
8. Ibid.

9. *Ibid.*, 2.
10. U.S.N. 1960 Landing Party Manual, Section VI., 635.
11. Operations Instruction 13-61, Enclosure (1).
12. *Ibid.*, Enclosure (2).
13. *Ibid.*, 3.
14. United States Coast Guard, Rifle and Pistol Detachment, Small Arms Firing School—Pistol Team, ca. 1961, unpublished, unsigned.
15. As a technical point, all rounds were reloaded using .45-caliber "Perfecast" bullets, 100 grain, Remington primers, 3.65 Bull's-eye powder. Star and Phelps loaders were used.
16. U.S.C.G., Commandant Instruction 3175.1 (Old Operations Instruction No. 30-63), OPL, E. J. Roland, June 7, 1963. The instruction was for study purposes only. There was no action to be taken.
17. *Ibid.*, 1.
18. "Saboteurs, Subversives Thwarted: Coast Guard Starts Coastal Force Training," *The Coast Guard Reservist*, 10 (July 1963).
19. The lack of authorization did not prevent the maintenance of the Coastal Foreman (CF) rating as an emergency rating in the Enlisted Qualification Manual.
20. U.S. Coast Guard Public Information Division, "Coast Guard Coordinates Coast Surveillance," Release No. 66-63, July 26, 1963.
21. U.S.C.G. Commandant Instruction 3591, "All-Coast Guard Rifle and Pistol Teams 1964," OOR, W. D. Shields, January 3, 1964. The old OGR designation had been replaced with OOR—Operations, Ordnance and Readiness.
22. *Ibid.*
23. *Ibid.*
24. *Ibid.*, Enclosure (1), 1-3.
25. U.S. Coast Guard Report "A Study of Marksmanship Training In The Coast Guard." The report was an unofficial study and was neither signed nor dated (ca. 1967). Presumably the OOR office prepared the study to demonstrate deficiencies in the small arms training program.
26. *United States Coast Guard OBJECTIVES* (CG 378), U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters (CCS-2) Washington, D.C., March 4, 1964. Headquarters considered this pamphlet "sufficiently broad and general in nature to have validity for the indefinite future," and a "general assertion of philosophy, objectives, and policy," for the Coast Guard. The intent of the pamphlet was not to "prescribe what or how," but to "stimulate individual thought." The accomplished volume needed to dictate policy and because of the hierarchical nature of the Coast Guard, few stimulated thoughts emerged.
27. *Ibid.*
28. The name selected was because of its similarity to the Army's and Marine Corps' Marksmanship Training Units (MTU).
29. Marksmanship Study (ca. 1967).

30. Ibid. Originally, "coastal force" was included in this list as an afterthought, but scratched out. Adding the coastal force was a natural assumption. The Coast Guard Enlisted Qualifications Manual (CG-311), Amendment No. 3, May 10, 1967, (GPO, Washington, DC, 1968) pg 8-5, continued to describe the rating. The qualifications manual also outlined qualifications for petty officer [enlisted] pilots in pay grades E-5 through E-9.
31. U.S.C.G. Commandant Notice 3591, "Pellgun Training Equipment," OOR, July 22, 1965.
32. U.S.C.G. Commandant Notice 3591, "Pellgun Training Equipment," OOR, March 14, 1966.
33. Marksmanship Training Study (ca. 1967), 3-4.
34. The author personally "leafed" through hundreds of training reports to determine the weapons qualifications of personnel sent from the Eighth Coast Guard District to Key West, Florida, to assist in the emergency.
35. Ninth Coast Guard District letter 3590 Serial: OGR-157, 1964. Beside small arms, the Marines qualified over 87% as second class swimmers, first aid classes, and some attempted the "confidence course."
36. Undated, unsigned, Marksmanship Training Study (ca. 1967), 6.
37. The "trophy" had been established in 1932, but in 1928 a plaque had been presented for the same purpose.
38. The Navy had not asked the Treasury Department for "suitable" shallow draft vessels since the Seminole War in 1836. Department of the Navy letter, No. 0946, April 16, 1965. P. H. Nitze to H. H. Fowler.
39. Memorandum for the President from Secretary of the Defense dated April 29, 1965.
40. It was doubtful if qualification would have ever become a requirement for being assigned. Not all Coast Guardsmen were volunteers and some may have used non-qualification as a means of avoiding this duty.
41. The M-16 rifle had to be sighted for the man using it. The 82-foot cutters carried at least six M16 rifles, with no particular rifle assigned to any one man.
42. The cutters later exchanged their M1 rifles and Thompson SMGs for the M16 rifle. However, many Coast Guardsmen were exceptionally adept at procuring arms of any nature. The use of revolvers in many calibers and models was common, as were communist weapons of which the AK-47 was the favorite. In addition to the M16, the M79 grenade launcher and the M60 machine gun were added. As far as weapons on board the cutters, it was an anything-goes allowance.
43. U.S.C.G. Commandant Instruction 3590.2, "Annual Small Arms District, Area, and All-Coast Guard Competitions," OOR, April 18, 1966.
44. Ibid.
45. U.S.C.G. Commandant Instruction 3574.1 "Replacement of .30-Caliber Carbine by M16 Rifle 5.56mm (2.33 Caliber)" [sic], OOR, June 2, 1966. The mistyping of the caliber ".233" was indicative of the newness of the weapon. It was purchased almost sight unseen by the Coast Guard.

46. U.S.C.G. Commandant Notice 3591. "M16 Rifle Qualifying Course," OOR, February 2, 1967. A notice in the Coast Guard had a life span of only six months. It was anticipated, with some optimism, a new course would be developed in that time.
47. It was true some of the same fundamentals could be used, but firing with an unzeroed rifle from the deck of a patrol boat or out of a high-speed runabout was a different type of reaction from the slow pace of a normal training range.
48. U.S.C.G. Commandant Instruction 3591.4A, "Command Support of Marksmanship and Competitions," OMR, April 16, 1968. It was normal procedure for the Chief of Operations to sign all such instructions. However, this one was thought important enough to have the weight of the commandant behind it. Also notice the office designation had changed again to Operations, Military Readiness. Ordnance and Gunnery were no longer applicable.
49. Some beach patrol stations used the silhouette "S" or the Colt silhouette target for all weapons training, including submachine gun.
50. U.S.C.G. Commandant Notice 3591, "U.S. Marine Corps Rifle Marksmanship Course C," OMR, July 8, 1968. This course, like other quickly assembled stop-gap methods, did not solve the training course problem and only fed the confusion the general Coast Guard.
51. U.S.C.G. Commandant Notice 3591, "Use of Decimal Targets for Service Rifle Qualifications," OMR, May 2, 1968.

Readiness, Obedience, and a Sense of Disorder

The dilemma of training in the previous 20 years came to a head in the 1970s. The patchwork regulatory effects continued far too long without adequate consideration, causing the small-arms program to weaken. Coast Guard small-arms training as a program was not strong enough to stand in the face of policy or budgetary changes. Small-arms training was in danger of drowning with no lifesaving apparatus available to rescue it.

The most significant external effect on the program was fiscal constraints placed on federal spending in 1970. Each agency was ordered to cut its wasteful practices, and with a view toward economy, one of the first items struck by the Coast Guard was competitive shooting. Competition, once the leading element and basis for all training, was no longer authorized. Headquarters announced its demise on August 18, 1970:

Since 1966 the Coast Guard has conducted annual small-arms competitions at the district, area, and servicewide levels. A recent evaluation of this program has indicated that in view of economy measures being taken in all mission areas, cancellation of area, all-Coast Guard, and Headquarters sponsored inter-service and National small arms competition programs is warranted.¹

The decision was arbitrary. The announcement canceled Headquarter's sponsorship of the major competitive programs. But unit and district commanders were encouraged to support local competition. Without Headquarters' support and funding, this seldom occurred. The familiar statement, "in view of economy measures being taken," simply meant budget reductions.² This was not, however, the first small-arms program to bite the bullet that year.

Earlier in March 1970, the Military Readiness Branch (OMR) issued a revised policy on small arms standardization, peacetime allowances, and minimum standards for annual training.³ The main thrust was economy through another standardization program which involved reductions in small arms and training. Coast Guard units were now provided small arms and training to use on a need-to-have basis.⁴

The need for arms was based on mission accomplishment, physical security, and training. Headquarters superseded the "20 percent" standard by an annual standard designed to train fewer people. Active duty training followed another form of the levels-of-training scheme.

In the new policy the first level required all new entrants (recruits, officer candidates, and cadets) to receive training. The second level required a minimum number of men to receive annual small-arms training equal to the

number of service weapons in the unit's allowance.⁵ The third category noted that qualifiers included "all personnel required to carry small arms or who may reasonably be expected to carry or to use small arms in the course of their duties."⁶

These people included intelligence agents, gangway watches, landing parties (shipboard billet structures maintained this function but had discontinued practicing it), port security functions, small-arms instructors, and the catch-all, "other special category personnel who are required to be armed in the performance of their duties." It was reminiscent of the 1919 regulations that allowed nearly everyone to practice. The need-to-know policy intended to reduce training, but could have actually increased expenditures if individual units had taken advantage of the policy's parameters. However, most did not and saw only the one-man, one-weapon training requirement.

The standardization of training was driven by the standardization of small-arms allowances. Previous allowances were based on ship and shore unit type rather than defined need. However, Headquarters based the allowance reductions on cost, not need. The freely issued M1 rifle was only partially replaced by the more expensive M16 rifle. The new rifle cost about \$200 each, a price close to the Thompson submachine gun of the late 1920s.⁷ No massive war issues came to the Coast Guard from Vietnam. The Coast Guard again paid its own way.

In the same fashion as other notices of reductions, Headquarters instructed all district commanders to review their small-arms needs and submit their requirements to Headquarters (OMR). Most district commanders had latitude in the final decision and could authorize allowance increases "when special requirements of activities under their cognizance warrant them and are fully justified."⁸ This statement was as open to local interpretation as similar ones in the past, but as fully unused.

To aid in the decision-making process, definitions were given to the standard classifications of small arms. Each weapon type received a classification of Standard A, B, C, or Obsolete. Standard A included the preferred and fully acceptable weapons for military readiness and law enforcement; Standard B fulfilled the requirements but was not a preferred weapon; Standard C was an unacceptable weapon and was to be retained only until a "higher standard" weapon became available; and all Obsolete weapons were to be disposed of within the indicated fiscal year.⁹ This plan called for a gradual replacement of the Coast Guard's older small arms.

All service—not recreational—small arms were classified and listed by weapon and standard remarks. The following table illustrates weapons in service and their classification under the system.

Weapons		Standard Remarks
Heavy Machine Guns	.50-Cal. Browning	A
	Machine Gun M2, HB	
Light Machine Guns	7.62 mm M60	A Replace .30-Cal. BMG
	.30-Cal. BMG M1919A4	B
Submachine Guns	.45-Cal. (All Models)	Obsolete (FY71)
Automatic Rifles	5.56 mm M16	A Replaces all submachine guns, M1 rifle, and M1 carbine
	.30-Cal. BAR M1918A2	Obsolete (FY 70)
Rifles	.30-Cal. M1 ^a	B Replaced as M16 rifles become available
	.30-Cal. M1903	B Ceremonial/drill use only
	7.62 mm M14	C
	.30-Cal. Sniper M1D	A Riot control use only
	.22-Cal. Hornet (survival)	A Aviation use only
Shotguns	12-gauge Riot Type	A
	All other	B
Pistols	.45-Cal. M1911A1	A
	.45-Cal. (All other)	Obsolete (FY70)
Revolvers	.38-Cal. (4" barrel) ^b	A Aviation use only
	.38-Cal. (2" barrel)	Intelligence use only
	Colt Cobra	A
	Colt Detective Special	A
	All other	B
Line Throwing Guns	.30-Cal. USCG (all models)	A

^aM1 rifle used solely for drill (Academy, TRACEN) will not be replaced with M16.

^bSpecific type and model to be determined, based on current requirements and inventory.¹⁰

Headquarters, still driven by rising costs, altered small-arms allowances to meet the minimum requirements. As in the past, the 1970 allowances for the cutters fell under definite parameters: high endurance cutters (WHEC) and icebreakers (WAGB) with landing parties and one rifle squad received two light machine guns, fifteen rifles, four shotguns and one pistol for each officer. Oceangoing buoy tenders (WLB) and larger medium endurance cutters (including 125-foot and 143-foot WMECs) carried six rifles, two shotguns and one pistol per officer; the pistol again became an officer's weapon. All other oceangoing, coastal and inland vessels carried one rifle, one shotgun, and one pistol. A noticeable digression was the allowance of pistols for officers only.¹¹

However, these were drastic reductions from past allowances. A 75-foot patrol boat in the 1930s and the 1969 82-foot (WPB) in South Vietnam carried more small arms than a 1970 210-foot medium-endurance cutter (WMEC).

These parameters made determining cutter allowances fairly easy, but figuring shore unit allowances was more complicated. The instruction recognized that not all units had the same requirements and "the difference in size and location is obvious and dictates that different types and numbers of small arms are required for physical security."¹² Allowances were generally based on the following parameters:

Law Units	Enforcements
Light Machine Guns	1 per 30-foot and 40-foot UT boat assigned port security duty
Rifle	30 per 100 enlisted men
Shotgun	4 per 100 enlisted men
Pistol	1 per officer

Officers at marine inspection offices, with a law enforcement mission, were allowed one pistol per officer; each intelligence investigator (enlisted or officer), one revolver. Riot control teams (instituted after the civil disturbances of the late 1960s) were authorized ten rifles or riot shotguns, two sniper rifles (for which no training was given), and one pistol for the squad leader.¹³ Presumably, according to the allowance factors, the squad leader was an officer, although a naval landing party rifle squad required a third class petty officer to serve in the same capacity; even the petty officer's required weapon was the .30-caliber carbine.

There was no set allowance for weapons used for training only "sufficient to facilitate an effective firing program" or "sufficient to support approved curriculum." However, no approved curriculum or effective program existed. The exact number of weapons was ultimately left to local decision: "all

commands possessing adequate storage shall maintain a minimum of one rifle for each enlisted and one pistol per officer attached.”¹⁴ Adequate storage did not necessarily guarantee secure storage. Many stations commonly used metal clothing lockers and converted broom closets to store weapons.

Realignment of arms allowances was not new, but the 1970 reduction was the first of such a magnitude. Historically, small-arms reductions met with fierce opposition. In 1834, Captain Ezekiel Jones, USRCS, faced a similar allowance reduction. Despite repeated requests, the Treasury Department allowed the cutter *Ingham* only 13 muskets and 12 pistols. Jones’ intention was to have enough arms for his crew of 20. He stated, “I think 17 [muskets] are highly necessary...and...I think 24 [pistols] are required.”¹⁵ He still did not get the weapons he wanted, but he did try. In 1970 there were no objections to the reductions. Without objections, the establishment of allowances continued.

After five years and close to the end of the Coast Guard’s involvement in South Vietnam, those in the non-combat roles received weapons allowances. The allowance was set at one rifle per man and one pistol per officer. Chief petty officers could opt for a pistol if they desired it. This was a remarkable standard where weapons were easily obtainable.

Small-arms allowances and training requirements were ambiguous, especially concerning rifle training. Within a year of removal of the M1 Garand, the M16 rifle issue had not been resolved. The problem could no longer be ignored. Eliminating competitive shooting made course selection easier. To meet interim training requirements again, Headquarters instituted another familiarization course. The 1,000-inch course was a combination of the 1944 carbine familiarization course and the .22-caliber rifle 50-foot course, using the U.S. Air Force reduced MIL “E” silhouette target.¹⁶

Order	Time Limit	Rounds	Position
Zeroing weapons	1 min per mag	9 (three 3-rd mags)	Prone
1.	1 min	10	Sitting
2.	1 min	10	Kneeling
3.	1 min	10	Standing
4.	45 sec	10 (two 5-rd mags)	Prone
5.	45 sec	10 do [ditto]	Sitting
6.	45 sec	10 do	Kneeling

The rediscovery of the 1,000-inch range relieved some problems related to finding firing ranges, but not all. Many military and civilian range operators were understandably reluctant, or fully opposed, to the firing of high-power

rifles on what were essentially pistol ranges. Whatever the course content, the course remained for familiarization only.

With the inception of this course, the Coast Guard again recognized the need for small-arms training, but had lost much of its past fervor for it. Some of the problems were in leadership; although trained to recognize the importance of small arms as part of military readiness, many had no interest in the training. Small-arms training suffered not only from budget constraints but from leadership. Admiral Waesche had predicted this in 1929 while serving as Chief of Ordnance.

It is not sufficient that they [the commanding officers of cutters] be required to hold the drills and practices. They must, by skillful personnel management, have their interest aroused. If the majority of commanding officers cannot be so impressed the fault lies with their superiors. There will always be peculiar and abnormal natures to deal with but the majority will be men of normal mental attitude who will fall into line if properly handled. The commanding officer's interest having been aroused, he in turn by skillful personnel management must arouse active interest in his subordinates and proficiency will follow as a matter of course.¹⁷

Skill management was not the only key to a successful small-arms training program, as Waesche well knew; training required financial support.

By 1971, the immediate effects of a budget crisis were clear and the outlook was not bright. However in 1970, in the midst of a deteriorating small-arms program, the Coast Guard instituted its own two-week small-arms instructor (SAI) course at the Reserve Training Center, Yorktown, Virginia. The intent was to prevent further decline in quality. The 1971 course graduated 24 instructors with plans to train 24 more later in the year.

The course taught the trainee the principles of effective shooting, under the supposition that an experienced marksman made an effective instructor. This same premise, used in the past at Cape May and elsewhere, was faulty because competent marksmen do not always make competent general service instructors. Neither the Yorktown or Cape May course taught instructional methods or presentation. There may have been some credibility in the theory for the men who had spent most of their careers firing in competition, but most trainees left Yorktown without learning the basic elements of teaching.

While the instructor school trained shooters, recruit training was also addressed again in the *Enlisted Qualifications Manual (CG-311)*. The amended qualifications required all recruits "to demonstrate practical knowledge in the firing, field stripping, cleaning and assembling of the service rifle and pistol." The time allotted to complete this training remained the same: eight hours of lecture with a full week for practical training. However, as in previous years, because of "other commitments to schedule" and inclement weather (primarily at Cape May), many recruits received no training with small arms.

This training was to be one of the fundamental features of the new training policy. The first training level specifically designated recruits to receive the

basics on which to build all future training. Without initial training and exposure, the Coast Guard became known as a weaponless quasi-military service dedicated to emergency, humanitarian service only. The prestige of the Coast Guard fell among those who knew of its fine military heritage.

By 1971, the M16 rifle replaced the majority of the M1 Garands. With this change, the more vocal of the district offices requested courses for qualification and issuance of the expert rifle medal using the new rifle. Headquarters had delayed a decision for five years; without the former M1 rifle courses the decision could not be put off any longer.

In the spring of 1971, Headquarters hurriedly devised a course and sent it to selected units for field testing. The selected units returned favorable reports that the course embodied all the competitive concepts used in previous years. The course showed little originality and was simply an unconscious hybrid of the navy's rifle expert "B" course, the 1960 carbine "C" course, and national match "A" course.¹⁸

This course did allow the firing at either 200 yards or the 1,000-inch range depending on local range availability. The target for the 1,000-inch course changed from the Air Force's silhouette to the 1,000-inch "bull's-eye" target. The army used this same target for about 30 years in the M1 rifle's A, B, C, and D training courses.¹⁹ The silhouette target suited Coast Guard needs better than the round target.

The new course dropped the 300- and 600-yard positions. It can be compared to the navy's marksman and sharpshooter courses of 1915. It added ten more rounds to fire from the prone position. This easy solution had not been adopted earlier for competitive reasons. The troublesome part was that once a course was defined, it became the basis for all future work. The 1971 M16 rifle course presented the following:²⁰

1971 M16 Rifle Course				
Order	Time Limit	Rounds	Position	Sling
Zeroing	1 min per mag	6 (two 3-rd mags)	Prone	Loop
1.	10 min	10	Standing or Hasty	Parade
2.	60 sec	10 (two 5-rd mags)	Standing to Sitting or Kneeling	Loop
3.	60 sec	10 (two 5-rd mags)	Standing to Prone	Loop
4.	10 min	20	Prone	Loop
Total Shots Record Firing: 50 (Maximum Score 250)				

1971 M16 Rifle Course		
Qualifying Score (Both Ranges):	Expert	225
	Sharpshooter	215
	Marksman	185

In the new course, rounds fired in the prone position increased and the number of rounds fell from nine to six. Headquarters gave no explanation for the reduction, but a general, and erroneous, perception among instructors was that the M16 rifle was easier to shoot and therefore, the shooter needed fewer rounds to zero the sights. The assumption had no basis in fact, especially in regard to novice shooters.

Once Headquarters (OMR) established a form of course, it relented to the requests and desires of the district offices and authorized the Coast Guard Expert Rifle Shot Medal for this course. In retrospect this may not seem to be a very large concession; however, it was an enormous step away from the competitive ready line.

The course came too late for the 1971 training year, but Headquarters appeared pleased with the results of the year's training even though qualification rates were less than satisfactory: 7,861 men had trained with the rifle; 7,868 with the pistol; but only 79 percent qualified with the rifle and 46 percent with the pistol. Seventy-nine was an adequate percentage for rifle, and nobody expected much out of pistol training anyway.

Recruit training at Cape May had the worst overall record of qualification in the Coast Guard. Of the 2,323 recruits firing the M1 service rifle, only 15 percent qualified.²¹ The small-arms instructors at Cape May claimed bad weather, inadequate training time, and inadequate training facilities. However, few would admit that the quality of instruction had also fallen. The SAI school at Yorktown remained the instructional framework and principle architect of small-arms instruction and operated largely without guidance or input from Headquarters.

For 1972 the confusion over courses, training levels, and deteriorating instructor quality caused small-arms qualifications to fall to post-World War II lows. General apathy in the districts toward small-arms training also took its toll. All district qualification percentages, except the Ninth District, fell, some by as much as 36 percent. In 1972 the rifle course enrolled 7,360 Coast Guardsmen qualifying at a rate of 57.5 percent; the pistol was fired by 9,269 with qualification sagging to 38.5 percent.

The excessive numbers attempting qualification with the pistol were bolstered by the addition of recruits. The recruit training centers had little time for rifle training and now tried to squeeze in pistol training. The results for Cape May were disastrous; only seven percent qualified with the pistol. A solid week of rifle training, even on indoor .22 range, was better than the hit-

and-miss training policy of both rifle and pistol. At the west coast recruit training center in Alameda, California, 35 percent qualified with the pistol with only 35 overall fewer recruits.²²

Headquarters made an effort to bolster the falling qualification rates by authorizing the sharpshooter and marksman ribbon for both rifle and pistol qualification. However, the full medal was still reserved for the "expert" designation. Marksmanship skill extended to all classes of qualification, similar to the early badges of the 1900s.

During 1972 there were pockets of competitive shooters throughout the Coast Guard, some using match weapons. In May, 59 men competed in an intraservice match held at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. Among the winners were YN1 Alex M. Chapman, SN Vincent J. Venegoni; SN Larry L. Rice in pistol; ENC Richard M. O'Brien; BM1 Corvin F. Henderson; and SN Monte R. Ashley. At the conclusion of this match, Rear Admiral Owen W. Siler presented the awards. In a few years Siler would be faced with difficult decisions about small arms, focused on changes.²³

Changes also took place in the Coast Guard Reserve. In November 1973, the reserve training branch at Coast Guard Headquarters suspended small-arms training for all inactive duty reservists.²⁴ These reservists had fired under the same rules as their active service counterparts. However, now these reservists were to receive their small-arms training only during periods of active duty for training at Yorktown, Virginia, or Alameda, California. The notice explaining the decision stated, "It is felt that this manner of instruction will be more efficient in terms of reserve training." As with active-duty Coast Guard, small-arms training for reservists also declined.

The 1973 small-arms training reports did not indicate a speedy reversal in the decline in training and qualification. Seventy-four percent of the 8,445 firing the rifle qualified, and of the 9,629 firing the pistol, 52 percent qualified. The ribbon incentive appeared to have accomplished some of its goal, but overall, the quality and consistency of training throughout the Coast Guard was still inadequate. Cape May had recurring qualification problems with 17 percent for pistol but 61 percent for rifle.²⁵

The number of personnel trained increased as the Coast Guard slowly moved back into its statutory, military, and law enforcement missions. The number of persons trained in small arms equaled those of the pre-World War II Coast Guard and, in 1974, would exceed it. A total of 10,677 trained with rifle and 11,596 with pistol produced qualification results of 69 percent and 53 percent, respectively. The figures showed no stabilization and were still far below the 80 percent qualification rate set as a goal in the late 1960s.

By mid-decade, law enforcement once again emerged as a major mission area. Instead of thwarting smugglers, slavers, and pirates, the enforcement of fisheries regulations, among others, became the thrust of patrol work. With enforcement of the fisheries laws, the use of weapons was again considered a possible and probable means of enforcing the laws.

The use of weapons made the Coast Guard aware that it was in a similar position to other sister federal agencies in having to conform to the same

requirements in use of deadly force, which had nothing to do with small-arms training. This procedural factor was established for legal reasons because of a greater public awareness of civil liberties and the abuses of law enforcement power. The matter of applied force by law enforcement agencies was a constant issue in state and federal courts. The Coast Guard's Rum Wars history had little bearing on the legalistic trends of the 1970s.

The selective use of force was new to the Coast Guard, which historically, if not practically, understood the application of armed force in civil areas. In August 1975, Headquarters issued its first instructions on the subject. The instruction grew out of fisheries difficulties, not on the open sea, but from disputes on the Great Lakes.²⁶

The instruction authorized the use of deadly force only for very specific reasons and purposes, such as 1) prevention of loss of material vital to national security, 2) self-defense, and 3) prevention of the actual theft of property. Although this instruction targeted shore establishments, it applied to floating units. As excessive use of force lawsuits against law enforcement agencies increased, the Coast Guard placed more emphasis on policy and training procedures for the use of deadly force. In the mid-1970s, the Coast Guard developed its policies and polled other agencies about regulations covering use of force. A definitive policy was issued after four years.

Echoing the sense of economy of the founding fathers, a January 1976 memorandum from the Chief of Military Readiness to his small-arms training staff advised them that "OMB [Office of Management and Budget] has said that FY-77 will be a "no growth" year and the budget submitted to the Congress will reflect this."²⁷ Captain R. G. Moore added,

Growth of some programs is essential and that growth will be supported at the expense of others of a lower priority. Small-arms training was sufficiently low [in priority listing of funding] so that an increase in funding did not survive. We must therefore look to only \$130,000 for the small-arms program in FY-77.²⁸

Moore's memorandum was an answer to the Commandant's statement of determination for fiscal year 1978.²⁹ The Commandant expressed the need for small-arms training but worried about the rising costs. He wanted a look at the possibilities of revamping the training program, including the use of simulators.

The Coast Guard small-arms training program would have to survive on less funds than those allotted for one year's competitive program in the late 1950s. The ammunition and repair parts purchased in previous years had to suffice. To cover the rising costs, Moore recommended "possible actions to accommodate the reduced funding."³⁰ These possibilities included reducing recruit firing during the qualification course to once instead of twice; training less than 100 percent of all recruits; re-programing monies from other sources; and reducing weapons acquisition and maintenance.³¹ But on the whole these were not viable options.

Headquarters (OMR) decided to continue the present level of recruit training, cease support of competitive shooting, purchase only service types of ammunition, reduce weapons holdings (training was still based on the number of weapons held by a unit), and limit the number of people receiving requalification training.

Two days later Moore forwarded another memorandum to the Chief of Operations. He began his second memorandum as follows:

Guidance of the past year dictated a reevaluation of the Small Arms Training program, with the goal of achieving a tightly structured cost effective effort meeting all mission requirements. The guidance was subsequently coupled with restrictions for FY-77.³²

Moore outlined planning areas, program definition, development of management procedures, and the realignment of training requirements and methods. The program goal was to ensure that those expected to bear arms were qualified "in terms of mechanical skills and grounding the fundamental factors implicit in the use of force."³³ To accomplish this Moore recommended the levels of training or step approach. This was not the step approach to training of the early 1900s, but a method resulting from fiscal concerns. Each level added to the number requiring training. Under this concept Headquarters could determine the number of personnel to train based on available funding. In other words Headquarters had the option to add or delete trainees at will.

Within planning, small-arms training levels were reborn. Similar to past methods, basic training was divided into essential follow-on, necessary follow-on, and desirable follow-on. The plan outlined specific groups and duties; it called for Headquarters to mandate the training level in each fiscal year.

Under the management section, Headquarters (OMR) looked to reallocate funds, quantify the number of trainees in each level, and make Headquarters responsible for monitoring the details of course and of instruction. OMR was to compare the numbers trained to the numbers which the districts had authorized for training and "prod where indicated."³⁴

In previous years the districts had been responsible for this function, which created a degree of autonomy. However, the planned monitoring required a full staff to supervise field training, although a complete staff was out of the question because of budget constraints. The last full-time small-arms training staff had served under the ordnance section during the 1930s and into the early 1940s. The memorandum did not address the utilization or management of small-arms instructors.

The training philosophies changed because of the budget restraints, forced by the mid-1970s rapid inflation rate in the general economy. Headquarters now recognized that traditional training over standard courses was "closely controlled and ignores the development of judgment and use of weapons in the 'real world'."³⁵ The standard courses taught only the mechanical skills of weapons handling and small-arms competition.

The same proposal suggested "utilizing police/military combat type courses," for follow-on training or using "to the maximum extent possible courses of instruction available locally from federal, state, or local agencies, [to] thus minimize lost time and travel costs."³⁶ The need to conserve money was paramount to the whole training program. In his January 8th memorandum, Moore wrote:

It's generally recognized that competitive shooting has a place, whether measured by an intangible such as incentive, or as a way to incrementally increase proficiency. It is not a cost-effective aspect of the program and must be considered only as "nice to have" where we're flush.³⁷

The Coast Guard would not be "flush" again for some time. The competitive program, curtailed some years before, was now beyond resurrection, at least in this decade. Competition had lost all of its former status and the men who still fired on their own, like their pre-1929 counterparts, found that Headquarters could no longer support competitive shooting from either a financial or philosophical position. For example, ASMCM Charles J. Dugan, a 20-year veteran of competitive shooting for the Coast Guard, requested temporary orders to attend the tryouts for the 1976 Olympic shooting team at Black Canyon, Arizona.³⁸ Headquarters had "no objection" to his participation but also allocated no funds. Dugan did note that the Second District would pay his entry fees and ammunition, but in a handwritten note, the assistant to military readiness said, "I suggest that he be allowed to go on permissive orders. Then if he is serious about competing, he will go on his own money."³⁹ The indication was that after 20 years of competitive shooting, including international matches and a tryout for the 1972 Olympic team, Dugan was not serious about his sport.

Ironically, the Coast Guard continued to support the Coast Guard Academy's pistol teams, arguing that their funds came from other accounts and were part of intercollegiate sports.

OMR's recommendations concerning small arms and training were summarized by the Chief of Operations and presented to the commandant. Rear Admiral G. O. Thompson recommended the end of support for competitive shooting and implementation of a stepped incremental approach to training keyed to needs and considering funding. The steps included:

- Step I* Training for all personnel upon entry.
- Step II* Annual follow-on training for intelligence investigators, small-arms instructors, air crew (survival training), and those considered absolutely essential by the various district commanders.
- Step III* Annual follow-on training for personnel assigned to established unit security forces, those providing internal security for combat and combat-support units, those for ELT and Port Security

personnel who would be required to bear arms to meet contingencies.

Step IV Annual follow-on training for all personnel assigned to operating forces.

Step V Annual follow-on training for all military personnel.

Step VI Support of competitive shooting.⁴⁰

These six steps, or levels as they were later called, were meant to lower the number of persons to be trained. This was the third system of management attempted over the past 40 years, but the first directly devised to reduce training costs. A chart showing estimated costs for each step was given to the commandant:

Step	I	II	III	IV	V	VI
\$	180K	24K	36K	225K	315K	88K
Cumulative	180K	204K	240K	465K	780K	868K

The total amount allocated to operate the small-arms training program through Step VI was \$868,000, less than the assets of the navy's 1969 competitive shooting teams. However, OMR planned to "achieve Step III during FY-77."⁴¹ Like so many other instructions relating to Coast Guard marksmanship training, the steps were open to liberal interpretation. In July 1976, Headquarters issued the training levels and the problems began.⁴²

Using the steps as a guide, the management system required each district to develop and report the numbers of trainees. In turn, Headquarters saw that no district exceeded those numbers. However, the trend was toward more training and more costs, not less. The numbers trained in 1975 represented a record high—over 11,000 with the rifle and 13,000 with the pistol. Cape May had a banner year with an unprecedented 48 percent of its trained recruits, not all of whom received training, qualified with the pistol.⁴³

Law enforcement was the impetus behind the increases. The Coast Guard anchored its service identity in law enforcement but Headquarters was slow to react to the calls for more law enforcement small-arms training. A uniform policy concerning law enforcement training had not yet been adopted. Without guidance, some districts broadly interpreted a line in the training level instruction—"To provide more effective/realistic training to Level III personnel, thus improving overall capability,"—and began sending personnel to unapproved local and state training courses.⁴⁴ Although this had been a consideration in Moore's memorandum, it was not implemented.

These were non-standard training courses and the instruction in theory, practice, and philosophy differed as widely as the regions of the nation. However, graduates of these mostly civilian police schools stated that this style of small-arms training was superior to anything the Coast Guard offered. This

was a natural reaction. Civilian-style weapons firing was less dogmatic and military, and the thought of being quasi-policemen was a welcome change from the monotony of everyday Coast Guard quasi-military activities. The change to civil law enforcement-style shooting was so superior that a few districts abandoned the slower, more structured official Coast Guard courses and devised their own. The autonomy permitted in past years now became a complete breach in training discipline.

This increase in law enforcement activity also brought a familiar call for more "realism in training" and a general shift from competitive style to police combat shooting. By this time Chief Hanna's training practices of World War II had been long forgotten, and the Coast Guard embarked on a short search for proper training courses.

Small-arms training of the 1970s also included more female Coast Guard members; their training became controversial. The controversy was not over whether women should be trained, but over the weapons they should use. The Reserve Training Center, Yorktown, Virginia, where the majority of female personnel were trained, requested additional .38-caliber revolvers for their training but Headquarters disapproved the request. The Reserve Training Division at Headquarters agreed, stating, "This division would prefer that women not be trained with the .38 revolver, but rather the standard service pistol [.45 caliber M1911A1]."⁴⁵

The firing range personnel at Yorktown were persistent and reported that 210 female shooters were trained between June and August 1976 on the standard U.S. Navy "F" pistol course.⁴⁶ The lengthy report explained the reasons that women should not be trained with the .45 caliber M1911A1 pistol. The report recommended "that USCG women be authorized to fire either weapon interchangeably, depending on personal strength and size [physical] demonstration of capability to use either or both weapons."⁴⁷ The report further recommended that once a particular woman was evaluated for weapon type suitability, she would use that weapon only and a certifying statement entered into her service record. The Yorktown range personnel outlined their major reasons for supporting this recommendation.

- a. The .45-caliber pistol is, in most cases, too heavy for Coast Guard women to fire safely during both timed and rapid fire. Most .45-caliber rounds fired by women during this segment of qualification strike the ground somewhere between the firing point and the target.
- b. Most women's hands are not physically large enough to properly grip the weapons and maintain positive control of it between rounds fired.
- c. Most women demonstrated a physical strength problem in pulling the .45 slide to the rear. In accomplishing this, the weapon usually was pointed at the shooter next to her or otherwise handled in a manifestly unsafe manner.⁴⁸

The report was neither scientific nor free of bias. It concluded with a warning that accidents and possible personal injuries could result.⁴⁹ The

training for these female members was conducted by the same staff that operated the small-arms instructors (SAI) school; however, no recommendations were given to improve safety or modify training techniques for female shooters or any other group. Headquarters was not swayed by the less-than-convincing argument and disapproved the request.

The hope had been that once the revolver was accepted for one group, it would be accepted universally. However, the discussion over the use of revolvers in the Coast Guard had not ended with this latest denial from Headquarters.

Requests for greater small-arms allowances countered the continuing need to reduce the amount of ammunition being expended. The reduction of the number of personnel to be trained saved ammunition, but this was not enough. In June 1976, to reduce ammunition expenditures, the M16 rifle course and the navy pistol "E" and "F" courses were altered and remained so for nearly a decade.⁵⁰

The M16 rifle course could still be fired at the 200-yard or 1,000-inch ranges. The routine of the courses was now as follows:

Order	Time Limit	Rounds	Position	Sling
Zeroing	1 min per round	12 (four 3-rd mags)	Prone	Loop
1.	5 min	10 (one 10-rd mag)	Prone	Loop
2.	60 sec	10 (two 10-rd mags)	Standing to Prone	Loop
3.	60 sec	10 (two 10-rd mags)	Standing to Sitting or Kneeling	Loop
4.	10 min	10 (one 10-rd mag)	Standing	Parade or Hasty

The major difference between this course and its 1971 version was the deletion of the rounds in the rapid-fire prone string; six rounds were added to the zeroing phase. The M16 rifle required as much care in zeroing as other rifles. Competitive shooting may have assisted in illustrating this matter. In 1975 competitive matches allowed use of the M16 rifle and these shooters gave considerable attention to the importance of zeroing.⁵¹ The deletion of the "rapid prone" ten rounds also necessitated a change in qualification scores to: expert—175, sharpshooter—167, marksman—140.

Headquarters modified the navy "F" course for Coast Guard use that was in essence the U.S. Navy Qualification course. The change deleted the entire

ten-round string, 15-yard string. Fired in its entirety from the 25-yard range it now consisted of:

Range	Time	Shots	Target	Types of Fire
25	10 min	10	Standard American 25 yds RD and TF	Slow
25	20 sec	10 ^a	Standard American 25 yds RF and TF	Timed
25	15 sec	10 ^a	Standard American 25 yds RF and TF	Rapid

^aTime is for one five-round magazine, two magazines to be fired.

The pistol scores had to be modified to reflect the changes:

“E” Course: Expert 240; Sharpshooter 225; Marksman 210.

“F” Course: Expert 225; Sharpshooter 200; Marksman 165.

Course changes were met with changes in the parameters for marksmanship awards. The expert shot medals for rifle and pistol were now presented on a permanent basis after only one qualification. In previous years the Coast Guardsman had to requalify in three consecutive years to retain the expert medal permanently. The change meant that once earned the award could not be lost; awards could be upgraded, but only one award could be worn.

The reduction of course standards in award criteria, and the qualification scores did not remove the call for more practical weapons training. Headquarters, with some field assistance, scrutinized the courses available for transformation. The most logical course for Headquarters and the easiest for staff inexperienced in police-type weapons training was at the neighboring FBI Academy at Quantico, Virginia. The Federal Bureau of Investigation was willing to help by providing their 1959-vintage courses of fire, which had remained virtually intact since the 1930s.⁵²

The developers of what was to be the Coast Guard practical pistol course were convinced that competitive “bull’s-eye” shooting as a service standard was best, and some had trouble understanding the purposes and concepts of practical pistol shooting. In addition, the FBI courses were adapted to shore operations, primarily in urban areas, and had little similarity to the waterborne operations of the Coast Guard. Other problems were experienced with the translation of revolver-based training courses to the service’s semiautomatic pistol. Compounding the controversy was the popular civil police concept that no semiautomatic pistol was suitable for law enforcement work.

Practical and competitive training were combined in the course. The two styles varied in the number of rounds fired in each string or phase. In this

practical course, the magazine remained loaded with only five rounds instead of the maximum seven. The 5-round limit was a holdover from competitive shooting. The FBI required the revolver to be fully loaded with six rounds for various phases of its training.

The stances for firing adopted by the Coast Guard were similar to the FBI's, particularly in the one-handed (unsupported) phase. During World War II, Chief Hanna remarked that by the time any Coast Guardsman achieved this position in an actual shooting situation, the Coast Guardsman would be dead! This stance is directly related to competitive shooting. In 1952, this contradiction of styles was noted by Walter R. Walsh, who stated that many people "have no taste for competitive shooting and are interested only in attaining maximum practical effectiveness in the minimum time."⁵³

Maximum effectiveness in the shortest possible time was exactly what the Coast Guard wanted and needed, but course development was further impeded by the number of rounds authorized for the course. The FBI's revolver course used over 60 rounds but the standard government issue packaging for .45-caliber service ammunition was 50. It was thought that the number of rounds should be kept to the even pack, which was a change from past rifle courses that ignored standard packs. This necessitated the deletion of some positions used by the FBI. The "new" course was born from the economy of ammunition expenditure, economy of research, and economy of thought.

One element not taken into account during the development phase was the philosophical difference between the FBI and the Coast Guard's purposes of training. The FBI required extensive preliminary training before attempting qualification on the practical course. The FBI small-arms staff stressed that "the requirement in the *development* (emphasis added) of combat shooting ability cannot be overemphasized."⁵⁴ The Coast Guard, on the other hand, looked for expedient methods, and considered the navy pistol "E" or "F" courses satisfactory for development.

Under pressure, the course developed into police-style training as published in the June 10th amendment to the 1976 *Ordnance Manual (CG-272)*. The course instituted was a condensed version of the FBI's "Tactical Revolver Course" published in March 1976.

As with any change in long used practices, problems were encountered, especially from field small-arms instructors who had not been trained in the course's content or procedures. Only a handful of field instructors had a firm understanding of the course's purpose or ideology. Headquarters had issued the course outline with only the orders to proceed and train. The concept that marksmanship instruction was a sophisticated and specialized form of teaching had been forgotten. Also forgotten was that the purpose of practical training was the protection of personal life and limb at the expense of the adversary—not target shooting.

The loss of instructional philosophy was compounded by the addition of two separate standards for revolver and pistol. The revolver course used the time requirements established by the FBI, but because the M1911A1 pistol was considered easier to reload, the firing time was shortened. Immediate reaction

came from the district small-arms training managers who felt that range safety had been sacrificed. This caused a revision to the course which made both the revolver and pistol times compatible.

Practical pistol firing also required a different target from the American standard 25-yard competitive target. The man-sized silhouette B-21 (or Colt silhouette) was selected because it was the same target used for the FBI course.

Soon after the new training plans went into affect implementation recommendations arrived at Headquarters from the field for changes or complete revision to the loosely termed practical course. Some districts wanted to junk the entire course and start over. All proposals were rejected. Some justifiably had no merit, and others were submitted at the wrong time.⁵⁵

The Coast Guard was not willing to change the established course it had just begun, despite flaws.⁵⁶ Headquarters felt that the personnel in the districts did not have sufficient experience in civil law enforcement style weapons training techniques to offer any beneficial suggestions. Some agreements had been made and the course question was settled for a time, but small-arms training continued growing in numbers trained. The growing law enforcement environment would not allow wholesale changes to training standards. However, with a course in place Headquarters felt no need to continue development of courses that could replace the courses as mission emphasis evolved or changed.

A year later, the levels system of training created as many problems in some districts as in the 1950s. The difficulties were noted by Commander J. D. Hartman, First District readiness officer, at Boston, Massachusetts, in a letter to Headquarters.

Level III personnel cannot practically be identified by the District Commander. The main problem is the inclusion of gate guards, gangway watchstanders and boarding parties. These assignments vary widely with the Command. This problem is amplified more by personnel rotation and collateral duty personnel, such as gangway watchstanders, who are also assigned to boarding details."⁵⁷

In concept, the levels approach had disregarded the varied duties of many units, especially the cutters. Under the guidelines, more than 50 percent of any cutter's complement could be trained. However, because of personnel rotations, a 100 percent could be trained each year. It all depended on the resourcefulness of the cutter's personnel. Hartman restated the arguments of 50 years before: the weather in the First District hampered training and "the opportunity to conduct practical type training has not yet arisen."⁵⁸ Headquarters recognized this was a problem, but offered no solution or guidance; instead in July 1977, it issued the next year's training levels, "up to Level III."⁵⁹

The tightly structured management of the small-arms training system did not reduce costs. Management under the new system did not prod; it did not tally; it existed only on paper. The annual reports outlining district performance unexplainably stopped; training figures were only scratch penciled

notes on intraoffice memoranda. No one supervised the districts which, taking note of the deficiency, began to deviate from the written system. Level III training was a matter of interpretation, and the figures trained in pistol during fiscal year 1977 exceeded 10,000 personnel.

Despite the lack of management, economy of ammunition usage again became the watchword. The 1976 ordnance manual was amended in September 1977 to reflect the new and lower annual training ammunition allowances from those of the 1960s. Rifle ammunition (5.56mm) was reduced to 170 rounds per member; pistol to 150 rounds; and riot gun remained at 25. The reduced allowances would have an impact on overall training, especially pistol training. Training with the rifle had already declined because it was not considered an appropriate weapon for law enforcement use. However, the 12-gauge riot gun became an important part of boarding parties.

Shotgun (riot gun) training consisted of a familiarization course implemented in the ordnance manual, and was only used for mechanical and safety training. Actual qualification had not yet become required for the shotgun. If a Coast Guardsman could qualify with the service rifle, then qualification and proficiency with the shotgun was taken for granted.

In December 1977, the reduction of ammunition training costs was still the leading question. During 1976 the Coast Guard expended over \$91,000 for rifle ammunition alone, and costs were expected to rise.⁶⁰

The use of simulators became attractive as costs increased. Master Chief Gunner's mate Martin J. Kelleher, Chief, Ordnance Training Section, a subdivision of military readiness, researched alternatives. He reviewed the marksmanship systems under test and evaluation by the U.S. Army and Marine Corps. These systems were laser and infrared simulators mounted on modified M16 rifles.⁶¹

Each system offered immediate feedback to the trainee in the form of a computer print-out. However, the systems were only prototypes, not fully developed. Only one, the U.S. Army's Weaponeer was ready. Coast Guard Headquarters, impressed with the army's system, requested funding to purchase a number of the systems. The requests, however, were continually disapproved or given a low priority; by 1982 Headquarters cancelled all requests. Costs for the system had risen to the point where it was no longer a thrifty choice for the Coast Guard.

Another training alternative reviewed was the .22-caliber rimfire adapter for the M16 rifle, reminiscent of the adapters developed in the 1930s for the service pistol. The U.S. Air Force and the Coast Guard tested the device. The Air Force used the device but the Coast Guard found design problems and did not adopt it.

The pistol was not considered for simulation but was considered for replacement—again with the revolver. A detailed staff study, commissioned by the military readiness branch at Headquarters, presented the pros and cons of each weapon type. The report recommended remaining with the pistol “until such time as a weapon demonstrating significant improvement becomes available.”⁶² The periods emphasis was on law enforcement, yet Headquarters

pursued training simulators applicable only to military missions and did not encompass the Coast Guard's actual needs.⁶³ There was little consistency of effort, largely because the small-arms training coordinator was not attached to the office that organized procurement of weapons training material and ammunition. Headquarters made no effort to employ external consultants or take advantage of the experts available within the reserves, many of whom had many years of practical law enforcement firearms experience.

Maintaining the *status quo* in weapons was reflected by the general attitude in mid-December 1977. The training management worked "to provide better training and to more effectively utilize our resources."⁶⁴ However, there were doubts that the overall program would accomplish all it should.

The present small-arms training program provides the trainee with adequate knowledge of the mechanical operation of the weapon for the Combat/Operations programs. This training program does not, however, as currently being applied, appear to answer the needs of the ELT [Enforcement of Laws and Treaties] and OFP [Offshore Fisheries Patrol] mission areas.⁶⁵

To improve training in the law enforcement areas, increased emphasis was placed on judgmental situations for "use of force" and instituting quarterly familiarization with small arms. The first concern was acted upon, but the second was not. Ammunition was still too expensive for quarterly training.

The most basic and cost-effective training tool was overlooked—the small-arms instructors. Efficient and knowledgeable instructors could have reduced training costs by reducing the amount of redundancy of trainee participation. Beginning in 1970, Yorktown had conducted two small-arms instructor (SAI) classes a year. However, nothing had been done to improve instructor quality or ability; the need within the Coast Guard for more small-arms instructors was growing as a result of increased training.

Considering that the small-arms instructor course continued at Yorktown, the Yorktown small-arms training staff had difficulties of its own. Its annual account of small-arms training for 1978, all above Level III, reported 44 percent qualified with the pistol, or revolver, and an average 83 percent with the M16 rifle.⁶⁶

In 1978, because of perceived deficits in instructors, the districts began pressuring Headquarters to provide more small-arms instructors and to increase the capacity of the training course. Headquarters, in turn, issued a one-time solicitation for anyone with former small-arms instructor training.⁶⁷ The solicitation for experienced personnel required each person to submit a resume of individual marksmanship training experience; Headquarters considered any of the following acceptable experience.

- a. Service SAI [Small-Arms Instructor] Schools
- b. NRA Qualified Range Officer/Range Safety Officer
- c. Civilian SAI Courses (FBI, Colt, Smith & Wesson, Winchester, Remington, etc.)

- d. Two years' experience running ranges in the Coast Guard
- e. Qualification as marksman or better with service rifle or pistol⁶⁸

It was a reasonable way of filling a gap. Beginning in December 1978, the letters answering the call for experienced instructors poured in, and military readiness assigned the new HH, formerly SAI, qualification code to all—even those with minimal or very doubtful credentials.

The experience of these men varied. Some had acted only as coaches on the various district annual training teams. Others had extensive experience, both at organized training centers and competitive training; others claimed civilian police experience. The basic competency level of the instructors did not appear to be a major concern, nor did the fact that the work of an instructor called for organizational abilities and capabilities that most of these instructors did not have.

Despite the 1 February 1979 cutoff date, Headquarters continued to accept the experience factor until 1983. This arrangement compounded the problem of recognizing standards of competency in small arms and added to the confusion in training methods.

The small-arms training program continued to outstretch the capabilities of Headquarters's managerial staff, which had been one of the major problems of the program for many years. The practical pistol course attracted many people to the training sessions because of the less competitive format. The practical course also added fuel to the controversy surrounding the differing training philosophies in existence after World War II.

As happened 30 years before, two distinct groups formed among small-arms instructors and program managers. The first believed all personnel should have a good foundation along more tradition lines although not necessarily competitive training. The second group saw no real need for the basic fundamentals of bull's-eye type shooting and urged for realism in training. Both had the same goal, but their approaches and attitudes were entirely different. The debate was not limited to enlisted instructors, but extended into the officer corps. Many of these officers, including non-ordnance warrant officers, had no training or skills in weapons fundamentals and based their knowledge on personal theories or experience.

These differences in opinion led to confusion in course choices. The *Ordnance Manual (CG-272)*, re-issued on 30 March 1978, included all the changes of the past two years, but field managers drew other conclusions. The manual required successful firing for qualification on both the navy pistol "E" or "F" course *and* the practical pistol course. However, these standards were challenged. Headquarters, obviously under some pressure, attempted without success to resolve the matter. It directed another quick-fix message in August 1978:

The pistol "E" and "F" courses shall be used as prerequisites for the practical pistol course at the discretion of the range officer, based on the individual shooter's familiarization and expertise with the weapon.⁶⁹

This indecisive approach only created more difficulties. The discretion method depended on the local range officer's experience or ability to make a competent decision of a shooter's expertise. Without clear procedures, many districts entirely abandoned the competitive style pistol "E" and "F" courses, while others had anticipated the problems and maintained the published standard. The result was an increase in ammunition expended for training.

The major difficulties came when personnel were transferred from district to district or, in some cases, station to station within a district. The differences in training policies became more apparent. The units following the prescribed regulations often had to retrain recently transferred personnel because they had received training on neither the "E" or "F" pistol courses.

In the same message, Headquarters showed signs of weariness over the constant problem and solicited "recommendations for improvements of small-arms courses."⁷⁰ OMR also noted that "after October 1, 1978, small-arms training in variance with the ordnance manual must be approved by COMDT (G-OMR) before being implemented."⁷¹ Units were given two months to stop their unauthorized training practices and obtain permission to resume them.

Pressure increased to develop a qualification course for the shotgun. The previous theory that riflemen were qualified with a shotgun was no longer held. A course was devised over two days at the Small Arms Instructor School at Yorktown. Headquarters ordered in Chief Warrant Officers George A. "Fingers" Quinn and C. W. Bozeman to assist in course selection and development.⁷²

The selection of course content was not difficult; a revised version of the FBI's basic shotgun course was chosen. This course was fired from the 15- and 25-yard lines and used a total of 15 rounds. The number of rounds for the course was a confusing factor. The ammunition allowance remained at 25; therefore, legally, the qualification course could only be fired once.

Some members of the Coast Guard voiced their discontent with the program and the ambiguous policies. The readiness office of Pacific Area wrote as follows:

In view of current austere funding at the district/unit level, increased operating schedules, lack of range facilities, and lack of qualified personnel to carry such a program, small-arms training to the level specified [Level III]...is unrealistic and certainly unattainable in the near future.⁷³

It is strongly recommended that an in-depth review of the procedures for carrying out the program be undertaken and additional guidance and assistance be provided to all districts.⁷⁴

This was not a typical complaint, but 1979 began with no review of the small-arms training program. The rift between the two instructional factions was still strong, and neither received the direction or leadership to regulate the program. However, congressional action would influence the small-arms program. In 1979, Congress passed legislation establishing a 200-mile fisheries

boundary around the coasts of the United States. This act, like the 1867 Seal Protection Act, resulted in more active and armed boardings by Coast Guard personnel, as well as a more active role in the development of law enforcement training and techniques.

With this slight turn from the lifesaver image to one of a law enforcement agent, the call to be armed like civilian counterparts came again. The Office of Intelligence and Security (OIS) headed the effort to replace the M1911A1 pistol. The Military Readiness Division objected, and both divisions turned to their commander, Rear Admiral Norman C. Venzke, Chief, Office of Operations, for a decision. Military Readiness provided a lengthy "issue paper" presenting the pros and cons of each weapon type. Venzke reviewed the statements and responded on May 18, 1979:

I reluctantly concur with your [OMR] recommendation that we retain the .45-caliber automatic and not replace it with the .38-caliber revolver. Although I am absolutely convinced that the .38-caliber revolver is far more suitable and safer than the .45-caliber automatic for law enforcement purposes, the change is not to be made for the following reasons:

- a. DOD [Department of Defense] is evaluating a new standard side arm;
- b. Replacement of our large inventory of .45-caliber automatics used for ELT [Enforcement of Laws and Treaties] would be costly inasmuch as surplus .38-caliber revolvers are not available."⁷⁵

The cost of replacing the seven-thousand .45-caliber M1911A1s with .38-caliber revolvers would be over \$1 million. The sentiments concerning safety were echoes from the 1930s, but the logical solution was to produce standards for better training and instruction. Headquarters still did not see the field instructor as the simplest solution to the problem. The desire to maintain authority in the Coast Guard often prevented the granting of responsibility.

In the meantime, training continued under the perplexing and often ambiguous provisions used in previous years. On 23 April 1979, the field units received another training level instruction for the remainder of fiscal year 1979 and fiscal year 1980. Within the notice military readiness made another attempt to clarify once and for all the training requirements. The military readiness office defined Level III personnel as "all personnel assigned to cutters who routinely perform ELT boarding and custody crew (a terminology change from the old prize crew, which technically can only exist in a time of war) duties," and "all personnel assigned to shore units who routinely perform ELT duties."⁷⁶

This was a clear and straightforward instruction; however, when read in the field, most ignored the word "routinely" and permitted anyone to "receive small-arms training to the maximum extent possible."⁷⁷ This last line of the instruction was taken quite literally by those conducting the training, exceeding authorized ammunition allowances.

As the tempo of law enforcement boardings increased, the riot gun, or shotgun, became a more important tool. It had taken a year to promulgate a course developed in less than a week, and like the practical pistol course, it remained a hybrid. Implemented in October 1979, the shotgun qualification course became a reality. The final course consisted of:

Stage	Rounds	Time	Position	Range	Target
1	5	25 sec	Standing	25 yards	B-21
2	5	25 sec	Kneeling	25 yards	B-21
3	5	5 min	Hip Fire	15 yards	B-21
Maximum Score: 675 (135 pellets)					
Qualifying Scores: Expert—425, Sharpshooter—400, Marksman—350 ⁷⁸					

The first string was fired from the standing position in 25 seconds, the second from the kneeling in 25 seconds and the third, from 15 yards, from the hip position. Like the practical pistol course, there was no real explanation of the fundamentals of instruction with the shotgun.

The scoring offered an exceptional opportunity for nearly everyone to qualify. The greatest point of contention of this course was the ten rounds fired rather quickly from the shoulder. Improperly trained personnel, or those not heeding warnings given, were often subjected to physical pain from an “improper hold” of the shotgun.⁷⁹

Unusually, field instructors considered the scores far too low, but calls for higher qualifying scores went unanswered. Headquarters also thought the scores too low at least initially. The original draft of the course showed expert as 500, sharpshooter as 475, and marksman as 400. The shotgun course would remain in use for four years, with no change or review, carrying Coast Guard small-arms training into the 1980s. The shotgun course added more fuel to the philosophical fire. The different training factions not only argued over course content, but could not agree on a standard method of loading and unloading the weapon. The debate raged on.

The Coast Guard of the 1970s found itself in many ways similar to the Coast Guard of the 1930s. A faltering national economy forced cutbacks in funding of many projects, but at the same time a growing law enforcement role demanded the implementation of progressive and worthwhile small-arms training techniques. Headquarters made attempts to use regulations to cope with dramatic internal stresses and fiscal changes. In addition, the Coast Guard abandoned the competitive program, possibly without thought of the benefits of retaining a dedicated source of trained marksmen and armorers in the Coast Guard. An investment in combat-style competitive shooting would have been a recoverable cost in increased expertise. But, unlike the 1930s, the 1970s

Coast Guard lacked an ordnance visionary such as Admiral Russell R. Waesche, as well as support and expertise, especially in ordnance-trained officers, to make the small-arms program an asset to the overall Coast Guard mission.

During the 1970s, however, a new interest emerged in small arms, which was one positive aspect of an otherwise financially austere and poorly managed period. The installation of practical training courses was another positive step that did more to universally increase interest in training—and create division—than at any other time in the course of Coast Guard history. Interest, however, was maintained at the field level, and to a significantly lesser degree, Headquarters.

Notes

1. U.S.C.G. Commandant Instruction 3590, OMR, R. E. Hammond, August 18, 1970.
2. The reductions would probably have come in the competitive program without the budget reductions. The Navy had issued a memorandum (Bureau of Naval Personnel, Pers-C43121/cag, 3590, April 10, 1969) that also questioned the worth of its competitive program for the good of the whole service. The decision was that it was worth keeping, and added \$293,000 to the program. It was possible the Coast Guard knew it could not compete on this scale and gave up.
3. U.S.C.G. Commandant Instruction 8370.2, "Small Arms Policy," OMR-3, R.W. Goehring, March 17, 1970.
4. *Ibid.*, 2.
5. *Ibid.*, Enclosure (3).
6. *Ibid.*
7. The price fell below \$200 as U.S. Army contracts grew larger. However, in 1967 the price was over \$200.
8. *Ibid.*, 1.
9. *Ibid.*, Enclosure (1).
10. *Ibid.*
11. *Ibid.*, Enclosure (2).
12. *Ibid.*
13. The riot guns used in this period were the Winchester Model M1897 12-gauge with seven-round magazine and bayonet M1905. The sniper rifles were the M1D and M1C Garands.
14. *Ibid.*, 2-3.
15. NA, RG 26 Entry 151. Report of Survey of USRC *Ingham*, November 14, 1834. Jones convinced the department that he was correct and received the additional arms.

16. U.S.C.G. Commandant Notice 8370, "M-16 Rifle Familiarization Course," OMR, R.W. Goehring, July 15, 1970. The notice said there were currently no familiarization or qualification course for the M16. The former courses issued had evidently been forgotten, and this one was issued as a quick fix to a recurrent problem.
17. Russell R. Waesche, Draft of "Armaments and Gunnery in the Coast Guard," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, 55 (May 1929):10. This quote is from the actual article.
18. U.S. Navy, *Small Arms Marksmanship Manual*, Bureau of Naval Personnel, NAVPERS 93863, (1971): 67. The "B" course authorized the use of reduced targets where 200-yard ranges could not be found. U.S. Navy, *Landing Party Manual, 1960*, OPNAV P 34-03, 636.
19. War Department, *U.S. Rifle, Caliber .30 M1*, Basic Field Manual, FM 23-5, Washington: GPO, (July 30, 1943):151.
20. U.S.C.G. Commandant Notice 8370, "M16 Qualification Course," OMR, D. H. Luzius, July 8, 1971. The continued use of notices gave a general intention that this was only temporary, and something would replace the course. The M1 rifle remained in use because a complete change-out with M 16 had not yet occurred.
21. U.S.C.G. Commandant Notice 3591, "Results of Small Arms Marksmanship for 1971," OMR, D. H. Luzius, April 4, 1972. Training Center Alameda trained 59 more recruits than Cape May and achieved a 60 percent qualification rate.
22. U.S.C.G. Commandant Notice 3591, "Results of Small Arms Marksmanship Training for FY-72," OMR, W. A. Jenkins, April 11, 1973. Cape May had 2,242 pistol shooters and Alameda had 2,207. The reason cited for the difference was weather.
23. David R. Renner, "Shooting Teams Sweep Competition," *River Current* (publication of the Second Coast Guard District), (June 1972):2.
24. U.S.C.G. Commandant Notice 8370, "Small Arms Policy," RT, M. B. Lemly, November 23, 1973.
25. U.S.C.G. Commandant Notice 3591, "Results of the Small Arms Marksmanship Training Program of CY-73," OMR, W. A. Jenkins, March 25, 1974. Fewer recruits were being trained at both training centers in this period.
26. Message from Commandant to Ninth Coast Guard District, "Fisheries Enforcement on Great Lakes," August 1975.
27. Memorandum from OMR to OMR-2, "Small Arms Program," 8370, January 6, 1976. R. G. Moore.
28. Ibid.
29. Memorandum (G-CPA/84) 7110.2 23 December 1975, "FY 1978 Determinations" O. W. Siler to R. H. Scarborough.
30. Memorandum, G-OMR (R. G. Moore) to G-OMR-2 and G-OMR-PPBC, 8370, "Small Arms Program," dated 6 January 1976.
31. G-CPA/84 Memo., paragraph 6, pages 2-3.
32. Memorandum OMR to Office of Operations, "Small Arms Training," 8370, January 8, 1976.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid.

35. Ibid.
36. Travel was the largest concern. Travel accounted for about 75 percent of small-arms training costs.
37. Ibid.
38. ASMC M Charles J. Dugan to Commandant (G-OMR), 12 April 1976, request for TAD orders to 1976 Olympic Games Tryout. Memorandum G-OMR [CWO E. A. Farlinger, author] to C-BPA 28 April 1976. OMR had no objection to Dugan attending but had no funding available for TAD orders. His memo to the Public Affairs branch insinuates competitive shooting was no longer a function of the ordnance section.
39. Assistant OMR notations on G-OMR Intra-Office Routing Slip dated 14 April 1976 attached to Letter from ASMC M C. J. Dugan to OMR, "Request for TAD orders," 3590, April 12, 1976.
40. Memorandum Chief of Operations to Commandant. "Small Arms Training," OMR, February 9, 1976.
41. Ibid. The Navy included weapons, ammunition, funds for travel, and fees.
42. U.S.C.G. Commandant Instruction 8370.T, "FY-77 Small Arms Training," OMR, G. O. Thompson, July 30, 1976.
43. U.S.C.G. Commandant Notice 3591, "Results of the Small Arms Marksmanship Program for FY-75," OMR-2, G.O. Thompson, May 6, 1976.
44. Letter from 11th CG District to OMR, "Small Arms Training for Law Enforcement, Report of," 3574, June 2, 1976. The course trained 80 men at the Long Beach, California, Police Department. The plan had approval of the OMR at a cost of \$880.
45. Memorandum from RT, J. M. Wilkinson, to OMR, 8370, May 27, 1976.
46. Letter from Reserve Training Center, Yorktown, C. L. Blaha, to OMR-2, "Pistol qualification shooting by USCG women," 8370, December 2, 1976.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid.
49. Noting the females shooting the ground halfway to the target is similar to the remarks made by Surfman Stanley Loyer in the mid-1930s, who noted the hale and hearty surfmen who also shot the ground halfway to the target.
50. *U.S. Coast Guard Ordnance Manual (CG-272)*, amendment to Chapter 6, June 10, 1976.
51. John W. Gaines, "M16 Competition Tips for Civilian Shooters," *American Rifleman*, (September 1975), 40-41.
52. *Instructions for Small Arms Training for U.S. Treasury Department Personnel*, U.S. Coast Guard, Treasury Department Washington, D.C., September 6, 1934.
53. Walter R. Walsh, "Practical Pistol Shooting," *American Rifleman*, 115 (May 1952):25. Walsh was a small arms instructor at the FBI Academy before World War II and a skilled competitive shooter.
54. Federal Bureau of Investigation Academy, "Double-Action Revolver Training," (July 1974):3.

55. A. J. Hunter, GMCS, Eighth Coast Guard District 1976. Hunter submitted a course based on the practical aspects of the U.S. Army's Military Police training. It, too, was a six-phase 50-round course.

56. OMR to Second Coast Guard District (or) 3574 letter "Small Arms Courses; proposed changes to" dated 27 November 1978. The Second District submitted sound proposals for changes to the small arms training. Although Headquarters (OMR-3) agreed with D2s ideas and that they were of good "thrust and content," the PPC course was sufficient when used with the E or F courses.

57. J. D. Hartman, CCGD1 to OMR, "Evaluation of FY-77 Small Arms Training," 8370, June 28, 1977.

58. Ibid.

59. U.S.C.G. Commandant Notice 8370, "FY-78 Small Arms Training Level," OMR, N. C. Venzke, July 14, 1977.

60. 5.56 mm Ball (M193) ammunition cost approximately 13 cents a round.

61. Memorandum, "Study of Small Arms Training Simulator," OMR-3, M. J. Kelleher, 3574, November 28, 1977.

62. Memorandum, "Staff Study concerning change of the standard Coast Guard service weapon, the .45-caliber [semi] automatic pistol, to the .38-caliber revolver," OMR-2, J. R. Edwards, 8370, August 11, 1977. The study was conducted by CWO R. C. Tice and he concluded the conversion would cost nearly a million dollars.

63. Memorandum, M. J. Kelleher to OMR, 3574 "Study of Small Arms Simulator," dated 28 November 1977. Kelleher was the Small Arms Training Coordinator in OMR-3.

64. Memorandum, "Small Arms and Law Enforcement Training," OMR-3, T. W. Watkins, December 13, 1977.

65. Ibid.

66. Letter, Commanding Officer USCG Reserve Training Center to Commandant (G-OMR), "Annual Small Arms Training," 3570, 25 January 1978. M. M. Powdermaker. The training center's trainee were primarily reservists.

67. ALDIST 371/78, Message 151816Z, December 5, 1978, OMR.

68. Memorandum, "HH Designator; criteria for assigning," OMR-3, R. B. Bacon, December 6, 1978.

69. ALDIST Commandant Notice 3574, OMR-3, N. C. Venzke, [author M. J. Kelleher], August 7, 1978.

70. Ibid.

71. Ibid.

72. Travel authorization message 042238Z, October 1978. The discussions began on October 10, 1978.

73. Endorsement to CCGD12 letter, Pr, 3574, A. J. Soreng, November 30, 1978.

74. Ibid.

75. Memorandum, "Small Arms Training," G-O, N. C. Venzke, May 18, 1979.

76. Ibid.

77. U.S.C.G. Commandant Instruction 3574.3A, "Small Arms Training Level," OMR-3, John C. Fuechsel, April 23, 1979.

78. U.S.C.G. Commandant Instruction 3574.4, "Qualification courses of judgmental training and riot shotgun," OMR, B. F. Hollingsworth, October 25, 1979. The judgmental course had no part in small-arms training.

79. Female trainees had a unique problem in firing the shotgun and one that most male instructors were not trained to deal with. The adjustment buckle on the shoulder strap of the regulation, and some non-regulation, brassieres happened to be located where the buttplate of the shotgun usually sat. The recoil of the shotgun often "bit" the trainee causing some adverse training attitudes. The knowledgeable instructor would discreetly have these trainees relocate the strap to prevent the abrasion.

The More Things Change...

The contradictory actions and programs of the previous ten years pushed and pulled by budgetary constraints, elusive goals, and a loss of expertise caused the enactment of temporary training courses which did nothing to stem the overall decline in quality of marksmanship. This legacy set the stage for the 1980s.

Although 1980 began with a revived interest in military readiness, law enforcement, and related small-arms training, the problems of the past persisted. The practical pistol course as well as the qualification standards of all small-arms courses remained as confusing as ever. Coast Guard Headquarters (OMR) established one standard, but then allowed another. This case-by-case management resulted in a system lacking a concise policy to guide servicewide small-arms training. The training program outgrew the training manager's capability to cope with the numerous field-instigated alterations to the training courses.

The differences between the two main schools of training theory grew wider in the 1980s. The law enforcement school, as before, adamantly held to the theory that bull's-eye (competitive) courses had little or no value. They believed this style had no relevance in current operations. Despite negative comments and numerous local and unauthorized changes to the courses, few people submitted creative ideas to Headquarters for replacement courses or improvements. Although Headquarters had sought comments at one time, it no longer actively solicited recommendations. This effectively sealed off those with expertise from influencing decisions.

The sentiments of proponents for civil law-enforcement-style training courses were essentially correct. The competitive style of shooting was not suitable for operational use, but they overlooked the superior value of the competitive style for training in basic techniques. Training regulations still required use of the pistol "E" or "F" courses, but could be waived at the discretion of the range officer. Once again no one understood the policy and the conflict created widespread confusion. A January 1980 letter from Headquarters to the First Coast Guard District Readiness Office at Boston, Massachusetts, typified the problem.

The "E" and "F" courses are required because shooting on an annual basis does not keep Coast Guard personnel sufficiently familiar with the safety factors required for safe handling of the weapons. People who do not handle weapons on a daily or weekly basis are seldom able to go right into the PPC [practical pistol course] with the requirement to draw and fire a weapon without some preparation. The "E" or "F" courses also refresh marksmanship skill necessary to qualify on the PPC and Judgmental Shooting Courses and fulfill our military readiness requirements.¹

Had this statement been issued to the Coast Guard as a definitive policy statement, the matter would have been settled. But since the letter was sent to only one district, it only caused more puzzlement—especially when the districts communicated among themselves. The first sentence mandated the use of the courses for safety familiarization, but made no mention of creating an atmosphere to teach competence or shooting skills for infrequent weapons handlers. The First District wanted, as did some of the other districts, the complete removal of the “E” and “F” pistol courses in favor of the 1976 practical pistol course.

To a small extent, OMR agreed and restated its permissive policy concerning the firing of these courses. Headquarters then stated, “If the range officer is familiar with the shooter’s ability to safely handle the weapon, the “E” or “F” course can be waived and the PPC fired, as per ALDIST 215/78.”² This statement was contradictory and left some uncertainty about the requirement for course completion.

In the end the decision was left to the judgment of local instructors (there were few range officers remaining in the service with the requisite training to make those decisions). The average shooter did not have to demonstrate appropriate and safe weapons handling, although the letter required the “E” or “F” courses for safety. The shooter just had to be known by the range officer.

This led to the testimonial system similar to the 1840s temperance movement within the Revenue Cutter Service. All officers swore they and their men took the temperance oath while standing before the bar—of sobriety. This tongue-in-cheek method of safe weapons handling determination was not exclusively a First District problem. This judgment was all too often left to junior petty officers, who were exposed to pressures from their seniors and peers.

Problems also entered into the decision processes of more senior instructors, some of whom had gained their qualification codes through the liberally applied December 1978 solicitation. Their decisions depended on aptitude, attitude, energy level, or personal bias rather than on demonstrated skills.

For these reasons some districts disregarded OMR’s decision on this subject. Headquarters issued no overall policy, satisfied that the issue would resolve itself. However, the districts were sure Headquarters did not resolve the issue and went back to their own training routines. Headquarter’s vacillation and lack of effective communication allowed district training autonomy much in the same way the Revenue Cutter Service operated more than a hundred years before.

The emphasis of all debate over all training courses was on pistol use. Although all service weapons were in use, the First District made no mention of much needed revision of rifle or shotgun training. Forty-five years earlier, inadequate long-gun training had been the First District’s primary complaint.

The complexity of implementation of small-arms training grew in the early 1980s as selected inactive duty reserve personnel began to augment active service units. This augmentation required these personnel to be qualified with

small arms. The initial changes in reserve small-arms training had begun in 1978. At that time Headquarters Reserve Training Division issued a notice stating that of those reservists trained during periods of active duty, "reservists so trained are not selected on the basis of mobilization billet requirements."³

Furthermore, the military style courses stressed "weapons familiarization and accuracy, and largely ignored the practical aspects, including judgment and use of force, which are at least as important in a real-world law enforcement setting."⁴ The reserve division learned the buzz words and acted out of frustration with the active duty Coast Guard because of the inaction in resolving training problems. For years reserve conducted its own small-arms training separate from the active service, but now it desired, or demanded, "that district commanders be responsible for the training of reservists in the practical use of small arms."⁵ Small-arms training for reservists was completely funded by the district reserve office, including the purchase of ammunition through the district readiness office.⁶

Despite the desire of the office of reserve, most district readiness offices knew little about reservists or their requirements. The concerns and complaints of the reserve sector were legitimate, but they had to share the responsibility for the appropriate personnel receiving small-arms training. The reserves, like the active service, experienced problems in determining those to be trained during summer months.

In the spring of 1980, the office of reserve issued another notice outlining the training levels for inactive duty selected reservists. The reserve levels duplicated the format of the active service and "set forth six levels of training." The two formats were different in that reserve used "specified mobilization billet detail codes by priority and frequency," to calculate the number of reserve personnel to be trained in the coming year.⁷

It was important for the training managers in each district readiness office to understand the detail codes and how to use them. These men procured the ammunition and training materials for active and reserve personnel. Unfortunately, determining eligibility through the complicated system proved difficult.

Ironically, the personnel in district reserve training had similar difficulty with the formulas and the guidelines. The published parameters did not help. Only a handful of reservists received training during fiscal year 1980. However, this was not the case in all reserve units; some seemed to be as innovative as some districts.

Individual reserve unit commanding officers took the position that they were a ready reserve and trained the entire unit regardless of detail code. They ignored the formula method and policies and included everyone in small-arms training. This provided a morale-lifting experience for the reserve units, but the training atmosphere suffered.

The reserve's entry into active small-arms training did have positive attributes. Its participation provided skilled instructors and created windfall ammunition stocks. Reserves seldom used their entire training allowances and

the active duty component used the surplus to supplement active training or build emergency stocks.⁸

Reserve growth was only part of the expansion of training that was noted two years before by the Military Readiness Division:

The recent expansion in the ELT Mission Area has put an enormous strain on our small-arms training program. This increase of over twice the number of Small Arms Qualified personnel required has created a shortage of Small Arms Range Officers. Without these we are limited to the number of personnel we can train regardless of the availability of funds.⁹

Captain R. B. Bacon added, "Until such time [as] we can qualify a sufficient number of Small Arms Range Officers, our program cannot accept additional trainees."¹⁰ By 1980, the problem was twofold. First, Headquarters perceived that there were insufficient numbers of small-arms instructors,¹¹ although the Yorktown school had run classes producing instructors for ten years.

Among the personnel selected to attend the small-arms instructor course, many did not possess the necessary communication or organizational skills. Although the course expanded to three weeks, it continued to carry the misnomer *instructor* training. It degenerated into a *how to shoot* course which still offered no training in the principles of teaching.

Outside of those few with natural teaching ability or those tutored by more competent instructors, none of the Yorktown trainees finished the course with the basic skills needed to transmit knowledge. Yorktown was not altogether responsible for the shortcomings. Between 1970 and 1980 the educational quality and ability of American students declined, especially in the ability to understand written information. The Coast Guard suffered, as did the remainder of the nation, from the decline in literacy. However no head instructor at the Yorktown training facility ever made one attempt to correct the problem that by in large was not even noticed.

This, in part, was a result of the confusion over the difference between range officer and instructor. Traditionally, the range officer was in charge of all range functions, of which instruction was only part. One of the duties of an instructor was to instruct a range officer in his duties. This was doubly important, since the majority of Coast Guard officers no longer had the knowledge of firing range activities and rules.

The second problem was small-arms instructor management at the Headquarters and district levels. Most districts did not have a concise plan for using their trained instructors. Some Coast Guard units sent multiple requests for quotas to the instructors' course, often not realizing that qualified instructors were already on board. Conversely, Headquarters (OMR) did not mandate the use of these trained instructors, but instead continued to acknowledge a shortage problem by requesting authorization to convene an additional class of instructors for 1981.¹²

This additional class caused the training of 100 unneeded instructors a year. The dubious need for more instructors and the overall decline in the quality of the instructor course created a situation leading to inferior training. The perceived needs were not real. Headquarters regularly provided lists of instructors to each district. Headquarters also continued to authorize use of the small-arms instructor code for those attending non-standard instructor courses at civilian facilities.

Oddly, with the additional instructor course and the out-of-hand grants of the instructor code, OMR acknowledged, "this output is barely able to keep up with the turnover in personnel at station, group, and district levels."¹³ However, Headquarters and district alike ignored, or did not know, that most of these people transferred to other duty stations took their qualifications with them, thereby providing an instructor to another place. There was no tracking mechanism in place to see that trained instructors were used at their new stations.

Some districts sought to have an instructor at each station, a feature not used since the 1930s. Apparently the general perception was that once a man left a station, he left his instructor qualifications behind. Headquarters and some districts did not recognize the transferability of the qualification, nor was it insisted upon.

The clamor for more police-type training made the supposed shortage of instructors more apparent. Districts and active service units asked for more frequent qualification and training similar to local police and FBI agents. The greatest proponent of more modern training was the Law Enforcement Branch (OLE) in Headquarters. OMR reacted to OLE's prompting, "We do not have the time, personnel, facilities or money. We must take a realistic look at our needs and train to a level that can be maintained. Our personnel turnover is too great to allow for saturation training."¹⁴

OLE was not finished: it also suggested that weapons qualification become a graduation requirement for recruit training similar to civilian police training. OMR answered: "The amount of time devoted to small-arms training at Recruit Training Centers is about thirteen hours out of eight weeks."¹⁵ This was only a day and a half for two weapons, about the same amount of time given in World War II.

OLE's viewpoint was that Coast Guardsmen were now federal law enforcement officers performing military duties, instead of the reverse. The realistic look mentioned by OMR had no more substance or promise than the 1956 study. Small-arms training moved along at the same halting pace.

Instructor shortages, instructor quality, and the push for more civilian-style training were the major items affecting small-arms training in the early 1980s. During this same period, a severe shortage of .45-caliber ammunition hampered training. The shortages resulted from Department of Defense budget constraints, and OMR attempted to relieve the problem by making a direct purchase of over four million rounds from a private ammunition manufacturer.

The purchase was a disaster. The standards of quality control of the ammunition was poor, and much of the ammunition arrived uninspected. Some

instructors found cartridges without any, or with too much, propellant (powder), and others with projectiles (bullets) inverted in the cartridge cases. Still others had no primers. Eventually Headquarters banned thousands of rounds from use and the shortage continued. This had been the first attempt to independently purchase service ammunition commercially in the twentieth century, with less than successful results.

The ammunition shortage caused the reemergence of the Air Force's .22-caliber M16 adapter as an alternative. Group Baltimore, Maryland, requested its use for both training and qualification.¹⁶ Ironically, OMR approved the use of the adapter for training within the Fifth District only, but did not approve it for qualification. OMR offered no reason for not allowing the device in the other districts, but as the instructor course was taught within the bounds of the Fifth District, that may have been a deciding factor. In previous years the .22 rifle could be used for qualification, but not awards. No other districts followed this line of training, preferring to remain with the service ammunition for the experience, if nothing else.

With or without ammunition, law enforcement became the driving purpose of small-arms training, whether practical or impractical. Coast Guard law enforcement began to copy police ideals and attitudes such as the following:

A modern police department today is really a miniature Army, complete from its arsenals, bristling with submachine guns, riot guns, high powered rifles, and side arms, to grenades and guns to lay down a barrage of gas.¹⁷

This described the 1936 Los Angeles Police Department, but well illustrated the Coast Guard's attitude toward, or quest for, civilian law-enforcement-style equipment and training a half century later. For example, the Thirteenth Coast Guard District applied for a monumental increase in training allowances to parallel the training routines of other full-time law enforcement agencies. The increased allowances would

ensure in the midst of a myriad of requirements for diversified skill he is able to develop a proficiency and confidence that will enable him to go from a search and rescue mission to a law enforcement mission with the necessary degree of competence on a very short notice.¹⁸

Others agreed with the Thirteenth District. Pacific Area Commander Vice Admiral J. S. Gracey added his support, remarking that, "Maritime law enforcement is an increasingly serious business and better small-arms training for our boarding officers is imperative."¹⁹ Gracey urged increases in training allowances for the Coast Guard at large and recommended that a "servicewide survey be made to determine overall ammunition increases."²⁰ The allowances suggested by the Thirteenth District included 930 rounds of .45-caliber, 526 for the M16, and 210 rounds for the shotgun for *quarterly training* (author's emphasis).

The official allowances increased only marginally in the intervening years to 300 for .45, 170 for M16, and 45 for shotgun. Proposed allowances would increase all allowances three-fold, which was an unrealistic amount even in the best of budgetary times. OMR again agreed "in concept" to the increase, but noted that the allowances would require an annual funding increase of three million dollars.²¹

Intermingled among requests for more ammunition were requests for more small-arms instructors. However, the instructors graduating from the instructor training course were still not used. In an attempt to change this system, a September 1982 notice dictated more efficient use of these instructors by directing that "all instructors *are to be utilized*" in the training of field personnel.²² This was a clear and accented directive where previous small-arms training directives had made new instructor utilization only a suggestion.

There was no immediate indication the districts were going to heed the directive. Their requests for instructor quotas continued to arrive at Headquarters unabated. This simple direct statement to use what they had that was ignored. When questioned about the non-use of the instructors, the districts answered that these men were no longer in positions to act as instructors even on a part-time basis. Others related that they were too busy with other duties to take the one or two days a year needed to train their shipmates. The overall reluctance of district managers to require the use of trained men further complicated the growing difficulties in conducting weapons training.

Within small-arms training, the qualification courses, particularly for pistol and shotgun, were becoming ineffective as training tools. The administration of the 1976 practical pistol course varied so widely throughout the Coast Guard that it became a routine function. Some districts, with and without authorization, applied training techniques adopted from civilian police agencies to the course.

The shotgun course was also becoming a problem. Its simplicity and liberal scoring of the shotgun qualification course caused it to become a *give-away* qualification.

In the fall of 1982, Headquarters undertook a study to find a replacement for both the practical pistol and shotgun courses. Work began with these two courses because of the important position they occupied in law enforcement training and operations. The study was conducted with the assistance of the U.S. Treasury Department's Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) at Glynco, Georgia. The use of the Treasury Department facility reversed the roles in the period from 1934 to 1948 when Coast Guardsmen trained over 6,000 Treasury civilians a year with only a minimum of instructors.

Headquarters chose FLETC over others because of biases and inflexibility in other training courses. The FBI course was not chosen because it had made only minor changes to its practical course since 1976, and the Coast Guard's school at Yorktown was not chosen because of its biases toward competitive style of training and odd non-standard civil law enforcement style courses.

The three panelists for the study were GMCM William R. Wells, Chief, Small Arms Training Section at Coast Guard Headquarters; GMCS Jerry W. Pearson, senior small-arms instructor for the Seventh Coast Guard District; and GMC James S. Adams, senior instructor of the Small Arms Instructor Course at Yorktown, Virginia. Remarkably this was the first all-enlisted panel to devise any Coast Guard small-arms training course. The use of an all-enlisted panel was a sharp indicator of the overall decline of overall military standards in the Coast Guard over the previous 30 years.

The first improvement tackled was the pistol course. The general consensus was that a variant of the Treasury Department's current qualification course modified for the M1911A1 pistol would suit current needs. The key word was *current* needs; not permanent. The use of the Treasury course was more logical than the FBI version because it offered the option of flexibility and innovation.

Training information was drawn from the over 30 law enforcement agencies which used the training center at FLETC. Their combined experience and knowledge formed a comprehensive training course covering many variables and situations. However, some of the variables in Coast Guard law enforcement boarding were unique to Coast Guard operations and practically unknown to the Treasury Department instructors. The three Coast Guardsmen added to the basic Treasury course those elements which took into account the factors most common to Coast Guard needs—a unique attitude in Coast Guard small-arms training development.

Previous training courses adopted by the Coast Guard had been designed for other agencies and military services. The Coast Guard had followed a traditional path and used handed down training courses whether they fit the Coast Guard's current needs or not. The new pistol course design was a positive step forward, but not perfect in its conception, nor was it meant to be a cure-all in its final form. It was neither a quick fix to a problem nor dogma; the intent was to form a living course that had the pliability for future growth.

One innovation included allowed instructor latitude while maintaining the traditional theories of marksmanship instruction. This was a combination of both training theories. The only inflexible portion was the end result—raising qualifying standards.

The next training program changed was for the shotgun. The resulting course slightly modified the existing shotgun course by reducing the number of rounds fired and adjusting the method of scoring. The proposed course used a total of ten rounds. This was an attempt to reduce the physical pain, the most common complaint of the trainees, which had understandably caused a negative attitude toward the shotgun training.

The general agreement among the panelists was to have the trainee fire the course two or three times with only minor pain resulting rather than once with great pain. At the same time, the multiple firing of the course provided quality training that was consistent with current operations.

The change removed the shotgun kneeling position and added two rounds fired from the *weak side* hip position. This weak-side firing, although not popular with trainees, was a reasonable tactical technique. Law enforcement

training required turning blind corners in close quarters which required changing hands, a technique used by the U.S. Army for urban warfare and the Coast Guard in South Vietnam with both the rifle and the shotgun.

The new hip position also offered some practice firing with the weak hand for emergency purposes. The kneeling position was removed because it is a basic concealment position, and that position should be generally understood from rifle training. In previous training courses, trainees were taught to assume the kneeling position without benefit of protective cover and then fire. In an actual law enforcement fire fight situation, this could have deadly consequences.

Kneeling was a viable position to be used from behind low cover, but a technique so elementary that none of the panelists thought it necessary for live fire practice. As Chief Hanna had taught during World War II, no one would have to tell their people to duck when the firing starts.

Scoring for the revised shotgun course abolished the competitive style five-points-per hit method. The new method allowed one point for each hit anywhere in the scoring area for a maximum of 90 points.

After the courses were drafted, Headquarters sent them to selected districts courses for testing and evaluation, which resulted in constructive alteration of a few procedures. The idea was to let those using the courses have some input, and Headquarters also realized that successful change needed the assent of the field forces which remained as autonomous as ever.

In addition to the course changes, the panel changed the target to the one used by the Treasury Department. Called the TRANSTAR II [Transitional Target II], it had undergone extensive testing by the Treasury Department and came in various colors to attract the trainee's eye toward the center of the target for development of center mass shooting. The Coast Guard used blue and green colors for its training to divorce itself from the older all-black targets which made better targets but poor training tools. The target change was necessary to remain consistent in an improved practical course which placed more emphasis on center mass shooting. The Coast Guard discontinued the B-21 silhouette target after nearly a half century.²³

The improved practical pistol course and revised shotgun course were placed in effect on 1 October 1983.²⁴ Remembering the debacle caused by the issuance of the previous courses without explanation, Master Chief Wells conducted a week-long seminar at Yorktown on 11 October 1983 for all district managers of small-arms training.²⁵ These 32 men received classroom and practical range-firing experience in the new courses. It was, in turn, their responsibility to train their local instructors, thereby establishing some continuity of training philosophy and thought in the Coast Guard.

The seminar brought out recurrent and similar problems in conducting small-arms training and made the following suggestions for improvements:

- a. The establishment of district controlled small-arms training teams.
- b. An annual course on procedures and policies, similar to the one held.
- c. The establishment of a manual geared to small-arms training alone.

- d. A bulletin-type publication to illustrate training procedures.
- e. A more frequent qualification standard (every six months).
- f. More time for recruit weapons training.
- g. Make weapons qualification mandatory for graduation from recruit training.
- h. A Coast Guard-owned firing range centrally located in each district.
- i. A better selection process for small-arms instructors.
- j. An improved target practice report and establishment of an individual weapons qualification card (similar to vehicle operator's license).
- k. The establishment of a Headquarters team to periodically monitor field small-arms training.

These ideas and suggestions were generated by the field managers. Some received attention, but others went unimplemented because of the lack of funding and interest.

The ideal of continuity in training was a question to be answered in the future. In February, despite the improved courses, more questions were directed to Headquarters by the districts about the lack of small-arms instructors. The Seventh Coast Guard District, the most active in law enforcement, called for more instructors.²⁶

The Seventh District also raised the question of semi-annual qualification again. However, the Seventh District, like other districts in past and present years, remained reluctant to order the use of its inactive instructors—despite Coast Guard regulations that required all instructors to train at least once each year to maintain instructor status.

Deficient instructor management in the districts caused Headquarters (OMR) to take the responsibility for issuing orders for the small-arms instructor course, just as it had in the pre-World War II period. Assignments were now by specific names instead of simply issuing an allotted number of quotas to the district. This was a return to previous policy and acquiescence to the Yorktown seminar.

The new orders also required that those attending the instructor course be third-class petty officers or above for ordnance ratings and only second or first-class petty officer for non-ordnance ratings. As in the pre-World War II era, the directive excluded officers from attending this school. Experience showed that very few officers ever served as instructors. In theory, with the assignment of specific names to the course, OMR almost assured that the district program manager, who made the ultimate decisions and recommendations, would have personal knowledge of the individuals' qualifications and suitability.

There was severe resistance to this method. Many districts wanted to maintain the former "select and direct" formula because it offered more flexibility of assignments. The new method also removed some of the district's autonomy. Headquarters countered these complaints by stating the district's responsibility to ensure that only the best qualified personnel were recommended for the course and place them on a priority list to receive training. The purpose, although not always successful, was to ensure that

district managers actually knew the people they were sending and the true condition of their individual programs. The policy would not change, at least not for a time.

The most obvious indication of the district's overall management difficulties was when two men attended and passed the instructor course—twice. OMR deliberately kept the quotas low to make the use of on-hand trained instructors more attractive.

To prevent Headquarters from being circumvented, a change to the enlisted qualifications manual excluded any external instructor training courses, including Federal, for Coast Guard use. The Coast Guard did not actually need more instructors. It had hundreds of qualified small-arms instructors on file but not on the firing range.²⁷

The disallowance of officers caused some problems, but the position of officers in Coast Guard small-arms training, as well as general ordnance, had changed considerably between the 1960s and the 1980s. Officers were now primarily on the firing range as safety officers and had little to do with the mechanics of instruction. Ordnance training for Coast Guard officers was at its lowest point since before the Quasi-War with France in 1798; therefore, small-arms training in the Coast Guard became an enlisted man's art and responsibility.

This lack of officer participation accounted for the slow progress of needed changes. The everyday use of weapons had not yet impressed Coast Guard leadership enough for them to press for more competent methods of training, such as training teams.

Many still believed, just as they had in 1928, that the Coast Guard was entirely an emergency service and that weapons had no place in this *lifesaving* service. The remainder of 1983 saw little in terms of small-arms training improvements.

There was no improvement in training by the end of 1983. The use of the 1976 practical pistol course came to an end with a meager 61 percent Coast Guard-wide qualification average. This qualification rate mirrored the rate of the navy "F" pistol course and demonstrated insufficient knowledge of basic marksmanship fundamentals and poor instruction.

The Coast Guard continued using the levels-of-training scheme. In December 1983, Headquarters issued the training levels for 1984.²⁸ Level III for the active service was still the limit, and Level IV for reservists on their own scale of training priorities. Budget constraints once again mandated training levels. Also in December 1983, another factor was being implemented that would affect future training. The procurement of the new service pistol, had begun. The new 9mm pistol would cost \$232 each for the Coast Guards 4,300 operational pistols but at this relatively high cost the pistol would be less expensive than the maintenance of the aging .45 M1911A1.

In the new training year, Headquarters authorized the use of the new practical pistol course as the qualifying course for the annual pistol qualification. However, Headquarters required successful qualification on the pistol "F" course before attempting qualification on the practical course.

The "F" course need only be fired one time successfully in a life-time. Therefore, awards for performance would be whatever the Coast Guardsman earned at that time. As a compromise and in keeping with tradition the "F" course maintained its status for awards. Contrary to civil law enforcement practice, Headquarters did not allow awards for the practical course.²⁹ This one-time award method caused some debate, but in this period of law enforcement the purpose of small-arms training was weapons proficiency—not awards. Some still objected, noting that it was common practice in civilian police agencies to issue awards for practical courses. Headquarters was aware of these awards but wanted the "F" course used for basic practice, and without incentive the course would fall astern and disappear over the horizon.

One of the base provisions of the new pistol course was that each instructor had the latitude to retrain any person he felt did not understand basic marksmanship principles. This opened the door for some abuse to upgrade awards, but the incidents were few because most younger instructors did not care to teach the fundamental course, preferring the quicker practical course.

Awards for shooting blew a small wind on the competitive spark that still dimly glowed in the hearts competitive shooting enthusiasts. In November 1983 the Headquarters Reserve Training Division met with the Marine Corps Weapons Training Unit at Quantico, Virginia. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the possibility of rejoining the competitive world of shooting.

The unit's commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Dave Willis, made pointed statements concerning what the Coast Guard should expect from a team and what its purposes should and should not be. He noted that if the purpose was "public relations/advertising, then the team will not survive over time. This has proven to be the case of the USAF and USN."³⁰

Willis noted that Marine Corps teams were the centerpiece of all Marine Corps small-arms training and coordinated all factors pertaining to general service small-arms training, including training curricula. This included a full-time active duty staff to oversee the program. The program of the Marine Corps was an excellent model, and similar to the Coast Guard's in the 1930s, but its costs were prohibitive. The Marine Corps spent, at that time, about \$700,000 for regular and reserve competitive shooting; the Air Force spent about \$200,000. The reserve division, while giving no figures, leaned toward the Air Force estimate of costs, but did not pursue the matter, and competitive shooting dimmed a little more. There was some irony in the Coast Guard's consultation with the Marine Corps. During the 1930s the Coast Guard and navy shooting teams had presented such a high level of competition that the Marine Corps was forced to develop its world-renowned shooting program or be beaten.³¹

While the reserve division tried to reinstall competitive shooting, OMR considered more practical matters. One of the major problems of the small-arms program was administration. The target practice report forms were last revised in 1967 and were based solely on competitive shooting criteria. The older forms did not contain space for current administrative needs. Revising the form took into account the changes in the methods of personnel

administration (PMIS), training levels, and the total score rather than the individual string scores.

The matter of a new form seemed a trivial detail, but the accurate representation of training figures was drawn from these reports, which in turn determined allocation of ammunition stocks, instructor needs, and training funding to the districts.³²

The second concern was for those personnel who carried the small-arms instructor qualification code (HH), but were not available for, or refused to, conduct training. This was an important subject for Headquarters as well. As the Coast Guard began to swell with potential instructors, the ability to justify the continued output of the small-arms instructor course became more difficult.

Master Chief Wells instituted the development of the HJ qualification code, which, in effect, placed inactive instructors into a pool. There was a dual benefit from this action. These instructors could be removed from the active list, but for minimal costs and moderate retraining, these experienced instructors could be brought back into the system of instruction. This pool reduced the number of active instructors, thereby justifying the continued output of the instructors at Yorktown. With the issuance of the HJ code, Headquarters encouraged commanding officers to remove the qualification code from any person who was not felt to be competent as a small-arms instructor. However, few codes were removed.

The effect of the many unskilled instructors was felt in the 45 percent qualification rate on the pistol "F" course. Wells was aware that it would only be a matter of time before the districts would bring enough pressure to abolish the pistol "F" course, leaving nothing to fill the void. With this in mind, he and CWO(WEPS) Salvatore (Sam) J. Clarino developed an alternate course that presented both basic skill training and made pistol course training necessity readily apparent to the opponents of the pistol "F" course. The development joined the training philosophies by using the same features of the competitive-style courses, but introduced the TRANSTAR II silhouette target used in the 1983 practical pistol course.

The use of the silhouette target made the course appear simpler, but in reality it was neither harder nor easier than the pistol "F" course. This was the strategy—something old in a new box. Another feature was the use of center mass shooting rather than the exact aiming point of the bull's-eye target. The ancestry of this course was in the military shooting clubs of the 1890s. It was also similar to firing at the 37-inch bull's-eye of the rifle "B" target during the 1920s.

The recruits at Cape May, New Jersey, test-fired the course for six months, and initial results showed improvement. Cape May now taught novice shooters the practical, basic fundamentals in nearly the same progressive mold as their predecessors of the 1920s. This followed the standards of performance-based training.

The Coast Guard completed a 60-year cycle in pistol and rifle training. The Coast Guard's first training courses were conducted in stages and six decades

later took a similar tack. The Coast Guard basic pistol marksmanship course removed the navy mindset and endeavored to instill some service pride.

On April 16, 1984, Captain William P. Leahy forwarded the basic pistol course to Rear Admiral Norman C. Venzke. "The attached [Commandant Instruction 3591.1] incorporates the best of bull's-eye shooting fundamentals" and "will stress necessary fundamental skill using the same silhouette target as used in the improved practical pistol course."³³ Venzke, himself familiar with competitive shooting, signed the instruction on 26 April 1984.

The instruction included "simplified marksmanship fundamentals which focus only on the factors that contribute most to hitting targets," and "the development of confidence and accuracy and reliability of the service pistol." The goal was fire superiority.

The simplicity and utility of the course made it enjoyable to teach and learn. The course was outlined as:

Ammunition (rounds)	Range	Time
12 rounds (2 magazines)	25 yards	1 minute per round
12 rounds (2 magazines)	25 yards	4 seconds per round
6 rounds (1 magazine)	15 yards	2 seconds per round

Awards were authorized for those achieving the required levels of qualification. Scores remained similar to those of the pistol "F" course: the maximum 150 points; expert, 144 to 150; sharpshooter from 129 to 143; marksman between 114 and 128. The scores had been raised considerably because of the size of the target. The minimum score of expert now required a 96 percent success rate instead of the 75 percent of the pistol "F" course.

This course carried the same requirement as the "F" course and required successful completion before attempting the practical course. Upon completion, the improved practical pistol course became the qualifying standard. This was a compromise to those who desired police-style training and, more importantly, allowed a reduction in ammunition expenditures in field training. This *extra* ammunition (training ammunition allowances had not changed) would be needed for the inevitable twice-a-year qualification standard imposed in late 1984 for Level II training.

The new basic pistol course was adaptable to the new service handgun and reduced overall ammunition expenditures, but .45-caliber ammunition was still in short supply. The navy advised that half of the Coast Guard's pistol ammunition needs could be drawn from navy stocks until the shortages subsided. The navy's decision was disappointing; OMR expected more and devised an allocation plan based on a district's current stock. It notified all districts to "monitor training and expenditures closely as this shortage is anticipated to last most of this year [1984]."³⁴

The amounts were based on ammunition on hand in the districts and projected amounts of expenditures. For the districts that had effective and well-

managed training programs, the amounts were sufficient; however, others with less managerial ability demanded more attention and more ammunition.

By the summer of 1984, OMR had made more changes to the small-arms training program in only a year and a half than in the previous 30 years, but there was still room for improvement. The Coast Guard had yet to seriously address rifle marksmanship.

During 1984, OMR devised, for research purposes, a replacement rifle course and tested it at Cape May. However, improper formulation by the small-arms training chief made the test results inconclusive.³⁵ It was based on the U.S. Army's BRM [basic rifle marksmanship] course, which had been under near constant research and development since 1976. The use of this excellent training plan, reduced and modified for Coast Guard use, was logical, economical, and certainly a historically appropriate choice.

Despite the commotion over pistol and shotgun training, there was no enthusiasm in Headquarters or from any district office to alter rifle training. There had been no frantic calls for police-type training with the rifle, though police firearms instructor courses nationally had recognized the need and added rifle training.

Training improvements in small arms still depended on the evidence of need. By the mid-1980s, the lack of evidence and definition of purpose plagued the Coast Guard. The multiple mission status pulled at the Coast Guard from all directions. Attempts to impose cohesive standards were met with resistance from the internal sources that claimed the standards were not part of their current mission areas, therefore were of no interest and had no relevancy. Small-arms training received the same treatment. Without positive leadership and effective methods to control small-arms training at a single management level, the future would be similar to the past.

The constant rotation of personnel through the small-arms training office adversely impacted the vital continuity that had been a historical hallmark of the program's beginning. Consistency needed a consensus of philosophy throughout the Coast Guard, but such unified thought did not exist by the end of 1985.

A historical solution would have been to install a civilian manager to provide the firm base and to prevent personal and professional differences from becoming the deciding factors in training. The difficulty in placing a civilian manager would be to find someone who was detached enough from the Coast Guard to exclude bias, but yet had a strong background in its small-arms training. An alternative was to recreate the ordnance officer concept which would place an officer of considerable knowledge in a decision-making role and as an advocate of the program.

The contradictory actions in small-arms training prevailed to about the early 1960s, with no solution in sight. There appeared to be only short-term plans that always looked on the spot. Few looked to the past for help, although all current training was driven very much by past procedures and traditions.

An eye could be cast to both the near and far past for answers that would help current and future managers navigate the troubled shoals of the training

world. Without knowing where the shots have hit, corrections to hit will be impossible. All concerned know that the only shots that count are those that hit.

Notes

1. Letter, OMR to ICCGD, "Small Arms Training," 3574, R. B. Bacon, January 7, 1980.
2. Ibid.
3. U.S.C.G. Commandant Notice 3574, "Small Arms Training for Reservists," G-RT, S. R. Breseman, December 1978.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Most districts included reserve ammunition purchases in active service requests and issued to reserves as needed.
7. U.S.C.G. Commandant Notice 3574, "FY-80 Small Arms Training Levels for Inactive Duty Selected Reserve Personnel," G-RT, S. B. Vaughn, March 4, 1980.
8. During this period all districts maintained their own requisitions and stocks of ammunition. However, they were not supposed to stockpile or hoard, but most did. Ironically, many of these stockpiles carried some districts through periods of ammunition shortages.
9. Remarks to concurrent clearance of COMDTNOTE 3574 (G-RT). December 12, 1978.
10. Ibid.
11. The term range officer was often used incorrectly to mean the same as small-arms instructor.
12. Memorandum, OMR to OLE, "Small Arms Qualification For Boat Crew," 3574, W. T. Leland, December 17, 1980.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. Rapid draft Letter, 5th CG District to OMR, 3574, E. A. Burns, March 5, 1981.
17. Sterling Gleason, "Outshooting the Guns of Gangland," *Modern Mechanics*, 16 (May 1936):60-61, 132.
18. Letter, 13th CG District to Commander, Coast Guard Pacific Area (P), "Small Arms Training Allowance," 3574, C. F. Larkin, April 3, 1981.
19. Endorsement to CCGD13 (or) letter 3574 "Small Arms Training Ammunition Allowance," April 3, 1981. J. S. Gracey, April 14, 1981.
20. Ibid.

21. Oddly, after Gracey became Commandant he made no suggestions for weapons training or allowance increases.
22. U.S.C.G. Commandant Instruction 3574.3C, "Small Arms Training Level," OMR, N. C. Venzke, September 24, 1982. The instruction also outlined the courses required for each weapon type.
23. The B-21 target also discriminated against left-handed shooters. A bad right-handed shooter could "jerk" rounds into the three area, but bad left-handed shooters would only get twos for jerks to the opposite side of the target.
24. U.S.C.G. Commandant Instruction 3574.4A, "Revised Qualification Courses for Practical Pistol and Riot Shotgun Training," OMR-3, N. C. Venzke, (author William R. Wells II), July 29, 1983.
25. Trip Report GMCM W. R. Wells to OMR, 3574, October 11, 1983.
26. Letter, CCGD7 to G-PTE, "Small Arms Instructor School," 3574, J. W. Kime, February 2, 1983.
27. By the end of 1983 the Coast Guard had nearly 800 small-arms instructors but only about 15% were regularly used. However, over the objections of Master Chief Wells, a 100 more were trained each year. The program, if vigorously questioned, could not justify the amount.
28. U.S.C.G. Commandant Instruction 3574.3D. "Small Arms Training Levels," OMR, N. C. Venzke, December 5, 1983.
29. In 1983 Master Chief Wells proposed a civilian style miniature silhouette target device that could be attached to the pistol ribbon. This device was approved by the Headquarters Awards Board but not implemented.
30. Memorandum, Lt. J. V. Grant to G-R, "Marksmanship Competition Project; status report," 3591, December 5, 1983.
31. Barde, Robert E. *The History of Marine Corps Competitive Marksmanship*, Marksmanship Branch, USMC Headquarters, (Washington, DC, 1961):170.
32. Combined Small Arms Training Report, CG-3029 (Rev. 2/84).
33. U.S.C.G. Commandant Instruction 3591.1, "Coast Guard Basic Pistol Marksmanship Course, Entry Level and Reinforcement Training," OMR-3, N. C. Venzke, (author William R. Wells II), May 1, 1984.
34. Message, OMR 281720Z, February 1984, S. J. Clarino.
35. Master Chief Wells retired before other test criteria and formula could be arranged, and there was no one in Headquarters who had the time to monitor the program.

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
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U.S. Revenue Cutter Service Sharpshooter Medal with date bar.
Note similarity to current medal.



Cadets of Revenue Cutter School of Instruction (CA 1906) - Note the stance of the cadets.



This pistol stance appears common at some ranges. However, the more standard position is evidenced further along the firing line. Also note the cavalry holster. Grand Haven Michigan (ca 1935)



Fireman Stanley Moore, at Warefield, Mass. (ca. 1936). The uniform and equipment were standard issue for the fire department throughout the 1930s.



This was not an authorized firing position with the Lewis machine gun by surfmen at Grand Haven, Mich. (ca 1933)



MIC Melvon O. Wilson (in civilian clothes) training Customs and Border Patrol men at El Paso, Texas (ca 1934). Note competitive style stance.




Sign J. W. Ryssy at Parris Island, South Carolina, 1928. The Coast Guard used the Marine Corps ranges to prepare for the national matches.




Unidentified Chief Gunner's mates who were Treasury Department instructors. (ca 1933)



1938 Pistol Team. Paul Goulden, M.O. Wilson, J.Q. Alligood, Earl C. "Porky" Jones, M. N. Cobb, D.A. Brown and Morrison. (left to right)



M Aubiua Galjour, CGM James Pinnix and CGM Stanley L. Loyer were all instructors with the Treasury Department. (left to right) They are shown on the main Treasury range in 1947. The range had six shooting positions.



The target area of the rifle range on Egmont Key about 1949. The condition of the range indicates the decline of use.



The shotgun added a new dimension to small arms training. Shown here is the hip position that was the most difficult to fire from.



Individualized instruction was the key to success in many training programs. (New Orleans, 1980.)



The prone position in the 1976 practical pistol course was similar to the one of 1920. (Port Bel, Texas, 1980)