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REPORT OF THE
AD HOC COMMITTEE
TO CONSIDER
THE UTILIZATION OF SPARS IN THE COAST GUARD

April 58

Preface

This report is made up in two parts, a Preliminary Report, and a Part Two. Though the material in the two parts could be combined into a single presentation, this final report contains two parts in order to retain the structure and timing of their original development by the Committee. This is considered desirable to illustrate the approach to the problem for those not associated with the work of the Committee.

The Preliminary Report recorded tentative initial conclusions and furnished the Commandant with information on which to base further guidance to the Committee.

Pursuant to specific guidance to the Committee furnished by the Commandant, together with his approval, in principle, of the Preliminary Report, Part Two of the report was developed to provide the required detailed conclusions and recommendations.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
PRELIMINARY REPORT	
I Foreword	1
II Approach to the Subject	2
III Determination of Mobilization Requirement	6
IV Means of Meeting Mobilization Requirement	12
V Further Planning Required	18
VI Guidance	19
PART TWO	
I Foreword	20
II Basis and Approach to the Subject	20
III Discussion	23
IV Conclusions	28
V Recommendations	34
CHARTS	
I Mobilization Requirements, Spar Officers	35
II Mobilization Requirements, Spar Enlisted	36
III Mobilization Requirements, Spar Officers and Enlisted	37

PRELIMINARY REPORT OF THE
AD HOC COMMITTEE
TO CONSIDER
THE UTILIZATION OF SPARS IN THE COAST GUARD

I FOREWORD

A. Nature and Purpose of Report

This is a report to the Commandant of the initial deliberations of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Utilization of Spars in the Coast Guard. It has two purposes, namely:

(1) To record the views of the Committee and the tentative conclusions which have thus far been arrived at.

(2) To furnish the Commandant with information on which to base further guidance to the Committee.

B. Form of Report

(1) The Committee has met in four sessions, and various members have consulted separately among themselves. Deliberations have been on an informal basis. This report is intended to present the thinking of the Committee in an orderly manner, although the substance of the report was not developed in the order shown.

(2) The report will state the areas wherein specific recommendations cannot be made because of a present lack of information, or where further planning is required.

(3) The report is unclassified. Data relating to classified mobilization planning is not included but was considered by

the Committee in reaching its conclusions.

II APPROACH TO THE SUBJECT

A. Discussion

In evaluating the role of Spars in the Coast Guard, it seems a logical first step to determine whether or not accomplishment of the Coast Guard's broad Mission can be facilitated through the utilization of women as military members of the organization. If so, then it is incumbent on the Service to make provisions to employ Spars in the manner and to the extent indicated. If not, then women have no place in the military organization; and no plans should be made to utilize them in it.

By reason of the probable expansion of the Service during mobilization, both in size and in the nature of its duties, this question may properly be considered as having two parts:

Is there a peace-time requirement for Spars?

Is there a mobilization requirement for Spars?

B. The Peace-Time Requirement

(1) Advantages

Experience during World War II abundantly demonstrated that there are certain tasks of a military nature that can effectively be performed by women; indeed, many tasks can be more effectively performed by women, because of their capacity for painstaking attention to routine duties over prolonged periods. They are somewhat more attentive to detail than are men in

situations unvaried by changing conditions or circumstances. Women work well under supervision and, when imbued with a proper sense of responsibility, are capable of selfless devotion to duty in situations men frequently find difficult to accept. The scope of their employment in civilian fields is continually widening. Today, industry utilizes women as draftsmen, architects, engineers, and technicians of all kinds. In the last War, they were singularly useful in communications, personnel management, and in all the medical and clerical branches.

These are the proved and obvious advantages deriving from the utilization of women for military duties in a wartime situation. Do these advantages obtain, however, during peace? If so, are there collateral disadvantages which tend to offset such benefits as might accrue from the utilization of women as military members of the Coast Guard?

(2) Disadvantages

In answering these questions, it is first proper to take into account that, during peace, women employed in a civilian capacity are capable of returning the same quality of service as are their military counterparts. Properly indoctrinated, they are equally as devoted, equally as loyal. There is, moreover, a prevailing belief that their cost to the taxpayer is below that of military persons serving in comparable positions. This concept is difficult to rebut and widely held; the effect during peace is to limit the Services in their employment of women in military positions to demonstrable needs. These needs are pretty generally

narrowed down to (1) positions having potential value for mobilization, (2) sensitive positions where military control is a requisite, and (3) positions involving long hours, or duty at unusual hours not compatible with Civil Service pay scales. In short, it is hard to justify the military utilization of women during peace.

Were this not the case, there would still be several disadvantages in the military utilization of women which are particularly applicable to the Coast Guard:

First, one of our basic strengths is the versatility of our forces: we employ our shore and floating units in a variety of duties; and our personnel is adaptable and generally ready for any task the Service may be called upon to perform. To the extent that we replace men by women in shore-side billets, we reduce the overall versatility of our personnel, for they cannot be shifted about or employed under emergency conditions to the same degree as men.

Second, it is desirable to reserve billets regarded as preferred duty for men completing afloat and overseas assignments. Most billets that Spars would fill are generally regarded in the Service as "soft jobs". This is not to say that there is less actual work required; it is simply to say that most, if not all of these billets carry extra allowances and freedom from off-duty supervision, and are especially prized and sought after by men returning from more arduous and demanding operational assignments. It would be manifestly unfair and harmful to morale

Why not?

to set aside for women any considerable number of such billets.

Third, the experience gained by men rotated to administrative billets ashore is undeniably useful to their future development as career personnel. A man suited for further advancement should become familiar with all branches of his specialty. Experience in administrative offices makes a man more effective in field assignments, and such jobs should not be closed off to him.

Fourth, the management of Spars creates a situation in some cases awkward to handle, because of the need to provide separate facilities for young, enlisted women and insure supervision of their off-duty activities to a degree not required for enlisted men. During peace, these measures would be costly and uneconomical at smaller units, where but relatively few Spars might be assigned.

(3) Evaluation

a. The civilian labor pool is an adequate source of manpower for jobs which preferably should be performed by women. Budgetary considerations make it desirable to employ civilians to the maximum.

b. During peace, the disadvantages attendant upon the utilization of women in military billets, particularly enlisted billets, more than offset the advantages to be gained.

(4) Conclusion

There is no peace-time requirement for Spars in the Coast Guard.

C. The Mobilization Requirement

(1) Discussion

During war, the requirement for the utilization of women in military positions is clear-cut. The need to augment the available manpower pool is a basic mobilization requirement of the Armed Forces. A current Department of Defense directive calls for the planned utilization of women as military members of the several Services to the maximum extent practicable. As a Service in the Navy during war-time, the Coast Guard is obliged by this directive to plan accordingly.

A strong possibility exists that manpower shortages in a future conflict will require that the Selective Service Act be extended to include women, or at least that the available pool of womanpower be allocated according to the war-time needs of industry and the military. It is thus essential that the Coast Guard determine what its own requirements for women may be and set up a suitable mechanism for accepting and utilizing its allocation of women upon mobilization.

(2) Conclusion

There is a mobilization requirement for Spars in the Coast Guard.

III DETERMINATION OF THE MOBILIZATION REQUIREMENT

A. Discussion

The entire field of mobilization planning is obscured by uncertainty as to the kind of war we will have to fight, its probable duration, and the major areas of conflict. This applies

not only to the Armed Forces of the United States, but to the other Powers, large and small, which may be engaged in, or affected by, the conflict. Hence, planning for war is imprecise at best.

B. Numerical Requirements

Certain planning factors related to mobilization requirements establish the requirement for Spars as follows:

M plus 1 month	-	1,375 Spars
M plus 3 months	-	2,695 Spars
M plus 6 months	-	4,315 Spars
M plus 12 months	-	5,250 Spars
M plus 18 months	-	5,700 Spars

Subsequent to M plus 3, the planned ratio of officer to enlisted approaches one to ten, following Navy policy; prior to M plus 3, it is less.

C. Areas of Utilization

(1) Continental U.S.

Experience shows that Spars may be effectively utilized throughout the United States at units large enough to justify the inclusion of a Spar component. At small units, difficulties inherent in the military supervision of women, referred to above, make it impracticable to accommodate small numbers of enlisted Spars, unless the unit is located in the proximity of a larger Naval unit, where they may be assigned to barracks and obtain adequate supervision. Although this limitation is not so important with respect to Spar officers, it is desirable, where practicable, that unmarried Spar officers also have barracks accommodations available.

Planned activities where these requirements may be
not are as follows:

Headquarters	Academy
Training Stations	Area Offices
District Offices	Supply Centers
Receiving Centers	Yard
A.R. & S.B.	Air Stations
GHQ Offices (specified)	MI Offices (specified)
Bases (specified)	

(2) Overseas

Owing to the small size of planned Coast Guard units overseas, it is impracticable to utilize Spars in any activity except those in the 14th and 17th Districts, and in the Greater Antilles Section, at the classes of units enumerated above. The effect of the Coast Guard's failure to utilize Spars in other overseas areas, as is planned for Waves by the Navy, will tend to reduce the percentage of Spars in the Coast Guard slightly below that of Waves in the Navy.

B. Types of Duties

Although it is generally accepted that women are capable of performing all duties that can be performed by men, except those for which they are physiologically unfitted, there are certain areas of military activity in which they are definitely not useful. It is anticipated, however, that the utilization of Spars in the Coast Guard will be in the same branches and types of billets as that of the Navy. Further study along this line will nevertheless be required. At present, it appears that planning should contemplate the utilization of Spars as follows:

Officers

Enlisted

General Line

Administrative Assistant*
Officers' Mess*
Education and Training*
Operations*
Personnel*
Security*
Welfare and Recreation*
Public Information*

Seaman (SN)*
Teleman (TE)
Radioman (RM)
Yeoman (YN)*
Storekeeper (SK)*
Commissaryman (CS)
Journalist (JO)
Photographer's Mate (PH)*

Aviation

Aerological Engineering

Airman (AN)
Aviation Electronics Tech. (AT)
Aviation Electrician's Mate (AE)
Aviation Structural Mechanic (AM)
Parachute Rigger (PR)
Aerographer's Mate (AG)
Aviation Storekeeper (AK)
Aviation Machinist's Mate (AD)

Legal

Claims Attorney*
Legal Assistance*
Military Justice*

Dentalman (DN)
Hospital Corpsman (HM)
Dental Technician (DT)
Hospitalman (HN)

Communications

Censorship*
Coding*
Communications (inc. CWO)*
Courier*
Postal*
Registered Publications*

Pay and Supply

Accounting*
Commissary*
Disbursing*
Ships Service*
Transportation*
Travel Claims*

Items marked with an asterisk(*) are considered suitable for training in the Ready Reserve.

E. Billet Structure

(1) Requirements by M plus 6 Months

The total number of Spars required, as indicated above, is directly related to the overall expansion of the Service. The ratings of enlisted Spars and the various officer specialties should be built up at the same rate as facilities of the Service are expanded to accommodate them.

An exact determination of these requirements would involve a knowledge of what units will be in existence at any time subsequent to M-Day and the personnel strength of each. Unfortunately, reliable information of this nature is not available, nor can it be obtained, since, as stated above, the outcome of events subsequent to M-Day is shrouded in uncertainty.

For this reason, planning is reasonably definite for only about six months after M-Day. We have firm plans for expansion within that period and broadly assigned goals involving the enlargement of the personnel for considerable periods beyond M plus 6. It seems proper, therefore, to plan firmly at this time to build up the Spar component to planned strength according to ratings and specialties required only by M plus 6. The Spar billet structure at that time should be designed to permit further expansion along lines as may be dictated by the then-existing war situation.

(2) Nature of the Billet Structure

This means that the Spar component should include by M plus 6 a functioning training group, not only to take care of attrition, but also to provide for further expansion according to requirements at the time. The remainder of the Spar component would be employed directly in support of operations.

Study is required, however, to determine how large a training force will be needed by M plus 6 and to what extent Coast Guard training can be supplemented by training at Navy facilities.

The remainder of the billet structure, and numerically the larger part, will be distributed by M plus 6 among those units at which it is planned to assign Spars. The exact division of ratings and specialties in this group likewise cannot be determined until further study is given to the overall billet structure at that time.

F. Conclusions

(1) Coast Guard policy with respect to Spars should parallel Navy policy with respect to Waves.

(2) Spars are required in percentages somewhat less than Waves by reason of a relatively smaller Coast Guard overseas requirement.

(3) As a general rule, Spars should be utilized only at larger Coast Guard units.

(4) Planning should take account of specific requirements only through M plus 6 months, with provision thereafter to meet the then-existing situation.

MEANS OF MEETING THE MOBILIZATION REQUIREMENTA. Discussion

The effectiveness of Spars during the immediate period after M-Day will depend on the rapidity with which they can be brought into service. Upon mobilization, the demand for men in active operational assignments will exceed the supply available. This places a responsibility upon the Coast Guard, as it does upon all the Armed Forces, to provide a women's component ready and able to assume a significant share of military support and administrative workload.

The manpower required during the initial stages of mobilization will, for the most part, be drawn from the Ready Reserve. Other sources such as the retired list will, of course, provide additional manpower, but the Ready Reserve must be relied on for the main supply during the first two or three months after M-Day. There is serious question, however, as to whether this is a feasible system with respect to women.

B. Limitations on the Ready Reserve as a Source of Spars(1) Enlisted Spars

During the first month after mobilization, the Service will undergo a very rapid overall expansion. Most of the added personnel would be trained and would come on board during the first few days. The added Spar complement would be on the order of 1400, of whom about 1100 would be enlisted. For the Spar component to be effective during this initial period, it would therefore be necessary for about 1100 trained enlisted Spars to be readily available.

This does not mean that the Ready Reserve should contain only 1100 enlisted Spars on M-Day; it means that out of the total number of enlisted Spars in the Ready Reserve, 1100 should be immediately available for active duty.

Present experience in the Navy indicates that in order to have this number of women immediately (within one to ten days) available, an excessive number would have to be kept under training. Attrition among enlisted Waves is on the order of 50% per year, mainly because of reasons of dependency. The Navy finds that in order to maintain a force of 5,000 Waves on active duty during peace-time, it is necessary to enlist about 2,500 per year, although the term of enlistment itself is for four years. In other words, the Navy has to train two women during peace-time for every enlisted Wave on the active list.

Approximately half of the attrition experienced for Waves on active service (or 25% per year) is due to enlistment expiration. Attrition will not be this high among Spars if a period of obligated service remains after the active duty period. Assuming a "2X6" program, annual attrition due to completion of obligated service will be 17%. This percentage added to the 25% due to natural causes produces an annual attrition of about 42%.

Even though 100% of the Spar Ready Reserves could be called to active duty in an emergency, it is apparent that to insure the immediate availability of 1100 Spars, 42% of 462 would have to be inducted into the training program annually. Larger numbers would be required in the training program until the total of 1100 could be built up.

These considerations do not apply to the same degree among commissioned officers. They are usually women of

Qualified Officer Cadre (2)

to 14-day.

the nucleus for expansion of the enlisted component subsequent for training. This group of spare enlistees should form a valuable potential availability beyond the period of active duty for spare enlistment might be reversed as a means of determining. Some system should be devised whereby applicants count, and provision should be made to exploit this source of a prolonged period. Planning should take this factor into account number will be available for immediate call to active duty over given number of women who receive Reserve training, a material. It should be recognized, however, that out of any

training plan recommended herein.

consideration errors in important influence on the entire Reserve primary emphasis of enlisted training should be upon men. This available to the Coast Guard for Reserve training purposes, the early an unprofitable business. In view of the limited funds listed women for active duty or call-up on mobilization is generally to conclude that the training of an-

level.

training would tend to maintain the Ready Reserve at a higher rate among men, the same funds devoted to all-rate Reserve of enlisted spares available. Because of the lower attrition justified by the advantage to be gained in having a ready force The costs of such a program would obviously not be

education and maturity, equipped to earn a living in professional or business fields, who have chosen military service for career reasons. Admittedly, this is not always the case, but the best evidence indicates that attrition among women officers is far below that of enlisted women. It is not clear whether this is because of lower marriageability of the officer group or because of personal preference for the single estate. In any case, the availability rate of officer Spars should be viewed as sufficiently high to warrant their affiliation with either the Reserve or Regular components.

G. The Spar Component on K-Day

(1) Reserves

The foregoing qualifications make it clear that initial mobilization requirements for Spars will have to be met from a group consisting predominantly of commissioned Reserve Officers. In addition, there will be a small number of enlisted Spars who have been screened for probable long-term availability. This means that, on K-Day and shortly thereafter, a relatively smaller number of Spars will be ready to fill active duty billets than their male counterparts serving in the Ready Reserve. It will be necessary to engage immediately upon an active Spar training program in order to bring the Spar component up to planned strength by K plus 6. The existing Spar component on K-Day will thus consist of two main groups: (1) those earmarked to fill operational and administrative billets, and (2) those earmarked for training duties.

Further study will be required to determine how many Spars should be trained to fill active duty billets other than training and how many should engage directly in the training program upon recall to duty after M-Day.

(2) Spars on Extended Active Duty

Since the training program should start immediately after M-Day, there should exist prior to mobilization a small force of Spars on active duty under whom the new Spars may be assigned as soon as they complete their recruit training or, in the case of Spars on inactive duty, as soon as they are recalled. This force should be capable of supervising the inductees and giving them appropriate on-the-job instruction until they are familiar with their new duties.

The number of Spars to be so retained on extended active duty will depend on the degree to which Spars can be utilized in the various activities of the Service shortly after mobilization. This needs further study. When it has been determined just which mobilization billets should be filled by Spars, it will be possible to identify the areas and branches where Spars should be retained on extended active duty to provide a nucleus for the expanded organization. This group should be comprised mostly of officers, for the reasons stated above, and should engage in the active duty training of other Spars who come aboard for shorter periods under the annual training program. They should be assigned to extended active duty billets of such a nature as to fit them to indoctrinate recruits and render practical, on-the-job assistance

to new Spars. The cost of the billets so established is properly chargeable against the Reserve Appropriation, since the primary function of this group is Spar training.

Those Spars who are now on extended active duty should be screened and reassigned as necessary to qualify them for this task. Periodic screening should take place thereafter to eliminate and return to inactive duty Spars who, by reason of age, advancing seniority, or for other cause can no longer be suitably employed in billets fitting them for this task upon mobilization. Qualified new Spars should be brought in regularly, as replacements, as a means of preserving the vigor and vitality of the Spar component on extended active duty.

D. Conclusions

(1) It is essential to make provisions for a Spar component ready and able, upon mobilization, to assume a significant share of the military support and administrative workload.

(2) On M-Day, the Spar component should consist of:

a. Mainly trained officers in the Ready Reserve qualified to fill certain operational and administrative billets.

b. A few trained enlisted Spars in the Ready Reserve qualified primarily for training duties.

c. A few officer and enlisted Spars serving on extended active duty qualified primarily for training duties.

d. Inactive Spars.

(3) Reserve training of enlisted Spars cannot be justified in terms of costs, and should not be engaged in, except for a small

and carefully screened group having good long-term potential.

V FURTHER PLANNING REQUIRED

Further planning is required as to:

A. The specific units to which it is planned to assign Spars subsequent to M-Day.

B. The numbers in each specialty and rating that will be required.

The development of these data will be contingent upon the planned personnel allowances at each of the units where Spars will be assigned. Mobilization planning has not progressed to this point, but sufficient information is available in the Program Analysis Division for the development of reasonably accurate data through M plus 6.

C. Billets to be filled on M-Day, or shortly thereafter, by Spar officers from the Ready Reserve.

This includes specified billets, other than training billets, of an operational or administrative character which should properly be filled by Spar officers. It is visualized that training will be on-the-job type, of periods up to 6 months, with costs of such training to be payable from the Reserve Appropriation. This program would continue until the requisite number of Spar officers had been trained. A screening process would be instituted whereby the probable availability of such officers might be evaluated, with separations from the Ready Reserve being effected as

necessary. Additional training would be continued as might be required by attrition.

D. The composition of a training force needed to bring the Spar component to planned strength by M plus 6.

This force would be composed of both Spars on extended active duty and those serving in the Ready Reserve, other than in C, above. The phasing-in of new Spars is an essential part of this planning. It also includes planning for the use of Navy training facilities and the establishment of its own training facilities by the Coast Guard.

VI GUIDANCE

The Ad Hoc Committee is agreed that the foregoing sets forth a sound and reasonable plan for proceeding with the Spar program, and one which is consistent with the overall requirements of the Coast Guard as they appear to the Committee. In view, however, of other aspects of this matter, of which the Committee may not be aware, further guidance is sought from the Commandant before proceeding with the detailed planning called for in Section V.

The Commandant is requested, therefore, to indicate the extent to which the foregoing plan is approved and wherein it may require revision.

For the Ad Hoc Committee:

F. T. KENNER
Rear Admiral, U.S. Coast Guard

PART TWO
OF THE REPORT OF THE
AD HOC COMMITTEE
TO CONSIDER
THE UTILIZATION OF SPARS IN THE COAST GUARD.

I FOREWORD

A. Nature and Purpose of Report

This is Part Two of the report to the Commandant of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Utilization of Spars in the Coast Guard. Its purposes are to indicate:

- (1) The units to which it is planned to assign Spars subsequent to M-Day.
- (2) The numbers of Spars in each specialty and rating that will be required at various stages of mobilization.
- (3) The billets to be filled on M-Day, or shortly thereafter, by Spars from the Ready Reserve.
- (4) The composition of a training force needed to bring the Spar component to planned strength by M plus 6.

II BASIS AND APPROACH TO THE SUBJECT

A. This part of the report is essentially a refinement of the mobilization requirements set forth in paragraph III of the preliminary report.

B. As with the determination of total personnel requirements for mobilization, the determination of requirements for Spars has taken into consideration the feasibility of filling the requirement, as well as the basic need for having the people.

C. Some requirements for Spars are requirements for women as such to fill billets suitable only for women. These are exemplified by billets involving procurement, training and direct personal supervision (as in barracks) of other women. These requirements can be stated quite precisely, but they amount to a small proportion of the ultimate Spar strength. Other requirements for Spars are to fill billets as replacements for men. The capability of women to fill such billets and the appropriateness of assigning females to certain duties and places will vary with time and with the circumstances that develop during any war. Therefore Spar billets in replacement of men, which are given herein, should be considered neither mandatory nor exclusive. Circumstances could dictate either retaining men in some of the billets or assigning women to many billets not herein indicated for them. These Spar requirements reflect what is now considered to be optimum use of females.

D. Discussions which follow are devoted to Pre-H-Day and to periods after H-Day (1) up to H plus 15 days, (2) from then to H plus 1 month, (3) from then to H plus 3 months, and (4) from then to H plus 6 months. Conclusions provide recapitulations of information developed in the discussions as necessary to fulfill the specific purposes of the report.

E. Throughout, abbreviations of general service ratings are used for enlisted women. As appropriate emergency ratings are approved for reserve personnel, some of these ratings may be converted. The following codes are used to describe officer specialties:

15	Communications	92	Finance
50	Administration	93	Intelligence
91	Legal	94	Training
	95	Port Security	

F. The discussions which follow do not contemplate the transportation of Spars from or to the continental U. S. during the early stages of mobilization. Thus, recruits or officer candidates would not be obtained outside the continental U. S. to be brought to the continental basic schools. Similarly, there would be no assignment of Spars from continental U. S. to territories or possessions during this period. Accordingly, this report does not contemplate the recruitment, or assignment of Spars outside the continental U. S. This should not be construed, however, to prohibit direct procurement of qualified female personnel for immediate local assignment when necessary at any time during mobilization, or assignment of Spars from continental U. S. to duty at appropriate units in territories and possessions after the period covered by this report.

G. The purposes of this part of the report address themselves principally to the post-M-Day period. Consequently, the peacetime composition of the active duty Spar force was examined only to the extent that it could provide an active duty force on M-Day and that it could provide, through training of personnel, a stronger mobilization base.

III

DISCUSSION

A. Peacetime

Spars on active duty during peacetime can contribute to mobilization only by (1) providing a capability more quickly to recruit and train Spars for mobilization or (2) developing a stronger mobilization base by providing some active duty training for Spars who serve in organized reserve training units or make up the Spar component of the Active Status Pool.

If Spars on active duty fill regular billets in replacement of men, however, there is no advantage in retaining them because the mobilization base of active duty males is reduced by whatever number of Spars is involved.

Thus, Spar's on active duty in regular billets prior to M-Day will not alleviate the mobilization problem, unless they are in billets for which Spars as such are needed promptly after M-Day. (See III B. which follows). Unless there are such billets there should be no Spars on active duty in prior to M-Day.

B. M to M plus 15 days

Except for a limited number of Spar officers for crypto duties (for which women are considered to be particularly adaptable) in RCC/Comm centers, all requirements during this period are for women as such in the fields of recruiting, processing, administration, and training other females subsequently to replace men in great numbers. The staff for two Spar basic schools (one for Officer Candidates, one for enlisted recruits) will be provided with 15 officers and 20 enlisted

women for each. Each of 11 continental District Coast Guard Commanders will have 6 off/18 enl for recruiting and 3 off/3 enl for mobilization teams. Additionally, 5 officers in each district will be a part of RCG/Comm centers for crypto duties.

These people should be in Organized Reserve Training Units to ensure their readiness and availability within 15 days. The existing and planned Organized Reserve Training Units, Rescue Coordination Centers should each include 5 Spar crypto officers. Organized Reserve Training Units in each continental district should include 9 Spar officers and 21 ratings for the recruiting and mobilization personnel. Contemplated Organized Reserve Training Units, School Administration should be two in number, each with 15 officers and 20 ratings.

The optimum rank/specialty and rating for these people follows:

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>
I RCG/Comm Centers (One for each of 11 districts)	1 LT (15) 2 LTJG (15) <u>2</u> ENS (15) 5	None
II Recruiting Groups (One for each 11 districts)	2 LTJG (50) <u>4</u> ENS (50) 6	18 YN <u>18</u>
III Mobilization Team Groups (One for each of 11 districts)	1 LTJG (50) <u>2</u> ENS (50) 3	2 SK <u>1</u> YN 3

IV School Administration (One for each of two basic schools - Officer Candidate and Enlisted)	<u>OC</u>	<u>ENL</u>	(Enlisted require- ments are the same for each)
	1	1 LCDR (94)	
	1	1 LT (50)	
	1	1 LT (94)	8 YN
	2	1 LTJG (15)	5 SK
	1	1 LTJG (50)	1 PH
	1	1 LTJG (91)	6 SN
	1	1 LTJG (92)	<u>20</u>
	1	0 LTJG (93)	
	1	2 LTJG (94)	
	1	1 LTJG (95)	
	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u> ENS (94)	
	15	15	
V Total people during this period	184		271

C. M plus 15 days to M plus 1 month

By M plus 1 month schools are established and initial classes are enrolled. Spars are required during this period principally as students and to fill administrative and staff billets in augmentation. Some of these may be in replacement of men.

It is contemplated that most of these people will come from the active status pool and will probably exhaust that source of personnel. A few officers will be commissioned directly and many enlisted women with requisite skills and sufficient maturity to forego recruit training will be obtained. To meet these requirements on active status pool of approximately 80 officers and 200 enlisted women is needed.

The optimum rank/specialty and rating for the additional billets to be filled during this period is tabulated below. The billets will be filled by people entering upon active duty during the period, or may be (as for example, the CDR, Senior Spar Officer) filled by re-assignment and promotion of an individual who had been called up prior to M plus 15 days.

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>
I District and Area Office augmentation (for each of 13 Area and District Offices)	1 LT (15) 2 LTJG (50) <u>2</u> LTJG (94) 5	7 YN 5 SK 2 JO <u>1</u> PH 15
II Headquarters augmentation	1 ODR (50) 1 LCDR (15) 1 LCDR (50) 1 LCDR (94) 2 LT (15) 2 LTJG (85) 2 LTJG (92) <u>1</u> LTJG (91) 11	7 YN 7 SK 3 JO <u>2</u> PH 19
III Supply Centers (2), Yard, Groton & Cape May (same for each of these 5 units)	1 LTJG (50) 1 LTJG (50) <u>1</u> LTJG (92) 3	7 YN <u>8</u> SK 15
IV To basic training	None	40 SR (00) Basic Officer's School 500 SR Recruit Training
V Total of additional people during this period	91 Officers	829 Enlisted

D. M plus 1 month to M plus 3 months

The output from the Spar basic enlisted school starts to enter into duty assignment during this period, but newly trained officers are not yet produced from the Officer Candidate's School. Some officers, however, will still be obtained by direct procurement; 20 are required in this period. Some enlisted Spars must be obtained for immediate assignment to active duty.

Additional billets filled by Spars during this period are tabulated below. The personnel to fill these billets are not necessarily the people who enter upon active duty during this period;

There will be promotions and transfers for Spars as appropriate.

I	To districts for each of 19 GCTP Offices (large)	1 LTJG (50)	1 YN 4 SN <u>5</u>
II	To districts for each of 8 PSU (large) associated with foregoing GCTP Offices		2 YN 2 SK 3 CS <u>5</u> 12
III	Additional for each of Supply Centers (2), Groton, Yard & Cape May (5 units)		2 SN
IV	Additional for Headquarters	1 LTJG (50)	
V	Additional for each of 13 Area and District Offices		10 SN
VI	To Navy Class A Schools (from first class of basic Enlisted Schools)		340 SN
VII	Additional input to Basic Officer School		80 SROG
VIII	Net input of basic enlisted trainees		500
	TOTAL	20	1300

E. M plus 3 months to M plus 6 months

During this period the regular output of basic officer and enlisted schools are being received upon active duty. Specific assignments for them will be selected according to the needs of the service for replacement of males and for augmenting the strength of units, as developed by the progress of mobilization, emergency, or war. Consideration may be given to the transportation of Spars to territories and possessions during this period.

Only a general breakdown of the needed distribution of the Spar force by M plus 6 months can be given:

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>
I Administration of Coast Guard schools	42	88
II District, Area Offices and Recruiting	186	556
III Headquarters and Headquarters Units	12	85
IV In training	12	1370
V Supply Centers, Yard & Bases	37	327
VI Coastal Force/Port Security	126	1474
TOTAL	415	3900

IV CONCLUSIONS

These conclusions are specifically in response to the purpose of the report as given in the Forward to this part.

A. In peacetime, Spar's should be retained on active duty only in billets for which women as such are required. Such billets would be involved in procurement, training and administration of Spars as required to develop the mobilization base envisioned herein. The period of active duty for the incumbents of these billets should be limited to 2 or 3 years, in order to provide a flow of females with active duty experience into the Organized Reserve Training Units and the Active Status Pool.

B. Units to which Spars will be assigned subsequent to M-Day are:

1. To M plus 15 days
 - a. Continental District Offices
 - b. Recruiting Stations
 - c. Mobilization Stations
 - d. Basic Spar Enlisted School
 - e. Spar Officer Candidate School

2. To M plus 1 month. (additional)
 - a. Area Offices
 - b. Headquarters
 - c. Supply Centers
 - d. Yard
 - e. Receiving Center
 - f. Training Station

3. To M plus 3 months (additional)
 - a. GOF Offices (large)
 - b. PSU (large)
 - c. Navy Class A schools
 - d. Navy Officer special schools

4. To M plus 6 months (additional)
 - a. Other Headquarters Units
 - b. Coastal Force Section Headquarters
 - c. Bases
 - d. Similar offices and units in territories and possessions as may then be determined necessary.

G. The numbers of Spars in each specialty and rating that will be required at various stages of mobilization are:

1. Officers	Phase	(Cumulative)			
		15 ds.	1 mo.	3 mos.	6 mos.
Specialty					
15 Communications	58	76	76	96	
30 Administration	109	141	161	201	
91 Legal	2	3	3	3	
92 Finance	2	9	9	49	
93 Intelligence	1	1	1	21	
94 Training	16	43	43	43	
95 Port Security	184	275	295	415	

2. <u>Relisted</u> Phasing Rating	<u>1/2</u>	<u>1/2</u>	<u>1/2</u>	<u>1/2</u>
	15 da.	1 mo.	3 mos.	6 mos.
YN	225	358	393	556
SK	32	144	160	370
CS			24	504
PH	2	17	17	17
JO		29	29	29
DT				6
SN	12	12	657	1298
SR(OS)		40	120	120
AR		500	1000	1000
TOTAL	271	1100	2360	3700

Note: Non-rated personnel enrolled in Navy Class A schools as of M plus 6 months will additionally be in training as:

Radiomen RM	Av. Structural Mech. AM
Telomen TE	Aerographers Mate AG
Hospitalmen HM	Av. Storekeeper AK
Av. Elect. Tech. AT	Av. Mach. Mate AD
Av. Electricians Mate AE	Parachute Rigger FR

The length of these courses is such that no people would complete training and be rated by M plus 6.

D. The billets to be filled between M-Day and M plus 15 days by Spars from the Ready Reserve are:

This is a recapitulation of the billets specified in the discussion, paragraph III A.

1. <u>Officers</u> Specialty Rank	Port							Total
	Comm. 15	Admin. 50	Legal 91	Fin. 92	Intell. 93	Tra. 94	Sec. 95	
LCMR						2		2
LT	12	2				2		16
LTJG	24	35	2	2	1	3	2	69
ENS	22	66				9		97
TOTAL	58	103	2	2	1	16	2	164

2. Enlisted	YN	225
	SK	32
	PH	2
	SN	12
TOTAL		271

E. Since all training, other than basic training, will be provided by the Navy, the only training force needed by the Coast Guard for development of the Spar component is that represented by the staff and faculty of the two basic schools. The billets for this task as set forth in the discussion, paragraph III A IV, contemplate use of contract engineering and maintenance support, medical support from another nearby unit, and civilians to provide messing. They are recapitulated here:

1. Officer Candidate School

Specialty	Comm.	Admin.	Legal	Fin.	Intell.	Tra.	Sec.	Total
Rank	15	50	91	92	93	94	95	
LCDR						1		1
LT		1				1		2
LTJG	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	8
ENS						4		4
TOTAL	2	2	1	1	1	7	1	15

Enlisted

0	YN
5	SK
1	PH
6	SN
Total	20

2. Basic Enlisted School

Specialty	Comm.	Admin.	Legal	Fin.	Intell.	Tra.	Sec.	Total
Rank	15	50	91	92	93	94	95	
LCDR						1		1
LT		1				1		2
LTJG	1	1	1	1		2	1	7
ENS						5		5
TOTAL	1	2	1	1		9	1	15

Enlisted	6	YN
	3	ME
	1	PH
	6	SN
Total	16	

F. A table showing total phased mobilization requirements follows:

SPARE MOBILIZATION

TOTAL PHASSED REQUIREMENTS

OFFICERS	1978		1979		TOTAL REQUIREMENTS MIL/OSY
	PROGRESSIVE INTEG	PROGRESSIVE INTEG	PROGRESSIVE INTEG	PROGRESSIVE INTEG	
W/15 dn.	184	184	271	271	455
	184/1/2 no. Ready Reserve Training Unit personnel				271/1/2 no. Ready Reserve Training Unit personnel
W/1 mo.	91	275	829	1100	1775
	91/1/2 no. Reserve Active Status Pool				829/1/2 no. 200 From Reserve Active Status Pool. Procurement incl. 239 For AOB without additional training
W/3 mo.	20	295	1300	2400	2695
	10/no. Direct commissions				650/no. Procurement incl. 110/no. for AOB without additional training
W/6 mo.	120	415	1500	3900	4315
	40/no. Spar OS				300/no. for basic training. Addition- al input of 40/no. for OS is balanced by out- put of OS from enlisted to officer status

2


V RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Complements developed for wartime manning of all units listed in Conclusion A. should be annotated to show the billets which may be filled by Spars.


B. Current extended active duty assignments for Spars should be terminated except for such billets directly involved in a program of recruiting, training and administration of the Spar portion of the mobilization base. Incumbents of such billets should remain on active duty for a period of approximately 2 or 3 years.

C. A force of Spars in the Ready Reserve should be developed as outlined in the discussion, paragraph III B.

MOBILIZATION REQUIREMENTS SPAR OFFICERS



MOBILIZATION REQUIREMENTS OFFICER AND ENLISTED SPARS



SPARS

ACTIVE STATUS POOL

TRAINING UNITS

OFFICERS

ENLISTED

M+ 15 DAYS RATIO 1.5
M+ 2 MOS. RATIO 4.0
M+ 3 MOS. RATIO 8.1
M+ 4 MOS. RATIO 9.4
M+ 5 MOS. RATIO 9.4
M+ 6 MOS. RATIO 9.4

MOBILIZATION REQUIREMENTS SPARS-ENLISTED

