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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, EIGHTH U.S. ARMY SPECIAL TROOPS COMMAND & AREA III
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96301-0008



REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

EAST-LS

15 September 1988

MEMORANDUM THRU: DEPUTY OF STAFF

FOR: CHIEF OF STAFF

SUBJECT: AR 15-6 Investigation No. 105-88

The Report of Investigation under the provisions of AR 15-6 is forwarded for your information and action as deemed appropriate.

Encl
as

JOSEPH R. SIMINO
COL, FA
Commanding

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HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES FORCES, KOREA
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96301-0010



REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

JAJ-AL (27-1a)

12 OCT 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR: SJS

SUBJECT: Report of AR 15-6 Investigation

This office has reviewed subject report of investigation. The following comments are submitted:

a. The investigating officer has done an outstanding job of sorting through regulations, testimony, and historical documents in this matter. Because findings are buried in recitations of background matters, however, it is difficult to determine what his findings actually are. Recommend he separate his findings into a more succinct statement, and indicate whether any of Mr. [REDACTED]'s allegations are founded. His narrative should also include information on exactly what he was tasked to investigate, as his eventual appointment was oral, and the information concerning Mr. Brown's management style appears, at first blush, tangential to his original charter.

b. The following comments pertain to the investigating officer's recommendations:

(1) Recommendation 17: Mr. [REDACTED]^{b6} has departed the command. No further action can be taken against him.

(2) Recommendation 18: Unless appropriate action was taken before Mr. [REDACTED] departed this command, he cannot be denied re-employment in Korea if he applies and is otherwise qualified for the position.

(3) Recommendation 30: The findings are not specific enough to support removal of all adverse information from the files of all civilian and military personnel. The investigating officer must determine what adverse actions were taken and substantiate that they were, in fact, inaccurate. If the findings support it, the command may initiate appeals on behalf of the soldiers affected IAW AR 623-205, and may act on behalf of civilian employees IAW USFK Reg 690-1.

c. The investigating officer indicates he did not interview Mr. [REDACTED] because it would have necessitated naming Mr. [REDACTED] a respondent and appointing a formal board. This is not necessarily true. A respondent need only be designated if the appointing authority wants to give him a hearing. The possibility of adverse recommendations against Mr. [REDACTED] is not dispositive. If the investigating officer or appointing authority believes Mr. [REDACTED] can provide relevant information, he can and should be interviewed.

1. Background:

a. On 20 April 1988, an AR 15-6 was directed to investigate the allegations of possible violations in the shipment and handling of hazardous materiel, MSC-K, Camp Carroll, Korea, Exhibit A. The AR 15-6 preliminary preparation revealed an IG investigation was directed by CG, 19th SUPCOM into the same allegations. In view of this, it seemed prudent to wait the outcome of the IG investigation, its findings and recommendations before proceeding with the AR 15-6. On 3 May 1988, the AR 15-6 was terminated by Director of Logistics, EAST, Exhibit B. On 30 May 1988, I was called by the Director of Logistics and directed to proceed with the AR 15-6 investigation.

b. The preliminary proceedings looked at the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and Korean law in terms of shipment and management of hazardous material. The investigator queried EUSA staff agencies SJA, J-4, Safety, Peak, Internal Review, DEH, 18th MEDCOM and 5th Preventive Medicine. Purpose was to review EUSA policies, responsibilities, procedures, and standards for the systemic control, monitorship and management of hazardous materiel and hazardous waste program.

Investigating Officer reviewed in detail the allegations made by Mr. [REDACTED] his treatment by 19th Support Command Office Civilian Personnel (OCP) and the circumstances surrounding the 19th Support Command's decision to remove [REDACTED] from the work force area at Camp Carroll, Korea. The investigation also focused on Transportation Division MSC-K Korean National employee unrest at Camp Carroll, Korea.

	YES	NO	N/A
2 Exhibits (para 3-16, AR 15-6)			
a. Are all items offered (whether or not received) or considered as evidence individually numbered or lettered as exhibits and attached to this report?	X		
b. Is an index of all exhibits offered to or considered by investigating officer or board attached before the first exhibit?		X	
c. Has the testimony/statement of each witness been recorded verbatim or been reduced to written form and attached as an exhibit?	X		
d. Are copies, descriptions, or depictions (if substituted for real or documentary evidence) properly authenticated and is the location of the original evidence indicated?	X		
e. Are descriptions or diagrams included of locations visited by the investigating officer or board (para 3-6b, AR 15-6)?			X
f. Is each written stipulation attached as an exhibit and is each oral stipulation either reduced to writing and made an exhibit or recorded in a verbatim record?	X		
g. If official notice of any matter was taken over the objection of a respondent or counsel, is a statement of the matter of which official notice was taken attached as an exhibit (para 3-16d, AR 15-6)?			X
3 Was a quorum present when the board voted on findings and recommendations (paras 4-1 and 5-2b, AR 15-6)?		X	
B. COMPLETE ONLY FOR FORMAL BOARD PROCEEDINGS (Chapter 5, AR 15-6)			
4 At the initial session, did the recorder read, or determine that all participants had read, the letter of appointment (para 5-3b, AR 15-6)?			
5 Was a quorum present at every session of the board (para 5-2b, AR 15-6)?			
6 Was each absence of any member properly excused (para 5-2a, AR 15-6)?			
7 Were members, witnesses, reporter, and interpreter sworn, if required (para 3-1, AR 15-6)?			
8 If any members who voted on findings or recommendations were not present when the board received some evidence, does the inclosure describe how they familiarized themselves with that evidence (para 5-2d, AR 15-6)?			
C. COMPLETE ONLY IF A RESPONDENT WAS DESIGNATED (Section II, Chapter 5, AR 15-6)			
9 Notice to respondents (para 5-6, AR 15-6):			
a. Is the method and date of delivery to the respondent indicated on each letter of notification?			
b. Was the date of delivery at least five working days prior to the first session of the board?			
c. Does each letter of notification indicate --			
(1) the date, hour, and place of the first session of the board concerning that respondent?			
(2) the matter to be investigated, including specific allegations against the respondent, if any?			
(3) the respondent's rights with regard to counsel?			
(4) the name and address of each witness expected to be called by the recorder?			
(5) the respondent's rights to be present, present evidence, and call witnesses?			
d. Was the respondent provided a copy of all unclassified documents in the case file?			
e. If there were relevant classified materials, were the respondent and his counsel given access and an opportunity to examine them?			
10 If any respondent was designated after the proceedings began (or otherwise was absent during part of the proceedings):			
a. Was he properly notified (para 5-5, AR 15-6)?			
b. Was record of proceedings and evidence received in his absence made available for examination by him and his counsel (para 5-4, AR 15-6)?			
11 Counsel (para 5-6, AR 15-6):			
a. Was each respondent represented by counsel?			
Name and business address of counsel:			
(If counsel is a lawyer, check here <input type="checkbox"/>)			
b. Was respondent's counsel present at all open sessions of the board relating to that respondent?			
c. If military counsel was requested but not made available, is a copy (or, if oral, a summary) of the request and the action taken on it included in the report (para 5-6b, AR 15-6)?			
12 If the respondent challenged the legal advisor or any voting member for lack of impartiality (para 5-7, AR 15-6):			
a. Was the challenge properly denied and by the appropriate officer?			
b. Did each member successfully challenged cease to participate in the proceedings?			
13 Was the respondent given an opportunity to (para 5-8a, AR 15-6):			
a. Be present with his counsel at all open sessions of the board which deal with any matter which concerns that respondent?			
b. Examine and object to the introduction of real and documentary evidence, including written statements?			
c. Object to the testimony of witnesses and cross-examine witnesses other than his own?			
d. Call witnesses and otherwise introduce evidence?			
e. Testify as a witness?			
f. Make or have his counsel make a final statement or argument (para 5-9, AR 15-6)?			
14 If requested, did the recorder assist the respondent in obtaining evidence in possession of the Government and in arranging for the presence of witnesses (para 5-8b, AR 15-6)?			
15 Are all of the respondent's requests and objections which were denied indicated in the report of proceedings or in an inclosure or exhibit to it (para 5-11, AR 15-6)?			
FOOTNOTES: 1/ Explain all negative answers on an attached sheet. 2/ Use of the N/A column constitutes a positive representation that the circumstances described in the question did not occur in this investigation or board.			

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c. Further research revealed a letter at Exhibit E, dated 4 November 1980, Subject: DOD Environmental Policy Concerning Pollution Abatement at Federal Facilities outside the United States. It states, pending revision of AR 200-1, dated 20 January 1978, Army activities located outside the United States, will conform to the DOD Policy in fulfilling environmental protection and enhancement. AR 200-1, dated 1981, para 1-8, Exhibit F requires Army activities to comply with the substantive pollution control standards of general applicability of the host country unless the SOFA provides otherwise. The US/ROK SOFA does not specifically address the matter of hazardous materiel, pollution control and disposal of hazardous waste. ~~Therefore EUSA is required (by DOD policy and Army regulations, rather than the SOFA itself) to comply with substantive ROK law dealing with environmental standards of general applicability. This includes handling, disposal, storage, and management of hazardous materiel and hazardous waste disposal. From this it would seem logical for EUSA to establish policy outlining responsibilities, procedures, and standards for the systemic control and monitoring of the identification, the collection, preparation, separation, storage, processing, recovery, treatment and management of hazardous materiel. This regulatory guidance must apply to active Army and all tenant or supported installations, facilities or sites under the temporary or permanent jurisdiction of EUSA. Appropriate regulatory guidance has not been published by EUSA.~~

3. Hazardous materiel, toxic chemicals and hazardous waste management is not new to EUSA or to Camp Carroll, Korea. ~~Research of records and paper~~

~~AL 15-6 investigation was conducted on the contents of a handout~~

Camp Carroll, Korea, prior to 23 July 1980. A letter provided by EUSA SJA Office recommended an AR 15-6 investigation directing and fixing the blame, or assessing liability on the burial of hazardous materiel and hazardous waste at Camp Carroll be terminated. The EUSA SJA Office recommended the AR 15-6 investigation be continued at the specialist and technician level in order to develop more facts and make specific recommendations to prevent such a recurrence and to establish policy and directives to prevent a recurrence. The IG/Staff Judge Advocate, comments to the AR 15-6 investigation are the only documents that could be located Exhibit G. SJA's states: this was a disturbing case because of hindsight, it is not easy to see how a large operation such as EUSA could have permitted such a dumping of hazardous materiel and hazardous waste to have occurred in Korea. There were many people, offices, and organizations involved over several years in this matter. The investigation substantiated various chemicals were deposited at Camp Carroll after the Korean war and that more were brought there after Viet Nam. The storage and disposal of hazardous materiel and hazardous waste of hundreds of drums and other containers was a perennial problem. Current concern should focus on removal of chemicals from Area 41 and burial at Area 'D' at Camp Carroll. Approximately 6100 cubic feet of 188

different types of hazardous chemicals weighing 300 tons were buried in Area 41. Exhibit G. This was part of a much larger and more serious problem to resolve the existing unsafe storage situation. It was a messy job, but it was done and everybody was involved from EUSA on down. SJA recommended the investigation be directed towards preventing this from happening again instead of placing blame. From this point, he was talking about how could we all share

4. EUSA published policy or guidance to subordinates for effective management control of hazardous material and hazardous waste. Further, it could not be determined if staff responsibility for providing hazardous material policy for implementation was directed. However it was recommended by EUSA SJA, the J4 be assigned responsibility and proponent for the management of hazardous material and hazardous waste. The whole issue seems to have died, but the point to make is EUSA had the initiative and momentum to fix hazardous material problems. EUSA did in fact clean up the landfills at Camp Carroll. However, I could not substantiate if the contaminated soil from Areas 41 & D were removed and properly buried.

4. Other Official Reports:

a. ~~4. US Army Environmental Hygiene Agency from Aberdeen conducted~~
~~survey on EUSA Hazardous Waste Management 14 - 30 October 1985. The~~
~~report was published by the US Army Environmental Hygiene Agency on 9~~
~~April 1986. Exhibit H, indicates the report was distributed through Health~~
~~Services Command (HSC) channels, to the EUSA Surgeon's Office. The~~
purpose of the survey was to evaluate EUSA's handling, storage, transport, disposal, and recycling of hazardous waste and hazardous material in Korea. ~~The Executive Summary concluded: EUSA needs to develop a policy~~
~~on the management of hazardous material and hazardous waste handled by US~~
~~Army operations in Korea. That EUSA develop and implement uniform~~
~~regulations for the management of hazardous material and hazardous waste~~
~~handled by US Army operations in Korea. That EUSA assign and~~
~~assess the responsibility for the overall management of hazardous~~
~~material and hazardous waste handled by US Army operations in Korea.~~
~~That EUSA develop and implement contingency plans for the event of~~

and response to a sudden and non-sudden release of hazardous materiel and hazardous waste at each installation. That EUSA develop and implement a comprehensive training program based on established policy and regulations of EUSA. This report was found in a file at 5th Preventive Medicine Detachment, 19th SUPCOM, Camp Walker, Korea. During the course of the investigation (I could not substantiate a [redacted] of reply) of corrective action. Further, I could not substantiate anyone having seen this report at EUSA or 19th SUPCOM staff. Inspector General, Internal Review, The DEH, FEAR, HOS, J-4 staffs, except 5th Preventive Medicine, further, I could not substantiate any follow-up to this report done by the US Environmental Hygiene Agency. The US Army Environmental Hygiene Agency report is Damaging to EUSA.

5. During the course of the investigation, I discovered a survey by the US Army, Pacific Environmental Health Engineering Agency. The title is Waste Management Practices Survey at Camp Carroll, Waegon POL STAGE, Salem Base, and Salem Top, Korea, 5 - 16 May 1986. Exhibit I. The purpose of the survey was to evaluate solid waste management, petroleum oil lubricants storage and handling, waste POL storage and disposal, and hazardous materiel/hazardous waste management practices. This report was finalized on 31 December 1986 and distributed through Health Services Command (HSC) channels as well as a copy furnished to 19th Support Command, US Army MSC-K, Camp Carroll on 31 December 1986. I could not substantiate 19th Support chain of command or MSC-K receiving this report in 1986. This report was forwarded to the Commander, Camp Carroll, HSC-K by [redacted] reply of corrective action on 26 January 1988, two years after the

report was finalized. The Commander, Camp Carroll provided copies to his activities and stated in para 1, "the enclosed survey is provided for your immediate action. This is a very important area that has generally been ignored in Korea in the past." He stated, "these days are gone." Since, two in-progress reviews and corrective actions are still being worked. The Commander, Camp Carroll, is conducting quarterly reviews until all the findings of the report are resolved and corrected.

c. The surveys on hazardous material and hazardous waste management practices in Korea are not being directed through USA command channels. Both the surveys indicate potential harm to personnel and the environment. More importantly similar conditions may exist elsewhere within the command. The inspection reports have valid points applicable to small installations that may have or manage hazardous material and hazardous waste. Little has been done in terms of analyzing these reports, and setting priorities to fix hazardous material problems. A focal point is needed.

d. Another example is a Camp Carroll Survey, Industrial Hygiene Study Exhibit D of the Heavy Equipment Division. The medical report points to unusual high lead blood levels in welders who were operating equipment in confined spaces, performing welding operations of metals containing lead and welding metals that contained a lead coated paint. Personnel were observed performing the welding operations without the proper exhaust or ventilating systems, and in this case, without the use of air respirators or respirators approved by the US Bureau of Mines. I could not track the

report and actions of medical personnel through the dispensary at Camp Carroll. During an interview with the two OSHA nurses they were unaware this Industrial Hygiene Study existed. However, this report was at the command group level, the Camp Carroll Headquarters. Management steps are required to place these welders in a medical monitoring program and to insure safety standards are met in accordance with Title 29 and Occupational Safety and Health Administration Regulations. Again, the investigating officer could not substantiate a copy of corrective action to resolve the issues of the report. Project 55-92-02-08-86, DATED 3 February 1987.

5. As a result of the US Army Environmental Hygiene Agency, EUSA Hazardous Waste Management Survey, discussed in (para 4. a.) a letter was prepared, 11 Feb 1986, Exhibit K by 5th Preventive Medicine requesting assistance in developing an EUSA Hazardous Materiel/Hazardous Waste Plan. The US Army Environmental Hygiene Agency at Aberdeen Proving Grounds, MD provided EUSA a draft Hazardous Materiel/Hazardous Waste Management Plan, dated 20 October 1986. Records indicate 5th Preventive Medicine forwarded the plan to the FEAK Engineers for further analysis review and adoption.

It looks like the FEAK Agency did finally modify the original plan with intentions to adopt it as the EUSA Hazardous Waste Management Program in October 1987. Exhibit K, 12 months after the draft was provided by Aberdeen Proving Grounds.

Further, DF's indicate the draft EUSA Hazardous Waste Management Program was forwarded for information to several agencies IAW AR 420-47 and AR 200-1. The purpose was to organize an EUSA Hazardous Materiel and Hazardous Waste Management Board for implementation of the

draft plan. This board was chaired by the FEAK Commander to develop, coordinate and evaluate EUSA Environmental Policy. The board would meet at least annually and consist of the following members as a minimum; FEAK, J-1 Rep, J-4 Rep, the EUSA Surgeon, the DRMO and DEH representatives. The point of contact for the draft EUSA Plan was a Mr. [REDACTED] assigned to FEAK as an Environmental Engineer. He has since departed this command. Another DF dated 30 October 1987, Exhibit K, stated, an Area Hazardous Materiel/Hazardous Waste Management Board would be established. The board membership was to consist of, but not limited to the following; Commanders of installations, DEH/DFE, area environmental coordinators, area medical or preventive medicine officers, area fire chiefs, area safety officer, chief installation transportation unit, logistics officer, director, industrial operations, local property disposal officer, and a representative from each activity generating hazardous materiel or hazardous waste. The function of this board was to plan, resolve, and coordinate area hazardous materiel and hazardous waste management programs. The DF stated, the area environmental coordinator be nominated to the EUSA Hazardous Management Board. The area environmental coordinator will write an Area Hazardous Materiel and Hazardous Waste Management Plan with support from appropriate installation personnel. The plan was to contain the following as a minimum; hazardous materiel management survey, identification of hazardous materiel and hazardous waste, inventory and tracking procedures, a storage inspection plan, a waste analysis plan, hazardous materiel and hazardous waste SOPs, a training plan, a spill prevention control and countermeasure plan, an installation spill contingency plan, local transportation procedures for

hazardous materiel and hazardous waste and storage, treatment and disposal facilities standards. The effort from this point on seems to have diminished with a weak attempt to establish a Hazardous Materiel and Hazardous Waste Management Plan for EUSA. This can be contributed to the lack of manning and establishment of environmental management offices/structure. So, the objectives of the program were never met and EUSA policy was not established.

6. Another document a Fact Sheet, dated 24 March 1987, unsigned by the EUSA Surgeon, Exhibit L, expounds on the problem. It identifies a transformer problem in the vicinity of the Yongsan Commissary and spill of an oily substance on the concrete pad and in the surrounding area. The spill was alleged to be suspected PCB, Polychlorinated Biphenyls Compounds. The workers replacing the transformer were without any protective clothing or equipment and apparently the transformer replaced had not been tested for PCB contamination. As a result, 5th Preventive Medicine Unit looked into the matter and the following information was provided to FEAK. 5th Preventive Medicine stated that USA Pacific Environmental and Health Engineering Agency developed a draft plan and submitted it to FEAK in October 1986, as yet, it had not been finalized. That a uniform regulation for the management of hazardous materiel and hazardous waste has not been developed or implemented. The responsibilities for the overall management of hazardous materiel and hazardous waste have not been developed or delegated for US Army, Korea. Contingency plans for the prevention and response to unplanned release or spill of hazardous materiel or hazardous waste have not been developed.

There is no training program for personnel managing or handling hazardous waste or hazardous materiel. In following up, I talked to a Mr. [REDACTED] EUSA, FEAK, who is assigned to the Engineer Directorate, Utilities Division, stated, "the PCB or suspected PCB had been cleaned up in the vicinity of the Yongsan Commissary, however, he could not substantiate if the transformer had been tested for PCB." He further stated, "he had no information on the workers who handled the PCB or the transformer containing the suspected PCB." He was uncertain if the workers had been medically screened or had been advised of the possible hazards to their health of PCB contaminants.

Again, in March 1987, there was a clear indication responsible offices were reminded of work required in the establishment of a Hazardous Materiel and Hazardous Waste Management Plan for Korea.

7. An interview with 19th SUPCOM DEH, Internal Review and the sub DEH at Camp Carroll, indicated they had not seen policy on EUSA Hazardous Material Management Program.

In talking to Mr. [REDACTED] he stated, "his office had responsibility however, they were just in the development stages of an EUSA Environmental Program including an EUSA Hazardous Waste and Hazardous Materiel Management Plan." I asked him if there was an EUSA Hazardous Waste and Hazardous Materiel Management Program in place implemented by EUSA and his answer was, "No, there was not."

8. I checked with EUSA Internal Review office to determine if the command had received any AAA Audit Reports on toxic and hazardous materiel and hazardous waste. It was found that since January 1984, the US Army Audit

Agency (AAA) had issued four audit reports covering toxic and hazardous materiel and hazardous waste. ~~The purpose of these advisory reports is to identify problems, provide pertinent facts in areas that warrant special interest and to provide checklists to assist commanders and their staffs.~~ The EUSA Internal Review Office had on file a hazardous materiel advisory report, SO 85-A1 Exhibit M. However, this was not disseminated because ~~agencies have to ask for the report before a copy is provided.~~ In review of the SO85-A1 Report, it has valid points on the management and planning for a Master Environmental Plan including hazardous materiel and hazardous waste. It covers radioactive items of supply, biological and radioactive waste, management of transformers, toxic chemicals, and the purpose for identification, inspection, labeling, storage, inventory, and disposition of hazardous materiel. It states the purpose for identifying the environmental and program resource requirements, also the training that should be provided to unit and activity personnel who deal with toxic and hazardous materiel and hazardous waste are discussed. The report references the Army policies and procedures that are prescribed in Army regulations across the spectrum of the staffs. It is a good report and one that should be disseminated to subordinate commands and used as a starting point to establish a hazardous materiel and hazardous waste program for EUSA.

9. Area III DEH, LTC ~~██████████~~ office was contacted. I spoke to the acting Deputy, Mr. ~~██████████~~ the Utilities Division Chief under DEH, Yongsan. ~~He stated, "I know of work plans, but not of the current hazardous materiel and hazardous waste management in Korea and Yongsan."~~ He stated, "they had just put a plan together and intended to

hold their first meeting in July of this year." He stated, "a EUSA focal point is needed for installation DEH's to come for problems relating to hazardous waste or identification of hazardous materiel." He felt this area deserves a lot of attention and that EUSA should assign an Environmental Engineer or an Environmental Coordinator. He stated, "the business of hazardous materiel and hazardous waste clearly indicates the need for more effective management, control, and coordination of an overall EUSA program." "There are many problems in the disposal of hazardous waste and hazardous materiel that local DEH's are faced with." He further stated, "with the industrialization process ongoing in Korea and new emphasis on the Korean environment this creates a need for a EUSA focal point, and certainly one of increased monitor-ship." Mr. [REDACTED] b6 stated, "it is a necessity that an environmental coordinator and an office be established at each installation to ensure the proper use and management of toxic materiel and hazardous waste." He felt that the DEH at Yongsan, Area III, was into the infancy stage of environmental awareness and training aspects of hazardous materiel and hazardous waste.

10. ~~The investigating officer could not substantiate an EUSA organization responsible for effective control, coordination, and monitor-ship of an Environmental Program essential to accomplish the Army goals for health environment protection and enhancement.~~ If nothing else EUSA has a moral obligation being aware of the dangers of hazardous and toxic chemicals as regulated under Federal, State, and Congressional laws in the United States. Certainly command emphasis is needed on what type of EUSA

Environmental Program be established in Korea to meet the minimum standards required by Army Regulations and the environmental standards of the Republic of Korea. Across EUSA, 19th SUPCOM, and the command staffs at Camp Carroll, it became evident that no single agency is in charge of an Environmental Program including the management of hazardous materiel and hazardous waste in Korea. There appears to be a lot of internal staff debate on whether it should be J-4 Transportation, DEHs, the EUSA Safety Office, or 5th the Preventive Medicine to take the lead and publish policy on the management of hazardous waste and hazardous materiel. This, I believe, has resulted in little or no policy.

15. Research indicates that AR 5-3 Exhibit N, dated November 1986 clearly outlines the Directorate of Engineering and Housing Agency responsible for hazardous materiel and hazardous waste management. Under the Directorate of Engineering and Housing (DEH), an organization should exist called the Environmental Management Office. This organization manages an Environmental Program and will typically have the following functions; a. It will operate pollution abatement programs (such as air, water, noise). b. It will manage hazardous materiel and toxic materials/waste programs. c. It will serve as a focal point for coordination management of hazardous materiel and hazardous waste. d. It will manage oil and hazardous materiel spill management. It states, if at an installation or at an organization where the population served is less than 2,000 or where there is minimal environmental workload, you may find the Environmental Office combined, normally, with the Engineering Plans and Services Division. AR 5-3 clearly sets down the function under the auspices of the Environmental Management Office to be responsible for managing hazardous

material and toxic materials/waste management. In the discharge of those functions it is also clear that FEAK should become the policy center for EUSA. In review of EUSA USFK 10-1, Organizations and Functions, you will not find those functions indicated under the FEAK or ACoIS, Engineer EUSA.

16. As you break down management responsibility for hazardous material, hazardous waste the complexities come in focus. Exhibit 10, Safety Installation Commander under AR 200-1, The Radiation Protection Officer under the A-4, Hazardous Material and Hazardous Waste Program under DEH, Preventive Medicine, Fire Prevention and Fire Protection Response Teams under DEH, Transportation Requirements under the J-4, and the Central Disposal Area Office under the DRMO all have a slice in management of toxic and hazardous material and hazardous waste. Considering the magnitude of the different Army Regulations, DOD requirements, Federal Regulations, National Fire Codes, and the current decentralization of operations, effective control and monitor ship by a single EUSA staff office is imperative. An integrated and coordinated approach to the issues dealing with the management of hazardous material and hazardous waste can only be brought about by command emphasis. I've heard arguments that Korea has not focused a nation's attention on the health and environmental affects of toxic and hazardous material and hazardous waste. Therefore some believe that EUSA should not be concerned. Others will tell you that hazardous material and hazardous waste is in a stage of infancy in Korea when compared to the requirements of other foreign countries such as Germany, Japan, and in the United States.

In arguments to all of this, EUSA has a moral obligation stemming from what was learned in the 1970's and early 1980's, based on popular concern about the potential risk of industrial chemicals, hazardous materiel and hazardous waste. Realization that some of those substances, used or released randomly or carelessly, pose serious health hazards and have significant harmful affects on the surrounding environment should be enough.

17. Organizational Structure:

EUSA Internal Review needs to look at REAK and determine if it is properly staffed with the right expertise to establish appropriate hazardous management plans/programs under AR 200-1 and AR 200-17. It applies to subordinate DEH's. During establishment of Environmental Management Offices concurrently look at Korean environmental standards, laws, Army Regulation as it applies to hazardous materiel management. The EUSA Environmental Management Office serving as the focal point can pull along other staff agencies in a coordinated and integrated effort. However without the proper manning EUSA will not succeed in the management of many and varied plans required for toxic and hazardous materials and wastes. Some of these are the Master Environmental Plan, Waste Analysis Plan, Spill Prevention Control and Countermeasures Plan, Installation Spill Contingency Plan, and others.

18. MSC-K - HAZARDOUS MATERIAL

a. Investigating officer was able to substantiate a partial list of types of toxic and hazardous materiel stored at Camp Carroll assembled by the Safety Office, Mr. [REDACTED] ^{b6} The OSHA Nurses at the Camp Carroll dispensary did not have a complete list of toxic and hazardous materiel that employees come in contact with. The Camp Carroll Fire Department had an incomplete list of hazardous material stored at MSC-K. This also applies to 19th Support Command, DEH. ~~More emphasis is needed on the establishment of safeguards and contingency plans for minimizing danger to health and environment in the event of a fire, or explosion, or some other type of disaster that could occur~~

b. I could not substantiate that a Waste Analysis Plan existed at Camp Carroll, 19th SUPCOM, AR 420-47. (Each installation activity hazardous waste or hazardous materiel must have) a plan that thoroughly analyzes: (a). The types of hazardous materiel and hazardous waste at the installation/activity; (b). The properties of such hazardous materiel and hazardous waste, so that appropriate measures and procedures can be employed to handle, store, and dispose of hazardous substances. (c). Training requirements essential for ensuring that personnel are aware of and are capable of safely dealing with hazardous materiel and hazardous waste. Although not required, I believe the plan should provide for periodic testing of areas, for example, soil and water surrounding facilities used for storage and disposal of hazardous materiel and hazardous waste.

c. I could not find evidence of a Spill Prevention Control and Countermeasure Plan at Camp Carroll and 19th SUPCOM. As a minimum AR 200-1 prescribes that the Spill Prevention Control and Countermeasures Plan contain; (a). An inventory list of storage, handling, and transfer facilities for which a reasonable possibility exists for a significant discharge of oil, chemicals, or other hazardous materiel and hazardous waste in harmful quantities. (b). A prediction of the direction, rate of flow, and total quantity that could be discharged as a result of a catastrophe or a major equipment failure. (c). A detailed description of equipment and countermeasures, including structures and equipment for diversion and containment of discharges for each listed site. (d). A description of deficiencies at each listed site including corrective measures required and procedures to be followed to correct the deficiencies. (e). Written operating procedures, inspections and record keeping requirements.

d. I did not find any evidence of an Installation Spill Contingency Plan at 19th SUPCOM or at Camp Carroll, except for a Chlorine Spill Plan developed by the Director of S & T, coordinated with the Fire Department and safety personnel at Camp Carroll. Chapter 8, AR 200-1, directs all installations to have an Installation Spill Contingency Plan and stipulates the minimum contents of the plan. This plan is basically used to clean up the discharges or spills of oil, chemicals, other hazardous substances. It is applicable for any installation with the capability to release hazardous materiel or substances in quantities that may be harmful to the environment and personnel. As a minimum, AR 200-1, prescribes that

an Installation Spill Contingency Plan contain the name, responsibilities, and duties of the installation on scene coordinator as designated by the Installation Commander. It specifies the composition and training plans of an installation response team. It also includes the names, positions, telephone numbers and addresses of key contact people and other key organizations and agencies to be notified of a chemical or hazardous waste materiel spill. It provides surveillance procedures for the early detection of hazardous substance spill. AR 200-1 requires this plan to be reevaluated and updated every three years and tested annually to ensure a timely and effective response is made in case of an accidental spill of toxic or hazardous chemicals.

e. Evidence in statements and interviews Exhibit, F substantiates the MSC-K Deputy Community Commander, Safety, Director of Supply and Transportation, DEH/DFE, 5th FM and the Transportation Division Chief, were not aware of any requirement for the plans just discussed. MSC-K Safety Office is trying to develop assessments on the types of hazardous materiel and hazardous waste generated at Camp Carroll. They plan to assign a hazardous rating by developing safety data sheets, descriptions, characteristics, and dangers associated with on-hand hazardous materiel and hazardous waste.

19. Inspections.

USA has not to get people smart in the inspection of hazardous materiel
a supplies for the storage, shipment, identification, handling, and
maintenance requirements, harm to the environment and surrounding

community. A case in point, the large storage Warehouse Six at Camp Carroll contains all water fire extinguishers without regard to the types of oxidizers, corrosive agents, acids, and other chemicals which are incompatible with water. Safety and fire inspections are being done without considering the chemicals, and hazardous materiel stored in a building. Again MSC-K warehouse operators and the first line supervisors were not well versed in the incompatibility aspects of storing hazardous materiel/chemicals or what could occur if you had an accidental mixture by breakage or leakage of incompatible chemicals and what types of violent reactions may occur. ~~It is necessary to do a better job of educating the workforce that handle, manage, and store hazardous materiel and hazardous waste. The lack of an MSC-K industrial hygienist, OSHA nurses, worker training, safety personnel trained in hazardous materiel and hazardous waste business contributes to the lack of knowledge found in the workforce.~~

20. ~~_____~~ TRANSPORTATION DIVISION CHIEF, MSC-K

a. Mr. ~~_____~~ qualifications. ~~_____~~ b6

~~_____~~ b6 ~~_____~~ b6 ~~_____~~ b6 and interview with COL Wheeler, Mr. ~~_____~~ b6

~~_____~~ b6 was technically qualified to serve as the Chief, Transportation

Division IGS in position as a Traffic Manager under the 616 Facility

Supply and Transportation, MSC-K, Camp Carroll. He was responsible for

the program management and coordinating functions relative to receipt,

packaging/unpackaging, and shipment of materials IAW current

regulations/policies and procedures relative to transportation traffic management. Part of his major duties was acting as the technical advisory service pertaining to traffic management in and out of Camp Carroll, military customs regulations and the shipment of hazardous commodities. He was to exercise staff supervision through subordinate supervisors engaged in the preparation and processing of documents and incidents to the movement and receipt of freight, the preparation of statistical and analytical reports, charts, and graphs reflecting the transportation workload, tonnage, future workload program and establish priorities. Also Mr. [REDACTED] served as the radiological control officer IAW regulations concerning receipt, storage, and shipment cycle. One aspect of the job was responsibility to formulate training plans for assigned employees and provide for OJT and cross-training on the job. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] description, Exhibit [REDACTED]

b. The Director, Supply and Transportation, Major [REDACTED] stated, Mr. [REDACTED] supervised 89 employees, the majority of which were Korean National employees, RGS's in the transportation field, a Department of the Army Civilian (DAC), and a number of active duty military, 88N series MOS, Movement Specialists. Statements by MAJ [REDACTED] and Mr. [REDACTED] the current Transportation Div Chief, Exhibit, P, the organizational manpower authorizations are adequate to meet the mission requirements, except for surge periods common in support of Team Spirit or other major joint/combined exercises within the Republic of Korea. However, extended work week and funding is able to take care of any shipping surges.

c. What type of manager was Mr. [REDACTED] It became very apparent during the interviews with KN employees, DAC employees KN supervisors several things seemed to dominate throughout each of the interviews.

summary there was a negative environment caused by Mr. [REDACTED]

complete lack of communications between Mr. [REDACTED] his first line

supervisors and KN employees and in part, a personality conflict existed

with Mr. [REDACTED] his first line DAC supervisor. Mr. [REDACTED] in

many cases went directly to the work force and directed the work effort,

bypassing his first line KN supervisors and DAC supervisor. (c) There

was a lack of planning and consistent guidance, to establish work

priorities for the labor force. (d) Mr. [REDACTED] autocratic and

authoritarian leadership style led to problems in mission accomplishment.

(e) Mr. [REDACTED] used abrasive language directed either around or at

employees and first line supervisors. (f) There is a lack of informal

training, DOT training, and orientation training for newly assigned

personnel as well as KN employees under the supervision of Mr. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (g) Under Mr. [REDACTED] unrealistic training goals were set

requiring KN employees to pass a technical DOT training course presented

by Aberdeen Proving Grounds, MD. (h) Mr. [REDACTED] failed to establish

long range goals to increase the effectiveness of the Transportation

Division. (i) There is a lack of an awards system which supports

achievement of the organization's mission as well as individual efforts to

personal development and achievement. Mr. [REDACTED] did not

take any steps to create an environment of

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d. Communications:

(1) Statements by Mr. [redacted] Mr. [redacted] Mr. [redacted] b6 b6
[redacted] b6 b6
LTC [redacted] MAJ [redacted] Mr. [redacted] SFC [redacted] Mr. [redacted] Mr. [redacted] b6 b6
[redacted] Mr. [redacted] Mr. [redacted] Mr. [redacted] used one way b6 b6
communications, communications down. James [redacted] communication b6
technique to the workers was autocratic without feedback, directive in
nature. "This is what I want you to do, I expect you to do it and there is
no other way to do it except for my way." Communications down was at
times not fully understood by the workforce and that lack of understanding
did not result in purposeful actions in worker output. Mr. [redacted] one b6
way street approach to communications caused problems within the workforce
and how they felt about being unable to initiate and implement any
change. The lack of communications did not encourage first line
supervisors or the employees to participate more in decisions affecting
them in accomplishing the daily workforce missions. However, the
employees wanted to be heard in certain directed effort in the packing of
hazardous materiel as well as other commodities shipped from MSC-R. As
indicated in the statements of Korean national employees they
countermanded Mr. [redacted] orders. Several times Mr. [redacted] directed the b6 b6
packing of hazardous materiels be added to fill a pallet and in cases
where the KN's thought it was unsafe, they accepted Mr. [redacted] b6
directive. However, when he left they packed it in a safe manner. From
the testimony of Mr. [redacted] Korean employees and supervisors Appendix F, b6
employees perceived Mr. [redacted] was not interested in their problems; Mr. b6
[redacted] was out of touch with the employee values and b6

their concerns. Mr. [redacted] did not encourage suggestions, he was only directive in nature, "you do it my way, and if you don't do it my way,"

there was a fear of demotion, transfer, or being fired from the workforce. This management style lead to closed minds in the workforce.

There was certainly no evidence that Mr. [redacted] gave any worker encouragement for creative new ideas of how to accomplish the packing, loading, or unpacking and shipping of hazardous materiel or commodities from MSC-K. Mr. [redacted] failed to be a good listener which is a basic condition of two way communication. Later on employees were reluctant to speak freely for fear that they would be chastised, and in some cases

singled out by Mr. [redacted]. They KN supervisors viewed Mr. [redacted] as a man marked with an explosive personality evidenced by excess outbursts of rage, aggression, and inability to control such outbursts as witnessed by

Mr. [redacted] and Mr. [redacted]

Chon, Exhibit P. This down communications and lack of communications led to serious problems, conflict and criticism, and suppression, all in a very negative work environment managed by Mr. [redacted]

(2). In the statements of Mr. [redacted] Mr. [redacted] Mr. [redacted] and petition Exhibit R, KN employees would greet Mr. [redacted] in the morning "Good morning, Sam" or "Good morning, there would be no response in

return. To the KN employees they didn't understand why Mr. [redacted] did this kind of thing, except to them it meant being looked down upon and indicated a disrespect. A petition signed by 59 KN, Subject: Protection of Human Rights, and complaints and grievances, Exhibit R, made against

Mr. [REDACTED] by the work force also bears out Mr. [REDACTED] mannerisms and the way employees perceived he treated them during his tenure as the Chief, Transportation Division. These were investigated and led to Mr. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] removal from the workforce. There is a Memorandum of Agreement in the matter of employees grievances, signed on 31 August 1987

by Colonel Wheeler and Mr. [REDACTED] President of the Waegon Chapter, USFK Korean Employment Union Exhibit 5. The document states

Mr. [REDACTED] is still assigned to his current position and will continue to function as the Transportation Division Officer with the following

limitations: (a) He is not to take part in the personal administration of the Transportation Division (This includes leave approval, appraisals,

time cards, etc.) (b) He was not to deal with or pass any instructions to VN employees of the Transportation Division to include subordinate

supervisors. (c) Mr. [REDACTED] would provide instructions to the work force through an intermediary NCOIC, SFC [REDACTED] (d) He was not to enter, at

any time, the Transportation Division work area. Much of the down communications and the negative work environment was substantiated in an

AF 15-B investigation directed by COL Wheeler, MSC-K Commander.

(3) Statements by Mr. [REDACTED] and supervisors substantiated that Mr. [REDACTED] on many occasions would go directly down to the workforce and redirect the work effort. Some of this may have been valid based on required delivery dates (RDD), and the destination of cargo. The item with the most imminent RDD will take priority over one that is 15 - 20 days later. Just the nature of the business, priority changes are generated each day,

especially in the Transportation Division. However, Mr. [REDACTED] did not go back to his first line supervisors and keep them abreast of the changes, either written or verbal, that he redirected. By not informing first line supervisors it caused turmoil and confusion as to what were the priorities and how they were reset for the day's work effort.

(4) In the statements by Mr. [REDACTED] Mr. [REDACTED] Mr. [REDACTED] the frequent changes in the work schedules and the lack of guidance or reasons why the work schedules were changed were due again to the lack of communication between Mr. [REDACTED] and his first line KN supervisors and DAC supervisor. However, if there were adequate communications up and down the chain of command this influence of change is logical, based on changed priorities, availability of materiel, rail cars, pallets, or high priority shipments, such as a blue streak. Changes would have been reasonable if Mr. [REDACTED] had done this through his first line supervisors, giving them the mission, and letting them redirect the resources of people, materiel, and effort. Mr. [REDACTED] failure to exercise staff supervision through subordinate KN supervisors caused many of the problems in the Transportation Division. He failed to delegate transportation requirements redirecting the work effort from the supervisor level down. The chain of command principle is important in accomplishing the mission especially in a large diverse organization such as the Transportation Division.

e. Leadership:

(4) [redacted] leadership style is autocratic and authoritarian. This may stem from a military career and authoritarian leadership applied to a civilian workforce. His leadership can be described by conformity to unrealistic demands that he set, marked by worker fear under threats of demotion, transfer or firing. Autocratic leadership worked well for [redacted] because KN workforce feared him. Mr. [redacted] and SFC [redacted] Exhibit P stated, if [redacted] was challenged and people stood up to him, he then respected an individual whether it be a supervisor or an employee. However, in the Hangul mind set this did not happen, so [redacted] was able to essentially run over the KN employees. They accepted this kind of abusive leadership because of personal obligations at home, respect for authority and the mere fact workers feared the loss of jobs. Also statements by Korean workers indicate they would be on the workforce a long time after [redacted] had departed the job.

(2) What was the state of morale under this type of leadership?

~~From statements of Korean national employees the morale of the workforce~~

~~was low!~~ This set a stigma, the employees would do just exactly what Mr. [redacted] would tell them and no more. Mr. [redacted] used his power to demand, "you do this, or else," meaning to them that an employee will be penalized if he does not follow orders. To back this up Mr. [redacted] let employees know he had the power to fire, demote, transfer, prepare letters of admonition and that was his absolute power. Again, this type of leadership style shows itself in Mr. [redacted] directive that Korean National selectees for the DOT transportation formal school better pass

was leaving soon. Mr. [redacted] stated, he was able to calm down, regain his composure and decided not to pursue the incident. Mr. [redacted] stated he knew Mr. [redacted] wife and she speaks little English. In statements of Mr. [redacted]

[redacted] Mrs. [redacted] Mr. [redacted] Mr. [redacted] Mr. [redacted] James Brown called Mr. [redacted] and others a son of a bitch and said statements to them. If it was in my power, I would fire you from the work

force. A statement prepared by [redacted] Exhibit T, dated 8 March 1986, describes the behavior of Mr. [redacted] towards Mr. [redacted] Mr. [redacted] became necessary, [redacted] and loudly told Mr. [redacted] to the effect, Well, make a decision. You have a backlog in the shipping area, get your people busy on the backlog and get your ass up from behind the desk and

get busy. Mr. [redacted] stated that Mr. [redacted] got up and explained to Mr. [redacted] where his people were working and then departed the area. This apparently happened in front of other workers. A memorandum for Record

signed by Major [redacted] counseling Mr. [redacted] is at Exhibit U. [redacted] statement Mr. [redacted] Exhibit P witnessed Mr. [redacted] hollering and screaming at Mr. [redacted] I want you to get out there and find that fucking trash truck and get that God damn trash out of here before noon. He stated

Mr. [redacted] conduct was unprofessional, uncalled for in front of the workforce. Mr. [redacted] called Mr. [redacted] abusive and derogatory names. A

statement dated 6 March 1987, Exhibit V was prepared by a SGM [redacted] the Operations SGM of the Directorate, Supply and Transportation. He overheard Mr. [redacted] threatening SFC [redacted] something about if one of the soldiers or SFC [redacted] made any mistakes, that it would be reflected on their EER and that they would not be considered for any type of end of tour award.

In a statement made by Mr. [REDACTED] at the Marine Depot, Barstow California indicated that Mr. [REDACTED] used abusive language towards some of his employees in 1982. He stated that he confronted Mr. [REDACTED] with the allegations and it seemed to have taken care of the problem. He stated, Mr. [REDACTED] was not a good individual and treated people in an unfair manner, was abusive and definitely not a team player while he was employed at the Marine Depot. In a statement made by retired SGM [REDACTED] of the Transportation Division J-4 stated the reasons why Mr. [REDACTED] moved to Camp Carroll from the J-4 in 1984. He was incompetent in the job as Manager, Tactical Vehicle Fleet. He stated, Mr. [REDACTED] had a personality conflict with a Colonel Keysting, Military Chief. Another statement taken by Mr. [REDACTED] who worked for Mr. [REDACTED] for a year and a half stated that Mr. [REDACTED] was abusive towards employees, unrealistic in setting requirements, and was incompetent in his job as manager, tactical vehicle fleet. Mr. [REDACTED] direct line supervisor of Mr. [REDACTED] stated Mr. [REDACTED] was abusive towards employees, was not a team player, and although he was technically competent, his one serious drawback was that he could not manage people.

The abusive language and hostile way that Mr. [REDACTED] handled the Korean National work force, his first line supervisors was well his dealing with people is documented. This behavior is degrading and derogatory, unprofessional, and not justified under any circumstances. This behavior towards others does not relate to the war, Iraq and on to let by which we treat all human beings in everyday life. It is also apparent that [REDACTED] is able to stay ahead of and escape without having been called on.

with the proficiency of the worker in his functions in the receipt, packaging, shipment, of hazardous materiel and hazardous cargo.

Statements from the workers indicate that under [REDACTED] there was no any OJT training, or a program of formalized training for employees. From the statements of Korean National Employees, they learned their job from other employees.

(3) A review of TM 38-250, 1-20, and AR 55-255, para 35-7, Exhibit 66 indicates only certifying officials for hazardous cargo must be school/formally trained. TM 38-250 indicates a number of courses that can be requested to satisfy this requirement. In this regard Mr. [REDACTED] letter is not entirely true as he states, all personnel processing hazardous materiel must have satisfactorily completed one of the OJT or formal schools in order to be qualified to prepare, pack, and ship hazardous materiel.

(4) In 1985, Exhibit W, a school of military packing technology was taught by personnel from Aberdeen Proving Grounds, MD titled the Defense Packaging Hazardous Materiel for Transportation, on 30 Jul 86. Eleven KN employees did not satisfactorily complete the course. However, [REDACTED] and any evidence where [REDACTED] requested pre-study materials for KN employees. The problems associated with the course stems from it being taught in English, not in Hangul. American green suitors failed the course. Again, without a management analysis on whether this was the right type of course to be taught to Korean National employees was again scheduled 27 Jul - 6 Aug 87 at Camp Carroll. Of 19 participants two satisfactorily completed the program of instruction (Exhibit W)

signed by the Civilian Personnel Office. The high failure rate caused the command to reevaluate selection, the course, and the needs of the command. Statement by Major [REDACTED] Exhibit P. It was realized by the

[REDACTED] b6
[REDACTED] chain of command this course was too technical and difficult and not tailored to the needs of the work force at MSC-K. This course was very difficult and covered more than was required by regulation to meet the unique needs of Korea. The students were being taught and tested in English, difficult if impossible to pass by a Korean. It was agreed by

MSC-K they needed to select a separate course, which in the long term would save money, meet the requirements of MSC-K in accordance with established regulations and increase the odds of successful completion of the students. At this time MSC-K was able to satellite off of the Shepherd Air Force Base, DOT course of instruction at Osan Air Base. As a result of this participation by MSC-K, six successfully passed the

course. In my judgement, it was one of the duties of Mr. [REDACTED] to ensure KN employees had a fair chance of passing whatever course they were referred to attend. I find no evidence Korean Nationals selected by Mr. [REDACTED] received assistance and appropriate materials for pre-study. b6
[REDACTED] b6
[REDACTED] and no evidence of time, money, skill development, or resources that were made available to the Korean National workforce to insure that they even had a fair chance of passing an English taught technical course presented by Aberdeen Proving Grounds, MD.

(5) For other employees who are not certifying officials, but work with hazardous materiel are required by TM 38-250 and AFR 71-4 to receive initial and annual refresher training.

The reg states this training will be designed for local units to teach and will be structured to include as a minimum familiarity with the following subjects: (a). DOT Hazardous classifications, (b). Marking, labels, play cards, and forms. (c). Packaging and handling. (d). Compatibility and other safety requirements. The regulations states that current records of individual's training must be maintained. Statements of MAJ

Mr. [REDACTED] LTC [REDACTED] Korean National Supervisors, to include Mr. [REDACTED] the training records were not kept. Training records are required by TM 38-250 and AFR 71-4, dating back to 6 Nov 81. [REDACTED]

~~Called to insure training records were maintained on the Korean National workforce and his supervisors. SFC [REDACTED] stated, she cannot recall any kind of formal training or OJT that had taken place in the year that she had been assigned to XSC-R. Major [REDACTED] stated, training records were a requirement under the new TM 38-250 and AFR 71-4 published in 1988.~~

(6) Major [REDACTED] is looking into training and development programs for the Korean National employees work force. There are initiatives that are underway in selecting a trainer and a training manager for the workforce as well as looking at formal schools of instruction, structured OJT, and administration of training for the Korean National employees work force. Another initiative is to train the trainers, whereby KN personnel are selected to attend a formal DOT school of instruction then devote time to train employees of their divisions. However, training and training management aspect is supported by the chain of command as important to organizational improvement and development of the Korean National employees work force.

(7) Training the work force is a job description requirement of Mr.

[REDACTED] This was a primary responsibility of Mr. **[REDACTED]** to train the work force and I find no evidence (except formal school training) this occurred from within the organization during his tenure at MSC-K and as Chief of the Transportation Division. Organizational training for new employees as the job relates to handling of hazardous material, safety equipment, and health practices are important for new as well as seasoned employees. There is a need for Hangul translations to assist employees working with hazardous material, hazardous waste, and regulations. It's also important for some type of structured first aid training. Intergrated into this training plan certainly could be safety, fire prevention protection, and 5th Preventive Medicine classes. Again, a computer automated program of instruction for each category of employee can be developed.

H. Job Description of Employees:

~~Mr. **[REDACTED]** requirement to add the job description statement. Incumbent must be knowledgeable in transportation of hazardous materials and able to comply with Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations, other regulations pertaining to shipping of dangerous and hazardous cargo's proper. However, the statement employees must be able to at least identify complete a special container, maintain correct labeling and operation, packing and marking of hazardous materials for shipping. IAW 49 CFR 171.15, 171.16, 171.17, 171.18, 171.19, 171.20, 171.21, 171.22, 171.23, 171.24, 171.25, 171.26, 171.27, 171.28, 171.29, 171.30, 171.31, 171.32, 171.33, 171.34, 171.35, 171.36, 171.37, 171.38, 171.39, 171.40, 171.41, 171.42, 171.43, 171.44, 171.45, 171.46, 171.47, 171.48, 171.49, 171.50, 171.51, 171.52, 171.53, 171.54, 171.55, 171.56, 171.57, 171.58, 171.59, 171.60, 171.61, 171.62, 171.63, 171.64, 171.65, 171.66, 171.67, 171.68, 171.69, 171.70, 171.71, 171.72, 171.73, 171.74, 171.75, 171.76, 171.77, 171.78, 171.79, 171.80, 171.81, 171.82, 171.83, 171.84, 171.85, 171.86, 171.87, 171.88, 171.89, 171.90, 171.91, 171.92, 171.93, 171.94, 171.95, 171.96, 171.97, 171.98, 171.99, 171.100.~~

~~Mr. **[REDACTED]** used this as the basis to remove a Mr. **[REDACTED]** Shipping Clerk Supervisor, Mr. **[REDACTED]** Clerk, Outbound Branch,~~

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Transportation Division as a means for transfer is without basis. Mr. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] request for transfer of two employees has no merit because it was
b6
not a job description requirement. They are qualified to certify the DD Form
1387-2 for air shipment of hazardous cargo. Mr. [REDACTED] has

b6
congressional letter stated, these employees could not read or comprehend

English to meet his needs. In fact, each of these employees were

individually tested and certified to a level of competence in the English
language as governed by CPO standards. A comfortable degree of competence

in English differs between a blue collar worker or a white collar worker
with English proficiency increasing as the grade level of the position
ascends. [REDACTED] initiated SF 52's to transfer the two Korean employees

b6
because they had failed the formal training provided in July 1986 and in
the hazardous materials course taught in August 1987. Mr. [REDACTED]

statement. Mr. [REDACTED] intentions were not to transfer the two Korean
b6

National employees, but to fire them. Statements from both employees

support Mr. [REDACTED] position. Looking at the record of Mr. [REDACTED] he

b6
is an outstanding employee serving in a position of responsibility since
b6

1966. His record indicates outstanding performance, letters of

commendation, recognition for 15 years of service and 20 years of

service. [REDACTED] record indicates a very outstanding performance

b6
since 1966. He has also completed other courses of instructions,

Supervisor Development Course, Instructor Training Course, a course taught

on the storage and warehouse operations and sails system, Conference

Leadership Course and many years of faithful and honorable service.

I. GOALS AND OBJECTIVES:

(1) I could not substantiate employee awareness of goals and objectives for 1986 - 1988. The workers stated one requirement was to process 500 MROs a day.

(2) Established Transportation Division goals and objectives can increase effectiveness and mission accomplishment. Goals can orient on people concerns, creating a sense of ownership of organizational objectives throughout the workforce. It can ease implementing changes more systematically for organizational development, including the work day priorities, required delivery dates (RDD), and upcoming surge periods caused by major exercises. Goals could be established to facilitate more systematic problem solving on the job. A goal to reward employees supports achievement of the organization's mission as well as individual efforts in personal development and achievement. Management must identify a training goal essential to the Transportation Division, in fulfilling its mission. Perhaps the Director S & T can look at a technical structured intervention goal which includes the modification of the work environment i.e., changing the physical arrangement of an office that may affect human interaction patterns, it may include changing a job description, and it may include the restructuring of an organization's branch because of a mission change. In interviews with the Director, S&T, the Transportation Division Chief, and the new Deputy Chief of S&T, they shared many good ideas on goal setting and how they contribute towards improving the working environment, professional and organizational development.

J. EMPLOYEE RECOGNITION:

Statements made by Mr. [REDACTED] and Korean National Supervisors, reflect the lack of management recognition^{b6} for Korean employee contributions.

~~Employees basically felt a lack of recognition for mission achievements,~~

~~the work effort, a much needed pat on the back once in a while. Hey you~~

~~did a good job during Team Spirit, you did a good job ensuring the C-119s~~

~~were loaded and the shipment of cargo was on time. I reviewed the~~

~~outbound workload, the short tons shipped, the number of time elements~~

~~processed and packaging requirements for FY 86 and FY 87. It is awesome~~

~~and impressive. Exhibit X6. Statements of Mr. [REDACTED] and chain of command,~~

and my observations indicate employee dedication is there to accomplish^{b6}

the workload and especially during Team Spirit 88. ~~Many employees have~~

~~unselfishly of their own time to see that the mission of the~~

~~Transportation Division was accomplished in a timely manner.~~ That doesn't

mean that they do everything, everyday, perfectly, but they work hard for

accomplishing the program management and the coordinating functions for

the receipt, the packaging, and shipment of materials for the defense

forces in Korea. The Transportation Division, MSC-K enjoys a good

reputation with the 6th Support Center, 19th SUPCOM, 69th Transportation

Battalion, and K-2 Air Base Cargo and Passenger manifest section. The

workers are responsible for this perception.

K. SHIPMENT OF HAZARDOUS CARGO Violations in the shipment of hazardous cargo

Mr. [redacted] made the statement in a letter addressed to the Director, Materiel Transportation Bureau, Congressmen and other formal outside agencies. During the past 8 years, there have been hundreds of mistakes in the shipment of hazardous materiel, in Korea, CONUS and to other overseas areas. In reviewing Mr. [redacted] job description exhibit 0, states, he is responsible for preparing materiel for shipment to include packaging, marking, hazard determination and labeling. He serves as the radiological control officer ensuring radioactive commodities are handled safely in accordance with regulations through the receipt, storage, and shipment cycle of those items. The incumbent is independently responsible for carrying out assigned responsibilities pertaining to transportation, traffic management IAW current regulations, policies, and procedures, referring only controversial major problems to be resolved at higher levels. In essence, as Chief of the Transportation Division he is solely responsible for accomplishing program management and coordinating functions relative to the receipt, packaging and safe shipment of hazard materials and commodities. If there were violations in shipments of hazardous materiel, it was his responsibility as the Chief, Transportation Division, to resolve those issues. [redacted] could not substantiate that Mr. [redacted] surfaced any problems or violations in the shipment of hazardous materiel to the 10th SUPCOM Staff, Commander Camp 2400th and 1st K. USAF Office, Internal Review Office, Safety Office, Transportation Division, 7th Preventive Medicine, 6th Spt Center, 69th Tps Support Battalion, 1st Aviation Bn, Pasay Water point, the DRMO at Pasay and Camp New EC. If there were unresolved transportation problems during his

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tenure as the Chief, Transportation Division, it was his responsibility to
fix or elevate those to higher level command. Statements from MSC-K
employees, 6th Spt Center, 69th Transportation Battalion Commander, the
K-2 Aerial Port, DRMO at Pusan and Camp Market does not support violation
allegations made by Mr. [REDACTED] b6
A review of documentation, [REDACTED] MROs
and TCMDs doesn't support Mr. [REDACTED] b6 allegations. In statements of Major
[REDACTED] b6 the Directorate Chief, Deputy Director Mr. [REDACTED] b6 Mr. [REDACTED] b6
Chief Transportation Division, I found no evidence to substantiate that
hazardous materiel is shipped in an unsafe manner. An exception to this
occurred in Sep 87 where MSC-K improperly shipped radioactive unhazardous
(9 wrist watches) directly to a private contractor, [REDACTED] Nuclear systems in
Snelling, SC. This violation was investigated by CDR MSC-K and the EUSA
Radiological Officer, Mr. [REDACTED] b6 J-4. The primary investigating officer
looked at the facilities, shipment procedures, and incorporated the
necessary measures to ensure all regulatory requirements are satisfied
prior to a shipment of radioactive materials. In review of
documentation, air shipments of cargo from Jan 87 to Dec 87, there were
301 air shipments of cargo that passed through the aerial port at Taegu.
Fifty-one of those air shipments were hazardous cargo shipments. From Jan
88 to 4 Jun 88, there have been 30 air shipments of cargo out of country,
six of which are hazardous cargo shipments. Statements from Mr. [REDACTED]
Mr. [REDACTED] b6 MAJ [REDACTED] b6 Mr. [REDACTED] b6 and others Exhibit P, could only b6
recall two or three shipments of hazardous cargo rejected by the Air Force
in the last twelve months. All shipments of hazardous materiel that
depart MSC-K are certified by qualified personnel on the DD Form 1387-2.

Personnel certifying the -2 shipment of hazardous cargo, are appointed on orders by the Commander, MSC-K. The Air Force at K-2, have valid signature cards on file used to verify -2 signatures. Statements of, LTC

~~██████████~~ SFC ~~██████████~~ Major ~~██████████~~, Mr. ~~██████████~~ and Mr. ~~██████████~~ substantiate a qualified person has always been available to certify the -2 for air shipment of hazardous cargo. However, in Aug 87, MSC-K had assigned one person qualified to certify -2. ~~Transportation Division now has six~~

~~people qualified to certify the -2 including the Chief, Shipping Branch and Chief, Transportation Division.~~ Statement by SSG ~~██████████~~ Customs

Inspector, personnel from Customs Branch are present during air shipment packing of hazardous materiel, and at no time has he or customs inspectors ever witnessed hazardous materiel packed in an unsafe matter. LTC ~~██████████~~ Battalion Commander and XO MAJ ~~██████████~~ 69th Trnas Bn stated, they provide an NCOIC to the MSC-K Shipping Branch, during loading of tractor and trailers because the drivers are KATUSAs. The Bn XO stated, accountability, proper loading, safety, cargo distribution, manifests are physically checked by the Operations NCO for each MSC-K line haul. He stated, there had been no serious problems in the shipment of hazardous cargo by tractor and trailer. Interview was conducted with the Air Force

at K-2 Air Base, a SMSGT ~~██████████~~ Chief, Passenger and Air Freight Terminal, Taegu. SMSGT ~~██████████~~ has served in the position for two and a

~~half years and cannot recall any correspondence or telephone conversations~~

~~concerning the loading of hazardous materiel on the Air Force Command at Taegu, the~~

~~receipt of hazardous materiel packed in accordance with the~~

(2) There is a difference between MSC-K hazardous cargo shipments rejection rate (2 - 3 in the last 12 months) to SMSG [REDACTED] (an average of 7 hazardous cargo air shipments are returned out of 10). [REDACTED] states, the Air Force challenges every air shipment of hazardous cargo by inspecting the containers for regulatory packing, verify proper containers, and quantity of hazardous material packed in each container, ensuring it meets the specifications required by AFR 71.4. However, the Air Force does not document why a customer's air shipment is rejected. Their main mission is to instruct and provide technical expertise to customers ensuring air freight is safe. SMSG [REDACTED] states the majority of rejected MSC-K air shipments loads is because of [REDACTED] AFR 71.4 requires [REDACTED] to be perfect, no strikeovers, erasures, or whiteouts. He stated, since MSC-K personnel have attended the Osan DOT instruction, air shipments have improved and felt that would continue. MGGU [REDACTED] stated, he did not care if 10 out of 10 air shipments were rejected as long as the shipments placed on an aircraft were safe, properly packaged without danger to the aircrew, the aircraft and passengers. His number one priority is to challenge every air load of freight to ensure that it meets the specifications in AFR 71.4. With this information, I inspected MSC-K records, DD Forms 1384-2, Transportation Control and Movement Documents, Material Request Orders, DD Forms 1384-1 and cannot substantiate why air shipments were returned from Osan to SMSG. Any improper paperwork is removed from the records, destroyed and the corrected copies put in the Ship to Branch file. If its a problem with loads they are brought back to MSC-K repacked then transported for air

shipment. ~~There are no checks and balances to verify which loads were~~
~~rejected at the K-2 air base and on the other side of the coin, there are~~
~~no records of air shipment rejections at K-2.~~ The Chief, Transportation
Division, Mr ~~██████████~~ and the Directorate for S & T were unaware the Air
Force rejected 7 of 10 air shipments of hazardous cargo. They agreed
there should be a procedure to capture information as to why the shipments
of hazardous cargo were rejected. They felt it's important to identify
weaknesses and through a training program, correct the problems across the
workforce.

~~20. There is no reason to halt any shipments from Camp Carroll because~~
~~they meet the requirements in the packing and safe handling of hazardous~~
~~cargo required by TM 38-250 and AFR 71-4 for air shipments.~~ There is
nothing in the records to indicate concern generated by customers or
inspectors who have received hazardous cargo air shipments from Korea.
All cargo departing MSC-K by surface transportation is monitored by
personnel knowledgeable in handling and shipment of dangerous
commodities. Transportation control and movement documents are certified
by an authorized agent of the responsible transportation office.

21. Standards and criteria in the handling of hazardous material.

~~These laws and regulations are in effect in the US, Canada, and the UK.~~
~~Substance and quantity of hazardous material must be clearly marked on the~~
~~manifest and in the shipping papers.~~ Thorough
programmed inspections of personnel, training, qualifications, safety

equipment, equipment to be used for detection, warning and control of hazards posed by storage of hazardous materiel, facilities, and transportation of hazardous materiel at least annually. This inspection needs to be integrated and coordinated across the staffs of Safety, 5th Preventive Medicine, the OSHA Program, DEH, and J-1. The IG's have got to get involved.

The Safety Office, 19th SUPCOM, Camp Carroll, and EUSA as well as the 5th Preventive Medicine OSHA programs have responsibility to become more involved in health and safety training of military and civilian personnel handling hazardous materiel under the provisions of AR 385-105 and AR

40-5. In a letter by EUSA Safety to 19th SUPCOM Safety Management dated 23 June 1986, EUSA comments Exhibit Y, the training safety of military and civilian personnel at all levels is one of the stated functions of the 19th SUPCOM Safety Office. It recommended the 19th SUPCOM Safety Office determine the training needs, such as hazardous materiel, specialized occupations, occupational health, etc., facilitate the provision of such training. It recommended a starting point to be the OSHA general industry training requirements. ~~For whatever reason, there was no follow up on this~~

~~EUSA recommendation. It seems to have died with an answer from Turner Support Command, that hazardous materiel was considered to be an~~
~~unclear~~

22. OSHA PROGRAM

(1) The OSHA, Occupational Safety and Health Act was signed into law on December 29, 1970, by President Nixon. The OSHA benefits manifest a substantial interest on a part of the public and Congress in industrial safety whereby, the Federal Government became deeply involved for the first time in the area of health and safety of the workforce. Following this, Executive Orders 11807 and 12196, dated September 18, 1974, and February 26, 1980, respectively, required Federal agencies to provide safety and health training for supervisory and non-supervisory employees. Department of Labor implementing regulations (29 Code of Federal Regulations) were issued in 1977 and 1980. Both regulations required each federal agency to provide specialized job safety and health training appropriate to the work performed. DOD instruction 6055-1, dated January 30, 1978, stated that non-supervisory personnel training should include specialized job safety training appropriate to the work performed, to include the provisions of relevant DOD occupational safety and health standards and hazards associated with any materials used in the work place. ~~DOD instruction 6055-1, April 30, 1980, stated that health hazard~~

~~training shall be provided to assure that personnel are aware of the health hazards of their occupations, informed of safe work practices and equipped with the use of personal protective equipment. The training shall be provided to all personnel performing hazardous work. The training shall be provided to all personnel performing hazardous work. The training shall be provided to all personnel performing hazardous work.~~

(2) In Korea, the OSHA Program is under the responsibility of the 5th

Preventive Medicine Unit, a subordinate of 18th MEDCOM, EUSA. The OSHA for Korea was mandated to be implemented NLT early 1985. [redacted] by the AR 15-6 investigation, the OSHA program is still in the stage of infancy. By the statements of Mr. [redacted] Mr. [redacted] LTC [redacted] MAJ [redacted] and others, the awareness of the OSHA program is not known to the general Korean National workforce, or DAC supervisors at Camp Carroll, the industrial complex. Two OSHA health nurses have been assigned since Oct 87 working under the 5th Preventive Medicine unit. A Memorandum of Agreement with the 150th Medical Detachment Dispensary at Camp Carroll for OSHA utilization of equipment, shared areas, and support provided to the occupational health nurses is in effect. [redacted] Hygienist, vacant position, as an important linchpin to the OSHA Program. [redacted] In an interview with occupational health nurses, [redacted] space, setup, [redacted] administration, interview areas are inadequate to support the MSC-K task at hand. They stated, the Camp Carroll dispensary is not staffed with the appropriate number of medical personnel to complete medical physicals for Korean National employees working in the industrial complex. They also have proponent responsibility for the workers at Camp Walker, Camp Henry, the JOL terminal, Chemsido, Pusan, Camp Abby, and Camp Ames. [redacted] funds to support visits. Visits are required to provide health training, identify hazards, to determine medical screening and emphasize the importance of the OSHA program. On the other hand MSC-K chain of command was unaware of OSHA requirements, and medical surveillance programs. [redacted] of command support, [redacted] to accomplish the major tasks of

(5) Development of a health hazard inventories to be completed at Camp Carroll and other remote sites, (6) Development of a health education program that can be provided to the work force so they understand the purpose and reasons for the OSHA implementation, (7) Establishment of a base line exposure data on the effects of hazardous material as it relates to health of individual workers, (8) Development of administrative and regulatory procedures that will be used in the implementation of the OSHA program, (9) The proper medical supplies and resources and administrative resources to support the OSHA program, (10) The procurement of equipment and facilities that are adequate to meet the needs for the administration of the OSHA program, (11) The establishment of an executive occupational health and safety council that tracks the implementation and progress of the OSHA program as it is being implemented in Korea.

(3) The OSHA progress must be reported to the Chief of Staff, USA, to keep the program on track. Additionally, I think it's important for an OSHA nurse at Camp Carroll to attend the weekly quarterback sessions involving the Commander, Camp Carroll, his directorate chiefs, and his staff. They can begin to become aware of the OSHA program and management requirements mandated under the OSHA rules. OSHA should be coordinated with

the industrial hygienist. The industrial hygienist is important in the development and implementation and compliance of an OSHA program at Camp Carroll and other locations.

23. CID INVESTIGATION REPORTS

(1) The 7th Region, US Army CID Office in Taegu looked into the

allegations of Mr. [REDACTED] b6 He alleged that a Korean National Employee

female, paid a bribe to a civilian personnel office employee in order to

gain employment with the US Army. In the CID investigation report exhibit

AA, investigation was closed on 17 May 1988, and the allegations made by

Mr. James [REDACTED] b6 were unfounded. It is interesting to note that in the

agent's investigation report Ms. [REDACTED] b6 stated, Mr. [REDACTED] b6 was a hard man and

treated all personnel in that manner. Ms. [REDACTED] b6 stated, working for Mr.

[REDACTED] b6 became increasingly difficult, due to his demeanor and she was

willing to take any type of job available in order to avoid having to work

for Mr. [REDACTED] b6 She applied for a temporary job at the Technical Services

Branch, CPO, Taegu which caused her to lose privileges, but she accepted

the job because she could no longer bare to work for Mr. [REDACTED] b6 Ms. [REDACTED] b6

stated, she remained on that job for one year, after which she applied for

a position at MER, CPO Taegu, and obtained employment there in a permanent

job. Ms. [REDACTED] b6 stated, she did not pay any money to anyone at anytime, and

further stated that Mr. [REDACTED] b6 never asked her if she paid money, as he

stated in his letter of complaint.

(2) Another CID document, Exhibit BB, pertains to the hazardous material

and instructions to Mr. [REDACTED] b6 personnel were

[REDACTED] b6

in a [REDACTED] b6 manual, [REDACTED] b6 which reflects the minimum training

requirements of personnel involved in the preparation, packing, and

marking of hazardous material. The CID states, special training only applies to certifying personnel. Other than certifying officials, only are required to be provided an initial familiarity, with annual refresher training. The CID office states, Mr. [redacted] incorrectly states the requirements in AR 55-355. Mr. [redacted] states, this regulation requires all personnel to be trained and tested. The CID states, this regulation actually requires certifying personnel to successfully complete formal DOT training, while personnel who prepare and handle hazardous material may receive OJT, or that which is accomplished by other acceptable training methods. On 10 May 88, the CID terminated this investigation.

24. Korean National Employee WORKFORCE, Camp Carroll.

(1) The Korean National employees are a conservative force with an impressive 17 years, the average number of years served in a demanding physical job in the Transportation Division, Directorate of S & T, Commander, Camp Carroll and 19th SUPCOM. The Transportation Division on a daily basis, demonstrates the significant contributions of Korean National employees along beside American servicemen, towards the mission accomplishment of MSC. The Korean National employee workforce are dedicated, loyal, and very hard working. In any assignment, they do what they are told in an unselfish manner. Their work accomplishments in 1986 and 1987 and 1988 represent excellent, impressive and commendable performance. They are more important and necessary to overall mission success than requirements of MSC. How they perform depends on management.

understanding of their capabilities, their limitations, policy, and their cultural backgrounds. They view their jobs as important to financial security and livelihood. They have great aspirations of a better life for their children and family. Most attend the same churches, live in the surrounding community, socialize together, and some have part-time work in the agricultural fields and construction business. They are not fond of change but will adopt to change if the policies are logical and for the betterment of mission accomplishment. They like to be heard with an active voice in decision making and be rewarded accordingly for significant achievements. Most have learned their job through dedication and own initiative. Korean National employees respect authority and position and in so doing have a tendency to tolerate abuse and neglect. This workforce serves as a critical entity in the overall support for the defense forces in the Republic of Korea. What I have said here summarizes perceptions of the Commander, Camp Carroll, the staff, and others who observe and know the accomplishments of the Korean National employees at Camp Carroll.

(2) In regards to [redacted] the workforce banned together, to get rid of Mr. [redacted] who treated them without due respect and dignity. [redacted] [redacted] threatened the workforce with demotions, transfers, and the possibility that personnel would be fired. It became a threat to their very own security and livelihood. I believe this alone constituted a hostile and intimidating environment by Mr. [redacted] and [redacted] on the surface, it through a labor union grievance. The chain of command had

(2) A series of MSC-K and 19th Sup Command events took place between 13 and 31 Aug, Exhibit CC, finally, with the ultimate decision that Mr. [REDACTED] would remain in his current position and continue to function as the Transportation Officer with the limitations stated in a letter dated 31 Aug 87, Exhibit S. During all of this 19th Sup Command moved with cautiousness, and concern that the labor strike at Camp Carroll was related to potential labor action going on in Korea. [REDACTED]

b6

[REDACTED] August message by MG Stadden, Exhibit DD, which states the current labor unrest in the ROK has created an environment conducive to labor disturbances within USFK. The Korean National Employee Union has presented to USFK a list of 14 issues that have been addressed in writing by the Office of the Civilian Personnel Director. It stated, a meeting of the Korean National Employee Union Executive Committee is scheduled for 26 Aug to consider USFK responses. It is highly probable that our responses would not be fully acceptable to all members of the Executive Committee, therefore, some form of union collective action must be anticipated. [REDACTED] the receipt of this message by MSC-K and with the consideration of the labor union grievances presented by the workers at Camp Carroll, the 10th SUPCOM as well as the Commander, Camp Carroll, looked into the Waegon Union grievances with great caution as they were not sure in their own minds the problems at Camp Carroll was the beginning of a much larger problem of labor and labor unrest in the Republic of Korea. At the same time, and time, there was a complex of 10th and the 10th SUPCOM and the Commander, Camp Carroll have to be commended for their decision to remove [REDACTED] from the work force. [REDACTED]

b6

by the chain of command.

(2) In a decision made by the Commander, Camp Carroll on 21 May 87, Mr.

~~██████████~~ was informed verbally and in writing that management had decided
not to offer him another tour in Korea. The decision was made by Mr.

~~██████████~~ immediate supervisor, Mr. ~~██████████~~ and of course, concurred in by

higher levels of review. Again, Mr. ~~██████████~~ was not in agreement with this
decision and filed a grievance on this matter. The grievance was
processed IAW Army and CPO regulations.

(3) In CPO actions the chain of command did not violate the rights of Mr.

Mr. ~~██████████~~ received due course through the grievance and appeal
process in consideration of his complaints and allegations. In this Mr.

~~██████████~~ could not accept no as an answer or a decision that was counter to
his ultimate conclusions. He conclude this upon the volumes of paperwork

and files generated as a matter of responding to Mr. ~~██████████~~ grievances,
considerations and appeals involving one third of 10th Support Cnd CPO
assets from 1986 until he departed the command on Nov 88. He

unnecessarily used every agency, staff activity, organization, within and
outside the chain of command to hear his case. In addition, if you review

his response to tour denial on 4 Aug 87, you can see from that he wasn't
through with this command. ~~██████████~~ subject, Extension of Overseas Tour

~~██████████~~ he states in para 2 exhibit 10, I have M, O, and am
in the process of providing additional documentation for my former

congressional investigation on deliberate, systematic, and intentional
classifications, harassment and discrimination against physical handicapped

He states, I believe, all employees should be treated fairly in all respects, not as I have been in the above position classification or by Major [REDACTED] during the 5 months, he was assigned to the position as the Director, S & T. He states, his performance has always been exceptional or outstanding and there was no reason for denial of extension of the overseas tour. ~~On the 1 Aug 87, DE to CEO, we see the Congressional intent followed by a letter written to MMC, and Congressman dated 6 Sep 87, alleging the hazardous material issue. However, this letter did not address aspects of harassment and discrimination against handicapped and how he had been unfairly treated by the Directorate of S&T.~~ I believe he is going to continue to bring his case to point making allegations against the chain of command.

(4) A statement taken from [REDACTED] Director, Industrial Engineering indicates Mr. [REDACTED] vindictiveness. Mr. [REDACTED] bumped into Mr. [REDACTED] at the Kimpo Airport, sometime around Thanksgiving 1987. He stated, Mr. [REDACTED] discussed a new assignment in Japan at Cameron Station. Mr. [REDACTED] had been accepted in a telephone interview to become part of a logistics assistance team. Mr. [REDACTED] stated, the inspection team would be looking at logistic and transportation functions in Korea, Okinawa, and other Pacific areas. Mr. [REDACTED] stated, I thought that was peculiar because later I found out Mr. [REDACTED] was being assigned to Washington State working in a Transportation Office of a Navy organization. Mr. [REDACTED] stated, Mr. [REDACTED] made several statements expressing concern about the failure of workers attending DOT training and the fact he tried to transfer them from his organization not supported by the chain of command.

Mr. Young stated, Mr. Brown was upset with the chain of command decision to remove him from the work force. Mr. [redacted] stated from these discussions I believed, Mr. [redacted] intended to pursue the matter through legal channels, congressional channels, and any other agency he could use for this purpose. Mr. [redacted] stated, Mr. [redacted] said to him, "This command has not heard the last from him."

25) Mr. [redacted] behavior and the evidence presented, I can only draw the conclusion that Mr. [redacted] wrote letters to outside agencies not because of merit or content, but because it is a way for him to get even. He brands a grudge against 19th Support Command, and the Camp Carroll chain of command. This lends credence to my conclusion Mr. Brown was vindictive and was on a grudge vendetta.

27. [redacted] PAST

(1) During the investigation, I substantiated how Mr. [redacted] treated employees from other organizations, during the last ten years. A statement Exhibit P provided by Mr. [redacted] as the Management Officer Traffic Branch, Barstow, Calif stated, he had confrontations with Mr. [redacted] in 1982. It was the abusive way Mr. [redacted] treated some of his employees. He states, he confronted Mr. [redacted] with the complaints and they seemed to subside. He stated, Mr. [redacted] was not very well liked, abusive and abrasive did not treat employees in a proper manner. In testimony of Mr. [redacted] Nontactical Vehicle Support Branch, J-4, in 1983 and 1984 stated, he had been working in the J-4 branch 10 years

before [REDACTED] became his immediate supervisor. He said, Mr. [REDACTED] had a temper, easy to anger, and a hard man to work for. He stated, Mr. Brown was incompetent in the job and a personality conflict existed between [REDACTED] and Colonel Keystring. He felt this was the primary reason [REDACTED] took a demotion and transferred to Camp Carroll as Division Chief, Transportation Division. Mr. [REDACTED] stated, he could not tolerate the abusiveness from Mr. [REDACTED] and after he worked for him approximately a year and a half, he transferred to a job as the EAST ITO in Jan 84. He stated, Mr. [REDACTED] had only one way of doing things and that was to do it [REDACTED] way, whether it be right or whether it be wrong. If it was the wrong way Mr. [REDACTED] didn't care he forced people to do it the wrong way. He stated, it was the first time in 10 years he had a bad experience working for such a difficult person as Mr. [REDACTED]. He said Mr. [REDACTED] looked down upon the Koreans, disrespected them, and showed a complete disregard for Korean employees. Testimony from a MSG [REDACTED] who is now the NCOIC, as the ACoIS, Transportation Division, 19th SUPCOM, knew Mr. [REDACTED] in 1979 at Camp Carroll. He stated, that he had heard Mr. [REDACTED] curse around Korean employees, however, those words were not directed at a person. He stated, Mr. [REDACTED] had difficulty dealing with people. In a statement provided by Mr. [REDACTED] the SGM of the Transportation Division, J4, in 1981 states [REDACTED] was not confident in his job, as Chief of Nontactical Vehicle Branch, J-4. He stated, Mr. [REDACTED] was not competent in written and oral communications and did not understand his job. Col Keystring reported in and Mr. [REDACTED] days were numbered because of poor performance. Mr. [REDACTED] took a way out as quickly as possible to the job at Camp Carroll, MSC-K. [REDACTED] stated, another reason for

Colonel Keystring's decision to remove [REDACTED] was failure to repair. [REDACTED] would come in the morning and take off ^{b6} 0830 or 0900 and not be seen until ^{b6} 1500 or 1600 in the afternoon. He stated, [REDACTED] left the position to keep from receiving a bad evaluation and the fact that ^{b6} Colonel Keystring was not satisfied with [REDACTED] performance. ^{b6}

(2) Looking at Mr. [REDACTED] past record 1979, Nov 1988, indicates a troubled supervisor. He can't deal with and manage subordinate employees in a proper relationship of superior to subordinate. This was just the opposite in Mr. [REDACTED] dealings with his seniors. As supervisor, he suffered a disorder of explosive personality, marked by outburst or rage, aggressiveness, and over responsiveness to pressures and appeared to have the inability to control such outbursts. The abnormal behavior may have been caused by the trauma [REDACTED] suffered in Viet Nam. At best, I can say this is purely conjectural on my part. It is extremely difficult to determine speculation in the medical field. ^{b6}

28. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. EUSA Staff Judge Advocate review the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, Environmental Standards and Korea's Environmental Preservation Laws. Define EUSA environmental compliance standards.

2. EUSA put in place an Environmental Management Office properly staffed with the expertise and organized as the focal point for policy, management problems, in handling of toxic and hazardous materiel and hazardous waste.

3. The EUSA Chief of Staff direct Resource Management to carry out a survey looking at organizational structure, resources, requirements, and responsibility to ensure US installations have proper manning, and the staff expertise to carry out a Hazardous Materiel/Hazardous Waste Program.

4. EUSA publish policy and responsibility, procedures, and standards for the systematic control and monitorship of the identification, the collection, separation, storage, processing, recovery, abatement, management, and disposal of hazardous materiel, hazardous waste, and toxic chemicals within the Republic of Korea. That uniform regulations and policy guidance be signed by the Chief of Staff, EUSA.

5. EUSA ensures an Environmental Coordinator is named at every U.S. installation with responsibility and authority to administer the hazardous materiel, hazardous waste, and toxic chemicals management program.

6. EUSA develop an Environmental Program as a model for installations and other activities as prescribed by AR 420-47, AR 200-1 and AR 40-5.

7. That the EUS Army provide policy and guidance for each installation to establish a Waste Analysis Plan under AR 420-47, AR 200-1, and AR 40-5.

8. That EUSA provide policy and guidance for each installation for the development of Spill Prevention Control and Countermeasures Plan required by AR 200-1, Chapter 8. The same applies for each installation to have an Installation Spill Contingency Plan under Chapter 8, AR 200-1.

9. That EUSA establish policy and set responsibility for development of a comprehensive hazardous material, hazardous waste, toxic chemical training program. Establish policy and regulations.

10. That EUSA ACoS, J1, Directorate of Safety, implement safety workshops for all subordinate safety managers to become smart and aware of dangers in handling and storing hazardous material, hazardous waste, toxic chemicals. That safety workshops be conducted at least semiannually.

11. That EUSA Safety and 5th Preventive Medicine integrate and coordinate a more active role in training the work force in the specifics of hazardous material, hazardous waste and toxic chemicals in safe work methods and practices.

12. That the EUSA Inspector General and subordinate IG's, inspect hazardous material, hazardous waste, and toxic chemicals management as a special subject of inspections in units and activities at all levels. The EUSA IG be given a copy of this report.

13. That EUSA provide necessary support to the OSHA program.

14. EUSA ensure private contractors collecting and disposing of hazardous waste, from US Army installations are registered and licensed with the Republic of Korea, Ministry of Health and Social Affairs Office.

15. EUSA provide assistance to MSC-K for verifying proper storage of hazardous materiel and chemicals in Warehouse #6.

16. EUSA look at and prioritize the hiring of an industrial hygienist for the MSC-K, Camp Carroll industrial complex.

17. EUSA SJA, and Directorate of OCP determine if any legal actions, administrative actions, can be taken against Mr. [REDACTED]. He was departed from this command. *bb*

18. Mr. [REDACTED] is not entitled to reinstatement as Chief, *bb* Transportation Division, MSC-K, Camp Carroll. As a matter of record, Mr. [REDACTED] should never be allowed his rights as an employee and *bb* supervisor in the Republic of Korea.

19. I find no evidence of harassment or discriminatory actions taken against Mr. [REDACTED] by the Command, Camp Carroll, and or 19th SUPCOM Staff. *bb*

20. That any outside agency conducting inspections of hazardous materiel, hazardous waste management and handling of toxic chemicals, inspection reports be forwarded through EUSA Chief of Staff's office.

21. Commander, 8th PERSCOM insure Movements Specialist, MOS 88N, being assigned to Camp Carroll, as hazardous cargo certifiers are qualified IAW TM 38-250. If they are not qualified, they must attend a DOT formal school TDY enroute to Korea.

22. The Directorate of S & T ensure there are adequate pre-course study materials, translated into Hangul, to provide Korean employees a fair opportunity to pass a DOT program of instruction presented by either the Air Force or Army Agencies.

23. The Directorate of S & T look at Hangul translations of technical manuals to aid the Korean National employee work force in the Transportation Division.

24. Directorate of S & T continue to work on updating SOP's published in English and Hangul for the Korean National employee workforce. Develop a hazardous handling course of instruction for the workforce. Lesson book Exhibit HH.

25. Directorate of S&T develop and conduct hazardous material training and administration for the workforce IAW TM 38-250.

26. That more green suiters be present in the Camp Carroll industrial complex, especially the work areas to keep a pulse on the Korean National employee work force. Ensure employees are treated with dignity, fairness and respect.

27. That 19th SUPCOM, EUSA take action to ensure staff assistance visits include inspection of hazardous materiel, hazardous waste, and toxic chemical management and the inspections are done by qualified personnel. Hazardous materiel, hazardous waste, and toxic chemicals should be looked at in an integrated and a coordinated staff effort to include Safety, 5th Preventive Medicine, DEH, J-4 Transportation, and others as deemed appropriate.

28. EUSA seek continued surveys and assistance from the United States Environmental Hygiene Agencies from Aberdeen and Japan.

29. EUSA determine if any additional works is required to clean up the contaminated areas at Camp Carroll.

30. Any letters of admonishment, or adverse actions taken against Korean employees or military by Mr. [REDACTED] be withdrawn from official files.

This investigation be approved and closed without an interview of Mr. [REDACTED] Otherwise, with the prejudicial information against Mr. [REDACTED] he must be named a respondent in a formal AR 15-6 conducted by a board of officers. To protect the rights of Mr. [REDACTED] and interest of EUSA, Mr. [REDACTED] was not contacted during this informal AR 15-6.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] b6
AR 15-6, Investigating Officer

USFK, C/J3, CJ-CC

Camp Carroll Site Questions, [REDACTED] Interview Answers 25 May 2011

23 May 2011 (v1)

Present at the interview:

Army Reps:

-COL Donald Degidio, IMCOM Korea

-Mr. [REDACTED] USAEC

-Ms. [REDACTED] IMCOM Public Affairs – Environmental Branch

Veteran Reps:

Mr. [REDACTED] (MAJ, USA, Ret) (currently employed with Bechtel at Bluegrass AD Demil Program)

1. When did you arrive at Camp Carroll, when did you leave?
 - a. Arrived October/December 1978
 - b. Departed October/November 1980
2. What was your unit, rank, duty position?
 - a. LB Detachment (Preventative Medicine)
 - b. 1LT and CPT
 - c. Officer In Charge of LB Detachment, Daegu, Korea
 - d. Rowden was from Preventative Medicine – he was stationed in Camp Walker, Daegu, but travelled all over Korea.
3. Do you remember your chain of command? (Platoon Idr, company commander....up to highest rank) – N/A
4. Please describe what was disposed of at Camp Carroll? and when? (Mr. [REDACTED] headed the effort to remove buried drums, etc.)
 - a. Not sure when disposed (not involved with disposal).
 - b. The outgoing officer in charge told Mr. [REDACTED] (incoming officer in charge) chemicals were buried at Camp Carroll.
 - c. A couple of months after arriving, Mr. [REDACTED] asked the engineer in the area about the burial of any chemicals. There was a pregnant pause then the engineer said 'let me get back to you'.

- d. Mr. [REDACTED] then met with the deputy commander. Inquiry stopped there.
- e. After a week, Mr. [REDACTED] said things started happening
- List of drum chemicals provided
 - Destruction certificate produced
 - Location was found
 - BG Pendleton asked what needed to be done
 - Rowden said they needed removed
 - Pendleton said OK
 - A DAC from Pine Bluff (couldn't remember name) and Rowden put together a plan, included protective gear and heavy equipment
 1. 10-12 GI's started hand excavation
 2. Trench was several hundred feet long
 3. Pallets neatly stacked 3-4 pallets wide and 2 high
 4. Set up temporary containment area
 - a. Sandbags and rubberized protection
 - b. Pulled drums out and put them in the containment area
 - c. Wore respirators, eye protection, rubber gloves, coveralls, and tox boots
5. Please describe what it looked like, where it was located, what the area looked like.
- a. Dirt area – not much vegetation in the area. Small, sloped hill. Trench was cut into hillside. Excavation/recovery of drums was at one end using front end loader and hand tools.
 - b. Couldn't describe soil type...just regular soil.
 - c. Rowden not 100% sure of location, but believes it was near fence line (within a couple hundred feet)(Area D did not come to mind)
6. Can you point out where it was disposed? Did it have a special name? Are you aware of the reason why it was disposed?

- a. Mr. [REDACTED] wasn't 100% sure of the area, but did point to an area at the current Land Farm as the likely area. No recall of any special name. No recall on why disposed.
7. How long did the transportation and disposal take?
- a. Does not know.
8. How much was disposed? In same location?
- a. Does not know.
9. Where did the containers originally come from?
- a. Mr. [REDACTED] thought that some of the containers came from a pesticide shop (Site 41 did not ring any bells). Many not known
10. Where were they stored prior to disposal? Did it have a special name? Any other locations where they were stored?
- a. See above.
11. What was the condition in storage?
- a. Does not know.
12. How were they moved?
- a. Does not know.
13. Who was involved with the transportation and disposal?
- a. Does not know.
14. Describe the containers (all the same, any markings)?
- a. What were they made of?
- Removed from excavation - steel drums painted OD Green – did not see Herbicide Orange (or any other herbicide type) markings on any of the drums – his point of reference is drums of Herbicide Orange he saw while working at Eglin AFB, Florida
 - Pails and other small containers were metal – small containers contained: Lindane; malathion; technical grade DDT; diazaron; paint; greases; oils; POL; and adhesives
 - Possibly some off-color drums
- b. If leaking, what did the substance(s) look like/ smell like?

- Chemical smells
- c. If leaking, what percentage of the containers do you think were leaking? Where was it leaking? How much was leaking from the containers?
 - Some crushing had occurred, but many were in tact
 - Some leaking and degradation of containers, as well
- d. If leaking, what did you do with the material that leaked both during transportation and disposal?
 - Excavated impacted soil placed in drums.

15. Describe where you found the containers?

- a. Length of trench, width, and depth of burial.
 - Length - About 300 feet long
 - Width – About 15 feet wide
 - Height – 15-25 feet
- b. How where the containers arranged in the trench?
 - Drums were on pallets and neatly stacked 2 pallets high
- c. What did you do with the excavated soil?
 - Excavated impacted soil drummed and stored onsite in contained area.
- d. How did you cover?
 - Trench was filled in after drums/etc. were removed because of safety reasons – too deep. Confirmation soil samples collected/analyzed from bottom of excavation.
- e. Were you there long enough to notice if any vegetation grew back?
 - Not applicable.

16. Are you aware if the containers were removed after they were buried?

- a. Not applicable

17. Other notes from the interview:

- a. Took about 6 months to get it all containers removed from disposal area.

- b. Excavation was started with front end loader.
- c. Equipment operators were from Camp Carroll.
- d. After drums were reached, excavation continued with hand tools
- e. Pallets, once exposed, were moved with rough terrain fork lifts
- f. Close to 300 items (319 sticks in his mind as the number of containers)
 - 55 gallon drums (est. (300) 55-gal drums)
 - Other items - 5, 10, 15 gallon pails
 - Condition of containers - some leakage, but many of the drums were in good condition.
 - Did not encounter any fuel pods or semi-trailer in trench.
 - Started sampling liquids from containers in the Fall of 1979:
 1. Used pipettes and disposable paddles
 2. Sent for environmental testing in Japan – COL Ron Bishop was commander of lab in Japan – he may still be consultant with Health Sciences Academy (AMEDD C&S?)
 3. Difficult unknowns liquids were sent to Edgewood Arsenal for further testing.
 4. Trench was left open while testing was being done.
- g. Expanded search to confirm nothing further buried.
- h. When [REDACTED] PCS's in Fall 1980, the drums which were stored onsite in a contained area were still there.
- i. Delay in excavated containers disposal to allow time to identify contents and arrange transportation
- j. Excavated soil (drums) and excavated drums possibly went to Utah or Nevada (Mr [REDACTED] thinks Utah makes the most sense)
- k. Mr. [REDACTED] wasn't 100% sure of the location of the trench but did point to an area at the current Land farm as the likely area.

USAG Daegu

Camp Carroll Update


21 May 11

INTERVIEW WITH

MR. 

b6

25 MAY 2011



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
Satellite Photos of Camp Carroll, Circa Probably 2008

MR. [REDACTED] b6

Potential Location

[REDACTED] Potential Location b6

MR



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY HAS AWARDED

THE ARMY COMMENDATION MEDAL

TO
CAPTAIN SCOTT [REDACTED] 66
UNITED STATES ARMY

FOR MERITORIOUS SERVICE AS ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE OFFICER AND OFFICER IN CHARGE, LB DETACHMENT, 5TH PREVENTIVE MEDICINE UNIT FROM JULY 1978 TO NOVEMBER 1980. HE DEMONSTRATED OUTSTANDING PROFESSIONAL JUDGEMENT AND TECHNICAL ABILITY WHILE PROVIDING ASSISTANCE TO THE COMMAND ON HANDLING OF CHEMICALS RECOVERED FROM A LANDFILL IN HIS AREA OF OPERATION. THROUGH HIS EFFORTS ALL COMMAND ELEMENTS SUPPORTED HAVE A NEW AND RESPECTED APPRECIATION OF PREVENTIVE MEDICINE. CAPTAIN [REDACTED] 66 MERITORIOUS PERFORMANCE OF DUTY IS IN KEEPING WITH THE FINEST TRADITIONS OF THE MILITARY SERVICE AND REFLECTS GREAT CREDIT UPON HIM, THIS COMMAND, AND THE UNITED STATES ARMY.

GIVEN UNDER MY HAND IN THE CITY OF WASHINGTON
THIS 20TH DAY OF JANUARY 1981



J A Wickham, Jr.

JOHN A. WICKHAM, JR.
GENERAL, USA
COMMANDER
USFK/EUSA

Cygnal E. Alexander, Jr.

SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

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USAG Daegu

Camp Carroll Update

21 May 11

INTERVIEW WITH

MR.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b6

b7c

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MAY


2011

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Satellite Photos of Camp Carroll, Circa Probably 2008

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Q1: WHERE
WAS THE
TANK TESTING
PITS
- DEEP ONE
- shallow
one

Q2: WHERE
WAS GATE
to HLZ

Satellite Photos of Camp Carroll, Circa Probably 2008

**Drums
Storage**



Camp Carroll Map, May 2011

Camp Carroll Site Questions/ [redacted] Interview Answers

26 May 2011 23

Present at the interview:

Army Reps:

-COL Donald Degidio, IMCOM Korea

-Mr. [redacted] USAEC

-Ms. [redacted] IMCOM Public Affairs – Environmental Branch

Veteran Reps:

Mr. [redacted]

Mr. [redacted] brother, also retired Army)

INTERVIEW DAs

1. B, 2

(Pgs 5)

1. When did you arrive at Camp Carroll, when did you leave?
 - a. January 1978 to January 1979. Stayed entire year, did not take leave.
2. What was your unit, rank, duty position?
 - a. 802nd Engineering Battalion, D Company, E4, 62 Lima (equipment operator).
3. Do you remember your chain of command? (Platoon ldr, company commander....up to highest rank)
 - a. Squad Ldr - Sgt. [redacted], Platoon Ldr - LT [redacted] Company Commander – CPT [redacted]
4. Please describe what was disposed of at Camp Carroll? And when?
 - a. Mr. [redacted] was asked by Sgt. [redacted] to place some spent, rusted, concertina wire in trench. Mr. [redacted] was not present during any other burial activities; however, Sgt. [redacted] indicated that the trench was built to dispose of used motor oil. Scuttlebutt on post was that Agent Orange was buried there.
5. Please describe what it looked like, where it was located, what the area looked like.
 - a. Mr. [redacted] was one of several equipment operators who excavated the trench.
 - b. Length was ¾ to 1 city block or roughly 100-yards. Width of 290 scrapper. Depth 10-12 feet.

- c. Area where trench was constructed, sloped downward towards the east.
6. Can you point out where it was disposed? Did it have a special name? Are you aware of the reason why it was disposed?
- a. After reviewing Mr. House's photographs and the maps provided by COL Degidio, Mr. [REDACTED] indicated he thought the trench was located west of the helipads, in the general area identified by Mr. House. See attached maps which depict the area identified by Mr. [REDACTED].
- b. Mr. [REDACTED] clearly remembers 2 water pits (1 small, 1 large) for tank water proof tests. The distance from the water pits to the trench was roughly 150 yds. See attached maps which depict the area identified by Mr. [REDACTED].
7. How long did the transportation and disposal take?
- a. Unaware.
- b. Mr. [REDACTED] stated that during PT runs he would run by a storage area containing 55-gallon, OD Green drums. The storage area was located in the Depot area. The drums were stacked on their sides, pyramid style, 6-feet high. See attached maps which depict the drum storage area identified by Mr. [REDACTED].
8. How much was disposed? In same location?
- a. Unaware.
- b. However, when asked by Mr. [REDACTED] how many drums sitting upright could be placed in the trench he built, Mr. [REDACTED] indicated, no more than 2 high.
9. Where did the containers originally come from?
- a. Mr. [REDACTED] stated that during PT runs he would run by a storage area containing 55-gallon, OD Green drums. The storage area was located in the Depot area. The drums stacked on their sides, pyramid style, 6-feet high. See attached maps which depict the drum storage area identified by Mr. [REDACTED].
- b. Mr. [REDACTED] noticed during a PT run (subsequent to the building of the trench), that the drums were no longer present in the storage area. He also noticed that the trench was filled in.
10. Where were they stored prior to disposal? Did it have a special name? Any other locations where they were stored?
- a. See attached maps which depict the drum storage area identified by Mr. [REDACTED].
11. What was the condition in storage?

- a. He didn't recall the condition of the drums.
- b. While on post, he observed flatbed trucks loaded with drums. The flatbeds were lined with rubber sheets. Mr. [REDACTED] did not see the drums being placed in the trench.

12. How were they moved?

- a. While on post, he observed flatbed trucks loaded with drums and flatbed was lined with rubber sheets.

13. Who was involved with the transportation and disposal?

- a. Mr. Stephen House and Mr. [REDACTED] were the equipment operators and Mr. [REDACTED] and Mr. [REDACTED] were the truck drivers.

14. Describe the containers (all the same, any markings)?

- Couldn't tell if they had any colored bands, or couldn't read writing on drums. He described the drums located in the storage area and on the flatbed trucks as 55-gal, OD Green, steel drums.
- b. What were they made of?
 - 55-gallon, steel OD Green drums.
- c. If leaking, what did the substance(s) look like/ smell like?
 - No odors during trench excavation.
 - Was at trench site after nearly covered, and did not recall any smells or anything unusual about the site.
- d. If leaking, what percentage of the containers do you think were leaking? Where was it leaking? How much was leaking from the containers?
 - Unaware.
- e. If leaking, what did you do with the material that leaked both during transportation and disposal?
 - Mr. [REDACTED] was not involved in the transportation and disposal of drums.

15. Describe how you disposed of the containers?

- a. Length of trench, width, and depth of burial.
 - Wasn't involved in any disposal of drums.
 - Mr. [REDACTED] was ordered to build a trench.

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- Length of trench built was $\frac{3}{4}$ to 1 city block or roughly 100-yards. Width of 290 scrapper. Depth 10-12 feet.

b. Were they still leaking?

- No knowledge.

c. How were the containers arranged in the trench?

- Doesn't have firsthand knowledge, however, he remembers hearing that the drums were stacked 2-high and thinks they were set in the trench with a loader and not dumped.

d. What type of soil was excavated? What did you do with the excavated soil?

- Sandy soil.

- Excavated soil was placed on side of trench using scrapper.

e. How did you cover?

- Unaware. Mr. [REDACTED] was not involved with the covering of the trench.

f. Were you there long enough to notice if any vegetation grew back?

- No noticeable dead vegetation in the area. Lots of scrub grass. Also remembers that ringed-tailed pheasants were in the area.

16. Are you aware if the containers were removed after they were buried?

a. No.

17. Other notes from the interview:

a. Mr. [REDACTED] noticed the trench had been nearly filled with exception to the north side of the trench.

b. Mr. [REDACTED] was asked by Sgt. [REDACTED] to place some spent, rusted, concertina wire in an open end of the trench (north end of trench). During the placement of the wire in the trench, Mr. [REDACTED] observed 2 jeeps and a Crown Victoria sedan entering the gate. MPs approached Mr. [REDACTED] asking "Are you aware of what's buried there". Mr. [REDACTED] said "yes" and the MPs left the site.

c. Mr. [REDACTED] asked if the south gate (gate leading into helipads area) has moved since the 1970's. This gate and water pits were his reference for the location of the trench he excavated.

d. He was enrolled in class 7 of the NCO academy, 1978.

- e. He doesn't recall any helipads being near the trench he built or any special names for the area.
- f. Mr. [REDACTED] operated the equipment to build the trench. It took no more than a week to build. It was completed in the Fall 1978. Doesn't recall wearing any special protective gear during construction of the trench.
- g. Did not observe water in the bottom of the trench.
- h. No discoloration of soil was observed or odors.
- i. When asked, Mr. [REDACTED] did recall a fence being nearby the trench.
- j. Mr. [REDACTED] heard that Mr. [REDACTED] was on profile "wearing tennis shoes" because chemicals were spilled on his feet. He also had heard that Mr. House had chemicals spilled on his lower legs. He doesn't recall Mr. [REDACTED] being evacuated from Camp Carroll.

USAG Daegu

Camp Carroll Update

MR. STEVE HOUSE
INTERVIEW


23 MAY 2011



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Satellite Photos of Camp Carroll, Circa Probably 2008

SLIDE 1-83



Satellite Photos of Camp Carroll, Circa Probably 2008

SLIDE 2 of 3



AREA WHERE SOIL WAS
MOVED TO AND USED
AS FILL FOR SMALL
BRIDGE SITE.

Satellite Photos of Camp Carroll, Circa Probably 2008

SLIDE 3 of 3

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DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS
VA Regional Office
3333 N. Central Ave
Phoenix AZ 85012-2402

RECEIVED
AUG 19 2010
BY: _____

August 18, 2010

THEODORE C. JARVI
ATTORNEY AT LAW
1050 E. SOUTHERN AVENUE
SUITE G-3
TEMPE AZ 85282

In Reply Refer To: 345/Privacy Act/FOIA
CSS [REDACTED] b6
HOUSE, Stephen F.

Dear Mr. Jarvi:

As you requested, we are enclosing a copy of the DRO Transcript of Hearing for July 9, 2010, with Mr. House.

We hope this will assist you.

Sincerely yours,

[REDACTED] b6
Veterans Service Center Manager
Email us at: <https://iris.va.gov>

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THEODORE C. JARVI

ATTORNEY AT LAW - VA ATTORNEY ACCREDITATION NO. 8906

1050 E. SOUTHERN AVENUE, SUITE G-3

TEMPE, ARIZONA 85282

(480) 838-6566

FAX (480) 838-8810

August 13, 2010

FOIA ADMINISTRATOR
Department of Veteran's Affairs
Phoenix Regional Office
3333 N. Central Avenue
Phoenix, AZ 85012

Re: Stephen F. House
C#: [REDACTED] b6
Attorney Accreditation No. 8906


REQUEST FOR DRO HEARING TRANSCRIPT

Dear Sir/Madam:

On July 9, 2010, Mr. House and I attended a DRO Hearing. This letter is a request for a copy of the transcript of that hearing.

This request is in accordance with the Privacy and Freedom of Information Acts. Thank you for your prompt attention to this request.

Very truly yours,



Theodore C. Jarvi
Attorney at Law

TCJ/sp
Dictated but not read
cc: Mr. House

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DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS
REGIONAL OFFICE
PHOENIX, ARIZONA

TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING

CSS [REDACTED] 66
HOUSE, STEPHEN F.

July 9, 2010
Time not provided
345/21HO

DECISION REVIEW OFFICER: You may begin.

POWER OF ATTORNEY: Okay, this is a continuation of a hearing that occurred October 23rd of 2009, and for whatever reason we weren't able to get a transcript of that hearing, so we're...we're reconvening it and according to the DRO, Mr. [REDACTED] here, the oath that Stephen House took in...on October 23rd is still in effect, so all his testimony here is as truthfully as...as if he were still under oath at that time, or not as truthfully, it is truthfully because it's under oath at that time.

I have prepared a...another memorandum of facts involved. There's already one in the file, this one, however, is somewhat more complete and it contains a sworn statement from the Veteran regarding his claim, and it's in...perhaps anticipation of any other problems, but the testimony...but his testimony will flesh out that.

DECISION REVIEW OFFICER: Okay.

This is your revised memorandum of all the facts involved.

POWER OF ATTORNEY: Right, and you will find there are additional items of evidence with it, although a lot of...of what you'll see there is the same. There are some additional items of evidence, include...including the Veteran's notarized statement. Just to sort of make things complete here, Stephen, why don't you go ahead and tell us your name and...and address.

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VETERAN: My name is Stephen Franklin House, and I live at:

1365 North Delaware.

POWER OF ATTORNEY: Steve, as we had discussed in the hearing previously, you spent a period of time in Korea, is that correct?

VETERAN: Correct.

POWER OF ATTORNEY: And there was some question at some point that...whether you were even in Korea or not, and I'd like to show you what...what we've now marked as Item 8, Page 5, a letter from the Army to your dad. Can you tell me where you got that?

VETERAN: That was a letter that was sent to my parents when I arrived at my unit, DEO Company in Waegwan, South Korea. I was stationed there and the commanding officer on Camp Humphreys (ph) sent the letter out just explaining to my parents if they need to get a hold of me in an emergency situation, how to go about doing so, and also just saying that...you know...to write often...you know...because of the distance and you get homesick...(inaudible).

POWER OF ATTORNEY: What I found particularly interesting about that letter was that it described your duties in Korea as a Heavy Equipment Operator. Was that an accurate description that he put in there about what your duties would be?

VETERAN: Yes, and he also...you know...explained...(inaudible)...that I'd be under a pretty heavy workload. I believe there's also the original copy...the original envelope with the postmark...I got it, too.

POWER OF ATTORNEY: He talks about you being assigned to an earth...(inaudible)...moving platoon as a Senior Wheel Tractor...(inaudible)...Operator. Is that right?

VETERAN: Correct.

POWER OF ATTORNEY: And that is at what station in Korea?

VETERAN: That was...it was a depot, Camp Carol. It was outside of Waegwan, closest...(inaudible)...within Taegu.

POWER OF ATTORNEY: Okay. You've used two names here that we'd kind of like to get the spelling on. The first one is Waegwan?

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VETERAN: Yes.

POWER OF ATTORNEY: Can you spell it?

VETERAN: (W-A-E-G...) I'm not for sure exactly how it's spelled right now, but the other one was Taegu...was probably about 45 miles or less.

POWER OF ATTORNEY: And that's (T-A-E-G-U)?

VETERAN: Yes.

POWER OF ATTORNEY: Okay.

VETERAN: But Waegwan was the town that the base was actually located near.

POWER OF ATTORNEY: Um...there's an initial item of evidence which is not in the memorandum that we have recently received, and it's called "Progress Notes" printed on May 6, 2010. Can you tell me what those are?

VETERAN: Yes. I signed a...signed to get into the Agent Orange Research Program down at the clinic...(inaudible)...and they scheduled me for a physical at the VA Hospital, Downtown Phoenix, where I underwent a full Agent Orange protocol physical. This is the doctor's report.

POWER OF ATTORNEY: And it discussed the conditions that you have...that would be related to Agent Orange once we are showing...once we have showed exposure?

VETERAN: Yes, the side effects, the diabetes, the neuropathy, the other medical issues that I've having right now.

POWER OF ATTORNEY: Mr. [REDACTED] b6, we...we're going to submit that, too, although I realize that you probably have that. I think it's very pertinent to his...the number of different claims he has arising from diabetes and his exposure to Agent Orange.

You were in Korea from...over what month?

VETERAN: It was from '78 to '79.

POWER OF ATTORNEY: Okay. September '78?

VETERAN: Yes.

POWER OF ATTORNEY: Um...this...well, it was earlier that September '78?

VETERAN: It was earlier that that, yes.

POWER OF ATTORNEY: And when did you leave? Do you recall?

VETERAN: It was in the spring of '78...'79...spring of '79.

POWER OF ATTORNEY: Now, we've attached a statement called, "The Statement of Stephen House," but it's not written in your...(inaudible)...in your words. Can you tell us how it was written?

VETERAN: I sat down with you and went through everything and tried to get a timeline of...you know...the buddy letters and everything....

POWER OF ATTORNEY: Okay....

VETERAN: ...that I've submitted to the VA.

POWER OF ATTORNEY: ...and you got to read that that was written up...

VETERAN: Yes.

POWER OF ATTORNEY: ...then as a result of that discussion?

VETERAN: Yes.

POWER OF ATTORNEY: And you have adopted that statement as your own and you had an opportunity to correct any inaccuracies in the statement?

VETERAN: Yes.

POWER OF ATTORNEY: And so it's your testimony now that you have...you adopt this statement as your own?

VETERAN: Yes.

POWER OF ATTORNEY: Explain how you were assigned to dig a big ditch out there in Camp Carol.

VETERAN: Sometime early spring, the first year I was there, after morning formation they called myself and I believe it was five of the other operators...several bulldozer operators and...(inaudible)...operators...drivers. I was...(inaudible)...there and I was with the EM Platoon, which is Earth Movers, and told that we would be assigned to...well, Lieutenant ██████████ (ph) was our platoon officer...and himself and another lieutenant from some other unit, and we would be doing a job. At the time we were told we were just going to be digging what they called a "Disposal ditch," and this ditch was to be dug up on a area called, "D-Area." It was on a ridge on the backside of the base. I was a...(inaudible)...area where the big Chinooks would come in and unload freight, and we dug this pretty large ditch at the base of the....

POWER OF ATTORNEY: Could you give us the rough dimensions, please?

VETERAN: Well, it was over two-pans wide, and it was as wide as a semi, and....

POWER OF ATTORNEY: And referring to...(inaudible).

VETERAN: ...scraper...(inaudible)...big earthmovers were called a pan or a scraper. I got photographs...(inaudible).

POWER OF ATTORNEY: Okay...(inaudible)...me to show you the first photograph.

VETERAN: This is the actual ditch as we were filling it towards the end of the job. There's...don't know if you make it out, but those are some pallets and an old oil tank of some sort that they brought on. That was towards the end of the job though, and....

POWER OF ATTORNEY: Okay.

After you dug the ditch, was the dirt from the ditch just put off to the side?

VETERAN: As we dug the ditch on the back backside of the...we build a big...(inaudible)...and then as the trucks would come in we would unload it with either forklifts or pull up a bucket motor. Some of the stuff...the first stuff was in great shape, it had been stored indoors apparently, and later on in the summer,

the stuff that came in had been outside. It looked like it had been exposed to the elements.

POWER OF ATTORNEY: Now, these photographs that we're now presenting, where'd they come from?

VETERAN: These were pictures that I took. I got photo albums. I took pictures of about every job I ever did while I was over there. They came off that little... (inaudible)... Sure Shot, they called a 35-millimeter disposable camera, and I... you could wear one and keep your... you would still be able to button your tee pocket closed. In fact, the pictures are dated if you look at them back when they developed them there.

POWER OF ATTORNEY: A couple of them are, but not all.

VETERAN: Yeah, on post they would develop the pictures.

POWER OF ATTORNEY: Well, let's go ahead and get these things in... into the file. Why don't you go through them one at a time and tell him....

VETERAN: Okay, this....

POWER OF ATTORNEY: ...tell us what we're seeing.

VETERAN: ...photograph here was taken from my motor pool.

POWER OF ATTORNEY: What's the date on the side of it?

VETERAN: And that is April of '78, and that is D-Area across the valley. In fact, there's a Chinook landing on the... on the site right now in this picture.

POWER OF ATTORNEY: You talking about a Chinook helicopter?

VETERAN: Helicopter, right, and that's D-Area on the other... so it's on the other sight of the base from where my motor pool was, and this next picture is an actual picture of one of the pans as we're digging.

POWER OF ATTORNEY: Can we get an I.D. on that picture? Maybe out a figure... a number and initials or something so that we can identify it easier? Just right on the back of it... one... one or two-word description and your initials. Okay.

VETERAN: And this other one....

POWER OF ATTORNEY: What did...what did you write on it?

VETERAN: I just wrote, "The job site," and then I put my initials.

POWER OF ATTORNEY: Okay.

VETERAN: Again, this is...now, I got the original of this photo. I can show it...(inaudible)...and it has [REDACTED] hand landing on the back...(inaudible)...it was...this was part of.... b6

POWER OF ATTORNEY: So, this...this is a copy of a picture that you have?

VETERAN: Yes, it's...(inaudible).

POWER OF ATTORNEY: Okay. Would you write on the back of it what you...what we're seeing?

VETERAN: Again, this is just the....

POWER OF ATTORNEY: Don't put the same words.

DECISION REVIEW OFFICER: This picture looks like the trench is full of water.

VETERAN: On one end of it, it was. We did the...(inaudible).

POWER OF ATTORNEY: Steve, what did you write on that?

VETERAN: I just wrote on this one, "This is the loader on the jobsite."

POWER OF ATTORNEY: And what are...what does the picture show?

VETERAN: It shows one of the...(inaudible)...loaders when we were moving the dirt and stuff around on the backside of the...the ridgeline, and then this here is a picture that was given to me by [REDACTED]

POWER OF ATTORNEY: So, this isn't...the one you're talking about now b6