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to the \$180-million level—a 25-percent cut. How unwise to spend billions to impose our will by force in South Vietnam, but not be willing to satisfy our own modest commitments to help other Asian nations peacefully redevelop.

The real problem is that out of the \$2.1 billion aid appropriation, a substantial portion never gets to help people economically. Of this sum, \$600 million is earmarked for Vietnam and Thailand supportive assistance and an additional \$365 million is in the military sector. The \$1.1-billion balance is simply not enough.

North Vietnam could take some solace from the fact that they have caused the United States to disrupt our posture and our other commitments, all over the world.

While we are impressed with our favorable casualty-kill ratio, it is also possible that the north is not watching our computers, but rather is counting the wounded Americans, the South Vietnamese, Koreans, and civilians maimed and killed, which latter statistics we seem to ignore.

Again it is possible that the north gets some hope from the continued reports of the South Vietnamese corruption reported in the press daily and illustrated by the 10 reports of the John Moss Foreign Operations Subcommittee on file, which reports are not all completely released.

It is possible that the North Vietnamese might sense some lack of total U.S. commitment due to the congressional revolt on the 10-percent tax surcharge plan of the administration. True, many rebel because of claims of excessive domestic spending; however, it is interesting to note that some of the same voices that attempted to set a crippling limitation on Government spending a month ago have approved, virtually intact, appropriation bills subsequent thereto that require expenditures at the \$145 billion level. A spending level of this magnitude, with our current income means a large two-figure deficit which could mean a further contraction of both domestic and military expenditures.

This devil's advocate analysis could go on ad infinitum. I am not alone in expressing my views. Publications like the New York Times, the Los Angeles Times, Newsweek, Life, Saturday Evening Post, and writers like Walt Lippmann, Richard Harwood, Steward Alsop, Scotty Reston, and Ted Sorenson have expressed various forms of strong reservations on our current American policy.

The President has stated that he is offered no workable alternative solution.

I say the solution is simple: Retract our American Goliath posture and de-escalate to Vietnamese proportions. Sell the war back to the South Vietnamese by slowly retracting and reducing our troops and dollars. North Vietnamese fanatics can only be stopped by South Vietnamese fanatics. Save American boys' lives and U.S. fiscal solvency and redevelop American cities with workable programs with the surplus that remains. The effect of this retraction might allow all the Vietnamese to work their will in the Tonkin Gulf; would cause the Soviets to retract their shipping to Hai-

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VIETNAM

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from California [Mr. LEGGETT] is recognized for 1 hour.

Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Speaker, on Wednesday of this week an interested spectrum of House Members were privileged to discuss with Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker the status of our Vietnam effort. The distinguished Ambassador impressed us with his capable demeanor. He painted a brightening picture of our Vietnam military posture, but expressly failed to project whether this picture would climax in a victory in 1 year, 10 or 20 years.

No one really seriously doubts that a \$790 billion economy is not making some progress against the \$1 billion economy insurgents of North and South Vietnam. What serious critics of the war are really concerned about are the ultimate chess moves that will be made. Unless the United States has a program for victory in the foreseeable future, the military, the President and our diplomatic corps are spinning their wheels getting mesmerized by intermediate type victories.

North Vietnam is apparently strong in its resolve, I do not believe so much because of American dissent but because of the facts over which some Americans are dissenting.

Our U.S. \$29 billion projected deficit could give the North Vietnamese some hope of a chink in American posture—likewise a forsaking of our support for peaceful defense against communism in the form of our foreign aid program could assist their resolve.

The foreign aid program which will be approved by this House tomorrow of \$2.1 billion for redeveloping the world is slightly more than 50 percent of the inadequate \$3.2 billion originally budgeted by the administration. The bill to be approved approved cuts by one-third the \$110 million minimum request for technical assistance to stop communism in South America. The bill cuts further Alliance for Progress loans by 50 percent to the \$400-million level and substantially below our 10-year commitment. This action to me means "South America, we have forsaken you."

The bill, in addition, cuts the technical assistance grants for the balance of the world from the \$244 million requested and the \$210 million authorized

phong, which has increased 50 percent in the past 9 months, and if nothing else might form the basis for negotiations which the American people now want by the polls 2 to 1.

I have commented on this matter extensively in the past, as follows:

I firmly believe we have escalated to no place. In the face of continuous recommendations from General Westmoreland that the war will go on indefinitely, I have failed to understand the theory of escalation. When we in the States have assumed that our force level at 150,000 or 250,000 was at the outer limit considering that a \$750 billion economy was fighting a \$1 billion economy without modern transportation, a Navy or airpower, we have always assumed that the large buildup had some kind of foreseeable victory in mind.

While we stated a year ago that we needed to beef up our troops because there were 10,000 North Vietnamese troops in the south and that we needed at least a 10-to-1 over-kill ratio to handle guerrillas in the bush—today while the United States has raised its level by 150,000 the North Vietnamese raised its level to better than 100,000. While we were fighting 225,000 solid core enemy a year ago, we now admit their numbers to be 278,000 and we frankly admit also that there is no magic in these numbers.

I would say then that the better part of valor at the present time would be for the administration to be deadly serious with itself as to where we have been and where we are going. *It will profit us little as a nation if we exhaust ourselves economically on North Vietnam only to find that our curtailment and lack of attention to the rest of the world, including the Americas, has allowed a Communist foundation to be dug on our hemispheric mainland.* While our policy in Vietnam at one time was a matter of choice, at the present time it is monumentally compulsive.

We criticized last year the U.S. AID program in South Vietnam as a conglomeration of confusion. If the situation is any better today I am unaware in spite of a major AID effort at reorganization. The South Vietnamese revolutionary cadre system of 30,000 men has suffered high casualties over the last year and is now reputed to be ineffective. What this all really means is that the war on poverty for the world's deprived and underprivileged must be fought offensively through effective AID programs in a time of peace rather than defensively at a time of war. Because people are bound to wonder if the United States does not care for my political future at a time of peace, why do they care at a time of war with communism? I sincerely hope that one day we will realize that American wealth was given to us for a purpose. If we would help our neighbors but 25 percent of the magnitude of our military assistance, there might truly be a hope for peace in our time.

How should the United States resolve our current international dilemma? First, we should recognize that we are escalating to nowhere. *We should resist escalation at all costs unless we know the escalated result. We have played too much blind man's bluff on a major scale too long. We should unilaterally scale down our cost and size of operations in South Vietnam and keep the burden of the conflict on the Vietnamese themselves. We should recognize, I believe, that the alternative to being pushed into the Tonkin Gulf in 1965 is not wholesale, all-out war in 1967 especially when our commander in the battlefield has no predictions for victory whatsoever in the foreseeable future.*

If actions were scaled down and if our war budget could reapproximate the \$5 billion level, then we would be postured as a nation to wait out the hard-headedness of

Ho Chi Minh. He sees us now restless in our Great Society and today his patience is better than ours.

In some encounters in the past perhaps we had not the option to reason why, only to do and suffer the consequences. Today we are involved in a new kind of undeclared war which is concerned not so much with a mad dictator's lust for power, but with a surge of people to better their plight. While we can destroy a dictator, you cannot destroy a whole people.

It is inevitable, therefore, that the present conflict be concluded with some kind of an accommodation by the people on both sides of the encounter looking toward their mutual development. The United States has been, perhaps, too ready with the olive branch in the past and now grows weary of offering to negotiate. In time, I believe tensions will will relax to the point where Ho Chi Minh will talk. It is to American interests that the balance of the world, free and Communist, not become too exercised or alarmed in the meantime.

The people of San Mateo County spoke clearly the day before yesterday in favor of a new American Asian posture. The party that heeds that voice might be in excellent position 1 year from now.

For the RECORD, I enclose not the voices of the much abused "pull out" doves, but the voices of American literature including my own and that of the U.N. composite which I believe constitute responsible dissent. Though most of these voices are constructively critical of the administration, on a proper poll of public opinion, they well might constitute the strong voice of the majority.

I include herewith a list of articles with their authors and publishers, and the text of the articles:

James Reston, the Sacramento Bee, November 3, 1967, "Writer Offers Short Course on LBJ's War Maxims".

James Reston, New York Times, October 13, 1967, press release.

Editorial, New York Times, November 15, 1967, press release.

Editorial, New York Times, May 27, 1967, "What Price Vietnam?"

James Reston, New York Times, April 5, 1966, "Myths and Realities in Saigon".

Joseph Kraft, Washington Post, October 1, 1967, "U.S. Must Negotiate a Way Out and It Won't Help to Personalize the Issue Against LBJ".

Theodore C. Sorensen, Saturday Review, October 21, 1967, "The War in Vietnam—How We Can End It".

Walter Lippmann, Newsweek, November 20, 1967, "America In Asia".

Walter Lippmann, Newsweek, October 23, 1967, "The Tax Revolt".

Walter Lippmann, Newsweek, October 9, 1967, "The American Promise."

Walter Lippmann, Newsweek, May 23, 1966, "The Painless War."

Walter Lippmann, Washington Post, May 23, 1967, "A Collision Course."

Walter Lippmann, Washington Post, April 18, 1967, "The Escalating War."

Walter Lippmann, Washington Post, January 17, 1967, "Alternatives."

Editorial, Saturday Evening Post, November 13, 1967, "Changing Views on Vietnam."

Stewart Alsop, Saturday Evening Post, date unavailable.

Stewart Alsop, Saturday Evening Post, January 28, 1967.

Editorial, Washington Post, November 14, 1967.

Henry Raymond, New York Times, October 13, 1967.

Editorial, Life, October 20, 1967.

Editorial, The Washington Daily News, November 16, 1967.

Richard Harwood, Washington Post, September 3, 1967.

Editorial, Los Angeles Times, June 4, 1967.

Emmet John Hughes, Newsweek, October 30, 1967.

Emmet John Hughes, Newsweek, July 11, 1966.

Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., New York Times, date unavailable.

United Nations Materials.

George F. Kennan, Washington Post, February 11, 1966.

Robert L. Leggett, letter to Secretary McNamara, February 8, 1966.

[From the Sacramento (Calif.) Bee, Nov. 3, 1967]

WRITER OFFERS SHORT COURSE ON L. B. J.'S WAR MAXIMS

(By James Reston)

WASHINGTON.—It is important, though not easy, to keep up with President Lyndon B. Johnson's maxims on the war in Vietnam. Therefore, if the class will please come to order, we will turn to the little blue book.

Question—What is the latest White House precept on the war.

Answer—President Johnson said this week that there has not been a change of policy in Vietnam since 1964. Just a slight modification, maybe, or rolling adjustment, but we were always against aggression, so no change.

Q—Who says there was a change?
A—Embittered critics.

Q—Good. Now: Please compare the making of the South Vietnamese constitution with the making of the American Constitution.

A—Madison and Hamilton took 13 years to get the American Constitution through, and generals Thieu and Ky did it in 13 months.

Q—How is the war going?
A—We have turned the corner and are over the hump and now see light at the end of the tunnel, but of course we are waiting for signals from Hanoi.

Q—Precisely. What will we do to get peace in Vietnam?
A—We will walk the last mile.
Q—And meanwhile?
A—We will win the hearts and minds of the people.

TWO TYPES

Q—Please identify the two types of men in Washington.

A—There are Good Men and Bad Men.

Q—Will you define the qualities of a Good Man?

A—A Good Man is a patriot who backs the administration. He is for the bombing because it "saves lives." He supports the war because it may prevent a world war which might obliterate the human race.

Also, a Good Man publishes nothing that would give comfort to the enemy. He never criticizes the President or Secretary Rusk because this would encourage Hanoi. He does not complain about the mess unless he has a provable and honorable solution of his own.

Q—The mess? What mess?
A—I'm sorry. I meant the inevitable sacrifices of our crusade.

Q—That is better. Anything else?

NO FEAR OF WAR

A—Well, of course, a Good Man is patient, practical and brave. The prospect of war with 700,000,000 Chinese does not scare him. He concentrates on the present, forsaking all thought of mistakes in the past. He keeps his promises. He puts the commitment to Saigon ahead of the commitment to avoid a land war in Asia. He knows that President Johnson is merely following the policies of Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy—give or take 450,000 men and \$20 billion or \$30 billion a year.

Finally, he keeps things in perspective. He remembers that 100,000 casualties, while regrettable, are less than our annual casualties on the highways at home. Above all, he

has confidence in the men who led us into the war because if they led us in surely they can lead us out.

Q—Excellent. Now please illustrate the qualities of the Bad Man.

A—A Bad Man is one who engages in wrong-thinking, and sometimes even in thinking. He fusses at the government and even at the President, questions the compassionate bombing, worries about war with China, complains about problems at home, and reads Walter Lippmann.

Q—Is that all?

A—No. A Bad Man is a neo-isolationist. He does not see that lowering the level of violence would inevitably hand over the Pacific to the Communists and force us back to Hawaii. He does not realize that fighting on bravely, if indefinitely, will make the American people proud and eager to stay in Asia and fight future wars on national liberation. He is a doubter and a grumbler who keeps prattling on about having a decent respect for the opinions of mankind.

GETTING THE IDEA

Q—You are beginning to understand. Is there any difference between a Bad Man who wants to de-escalate the war—"hunker down," as we say—and a Bad Man who wants to quit and run away?

—This is a dangerous distinction. We must argue that de-escalating is quitting on the instalment plan. This is easier, for nobody likes a quitter.

Q—So what do we do?

A—We say Vietnam is "vital" to the security of the United States. We point to a billion unpredictable Chinese armed with nuclear weapons. We say Asian communism, directed from Peking, is the enemy. Nobody can argue against defending the security of the United States and everybody around here hates communism.

Q—And finally what is our policy on dissent?

A—We are very much in favor of dissent unless, of course, it is actually practiced, and then it clearly helps the enemy. Nevertheless, if it goes on, we identify it with the hippies and the law-breakers. The people under 30 will not like that, but they do not vote much anyway.

[From the New York Times, Oct. 13, 1967]

ARTICLE BY JAMES RESTON

Secretary of State Dean Rusk . . . has emerged as the principal defender of the Administration's Vietnam policy because he is the most eloquent of the true believers in the President's Cabinet.

He is a simpler man than either President Johnson or Secretary of Defense McNamara, and more articulate . . . he sees the present leaders of China as the greatest menace to the security of the United States and the continuity of Western civilization since Hitler.

Nobody involved in the present Vietnam debate, whether in the White House, the Congress, or the universities, suspects him of personal ambition. He is both broke and honest. . . .

For while everybody admires his loyalty, even his closest associates in the State Department, for which he is responsible, question his judgment. He is modest, loyal, articulate, but is he right? He is determined to unify Asia, Europe, Latin American and Africa—a noble ambition, but how can he do it if he can't even unify his own department?

Rusk's argument here this week was that the Senate and the press were merely debating what he calls "variations on a theme"—that very few people either want to run away or smash our way to a military victory in Vietnam; that all agree we should "defend our vital national interests."

But this is exactly the central issue in Washington which Rusk, for all his attractive personal qualities, denies. The Capitol

is deeply and fundamentally divided on whether fighting to the finish in Vietnam, at a cost of over 100,000 casualties and \$30 billion a year, really is in our national interest. . . .

Washington is now deeply troubled about these things. It sees and admires Rusk's loyalty to the President. It likes him personally—particularly his obvious honesty, his conviction, his sense of decency and his sense of humor—but it is not convinced, and it hates his vague suggestions that dissent is disastrous to our cause.

He says the country is united on defending our "vital interests" in Vietnam, but this is not true. No matter how appealing he is, Washington is still divided on whether Vietnam is really vital, and whether China is hell-bent on conquering Asia. Rusk says it is—he is eloquent and determined about it and puts it before the cities and races at home or anything else. And this is what Washington does not believe.

[From the New York Times, May 27, 1967]

WHAT PRICE VIETNAM?

The dramatic and dangerous crisis of the last few days in the Middle East has focused the world's attention there; but the terrible cost of the Vietnam war in blood and treasure goes on and on—and its baneful effects can be sensed in the seemingly unrelated conflicts from Suez to Hong Kong.

In Ottawa, President Johnson and Prime Minister Pearson talked about the Middle East—and Vietnam. In Moscow, British Foreign Secretary Brown and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko talked about the Middle East—and Vietnam.

The threat from the United States forces whom Peking sees moving inexorably toward China is surely playing its role in the Communist pressure on Hong Kong. The Soviet Union is the chief supplier of arms to North Vietnam, and the Soviet Union is also the chief supplier of arms to Egypt and Syria.

About a month ago, in one of the most notable speeches on the Vietnam war yet made in the Senate—and long before the present Middle East eruption—George McGovern of South Dakota said: "A Vietnamese civil conflict has been transformed gradually into a cruel international war."

Meanwhile, inside Vietnam the conflict has grown in every way and become internally "internationalized" by the greater and greater American involvement. Senator Clark of Pennsylvania recently pointed out that "increasingly, as the ineffectiveness of the South Vietnamese Army as an aggressive force becomes more and more apparent, American forces have taken over the main burden of the fighting." A Times correspondent writing from Hue in northern South Vietnam tells of the pessimism and despair of United States officials working on the pacification program because of "the failure of the South Vietnamese Army to carry out its assigned role."

The House Appropriations Committee believes that the Vietnam war in fiscal 1968 will cost \$6 billion more than President Johnson's January budgetary calculation. The most recent weekly American casualty figures gave 337 killed and 2,282 wounded—the highest of the war. Nearly a hundred more American than South Vietnamese soldiers were killed. Yet in one of a number of similar statements made by Lyndon Johnson in the 1964 Presidential campaign he said: "We don't want our American boys to do the fighting for Asian boys."

The cost both within Vietnam itself and on the international stage is rapidly increasing. If nothing could be done, the United States would now have to move deeper and deeper into the morass; but there is no inevitability about history. It is possible to stop the escalation of the war in Vietnam, to stop the bombing of North Vietnam and thus

to encourage unconditional negotiations with the Vietnamese.

It is not too late either to halt or slow down now; but as the costs and the risks rise both inside and outside Vietnam, it becomes more and more likely that the solution sought will be "total victory," which is the costliest of all solutions because it could lead to "total" world war.

[From the New York Times, Nov. 15, 1967]

TIMES EDITORIAL

In the face of rising costs and diminishing returns in Vietnam, a rational debate over United States policy is, as Ambassador Arthur Goldberg recently observed, "inevitable, desirable and indeed essential."

Unfortunately, the Administration does not seem to view so calmly the role of dissent and discussion in formulating policy in a democratic society. Instead of listening to its critics, the Administration often chooses to attack or at least to belittle them. Instead of seeking a dialogue, Washington officials have frequently intimated that those who oppose their Vietnam policy are not quite patriotic or not quite bright.

The Administration . . . insinuates that its critics are to blame for its own failure and that dissent borders on treason. This, a that wise old sometime-dissenter, Senator George Aiken of Vermont, has observed, is "hitting below the belt."

Does no one in the Administration realize that a citizen who honestly believes his country is headed on a disastrous course would be acting in a cowardly as well as unpatriotic manner if he did not try by all legal means to set his country right?

[From the New York Times Service, Apr. 5, 1966]

MYTHS AND REALITIES IN SAIGON

(By James Reston)

WASHINGTON.—The latest political agitation in South Vietnam, with its undertone of rebellion and anti-Americanism, gives the impression of a new and particularly vicious crisis, but this is misleading.

It may be a crisis—though it can undoubtedly be handled—and it is vicious, but it is certainly not new. The demonstrations of the Buddhists and the students against the Washington and Saigon Governments are not transforming the situation but only exposing it. They are not changing the political fundamentals, but merely reminding us of what they are.

The nub of the American problem from the beginning of this adventure was the fragility of the political base from which we chose to operate. The present Saigon Government is a coalition of military warlords. The Prime Minister in Saigon, General Ky, never really had control over the South Vietnamese military commander in the First Corps Area, General Thi, whose domain bordered on North Vietnam.

The present difficulty arose from the fact that the Prime Minister, General Ky, tried to prove that he had control over the whole country. President Johnson summoned him to a dramatic conference in Honolulu. He outlined a very sensible program of social and agrarian reform for South Vietnam which General Ky agreed. President Johnson treated General Ky as the leader of all South Vietnam, knowing this was not true but hoping he could make it true if he said so. But it didn't work.

It is too bad. There should be social reform and there should be a powerful central government in Saigon that could bring it about; but there isn't. General Ky tried to prove that there was. Inspired by all the publicity and flattery of Honolulu and all the Johnson Ky photographs, he tried to eliminate his rival in the First Corps Area, General Thi, and the trouble started.

The Buddhists and the students took to the streets in support of their deposed local leaders. The protests spread from Danang in the First Corps Area to Saigon. The United States Consul in Danang, Samuel B. Thomson, had to urge Americans, including the 50,000 U.S. soldiers in Danang, to keep off the streets, and even American officials and Congressmen were advised to cancel their proposed trips to Saigon.

All this proves is that the political situation is unchanged, and that the propaganda of Honolulu has not prevailed over the power and tradition of Saigon. There is no cohesive national spirit in that nation for the simple reason that there is no nation.

It is still a tangle of competing individuals, regions, religions and sects, dominated by a group of military warlords, representing different regions, an army without a country, presiding over a people who have been torn apart by war and dominated and exploited by Saigon for generations.

No doubt American power will be able to sustain the central government of General Ky in the present crisis, but the more power we use, the more American domination will be resented. This is the dilemma. It has been there from the beginning, and the latest political struggle has merely brought the facts to the surface.

The basis of American intervention in the beginning—and even of the official American thesis now—is that we are in Saigon to support a "government" and a "nation" against external aggression, which that government and nation must win or lose primarily by themselves. But there is no Saigon government that can govern, and no South Vietnamese "nation" in our understanding of the word.

Meanwhile the war goes on, unaffected so far by the political turmoil, but there is a basic problem still unresolved. Washington is still counting on a cohesive Saigon government that does not exist. It cannot count on effective political or military action by the South Vietnamese and it is not prepared to produce the political and military manpower to take their place.

In short, the Administration in Washington has not adjusted to the facts. It has not brought its ends and its means into line. It has accepted the ends of the "hawks"—destruction of the enemy's forces but not the means—and it has accepted the ends of the "doves"—a negotiated compromise but not their means, negotiation with the Vietnamese who are doing most of the enemy fighting.

So Washington is in trouble. It is relying on myths and the only consolation of the present political demonstrations is that they are at least exposing the reality.

[From the Washington (D.C.) Post, Oct. 1, 1967]

U.S. MUST NEGOTIATE A WAY OUT AND IT WON'T HELP TO PERSONALIZE THE ISSUE AGAINST L. B. J.

(By Joseph Kraft)

Returning to this country after two months in Vietnam and elsewhere, I find one striking change. There has been a dramatic hardening of temper against the President on Vietnam.

What useful purpose this shift of mood can serve is not clear to me. Not that I think the war is going well. On the contrary, I am more than ever convinced that the United States cannot achieve a military victory in Vietnam.

One measure of the outlook is the situation around Danang. For more than two years, that city and its environs have been a base for about 10,000 American Marines. The Marines have been active in the area not only militarily, but equally in civic action programs designed to assert control over the local population.

Still, hardly a night goes by without some small-scale enemy assault on the Marine positions. The attacks generally come from close in—sometimes a mere 1000 yards away. The attackers can come that close only because they have the support of the local population.

This means that our best troops operating in force in not unfavorable terrain over a period of two years have not been able to break up the enemy's local support. At that rate, I do not think the United States will force the other side to fade away for years and years. And thus it seems to me imperative that we negotiate our way out of Vietnam.

But negotiating out, while perhaps possible, is surely not easy. For openers, there has to be a halt in the bombing of North Vietnam. Without it, there will be no talks with the other side.

But would there be talks if the bombing stopped? The President is certain there would not be. Some well-informed officials around the world disagree. But even they acknowledge that to yield talks, a stop in the bombing would have to be managed with great skill—particularly as to timing.

The more so because Hanoi would probably use any bombing pause to rush new supplies to its forces. That would increase the vulnerability of American troops, and cause American commanders, not unnaturally, to demand resumption of bombing.

To forestall these demands, American troops would have to be insulated against whatever advantage the other side might take of a bombing halt. They would have to be less exposed—which, at a minimum, means pulling back from the belly-to-belly encounter along the Demilitarized Zone. But deliberately relinquishing territory is not easy either.

Then there is the matter of political objectives. Since the President has never spelled these out in detail, the field has been dominated by men in Washington and Saigon who give the impression that the American aim is an anti-Communist South Vietnamese state.

But the other side will negotiate only if there is some prospect that at some time in some way its political objectives can be obtained. Thus as a further prelude to talks, Washington and Saigon will have to lower their political objectives. They will have to open a channel whereby the insurgents on the other side can re-enter South Vietnamese political life, and maybe even come to power.

These are the minimal arrangements which have to be made for negotiations to have a chance. No President would find the course easy to follow; a beleaguered one least of all.

And so, while I think President Johnson has made mistakes, while I think he has been led to exaggerate the strategic importance of Vietnam out of all proportion, it does not seem to me to be helpful to personalize the issue.

The sad truth is that for those of us who favor a political settlement the best hope lies in support of that part of the President's instinct which also seeks to resolve the war by negotiations.

[From the Saturday Review, Oct. 21, 1967]
THE WAR IN VIETNAM: HOW WE CAN END IT

(By Theodore C. Sorensen)

I have not previously spoken out publicly against our course in Vietnam. My years in the White House made me more conscious than most private citizens of the burdens our President bears, more aware of his unique access to information, and more unwilling to add fuel to the fires of dissension within my party and country. But I believe that the President's friends and supporters today can best serve him as well as the country

by speaking out: No by offering oversimplified solutions or personal criticism; not by questioning anyone's motives or credibility; not by reflecting on the skill and courage of our fighting forces; but by helping to seek before it is too late a reasonable, feasible course in Vietnam that offers some hope of achieving an early peaceful settlement—a course with costs and risks more proportionate to America's interests than this present avenue of expanding escalation and slaughter.

"Your government should understand," a Russian diplomat said to me as we lunched last August in Moscow, "that we are obligated to do for the North Vietnamese whatever they ask us to do. If they ask us to send bombers, we will send bombers. If they ask us to send men, we will send men." This was not delivered as a threat nor was it surprisingly new. But it helped point up for me the urgency of our stopping World War III now before it starts.

I realize that it is difficult for a great power to alter its course—but the Soviet Union pulled its missiles out of Cuba (and received world praise for doing so). I realize that it is difficult for our proud nation to acknowledge error instead of compounding it—but we did exactly that at the Bay of Pigs.

I do not say that we have wholly erred in Vietnam or that we should precipitously pull out our troops. Nor am I concerned here with many of the other disputes surrounding that war. The Senate will long debate the legal basis for our involvement, the alleged choices between Europe and Asia, and the effect of the war on our prestige, politics and priorities. Historians will long debate over how and why we got into Vietnam, who first breached the Geneva Agreement, whether it was originally a civil war, whether another President would have acted differently, whether Congress was consulted adequately, and whether the various past precedents cited—from Munich to Malaya—are meaningful. What concerns me now is not the past but the future.

What concerns me now is the prospect of an endless war in which the original issues (to say nothing of the Vietnamese people) will have long been forgotten, in which each gradation of American escalation will continue to be offset by more troops from the North and less help from the South. What concerns me is the prospect of a frustrated, aggravated, bitterly divided America, irritated at its increasing isolation from the world, unable to accept its inability to bring this upstart to heel, under growing pressure from a growing military establishment, consequently pouring in more men, bombing out more targets, and finally, in desperation, mining or blockading the Haiphong harbor or even invading the North by means of a permanent excursion across the demilitarized zone or an "Inchon-type" landing behind that front line. Then the entry of Chinese and possibly Russian "volunteers" will be a very real threat and possibly—even without our destroying North Vietnamese dikes, bombing MIG bases in China, or occupying Hanoi—an inevitable fact, as inevitable as the fact that their entry will lead eventually to a world-wide nuclear war. The tragic irony of it is that all this could happen without our advancing one single step nearer to our original goal of a terror-free South Vietnam.

We have already moved in recent years from limited counterinsurgency to all-out combat, from 15,000 advisers to 500,000 troops, from a war fought largely by South Vietnamese forces in the South to a war fought largely by American forces both North and South. Each stage of escalation has brought a response from the other side requiring more escalation, bringing a further response from the other side requiring still more escalation. When two doses of penicillin failed to help the patient, we gave him four, then six, now eight. It is high time we realized that penicillin is not what this patient needs, and more can only poison him.

To be sure, we cannot now lose the war. We have prevented the kind of large-scale North Vietnamese assaults that might have destroyed all hope for self-determination and survival in the South. There is no prospect now that the Communists can push our forces into the sea or impose their rule by conquest. Nor is there any prospect now that we will abandon to slaughter those South Vietnamese who stood up against a Communist military takeover. But this country has to face the unaccustomed and uncomfortable fact that, despite all the brilliance and valor of our fighting forces, their lives are being given for a war which—in terms of achieving our total objectives, political and moral as well as military, in all Asia as well as Vietnam—we are not “winning” in the traditional sense and cannot ever expect to “win.”

We are not “containing” the Red Chinese when we create a vacuum on their borders into which they will inexorably move unless we stay forever—when we increase North Vietnam's dependence on Chinese imports—or when we erode South Vietnam's institutions, traditions, economy, independence, and spirit.

We are not “winning the war for men's minds” among the South Vietnamese people, much less “pacifying” their country, when we level their villages, burn their crops, dominate and prolong their war, work primarily with the privileged few entrenched in both their military and government, and place half a million free-spending Americans into that tiny, impoverished, and now inflation-ridden country.

We are not demonstrating the futility of Communist “wars of liberation” to an army that soon returns to rule by night those areas from which we have temporarily driven it; nor are we deterring similar attacks in Thailand or elsewhere when we stretch our forces thin in Vietnam.

We are not “defending our national interest” when we endlessly divert more than two billion tax dollars a month away from our cities and schools and overseas friends for a war that much as we dislike the word, is producing at best only a stalemate.

I read all the predictions that victory is just around the escalation corner—but I heard those same predictions three and four and even five years ago. I read all the rosy statistics on how many Communists we have killed and captured and induced to defect—but still their number keeps growing. I read all the claims on our bombing successes in the North—but still the infiltration southward continues. I read all the statements that this is a joint effort with South Vietnam and others—but still we are doing more and more of the fighting and dying. And, finally, I read all the assurances that neither the Russians nor the Chinese will intervene—but at the same time Washington experts acknowledge that neither Peking nor Moscow could tolerate a North Vietnamese defeat.

General Westmoreland calls it a war of attrition. That it is—a war of attrition pitting American youth on the Asian mainland against an Asian foe which has not yet begun to tap its immense manpower reserves. Most of the time that foe is a Vietnamese guerrilla—a tough, cunning, elusive warrior who knows every hiding place in his native land, who is fed and shielded by the people we are supposedly there to defend, and who believes that someday his children will push out the Americans just as his elders pushed out the French.

Even if the old-fashioned kind of military victory in Vietnam were possible, it would require an indefinite occupation of that country by American troops under constant attack from such guerrillas. But such a victory is not possible against an enemy that keeps coming and fighting, as it has for twenty years and as it seemingly can for

twenty more, suffering heavy casualties but also inflicting them, hiding in the hills or brush, disappearing literally underground or by mingling with civilians, eluding our “search and destroy” missions and then returning, controlling or terrorizing virtually as many villages and roads, and assassinating or kidnaping virtually as many South Vietnamese local leaders, as it did before we arrived.

If countering this kind of guerrilla warfare requires, as the Pentagon has said, that our forces outnumber theirs by a lopsided ratio of 3 or 4 or even 10 to 1—and if, in addition, we must take over the immense and unfamiliar task of nonmilitary “pacification,” and do it without a nonpartisan civil service, without the goodwill of the people, without effective land distribution or respect for the South Vietnamese troops or cooperation from their intellectuals—then where do we obtain the manpower to offset the gradual tapping of Communist reserves? Not from our Asian and Pacific allies who have, on the whole, shown very little enthusiasm for propping up with their own forces what we have warned could be the first of the falling dominoes. Nor are there unlimited reserves still available to the South Vietnamese army, whose brave but poorly paid and demoralized soldiers are still too often led by corrupt and politically controlled officers more imitative of the Vietcong in brutally interrogating civilians and prisoners than in risking their own comfort in combat.

It is small wonder, then, that one American military leader has said that 2,000,000 U.S. troops will be required to root out the terrorists in the South, village by village. But if the other side keeps growing through recruitment and reinfiltration, despite escalated bombings and electronic barriers, even 2,000,000 may not be enough. And what would an American commitment of 2,000,000 men do to our force levels at home and around the world? What, finally, would it do to the South Vietnamese themselves?

“In the final analysis,” said President Kennedy in the fall of 1963, “it is their war. They are the ones who have to win it or lose it . . . the people of Vietnam.” But as we pour in more troops, destroying in the process their economic stability more effectively than the Communists have ever done, it has become our war. We have the largest fighting force. We suffer the largest fatalities. The South Vietnamese people, weary after twenty years of warriors and foreigners, divided by rival sects and provincial politics, seem simultaneously to resent and prefer our taking over their battle. Many of the young leaders and scholars upon whom the country's liberation must ultimately depend are reported openly cynical and skeptical of the American presence. The present military government with which we are identified—now popularly elected but still far from universally accepted—seems incapable of understanding any real opposition or dissent, and incapable of undertaking any serious land reforms or serious peace negotiations.

[From Newsweek, Nov. 20, 1967]

AMERICA IN ASIA

(By Walter Lippmann)

The war would be over sooner, said the President recently, if the country would unite behind him. He meant that our opponents would stop fighting if they lost hope that in 1968 Lyndon Johnson would be ousted and some sort of dove elected.

I find it hard to believe that our opponents have staked everything on an American Presidential election. No doubt they are encouraged by the polls and by the dissenters.

The issue which keeps the Vietnamese fighting with Soviet and Chinese support is a conviction that we intend to hold and consolidate our massive military lodgment

in Southeast Asia. The Vietnamese will fight on, in the open or by terrorism, as long as they believe that American military power will remain in Indochina. Moreover, if Hanoi were in a state of collapse, China and Russia singly or combined would probably intervene. For the fundamental issue in the war is whether a non-Asian power, formerly France and now the United States, shall hold a military base on the Asian continent.

To be sure there is the pledge made in Manila that, once our aims have been achieved, we shall withdraw. But this is not generally believed. The Asians believe that we mean to stay. They argue that our aim can never be achieved, not even if Ho Chi Minh surrendered. Our aims are impossible to achieve without our permanent military presence. So they believe that we intend to remain in South Vietnam.

PROBLEM AND PROPOSAL

For the time will never come when there is a government in Saigon which is anti-Communist, anti-Chinese, pro-American, and yet not dependent on the presence of American military forces. Because the official Johnson war objectives would be lost if we withdrew, the Johnson declarations about withdrawal are not generally believed.

The conclusion I draw from all this is that until and unless we deal with the question of whether or not we are going to stay in Vietnam, and, if not, how, when and where we are prepared to pull back our military power, we are avoiding the real problem. The real problem will not be solved by bombing even if we flatten Hanoi and Haiphong. The problem cannot be solved by ceasing to bomb unless it becomes clear that we are also prepared to negotiate about the terms and conditions of a great military disengagement from the continent.

If we decide to pull back our military forces from Indochina, the obvious place to stand in the South Pacific is on the continent of Australia. The defense of Australia is a commitment about which there can be no dispute among Americans. Australia is moreover a secure and invulnerable base against any sort of aggression, short of nuclear war with ballistic missiles. As to that the defense of Australia against a nuclear attack is the same as the defense of the United States. For we must and almost certainly would treat an attack on Australia as if it were an attack on Ohio.

This proposal raises two questions about which all of us will wish to clarify our minds. The first is the question of prestige. To negotiate a pullback of our power is to acknowledge that we have not won a war. How will such an admission affect our reputation and our influence? The answer is that we shall have to pay some price for the mistake of involving ourselves in a war for ends which cannot be achieved by the means which we are willing and able to use.

RESPECT AND GOODWILL

This will no doubt affect Lyndon Johnson's reputation. But I do not think it will have a lasting effect on the reputation of America. For an admission that the American land war in Asia must be terminated without victory will not necessarily diminish for long and may indeed enhance the respect and goodwill which the world has for the American nation. In any event, nothing unpleasant can be avoided by compounding the mistake instead of correcting it.

The other question which a pullback to Australia raises is whether we can then play our necessary part in the affairs of the Pacific and of Asia.

In my view Vietnam is a particularly insecure place in which to base our power in the Pacific region. The Asian mainland can never be secure for America. There are too many Asians. Vietnam is not in fact a good forward base but a hostage to the unre-

dictable turmoil of the emerging Asian peoples.

Our real foothold on the Asian continent should be the friendship and mutual interest of the Asian powers, most particularly the friendship of Japan and India and Indonesia and the Philippines, and eventually of China. This would mean, let us be quite clear about it, that the future and the destiny of the Asian continent would be, as it should be, determined by the Asians themselves. Once we have conformed our policy to this principle, we shall be living in the modern world.

[From Newsweek, Oct. 23, 1967]

THE TAX REVOLT

(By Walter Lippmann)

The revolt against the surtax proposal made by the Administration in order to control inflation by reducing demand marks the end of one chapter in the history of the war.

Two years ago, when the President decided to commit the country to the battlefield in Vietnam, he realized, of course, that such a war would not be popular. At most it would be accepted. He took as the cardinal rule of his conduct of the war a determination to make it as painless and as invisible as possible to the mass of the nation. He assured the poor and their friends the reformers that the country was rich enough to wage war and also to build "The Great Society" at the same time. So he avoided levying new taxes to pay for the war. He escalated the military effort gradually and drew upon stockpiles. He avoided a mobilization of the reserves. For that would have disturbed and angered many influential young men and their families. He allowed the draft to be administered so that with rare exceptions the more gifted and the more well-to-do escaped military service, or at least found safe havens within it. And he allowed his Administration to set an example in which it was not fashionable or obligatory, as it has been in every other war, to go on active military service. As a result, the war, while it has never been popular, has been kept sufficiently remote and impersonal for most Americans families. They have allowed the Administration to conduct it as best it could by wheeling and dealing with the Chiefs of Staff, the Pentagon, the hawks and the doves in Congress.

SHATTERED ILLUSION

The painless, nonsacrificial phase of the war came to an end a few months ago. The Negro insurrection in the cities shattered the illusion that the country could fight a big war in Asia and construct a good society at the same time. Then, as the costs of the war rose, it became clear that there would be inflation, a credit stringency and economic disorder unless the Americans at home were prepared to begin to make sacrifices.

They could pay more Federal taxes and thus have less money to spend for themselves. Or they could compel the Federal government to spend less—to spend less on assistance for the poor, on assistance to foreigners in the underdeveloped nations, on education, on the race to the moon, on supersonic airplanes, and on the lavish acquisitions of the war itself.

Congress, which certainly represents a great mass of vocal opinion, is insisting that before the taxpayers are asked for anything more, the Federal expenditures for the Great Society and for foreign aid should be cut to the bone. This means in fact that the sacrifices required by the war shall fall first upon those who have the least political influence, upon the poor at home and abroad. It is not a noble stance. But it has always been naive and deceptive to think that noble sentiments would be evoked in this kind of war conducted in this kind of way.

CONFLICTING TASKS

The President has led the country into a dilemma where it must choose between the continuing enlargement of the war and serious measures to deal with the vast and seething and urgent internal problems of the country. Even if money could be made available for both, which as a practical matter of politics under a popular government is impossible, there is not enough moral energy, will and purpose and attention, in the leadership of the nation to carry out the two conflicting tasks at home and abroad.

Thus it has in fact happened that the war has displaced the internal needs of the country. Having been neglected, our troubles have started to fester. Perhaps the most significant consequences is that because the war was sold to the people as a painless war, in its early stages as an exercise in professional war making, as quite compatible with our highest aspirations for a good society, the showdown and the reckoning which have now taken place are producing an increasingly virulent popular dissent. The polls are a mere indication and do not describe the quality and depth of the feeling of having been misled and having been had. In our times there has been no parallel in any other war in respect to any other President.

It is a bad and dangerous situation when a great power in this anarchic world finds itself without leadership which it fully trusts and in which it has confidence.

[From Newsweek, Oct. 9, 1967]

THE AMERICAN PROMISE

(By Walter Lippmann)

After a summer in Europe, when for the most part I sat back and watched, I am impressed with how much Americans and Europeans are involved in the same predicament. For us all the world is disorderly and dangerous, ungoverned and apparently ungovernable. Everywhere there is great anxiety and bewilderment. This general concern about the threat of atomic war, of revolution and counter-revolution is suffused by almost everybody's preoccupation with the difficult business of living in the modern age.

The governments of the more advanced countries, those which have outgrown the first illusions of liberation and independence, are all of them unpopular governments. For they are failing to cope with disorders abroad and with trouble at home. In the more-developed countries, Communist as well as non-Communist, there are no great sustaining, unifying and inspiring beliefs, no schemes of salvation and no ardent promises of better things to come.

This dusty outlook marks, I believe, the historic fact that we are living through the closing chapters of the established and traditional way of life. We are in the early beginnings of a struggle, which will probably last for generations, to remake our civilization. It is not a good time for politicians. It is a time for prophets and leaders and explorers and inventors and pioneers, and for those who are willing to plant trees for their children to sit under.

The international order which evolved since the Middle Ages, the order imposed and managed by the Western great powers, has been shattered. There are some who think we can return to that old order, with the United States replacing the Great Britain of the nineteenth century. But all who think this, President Johnson and Secretary Rusk and Mr. Nixon for example, merely compound the confusion and anarchy of the international order. It is a naive illusion that 1967 is 1939, that Southeast Asia is Western Europe, that Mao Tse-tung is Hitler and that Lyndon Johnson is Churchill. It is not producing a firm and free international order but the largest quagmire in which this country has ever floundered.

UNPOPULARITY

The best that can be said for President Johnson is that the other leaders of great powers are also in trouble. The Gallup polls are bad reading in Paris, London, Moscow, New Delhi and Peking. This general unpopularity of the governments of great powers throws light on the problem. But it does not explain away what has happened in Washington. More is expected and more is demanded of the President of the United States than from any other head of government. For the United States is incomparably the most powerful country in the world. Moreover the original purpose of America has created hopes and expectations in the hearts of men everywhere. The original vocation and destiny of the American people has been, not that they should rule the world, but, that they should provide an example of how men can live in freedom.

The dislike and distrust of Johnson's America is harsh. It stems in the last analysis, I believe, from a feeling of having been let down. There is a growing belief that Johnson's America is no longer the historic America, that it is a bastard empire which relies on superior force to achieve its purposes, and is no longer providing an example of the wisdom and humanity of a free society. There is, to be sure, envy, fear, rivalry in the worldwide anti-Johnsonism. But the inner core of this sentiment is a feeling of betrayal and abandonment. It is a feeling that the American promise has been betrayed and abandoned.

INEFFECTIVENESS

This feeling is accentuated by the spectacular ineffectiveness of President Johnson's resort to military force. After years of struggle the greatest military power on earth finds itself unable to bend to its will a small and backward people. Our hawks ascribe this lack of military success to the official strategy of wounding but not killing the adversary. The performance in Vietnam would be a military scandal were it not a demonstration, which is of enormous historic significance, that the firepower of modern weaponry can annihilate an adversary or neutralize him but it cannot bend him to its will.

As against the military muddle in Vietnam there is, by way of contrast, the tremendous example of the American way of life. An irresistible tide of Americanization is flooding the world with our airplanes and computers and supermarkets, our household appliances, with ready-made clothing, with mechanical entertainment, carrying along with it what is convenient and pleasant in our lives and also much of our vulgarity.

The fact of our example is greater than the force of our arms. If only we realized this, if only we were governed by men who realized that the age of Roosevelt and Churchill is over, we might begin to pull ourselves out of the quagmire.

[From Newsweek, May 23, 1966]

THE PAINLESS WAR

(By Walter Lippmann)

Once again the calculations about the war in Vietnam have proved to be wrong, and once again, therefore, the President finds himself having to make very hard decisions. How much and in what way shall he agree to enlarge and extend the war? Although the American troops have won a number of local battles, only those who are completely drugged by official briefings avoid recognizing that the quarter of a million troops already in Vietnam are unable to win the war and to compel the adversary to negotiate. The current calculation is that the present quarter of a million soldiers will have to be almost doubled and that the bombing will have to be increased greatly. There is little assurance and indeed little hope that even

this will be decisive, and there is no expectation that the coming escalation will bring us any nearer to a solution.

Nevertheless, the new phase will mark a change in the character of the war. We have come to the end of the kind of war which President Johnson has hoped would yield a success in Indochina without demanding unpopular sacrifices from the American people. As late as January of this year, the President believed he could succeed by waging a very limited war: a war with few casualties, a war that required no calling up of the reserves, no drastic cutback of civilian programs, no increase of taxes and no inflation of prices.

For the American people as a whole, the war was to be so painless that business and pleasure could go on as usual.

HIDDEN COSTS

It is now becoming clear that the war has been made to seem painless because its true costs have been concealed. In the military buildup the policy has been to deploy in Vietnam mainly professional soldiers and to replenish them by drawing trained men from all the other armed forces which are in Europe and around the world. This policy of cannibalizing the military establishment has made it possible to avoid calling up the reserves of trained men. It has also meant that the casualties and other miseries of the war have fallen upon professional soldiers who are most prepared to accept them, and upon young and inarticulate draftees.

The same device has softened the economic impact of the war. The reason why the Administration has been able to escalate the war without greatly increasing defense spending, is that in very large measure it has been drawing on accumulated stocks. But now, as it becomes necessary to replenish the stocks, the real economic costs will have to be translated into expenditures.

The official, and the essentially misleading, Administration argument has been that defense expenditures, despite the war, are not much higher than last year and are in fact lower than in several previous years—7.7 per cent of the gross national product this year as compared with 7.5 per cent in the first half of 1965.

Mr. Walter Heller, the former chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, said, in a notable speech on May 2 that these figures "mask the important economic fact that the rate of spending today is some \$5 billion above its rate just ten months ago. Allowing for various multiplier effects, this means that the added impact of Vietnam since last summer accounts for something over \$15 billion of the current demand in the U.S. economy."

DWINDLING INVENTORIES

In the April issue of *Fortune* magazine there appears a cost analysis of the Vietnamese war made by a group of unofficial economists: "In the early phases of any war, the Defense Department can hold down expenditures by drawing upon existing forces and supplies, just as a business firm can temporarily reduce cash outlays by letting inventories dwindle . . . the war reserve of 'combat consumables' has been drawn down . . . the war has required only moderate incremental expenditures . . . but as deliveries roll in and the armed forces expand, expenditures will begin to catch up with the war's far from moderate costs . . . Secretary McNamara can cut somewhat further than he already has into programs not directly connected with the war. But not very far; his options for deferring expenditures in fiscal 1967 have been pretty well used up."

We have come within sight of what can be accomplished by cannibalizing the existing forces for the buildup in Vietnam, of what can be done by drawing on existing military stocks and manpower.

Thus, we are at the end of the painless war. The hope of January, that the war could be won without increasing sacrifices, has been dashed on the hard realities.

For the President has committed us to a war in Asia for an unattainable objective—for the creation, in a land torn by revolution, on a continent seething with revolution, of a secure, free, pro-American government which is accepted and supported by the people.

[From the Washington (D.C.) Post,
May 23, 1967]

A COLLISION COURSE

(By Walter Lippmann)

The President denies that he has put us on a collision course with Red China and the Soviet Union. In this he is relying upon his ability to guess correctly how far he can go in North Vietnam without bringing on Chinese intervention. He feels he is able to judge just what targets he can hit before the big Communist powers decide to hit back. This is a kind of Russian roulette. The President believes that he can discriminate between those targets which he can hit with safety and those which he cannot hit with safety.

This is a deadly guessing game. Yet it has become the center of the Johnson strategy. It would be less giddy and nerve-wracking if it were not for the fact that it was played once before, and played, moreover, by some of the same men who are playing it now. This was in the Korean War. Some of the President's principal advisers are the same men who guessed wrong in the Korean War. They could not then believe that if General MacArthur carried the war into North Korea and to the Yalu River that the Chinese would intervene. The Indian Ambassador in Washington passed along a message from the Indian Ambassador in Peking warning the United States Government that a movement to the Yalu would set off Chinese intervention. The Indian Ambassador's name was Panikar, and he was one of the ablest diplomats in the Service. But the State Department dismissed his warning, and the ever witty bureaucrats called him "Panicky Panikar." Not long after that the United States army suffered one of its worst military disasters.

It does not, of course, follow that the Korean experience will be repeated. But the fact of the matter is that it may be repeated. This is because President Johnson has allowed the issue of the Vietnam war to become a test of whether the United States is to continue to be a military power on the Asian mainland. The President is acting through a puppet regime in Saigon supported by troops and enormous sea and air power.

The most important recent development from the other side of the struggle has been the warning that the two Communist powers are resolved not to let us win the kind of military victory which President Johnson's new war aims call for. No one can pretend to know at just what point in the escalation the Chinese and the Soviet Union will in fact intervene. But what we do know is that President Johnson has war aims in Asia that cannot be achieved against the offensive power of China and of Russia. That is why he is on a collision course.

[From the Washington (D.C.) Post,
Apr. 18, 1967]

THE ESCALATING WAR

(By Walter Lippmann)

Returning from what must have been a most welcome change at Punta del Este, the President is back again with Vietnam.

It can be argued that here on the home front, he has made some gains. He has obtained the approval of Sen. Brooke and a certain amount of approval from Gov. Romney. As of now the Republican Party will not run in 1968 as an anti-war party. And if Mr. Nixon prevails, the Republicans will outbid the Democrats in their support of Lyndon Johnson. The only fly in the ointment is that no matter what the Republican politicians

say about the war, many voters will turn to the Republican Party, as they did in 1952, because there is no other alternative to a Democratic President who has proved that he cannot make peace. There are enough reservations and qualifications in Gov. Romney's speech to provide the Republican candidate with all the openings he would need if he really intended to end the war by negotiation.

There are many reasons for believing that the situation in Southeast Asia has worsened. First and foremost, as we now know with almost complete certainty, the Soviets and the Chinese have worked out an arrangement to facilitate the supplying of North Vietnam across Chinese territory. This supply line cannot be interrupted except at a direct risk of world war.

Two or three months ago such an arrangement would have seemed unlikely. For the Sino-Soviet quarrel was very bitter, and Hanoi gave signs of being much weakened and alarmed. There appeared to have been a shift in the balance of power which was inducing Hanoi to offer a peace conference in return of a cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam. It is now clear that Hanoi's attitude has hardened and sharpened, and the probable reason for this is that Ho Chi Minh can now count on reinforcements of food and material and, if necessary, manpower from the whole Communist world.

A measure of how the situation has worsened can be found in some remarks made by Gen. Westmoreland last week. He said that he knew of no better way to win the war than to "go on bleeding" our adversary. The spectacle of an American commander committed by his government to a war of attrition on the Asian mainland, committed to spending American lives in some exchange ratio against Asian lives, is a startling illustration of what has happened to American military and diplomatic leadership in this war. Imagine Gen. MacArthur, Gen. Eisenhower, Gen. Ridgway, Gen. Bradley, imagine any of the military leaders and thinkers in our history being placed in a position where the defense of freedom on the globe depended on matching American lives against the manpower of Asia!

The situation has worsened also in South Vietnam. There are many indications that Marshal Ky and his junta expect to "legitimize" their dictatorship in the elections being held in the unoccupied parts of South Vietnam. Having done this, they appear to be determined to use their new political power to prevent serious negotiations either with the Vietcong or with Hanoi. Mr. Johnson is riding a tiger and he will find it difficult to dismount.

As there is the worsened prospect of negotiations among the Vietnamese, as the channels have been opened for indefinite escalation from the Communist side, the outlook is that the scale of the war in men, money, and casualties will expand indefinitely. Mr. Nixon, Sen. Brooke, even Gov. Romney, are quite mistaken if they think that the resistance of the Communists is being fed by the American dissenters. No doubt they like to hear the American dissent and they find it encouraging. What is feeding the war is the large industrial potential of the Soviet bloc, the inexhaustible reserves of Asian manpower, and the determination not to let the United States install itself on the mainland of Asia.

It is no contribution to this grim situation to pretend that the only alternatives open to us are either to scuttle and run or to escalate to the brink of total war. It is not true that there are no other alternatives and that President Johnson, because he appears to be between two extreme positions, is therefore following the only course that is open to us.

There are other courses than the present course which entails the occupation and pacification of all of South Vietnam by the Americans. They are all variants of a strategy

which would limit our commitment and reduce the objectives which our troops must achieve. The fatal objection to the adoption of a defensive and holding strategy, awaiting the time when general negotiations become possible, is that this limited strategy cannot be pictured as a triumphant victory. It cannot be painted up to look like something which is not. This is intolerable at the White House which is, so far, unwilling to accept the liquidation of an endless war if it is not made to seem like an heroic and victorious ending.

[From the Washington (D.C.) Post,
Jan. 17, 1967]

ALTERNATIVES

(By Walter Lippmann)

Addressing Congress last Tuesday the President appeared as a sad and compassionate man who, having taken his stand in Vietnam, was determined to persist, no matter what the cost. The picture is misleading. For it leaves out the fact that the President is confronted with great new decisions. Last Tuesday's picture implied that the military situation is stable. It is in fact very fluid.

The new decisions which have still to be made turn on the probability that our troops have prevented a military victory over the Saigon government by its northern and southern enemies. The hopeful observers among us argue that this success over the main forces of the enemy will be followed by the weakening of the Vietcong rebellion and the pacification of the whole of South Vietnam by South Vietnamese—as Ambassador Lodge has put it, by "the South Vietnam regular army, the regional forces, the popular forces, the South Vietnam police, police field forces."

Neither Gen. Westmoreland nor Ambassador Lodge takes the view that the South Vietnamese will pacify South Vietnam quickly. They are thinking of a long period of guerrilla warfare and terrorism and sabotage—up to ten years of it. Other competent observers, who take a grimmer view of the strength of the rebellion and of the weakness of the Saigon regime, believe that if in fact South Vietnam is to be pacified, the task will have to be performed by the United States.

If they are right, then the President is going to have to make new and tremendous decisions. He will not be able, as he implied in his address to Congress, just to grit his teeth and persist in what he is doing. He will have to decide whether to conquer and occupy the whole of South Vietnam—not merely to repel the military intruders from the North, but to suppress the rebellion in the South, and then to run the country until a new South Vietnamese society can be put together.

To commit ourselves to this task would be, however disagreeable the old words sound, to become an imperialist power on the Asian continent. Unhappily, the record of Lyndon Johnson since his election gives little reason for hoping that he will not take this path. Just as in 1965 he transformed the Eisenhower-Kennedy intervention to assist indigenous forces into an American war, so in 1967 he will, if he runs true to form, enlarge the scope and the objectives of the American forces. He will argue sadly that there is no alternative to doing this, that to honor his pledges and his promises he must do this, and to justify the sacrifices of the American dead. He will move towards the conquest and occupation and the clearing and the reconstruction of the whole territory of South Vietnam.

This, I believe, is the dread possibility before us. It includes, but it transcends, the much debated question of whether to attack Hanoi and Haiphong in order to "win" the war by knocking out North Vietnam. If the President enters upon the imperialist course, which is what he is being hard pressed to do, the war will widen and no one will see the limit.

Moreover, to conquer and occupy and pacify the whole of South Vietnam would require on a conservative estimate, a million American troops for an indefinite time. Disregarding what this would do to the American Nation here at home, it would mean the increasing isolation of the United States because we would be regarded as a threat to the peace of the world. It would mean also spreading disorder in the borderlands of China where the United States military and economic power is now dominant. For it is inconceivable that we shall not encounter a swelling resistance in all the continents if we advance towards a self-appointed imperial destiny in Asia.

Is there no alternative which is consistent with our interests and our honor? There is. The prospective nightmare I have been describing arises from the current military situation—even though our organized forces are successful, the Vietnamese rebellion continues. We are at a point where, though the big organized forces are stalemated, there is almost no progress in subduing the activity of the guerrillas. The alternative to the imperialist course is to stand fast and be ready to negotiate. Instead of conquering and occupying the whole country, we would make secure the positions we now hold, and would then encourage the Vietnamese to work out, or to fight out, their destiny.

This is, of course, the central principle of what is known as the Gavin-Ridgway strategy. A year has elapsed since Gen. Gavin testified. Time and experience have shown, I am convinced, that it is the only workable strategy. For one thing, there is no longer any doubt that it is a practicable strategy. For it is now generally accepted that the United States forces cannot be pushed out of their strongholds. Experience has shown, second, that the pacification of the whole country would be an enormous commitment to take, one which might well prove to be an impossible commitment. Third, the junta of northern generals around Gen. Ky, almost all of whom are veterans of the French army in its war against the Vietnamese people, are quite incapable of becoming leaders of the Vietnamese nation. These adventurers from the North cannot win the confidence of the people of the South. The only hope in the situation is to remain in our military positions and let the internal politics of Vietnam take their course.

This is not a policy of scuttle-and-run, it is not a policy of delayed surrender, it is not a policy of betrayal and dishonor, and I should like to see anyone show that it is not in the true interests of the United States.

[From the Saturday Evening Post, Nov. 13, 1967]

CHANGING VIEWS ON VIETNAM

It is a perilous thing to try to estimate what the American people think about anything at any given time, but there appears to be a definite change in popular feelings about the war in Vietnam. A year or two ago, anybody who opposed the war got a distinct feeling of loneliness, and the general view seemed to be that, regardless of whether the war was justified or not, we all had to fall in behind the leadership of the President. As recently as last winter, when this magazine criticized the bombing of North Vietnam, that issue of the *Post* was read aloud before a Senate committee and excoriated as an example of wrongheadedness.

In recent months the sounds in the Senate have been rather different, and the most notable denunciations of the war have come not from liberal Democrats but from moderate Republicans. There was mild-mannered Sen. Clifford Case blaming the President for a "highly irresponsible" escalation of the fighting. Sen. Thruston Morton, former G.O.P. chairman, went even further: "President Johnson was brainwashed. . . . He has been mistakenly committed to a military

solution in Vietnam for the past five years." Sen. John Sherman Cooper added: "There is little hope for negotiations and for a just settlement of the war in Vietnam until the United States takes this first step—the cessation of its bombing of North Vietnam."

Politicians do not speak in a vacuum. To a certain extent they reflect the opinions of the voters they represent, and those voters no longer seem content to follow the President's course. According to a recent Gallup poll—and a Harris poll showed similar results—57 percent of the people questioned disapproved of the President's handling of the war, compared to only 28 percent who approved. This was the highest rate of disapproval ever recorded in the poll, and a phenomenal rate for any democratic society engaged in a major military conflict. Some of those who disapprove of President Johnson's policy are, of course, the "superhawks," who demand unlimited military force to "get it over with." But of those who disapproved, the "superhawks" accounted for only 37 percent, while 48 percent thought the United States ought to scale down the fighting.

There are perfectly good reasons for the increasing disenchantment with this war. For one thing, the simple passage of time tends to sour the popular appetite for fighting. More American troops, more bombing, new plans for "pacification"—all these things were supposed to produce results, but the results are hard to find. On the contrary, the South Vietnamese army seems to fight less today than it did a year ago, while the Communists fight harder. Politically, too, our South Vietnamese military protégés have shown themselves unable to govern the country and unable to evolve toward democratic rule. And for Americans, the only consequence of escalation is that the price we must pay gets higher and higher. While major domestic problems go unattended, the President demands higher taxes to pay for the war. And from the battlefield, the bodies come home in ever-increasing numbers. The death toll so far this year is higher than during the previous five years combined, and the total casualty figure has already climbed to more than 100,000. In a few months, Vietnam will pass Korea as the fourth-bloodiest war in our history.

For the defense, Washington's tired warriors provide their tired arguments. Speaking on behalf of President Johnson, Republican Senate leader Everett Dirksen asked: "Have you heard the British demand their king and queen? . . . It don't sound good, and it don't look good. The President is not our ruler, but you do not demean him in the eyes of people abroad." And in an increasingly extravagant speech, Dirksen went on to declare: "Let me say that I was not made a senator to preside over the liquidation of the holy fabric of freedom." Somewhat less rhetorically, but no less passionately, Secretary of State Dean Rusk insisted that the war represented an honoring of "commitments." Though it has never been clear exactly who committed the United States to a major land war in Southeast Asia, or how, or why, or to whom the commitment was made, Secretary Rusk declared: "Let me say, as solemnly as I can, that those who would place in question the credibility of the pledged word of the United States under our mutual security treaties would subject this nation to mortal danger." As for stopping the bombing of North Vietnam, Rusk's answer was scornful: "Let's not be children."

Secretary Rusk is responsible only to President Johnson, of course, and President Johnson seems to be responsible to nobody. Back in the days when his critics were in the minority, the President used to flourish polls to show that the people loved him. Now that the polls show a majority opposed to him, the President talks mournfully about the need for noble leaders to carry out unpopular policies for the greater good of the nation. There have been times when this was

true. But there have also been times when leaders have made terrible mistakes and refused, through pride and stubbornness, to correct them. The war in Vietnam is Johnson's mistake, and, through the power of his office, he has made it a national mistake. More and more Americans have come to see this, and that is the message of the polls that the President now ignores.

[From the Saturday Evening Post]

AFFAIRS OF STATE

(By Stewart Alsop)

WASHINGTON.—“Put not your trust in princes,” the Bible warns. Presidents of the United States might do well to bear in mind a revised version of this admonition: “Put not your trust in generals.” For it seems to be a sound rule that almost all generals are almost always wrong about all wars.

Every one of our Presidents since World War II has received dubious advice from the generals. President Truman's military advisers at first told him that South Korea could be defended with American air and naval power. Many bloody infantry battles later, when American divisions were advancing toward the Yalu, General MacArthur pooh-poohed the President's fears that the Chinese Communists might intervene.

A majority of the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended to President Eisenhower the bombing of the Chinese mainland at the time of the offshore-islands crisis, and the bombing of the Viet Minh at the time of Dien Bien Phu. Eisenhower vetoed both proposals—wisely, in retrospect. But then, Eisenhower was a general himself, so he knew how wrong generals can be.

President Kennedy found out how wrong generals can be when the Joint Chiefs ruled in advance that the Bay of Pigs project was militarily sound and feasible. As for President Johnson, there is not much doubt that his military advisers have been wrong about the war in Vietnam.

President Johnson made two key decisions about Vietnam, both early in 1965. The first was to bomb North Vietnam, and the second was to intervene with American combat troops in South Vietnam. These decisions may have been the right decisions—that is for history to tell. But there cannot be any serious doubt any longer that the military assumptions on which they were based were wrong. To prove that these assumptions were wrong, it is really only necessary to ask a couple of questions.

The bombing of North Vietnam has been heavier than the bombing of Nazi Germany. Yet there has not been the slightest hint from the North of any intention to negotiate seriously, and the rate of infiltration from the North has gone sharply up since 1965. Question One: Were these the results of the bombing that the President's military advisers expected and predicted to the President in 1965?

There are now more than 460,000 American troops in Vietnam, and there will soon be more than half a million. By “reasoning together” with General Westmoreland and the Joint Chiefs, President Johnson has got them to agree to this level—for public consumption. But it is no secret that Westmoreland and the Chiefs really want 600,000 U.S. troops in Vietnam, and eventually as many as 750,000. Yet despite the commitment of a very big U.S. army to Vietnam, the war is very far indeed from being won, and in some areas the Viet Cong is stronger than ever. Question Two: Were these the results of the troop commitment that the President's military advisers expected and predicted to the President in 1965?

The questions answer themselves. All military predictions are of course carefully hedged, but the plain fact is that the President's military advisers expected far quicker and more decisive results from the bombing

of the North and the commitment of American troops in the South.

It is no new thing under the sun for the generals to be wrong. In 431 B.C., old King Archidamus of Sparta counseled against making war on Athens, warning that the war would be “bequeathed to the next generation.” But the Spartan generals, confident of speedy victory attacked anyway. The war lasted for 27 years.

Skip the intervening millennia, rife with examples of the wrongness of generals, and consider a few examples from our own century:

ITEM: In the First World War the generals on both sides were consistently wrong. For example, the German General Staff confidently predicted that the war would be over in four months, and with the exception of Kitchener and Joffre, the British and French generals also made their plans on the assumption that the war would be over in less than a year. The war, of course, lasted four long and blood-soaked years.

ITEM: After Hitler's blitz against France, the prevailing view of the American military, as conveyed to President Roosevelt, was that the British could not possibly hold out for more than a few months. When the Germans attacked Russia, the American intelligence estimate was that the German Army would go through Russia “like a knife through butter,” six weeks being the estimate of the time required to complete the conquest. In late summer, 1944, General Eisenhower's intelligence staff predicted the end of “organized resistance” by the Germans by “1 December 1944 . . . and it may even end sooner.” It ended many months and many thousands of casualties later.

Item: Before Pearl Harbor, the military estimates of what the Japanese could and would do were consistently wrong—literally dozens of bad guesses are recorded in Roberta Wohlstetter's book on Pearl Harbor.

The basic assumptions were that the Japanese wouldn't dare to attack the United States, and if they did they would be defeated in a few months. Four years later, in 1945, Gen. Douglas MacArthur was convinced that “the cost in blood in defeating Japan” would be so high that “the President should start putting pressure on the Russians” to get them into the war.

But this gloomy forecast was an exception. Generals usually think that wars can be won quickly, still another example being General MacArthur's famous “home by Christmas” statement in Korea in 1950.

Generals are sometimes right, of course—and civilians, especially journalists, can be even more spectacularly wrong about wars than generals. The trouble is that a civilian President doesn't expect his generals to be wrong about wars, any more than he would expect good lawyers to be wrong about the law. But the fog of war is even thicker than the fog that surrounds the law, and military professionalism doesn't dispel war's fog—it thickens it.

This is not because “the brass” is stupid or wrongheaded—most generals are exceptionally honorable and intelligent men. It is a matter of conditioning. A soldier is trained to be a “can-do man”—it does not come natural to him to say that he doesn't think a war can be won quickly or that the risks of intervening in some small country are too great. He is also trained to exude a certain authority and certitude, so that when all the generals, all exuding authority and certitude, all agree on a certain course, it is difficult for a civilian President to turn them down.

This is why it may be useful for future Presidents—and all the rest of us—to bear in mind that almost all generals are almost always wrong about all wars. Generals should be listened to with skeptical respect, but never with reverent credulity.

[From the Saturday Evening Post,
Jan. 28, 1967]

VIETNAM: WHOSE WAR?

(By Stuart Alsop)

SAIGON.—The young Buddhist leader from University had a big bush of black hair, and an air of quiet authority.

“Among the intellectuals in the city, like those in this room,” he said, “it is understood that the presence of the Americans is a necessary evil.” He waited calmly while his words were translated, and then continued: “But among the simple people, the peasant in the countryside, the Americans are of course hated and feared by ninety percent—by all those who do not work for them, or profit from them in some way.”

At this point an argument broke out in Vietnamese. There were seven other “student leaders” from Saigon University in the living room of the cultural attaché of the American embassy. All the boys were products of Vietnam's tiny ruling class. They had to be, for only the children of the ruling class have much chance of being admitted to Saigon University and thus exempted from military service. The parents of seven worked for the government, or had close connections with it. The eighth came from an old mandarin family.

The argument had started when a Catholic student leader objected that the Americans were not hated and feared by as many as 90 percent of “the simple people.” There was much discussion, and finally the young Buddhist conceded that it might be more accurate to say that the Americans were hated and feared by “more than half” of the simple people. Then he continued to speak, in the tone of one who lectures a backward student.

The Americans, he said, are of course responsible themselves for the danger of a Communist takeover. As everyone knew, the Americans had placed the dictator Ngo Dinh Diem in power when the French left. If the Americans had not interfered, South Vietnam would have developed into a stable, independent state. But the inevitable revolt against Diem's misrule left a vacuum, and the Americans, having installed Diem in the first place, had no choice but to fill the vacuum.

No one seemed inclined to dispute this version of history. A second boy complained that the Americans were too weak, that they had failed to use their power to give Vietnam the economic and social reforms that were needed. There was much nodding of heads. A third boy agreed, and added that the Americans also interfered too much in the internal affairs of Vietnam. As a result, most Vietnamese now regarded the Americans as colonialists, like the French. Again there was much nodding of heads, and no one seemed aware of any contradiction between what the second and third boys had said.

As the talk proceeded, one thing became abundantly clear. Not one of those eight young men—not even the Catholics—felt any sense of commitment to the war against the Communists in their own country. The war, in their eyes, was the business of the Americans.

How could the war be ended? This question stimulated another spirited argument in Vietnamese. A Buddhist boy had said that there ought to be direct negotiations with the National Liberation Front, and a couple of Catholics had protested that he ought not to say such a thing in front of Americans, but he insisted. Then another boy suggested mildly that the only way to end the war was for the Americans to go to war with Communist China. Yes, said another, that was true, and of course it was the only reason the Americans were in Vietnam—they were planning to attack China, but they had not yet found a pretext.

Was the election in September a meaningful event? It was a small but useful step in

the direction of democracy, said a Catholic student. It was a farce, said the Buddhist who wanted direct negotiations with the Communists. The returns were faked by the government, and he had refused to vote. Another Buddhist said that he had voted, "but only because otherwise I might have been sent to military school." Several heads nodded in sympathy.

As the polite good-byes were said, it struck me that there was something very sad about these young men, with their graceful hairless arms and their charming smiles. They are at the age of idealism and they have nothing to be idealistic about. They know too much about the Viet Cong to be pro-Communist. But they know too much about their own government and social system to find any inspiration or allegiance there. So they end up against everything—against, above all, the Americans who are fighting their war for them.

A few "student leaders" from Saigon University no more represent Vietnamese national opinion than the "student leaders" of Berkeley represent American opinion. On the other side of the ledger must be placed the "Popular Forces"—the undersized, under-armed, undertrained local boys who often defend their villages against the V.C. with remarkable bravery. Without them the war would long since have been lost.

And yet that talk in the attaché's living room seemed to me significant in one way. It helped to explain why South Vietnam has so dismally failed to produce what South Vietnam so desperately needs—a political leadership with a genuine national following.

To an extent very little understood in the United States, the Vietnamese ruling class is identified with the French colonial regime. The people who run the government and the army—the military, the *fonctionnaires*, the landowning and *bourgeois* families—come from a class created by French colonialism. All the generals in the ruling junta fought on the side of the French before Dienbienphu, and all but one (Premier Ky, who was too young) wear French decoration. The vast majority of province and district chiefs are also products of French colonialism.

This makes it easy for the Communists to picture all those who resist them as "puppets" of American "neo-colonialism." Far more than the British system, moreover, the French colonial system created a ruling class alienated from "the simple people"—i.e., those not similarly privileged. This phenomenon of alienation is visible in all the former French colonies. Indeed, it was visible in France itself during World War II, when the French ruling class remained until the last moment studiously aloof from the mass resistance to the Nazis. Inevitably, moreover, the Vietnamese ruling class has inherited all the more unlovable French characteristics—notably the tendency to blame all their troubles on anyone but themselves, and to resist all change not clearly to their personal advantage.

"It is their war," President Kennedy said before he died. "They are the ones who have to win it or lose it." The amiable young men in that apartment did not regard it as "their war" at all. The war will never be won by such as they. And the genuine national leadership which South Vietnam must have, if the war is ever to be won, will not come from the tiny, alienated, French-created ruling class which produced those sad young men.

[From the Washington (D.C.) Post,
Nov. 14, 1967]

VIETNAM AND DISSENT

Nobody would deny that President Johnson has been hard hit, and often unfairly hit, by the war critics, even allowing for the fact that Presidents are obliged to absorb a reasonable measure of dissidence. And no-

body can question his right to answer back in just about any way he sees fit. He can deride and dismiss dissent by declaring that Vietnam is "not a topic for cocktail parties, office arguments or debate from the comfort of distant armchairs." He is quite free to stand in among the airborne troopers, or the Marines, or the sailors on the Enterprise, assailing his critics, knowing that if they hit back at him they may seem to be hitting at our fighting men. As Commander in Chief, he can wave a sword, beat a drum, or launch a peace offer from the flight deck of a vessel for months has been launching air strikes over North Vietnam.

The question is not whether he has a right to do this, but whether he is right to do it; whether this advances his tactical objectives, in a narrow sense; whether, in a broader sense, it unites more than it disquiets and divides. On all counts, the answer is almost certainly that it does not.

On the tactical question, Mr. Johnson argues that dissent misleads our enemies, causes them to miscalculate our resolve, and thus prolongs the war with all its human and material costs. Leaving aside the propriety of such a charge, the mere making of it is certain to inflame dissenters, especially when it is made from the political sanctuary of a military camp or a carrier flight deck. The result seems likely to be only angrier cries from the critics, and this, by the Administration's logic means more, not less, miscalculation in Hanoi. This would seem to call, by the same logic, for still more flag-waving and beating of the drums, which can only play directly into the hands of those elements from whom the President, by the testimony of some of his advisers, has most to fear; those who would abandon a limited Vietnam effort, and "fight to win."

The Veterans Day oratory gave us a vivid sample of this school of thought, from a possible Republican candidate, Governor Reagan, who plainly has a better feel for at least one segment of American sentiment on Vietnam than he does for the complexities of Vietnam itself. "Isn't it time that we either win this war or tell the American people why we can't," he cried.

A sound strategy for the President might be to tell us, in more straightforward terms, just why we can't "win this war" in conventional terms, but how we might well accomplish a more limited mission all the same, and to explain more candidly just what this might entail in terms of time and lives and material cost.

At this stage, what's needed is not so much exhortation, as education. We do not need to be told our debt to our fighting men, both those who have fallen and those in the field. What is needed is more plain talk about the real nature of their sacrifices, of the limited methods they must use, of their limited mission, of just how long it could drag on.

It is too late for the President to expect silence as the necessary ingredient of his strategy. That he now needs a minimum of dissent and all the cooperation he can get is obvious. He is not likely to get it by denigrating or disdaining those whose questions are relevant and whose anguish is real. By that approach he can only hope to generate more—and more inflammatory—dissent.

[From the New York Times, Oct. 13, 1967]
(By Henry Raymond)

Life magazine, in a shift in editorial policy, will call next week for a pause in the bombing of North Vietnam to create better conditions for a new peace initiative and improve national and international confidence in the Johnson Administration's policy.

The Life editorial asks that, unlike the six previous pauses, a new one should be accompanied by no publicly announced "condi-

tions" that could carry "the whiff of an ultimatum."

While the editorial praises President Johnson for having shown "a remarkable blend of resolution and restraint" in his conduct of the war, it argues that in articulating Vietnam policy "the President and his administration have become more and more glaringly unsuccessful."

The editorial, to appear in the issue dated Oct. 30 which reaches the newsstands next Monday, will mark the first time that the magazine has explicitly departed from its previous support of the Johnson Administrations' Southeast Asian policies.

The shift was regarded by executives of Time, Inc., the publishers of Life, as the most important editorial position since the magazine endorsed Mr. Johnson for President in 1964. Up to then Life had backed only Republican national tickets.

[From Life, Oct. 20, 1967]

THE CASE FOR BOMBING PAUSE—No. 7

Six times in 32 months of bombing North Vietnam, the U.S. has held its fire. Three times it was for a brief holiday respite. The three other bombing pauses were ordered to allow Hanoi to signal a willingness to talk peace. No clear signal came. Then, three weeks ago, President Johnson announced the U.S.'s willingness "to stop all aerial and naval bombardment of North Vietnam when this will lead promptly to productive discussion." Hanoi came back with its standard reply: the U.S. must stop bombing "unconditionally," and North Vietnam will promise nothing in return.

Notwithstanding, we believe it would be worthwhile for the U.S. to take the initiative in another bombing pause. We think the U.S. should declare a respite in the attack against the areas north of the battle zones, confining bombing to the Ho Chi Minh Trail complex in Laos and to the southern provinces of North Vietnam, the immediate rear of the enemy forces pressing against the DMZ. There should be no publicly announced "conditions" that carry the whiff of an ultimatum. But this should not be a commitment to stop the bombing indefinitely. In taking this diplomatic and political initiative, the U.S. administration would have clearly in mind the kind of North Vietnamese response we would consider constructive, and how long we were willing to wait for it.

In advocating a bombing pause, with no advance promise of any reciprocal move by North Vietnam, we must acknowledge that almost all U.S. military opinion opposes such a course. The U.S. would be reducing pressure on the enemy, and that is not ordinarily the way to win a war. This, of course, is not an ordinary war. U.S. bombing is in a sense a reprisal against the North for the destruction and terrorism the Vietcong work in South Vietnam. Bombing damage and strain is an important price the North is forced to pay for continuing its support of Communist aggression in the South. The more direct military benefit for the U.S. and our allies is, of course, the interference with the flow of men and matériel from the North. There is much argument as to exactly how effective the bombing is, but in stopping most of it, we would unquestionably be giving up a weapon of some value.

Life believes, however, that the benefits of a bombing pause at this time outweigh the short-term military cost:

There is a remote possibility that a pause now could be the first step toward an acceptable diplomatic settlement of the war.

There is a strong probability that a bombing pause would improve the posture of the U.S. in Vietnam, in the eyes of many other nations and indeed of many Americans, and thus ultimately improve our chances of achieving our purposes in Vietnam.

As to the possibility of a pause leading to meaningful negotiations, Secretary Rusk tirelessly points out, "I have yet to hear anyone tell us that if we did stop the bombing they could definitely deliver Hanoi to the conference table. I have asked a number of governments, 'All right, if we stop the bombing, what can you deliver?' I get no response."

Hanoi itself has denounced past bombing pauses as U.S. "hoaxes." There is a danger that they would take a new bombing pause as a sign that the U.S. is caving in. There is considerable precedent in Communist diplomacy for raising your terms when the other side offers any concession.

Yet there do come times in wars when belligerents change policies and positions, sometimes shortly after swearing they never would. The fact that Hanoi will not promise anything in advance, in return for a bombing pause that hasn't happened yet, does not necessarily foreshadow their actual reaction to a pause that had gone on, say, for several weeks. Such a pause could stir up hopes all over the world, including the East European branches of Communism, and could put considerable diplomatic pressure on Hanoi. Probably Hanoi would say No again, to everybody—Canada, India, Denmark, U Thant, etc. But it is worth finding out.

The more weighty reason for a bombing pause is to recapture support for the U.S. presence and commitment in Vietnam. The bombing has isolated the U.S. from most of its friends and allies throughout the world (there are a few stout exceptions in Asia), and in this country the bombing is the focus and catalyst of most of the opposition to the war. There is the "bully" image—the most powerful nation on earth pouring World War II-scale bomb loads onto a primitive little country. The U.S. has never been bombed; countries that have been tend to identify with the targets rather than with the bomber crews.

The fear that the bombing might bring China into the war, even bring on nuclear war, naturally increases as the U.S. goes after North Vietnamese targets which are only 60 seconds' jet-time from the China border. It may be foolish of so many Japanese, Indians, Indonesians, etc., to worry about this. But they do.

In the U.N., over 30 non-Communist nations, among them several of our NATO allies, have now advocated stopping the bombing (with many variations of formula as to "conditions" or no-conditions). Perhaps the most thoughtful proposal was the Canadian suggestion of a bombing halt followed by restoration of the DMZ's neutralized status under international inspection. In later phases of the plan would come freezing of military "capabilities" throughout Vietnam and an eventual cease-fire.

Naively or not, many millions of ordinary citizens, and not a few ambassadors, foreign ministers and U.S. senators, think a bombing halt could lead to peace in Vietnam, and they are increasingly critical of the U.S. for not trying it again. If we did try it for a reasonable time, accompanied it with an energetic diplomatic probing, and then nothing came of it, the air would have been cleared. Support for a resumption of bombing, even for an escalation, would be stronger than for our present policy. But much would depend on what the Administration said about the new policy, and how it said it, not just to Hanoi but to the U.S. and the world.

Life believes that the U.S. is in Vietnam for honorable and sensible reasons. What the U.S. has undertaken there is obviously harder, longer, more complicated than the U.S. leadership foresaw. And in 1967, we are having another hard, complicated year out there. There is the encouraging fact of the Vietnamese elections, small blemishes and all; there is straight military progress; but there is the maddeningly slow work of translating these

advances into specification at the "rice-roots level." We are trying to defend not a fully born nation but a situation and a people from which an independent nation might emerge. We are also trying to maintain a highly important—but in the last analysis not absolutely imperative—strategic interest of the U.S. and the free world. This is a tough combination to ask young Americans to die for.

Home-front support for the war is eroding. One may discount some maneuvering among U.S. politicians as 1968 politics, but even the most patently partisan of these noises represents somebody's rather professional judgment of how the voters are feeling.

Life has more than once expressed its admiration for the Johnson administration's coolness and courage in its Vietnam policy. In action the President himself has shown a remarkable blend of resolution and restraint. But in articulation of the policy—which in the end is inseparable from policy itself—the President and his administration have become more and more glaringly unsuccessful.

The President is said to be subdued these days, inclined to "hunker down" and let the Vietnam criticism beat over him. Dean Rusk is infinitely patient and courteous in explaining to critics and questioners "Your quarrel is really with Hanoi." A confusing circumstance is that the other most influential Cabinet officer, Robert McNamara, clearly is less convinced of the efficacy of bombing the North than are the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or Rusk. Nothing inspiring or eloquent and not much that is simply informative is being said from Washington.

We believe the Administration very soon must act—and speak—to recapture domestic political and intellectual respect for its Vietnam policy and to rally more diplomatic and moral support abroad. We believe the initiation of a bombing pause is a gesture of forbearance and conciliation which might accomplish that. America has the strength to do it.

[From the Washington Post, Sept. 3, 1967]
GENERALS AND REPORTERS SPLIT OVER VIETNAM: THE WAR JUST DOESN'T ADD UP

(By Richard Harwood)

(NOTE.—Staff writer Harwood has just returned to this country after four months covering the war in Vietnam.)

The summer's events in Vietnam have generated a major conflict between the American Government and the press. It is a conflict of judgment over the course of the war.

A substantial majority of the correspondents in Vietnam believe and are reporting that the war is going badly, that no victory is in sight, that the effort to pacify the peasantry has been unproductive.

To the Johnson Administration in general and to the President in particular, such assessments are incorrect and uninformed. As The Washington Post reported Aug. 18, "Recent newspaper reports that little progress is being made in Vietnam and that the military situation is stalemated are hotly disputed by the White House."

The reports in question have come from Peter Arnett and Horst Faas of the Associated Press, both of whom have spent more than five years in Vietnam; from R. W. Apple Jr. and Thomas Buckley of the New York Times; from Ward Just of The Washington Post; from Sol Sanders of U.S. News and World Report, and from other correspondents, both American and foreign, representing newspapers, magazines and the television networks.

"This war," Just wrote in June at the end of an 18-month tour in Vietnam, "is not being won . . . It may not be winnable."

"Stalemate," Apple wrote early this month, "is a fighting word in Washington . . . But it is the word used by almost all Ameri-

cans here, except the top officials, to characterize what is happening."

A CRISIS OF CONSCIENCE

The private comments of most (although not all) of the correspondents in Vietnam are even more pessimistic and more disillusioned than their stories reflect. One correspondent for a major American publication has spoken often this summer of a personal crisis of conscience: "If I had any guts, I'd quit and join the peace movement."

He is admittedly a dove. But it is not only "doves" among the correspondents who have lost faith in the ability of the American to salvage their \$25-billion-a-year enterprise in Vietnam.

The negativism in dispatches has been pronounced that the official spokesman for the U.S. Mission in Saigon, John McGowan was led to remark last month: "The pessimism among the correspondents has never been deeper than now." From all accounts however, the President is getting few, if any pessimistic reports from his subordinates in Washington or Vietnam.

"(He) tells visitors," the papers reported last month, "that every responsible official he has sent to Vietnam reports that there is no stalemate; that the Communists are suffering heavy losses, have a shortage of medicine and food, are finding it increasingly difficult to move supplies and face moral problems."

These officials include Gen. William C. Westmoreland, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Earle Wheeler, all of whom have emphasized "progress" in their assessments of the war this summer.

A TOUCHY ASSOCIATION

One result of this conflict is public confusion, which the opinion polls reflect. An other result is mistrust between the press and American officialdom involved in the war in Vietnam. At a social gathering in Honolulu a few weeks ago, a correspondent was introduced to an admiral, who curtly announced, "If I'd known you were a newspaperman, I wouldn't have shaken your hand."

The press corps, at times, has been more gracious. Many of the statements issued by the American establishment in Saigon these days are challenged bluntly a propaganda or self-delusion.

This "credibility gap" is a product of many factors, not the least of which is ignorance. The state of the enemy's morale, for example influences any assessment of the war. But neither the CIA nor the American correspondents can say with certainty whether the morale of the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese is up or down at any given time.

The Johnson Administration, on the basis of intelligence estimates, nevertheless insists that the enemy is "hurting badly." On the other hand, correspondents and American troops who observe enemy units in action are impressed by their aggressiveness, their fighting ability and the quality and quantity of their arms. North Vietnamese units in Kontum Province, for example, have not bothered in recent months to pick up American weapons left on the battlefield except a souvenirs to take home.

DUBIOUS TROOP ESTIMATES

Another area of ignorance involves enemy troop strength and enemy casualties. American military commanders have said all summer that the enemy force numbered between 295,000 and 300,000 men and that it was growing larger each month. American civilian officials, such as pacification chief Robert Komer, have been skeptical of these estimates and have predicted that they would be corrected downward.

Last month, they were revised downward. The revision, military spokesmen said, was a result of heavy enemy casualties and no

simply an arithmetical recalculation. The difficulty with that explanation, in the minds of some correspondents, is that U.S. estimates of enemy casualties often appear to be little more than wild guesses.

On June 19 and 20, for instance, elements of the U.S. Ninth Division attacked Vietcong positions at Apbac village in Longan Province 15 miles south of Saigon. The Americans had heavy casualties but claimed to have killed 265 of the enemy.

Two reporters, Lee Lescaze of The Washington Post and Robert Pisor of the Detroit News, interviewed all of the surviving officers and senior NCOs who took part in the fight. From their estimates, Lescaze and Pisor concluded that the number of enemy killed was between 54 and 70.

The following week, a company from the 173d Paratroop Brigade was virtually annihilated in a five-hour fight at Newdakto in Kontum Province. Gen. Westmoreland called the engagement a major victory and the brigade commander reported 475 enemy killed.

Subsequently, the U.S. command in Saigon unaccountably reduced the enemy losses to 106. The estimate of troopers who survived the fight was 230. The number of enemy bodies found was 44.

TIPPING THE SCALES

The significance of such numbers is simply that they often spell the difference between "victory" and "defeat" in given engagements. And inevitably they provoke the question: Which numbers does the White House receive in its reports from the field?

This speculation carries over into other aspects of the American effort in Vietnam. A correspondent traveling in the Delta south of Saigon in June was informed by American officials there that only about 1.5 million of the region's 5.7 million people lived in "secure" areas controlled by the Saigon government. American officials in Saigon disagreed vehemently after the figures were published in The Washington Post. More than three million Delta people, they claimed, were "secure" and under government "control."

A few weeks later, the New York Times reported that "official United States data" showed fewer than 500,000 people under "total government control" in all of South Vietnam, excluding large cities such as Saigon. Since there is only one major city in the Delta (Cantho with a population of 200,000), the implication was that there is gross confusion among American officials over the degree of "security" in the country. Again the question presents itself: Which figures does the President read?

The White House was informed early in the summer that the troops under the command of Premier Ky in Saigon had shown dramatic improvement in their combat skills. Ky's armored squadrons, as an example, killed 125 enemy troops for every ten fatalities they sustained, according to American commanders.

Assuming the correctness of the ratio, however, the performance of these squadrons—each containing 500 men—was not necessarily impressive. In all of 1966, the Eighth Armored Squadron killed one enemy soldier, the Fifth killed 12, the Tenth killed 23 and the Ninth killed 148. Total enemy dead: 184. Presumed Armored losses: 14 killed.

A single U.S. Marine battalion of about 1000 men claimed more enemy kills and lost more dead than these four armored squadrons in three days of fighting at the Demilitarized Zone in Quangtri Province the first week in July.

A QUESTION OF RELATIVITY

Another problem contributing to the "credibility gap" is the different yardsticks applied by the correspondents and the American military establishment.

To the correspondents and to Marine riflemen at the DMZ, U.S. losses have been appalling and military gains nonexistent in recent months. Marine casualties along that frontier between North and South Vietnam have exceeded 10,000 since Jan. 1. Not a foot of ground has changed hands permanently.

To the generals, however, and presumably to the Pentagon and the White House, the military gains have been impressive; the Marines have prevented a full-scale invasion of the South. As for the casualties, they are not disturbing in terms of the manpower available in the United States.

A final element in the credibility debate is the judgments that both the correspondents and the American Government have made in the past. Major elements of the press expected the overthrow of President Diem in 1963 to lead to major reforms in Vietnamese society. That failed to happen. The press was generally confident in 1965 and 1966 that the American buildup in Vietnam would dramatically change the course of the war. Most correspondents have now abandoned that view.

The Government's record is equally spotty. Secretary McNamara predicted in late 1963 and again in 1964 that some American troops would soon be brought home. Instead, there has been a steady buildup in American troop strength. Secretary of State Dean Rusk said in February, 1964, that the South Vietnamese had reached a position where "they themselves can handle this problem primarily with their own effort." Instead, American troops have taken over more and more of the fighting and have become more and more involved in the civil pacification effort.

Early in July, Gen. Wheeler announced that "we have the initiative, the military initiative, and this is the basis upon which wars are won." Less than three weeks later, Gen. Westmoreland told a press conference that American troops in South Vietnam were on the "defensive" and were fighting a "defensive" war.

Thus the President has one point of view and many of the correspondents in Vietnam have another. So the public is likely to continue to get wholly conflicting assessments of how it is going over there.

[From the Washington Daily News,
Nov. 16, 1967]

"NEW DEAL" IN VIETNAM?

At this stage, anyone who applauds a speech describing what great things are going to be accomplished shortly in South Vietnam does so at the peril of his own disillusionment. So let us offer two comments—without applause—on the inaugural speech of Saigon's new premier, the personable lawyer-poet Nguyen Van Loc.

He was absolutely correct in identifying his country's "emergency" needs: to eradicate corruption and inefficiency in the government and armed forces.

Whether these jobs get done depends on whether the men above Mr. Loc who have the real power—President Thieu and Vice President Ky—have the true desire, determination and guts to get on with it.

It should become the earnest endeavor of President Johnson, Ambassador Bunker and everybody up and down the American command in Vietnam to see that the new government make a serious attack on these two vital problems, that the "New Deal" promised Tuesday for South Vietnam is converted from promise into performance—without delay.

Corruption and inefficiency are at the very heart of our problem in Vietnam. The Vietnamese official or army officer who practices graft, favoritism or injustice is helping the Viet Cong. By devoting himself to stealing money, he is goofing off on his job of running

his company or province, or feeding refugees or building schools. By cheating the people (and they know it), he is driving them away from respect for the government and cooperation with it.

The longer corruption and inefficiency abound in the Vietnamese government and armed forces, the longer the United States must take to do the job, the more American lives will be lost, the more money the war will cost.

One of the great mysteries of the war is why the United States, with its thousands of military advisers, Embassy staffers, AID and USIA officials all over the map, intimately acquainted with every Vietnamese hamlet, province, corps, government department and military unit, has been so indifferent to this twin problem of corruption-inefficiency—especially when the cost is borne by Americans in terms of casualties and money.

Uncle Sam can no longer be content to look out the window as the corruption goes on.

[From the Los Angeles Times, June 4, 1967]

REASSESSMENT IN VIETNAM

The American military effort in Vietnam was begun—and supported by The Times among others—with the idea of fighting a limited conflict to obtain one limited basic objective: prevention of a Communist takeover of South Vietnam by force of arms.

The Times now sees a growing danger that the means being used to achieve this objective may soon pass beyond the military boundaries which define limited war. There is danger, in short, that U.S. power may be used in ways that will compromise or even destroy the American intention of keeping the war limited, that by accident, inadvertence or miscalculation a confrontation with the Soviet Union or Communist China will be made inevitable.

Before it is too late, before steps are taken which might involve the United States in a far larger conflict, a fresh assessment of what is going on in Vietnam would be in order. This does not mean a reconsideration of basic U.S. objectives, which we continue to believe are sound. But it does mean that the tactics employed to realize those objectives require a new evaluation, particularly as they involve North Vietnam.

Specifically, The Times believes that: There should under no circumstances be a U.S. land invasion of North Vietnam.

Haiphong harbor should not be mined, bombed or blockaded.

Hot pursuit of North Vietnamese planes should not extend across the Chinese border, nor should there be any U.S. air attacks on Chinese bases, unless the Chinese actively intervene in the war.

Bombing in the north should remain limited to military targets, supply points and infiltration routes to the south. There should be no saturation bombing of population centers.

The American government has, of course, said before that the United States has no intention of invading North Vietnam, or of destroying its form of government. The Peking regime has also made clear that Chinese intervention in the Vietnam conflict would follow either a U.S. invasion of the north or an attempt to depose the Communists from power in Hanoi.

The combined effect of these statements seems to assure that there would be no basis for Chinese intervention in Vietnam. This is not, however, necessarily the case. Peking's leaders speak as if they believe the United States is preparing to strike into North Vietnam, on the ground. They may well be prepared to act on this conviction before the fact.

Some U.S. actions in North Vietnam, and some statements by congressional sources

and others, may encourage the Chinese opinion that a major expansion of the war is imminent.

For example, recent U.S. moves into the demilitarized zone, while beyond any doubt militarily justified, may have served to support the belief that a land invasion is being prepared. Similarly, air attacks on the north have been expanded to include targets in Hanoi and Haiphong, as well as sites close to the Chinese border. Nonetheless the list of targets approved by the President and not yet hit is rapidly shrinking. The logical question is what next, and the answer the Communists may draw is that targets hitherto off-limits are to be attacked.

This is particularly the case with the port of Haiphong. Increasingly, the call is heard to mine, blockade or bomb the harbor, in the hope that the influx of supplies from other Communist countries can be reduced or shut off. Yet the considerations which so far have prevented strikes at Haiphong remain as sound as ever. An attack on the harbor would immeasurably increase the chances of active Soviet or Chinese participation in the conflict.

The U.S. government, to be sure, repeatedly affirms its intentions to keep the war limited, and probably these assurances are based on sincere aims and hopes. The trouble is that the American people have heard such assurances in the past and have seen that, by design or not, they have come to nothing.

Thus the U.S. commitment in Vietnam began in an effort to help the South Vietnamese defeat essentially by themselves the Communist-directed insurgency. But as the Saigon regime consistently showed that it was incapable of solving its own problems alone the U.S. effort was increased.

From 685 advisers U.S. strength expanded steadily: to 5,000 in early 1962, to 12,000 a year later, to 23,000 by the end of 1963, and so on, up and up until there are now nearly half a million U.S. troops in Vietnam. These troops not only are doing most of the fighting but, because the South Vietnamese have failed at it, the U.S. command has now also taken over the pacification effort, a task that may require another 150,000 men.

This is the kind of creeping escalation, essential as it may have been, that creates strong concern at this time that we may go beyond the brink of limited war into something far larger. There is still time to step back from that brink, however, by steering clear of any escalation which threatens to exceed the policy of limited war.

This does not mean any unilateral reduction of strength or effort at this time. We believe that the bombing of military targets in the north must continue so long as there is a strategic need for it, or until North Vietnam gives signs of wanting to talk about a political settlement, or begins reducing its forces in the south.

We believe, similarly, that all possible military pressure on the Communists in South Vietnam should be maintained.

At the same time we strongly feel that intensified new efforts must be made to search for ways to achieve a mutual deescalation of the conflict. To this end the United States should try to enlist the cooperation of others, including the Soviet Union, whose influence on North Vietnam might be put to work to achieve a climate in which both sides can begin a lowering of the level of the conflict.

We recognize that the odds now are against any accommodating move by the Communists. Our expectation is that the war will continue for some time. But we feel it is vitally important that the limits governing our conduct in that war be fully recognized, and adhered to, at all times.

The risks of abandoning limited war are too great for us, not to be wary.

[From Newsweek, Oct. 30, 1967]

THE STAMMERING ADVOCATE

(By Emmet John Hughes)

It is true that LBJ has been spattered by some assailants with a venom unmatched since reactionaries of the 1930s hissed their hate of FDR. And it is true that one critical chorus, damning the Vietnam tragedy not as political folly but as moral degeneracy, weirdly achieves a pietistic sound effect more reminiscent of a John Foster Dulles than a John Kenneth Galbraith.

The ordeal of Lyndon Johnson has been far less the cunning work of his aggressive detractors than the careless work of his appointed advisers. For as the anguish of Vietnam has steadily grown, they have encouraged him in a remarkable faith: what he feels is not pain but pride. And as the popular host of his believers thins, the pride of the leader should only swell, for the more lonely his vigil in war, the more lofty his place in history. So the President savors the bittersweet solace—as he murmurs to all visitors—of remembering how all great leaders, all the Lincolns and Churchills of history, have had to brave calumny or caricature. And by the miraculous healing power of such a credo, the stature of a President becomes attested and assured by the savagery of his critics.

All such sedative nonsense, of course, merely dulls the political senses. While the President mourns his failure to "get across" to the people, he ignores the true causes of this failure—manifest in almost his every utterance. And they can be summarized as three . . .

1. He refuses to carry on a dialogue with the people that is constant in philosophy, hence cumulative in force. Instead, he treats each occasion for addressing the nation as a new, special and particular event. Neither amplifying past thought nor anticipating future thought, he talks only to the fast-vanishing present: now a bellicose word to the right, now a pacific word to the left. But the art of politics must respect certain disciplines as much as the art of the theater. A democratic leadership captures its "audience" only with honest and serious drama—a representation of purpose that is consistent and complete. Onstage or in politics, only such drama is truly followed. And there can be no substitute for it in all the random repertoire of vaudeville.

2. He recites history carelessly. No instance may be more glaring than his repeated definition of Vietnam policy in the 1960s as only a loyal and logical reflection of Dwight Eisenhower's policy in the 1950s. The GOP President, in fact, personally vetoed the very kind of military commitment made by LBJ—despite its unanimous advocacy by Nixon, Dulles and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. And such rhetoric plants the spilling seed of doubt: does he scan the present as superficially as the past?

3. He wrenches the meaning of political facts—like the arms of reluctant senators—as if his quick twist can force their "vote" for his view of history. In his latest speech on Vietnam, he solemnly proceeded to "call the roll" of the Asian nations. In all, he cited five of the smallest Asian powers, along with Australia and New Zealand. The "roll" included not one of the Far East's major non-Communist powers, i.e., India or Indonesia or Japan. A few years ago, he could have achieved a comparable effect, when he presided over the Senate, by instructing the clerk to call a "roll" scrupulously omitting New York, Pennsylvania and California.

The whole failure reflects much more than oratorical carelessness or personal willfulness. It follows from a rare mark of the most sophisticated politician. At the time of

their 1964 nomination, his most devoted lieutenant, Hubert Humphrey, explained the matter to a friend—with both perception and affection. "You know I tend to talk too damn much," the irrepressibly honest Vice President said. "But I hope even this may prove of help to Lyndon Johnson. This masterful practitioner of government has trouble understanding just one part of politics—the art of advocacy. He believes in doing things, not talking them. Can you imagine he was in politics some 30 years before he ever bothered to address a labor audience? He has grown big on Capital Hill—where the real job is to exercise power, not explain it. And he is going to need time to learn the crazy and complex and exasperating problem of—advocacy."

This President surely lacks neither the shrewdness nor the energy to learn much of this elusive skill. But the hour may be late and the desire may dissolve in disdain. It may seem more painless to go on deriding critics, exalting loneliness and awaiting whatever honor history holds in hiding for the President too proud to be understood

[From Newsweek, July 17, 1966]

A REMEMBERED RECKONING

(By Emmet John Hughes)

We will not permit those who fire upon us in Vietnam to win a victory over the desires and the intentions of all the American people . . . We can continue the Great Society while we fight . . .

—State of the Union Message, January 1966

The proud promise provokes a personal memory . . . There have passed thirteen worried years—and almost as many world crises—since the first months of Dwight Eisenhower's Presidency in 1953. At that time, I served on his White House staff, charged with helping to prepare all Presidential speeches and messages. The new President then still felt confidently committed to his own compassionate instincts and perceptive insight about the world around him. All his pacific impulses—through that so sadly short political springtime—inspired him to deliver as his first major statement on national policy, an address simply called "The Chance for Peace." It then was widely judged to be as Sherman Adams long after appraised it in his memoirs, "the most effective speech of Eisenhower's public career." And the man's pure and open ardor for peace alone made it such.

The political season stays memorable. It came just after the death of Joseph Stalin with its promise of a softening of Soviet policy. It came just before the ascendancy of John Foster Dulles, with its toughening of American policy. It came just as the U.S. and China were awkwardly maneuvering toward the gray kind of settlement in Korea so sure to be denounced by many Republicans if it is mercifully repeated in Vietnam. In that season, the new and unfatigued President ceaselessly decried in private the world's burden of armaments. And I recall all the hours alone with him, as he paced with angry steps behind his massive desk in the Oval Room, crisply citing the costs of munitions, and snappishly asking: "What world can afford this sort of thing for long?"

And so finally he spoke his warning to a world in arms: "This . . . is humanity hanging from a cross of iron." With the practicality of a Kansas farmer, he computed the price of the martial life in terms of hospitals and utilities and highways: "We pay for a single fighter plane with a half-million bushels of wheat. We pay for a single destroyer with new homes that could have housed more than 8,000 people." And he pledged: "We are ready . . . to dedicate our strength to serving the needs, rather than the fears, of the world."

All this now comes to mind with a freshly sharp warning. A democracy cannot keep two sets of books: one for orations, and one for operations. The vaulting designs of the Great Society of a Johnson leave far behind the modest purposes of the Great Crusade of an Eisenhower. Yet a lot of the Great Society's preachment argues that—at no cost to either—its dreams can range as far as its bombers. And the myth impels one to bring up to date the simple kind of equations that Eisenhower computed years ago . . .

The cost of the Vietnam war—exceeding \$20 billion a year—signifies a sum that could mean quite different purchases.

It could—each month—finance the complete, seven-year training of almost 70,000 scientists.

It could—each month—double the resources of the Agency for International Development for a full year's economic programs in 38 foreign countries.

It could—each month—create three Rockefeller Foundations.

It could—each month—pay the full year's cost of state and local police in all 50 states.

It could—every year—provide a 10 per cent salary increase for every U.S. public-school teacher.

It could—every year—double the social security benefits paid to 20 million Americans.

The more paltry cost of U.S. helicopters lost in Vietnam only in the last year could fulfill a few other American "desires and intentions."

It could pay the full bill last year for all UNICEF health and education programs affecting more than 800 million children in 118 countries.

Or—it could signify a 10 per cent climb in personal income for every citizen of all the New England states.

And as for the puny worth of just one modern heavy bomber . . .

It could buy 1 billion bushels of wheat.

Or—it could double the huge education budget of the State of New York.

It would be frivolous to contend that such facts prove the inequity of U.S. action in Vietnam, for even a just war imposes an awesome price. But it is equally frivolous to deny that all of American life pays for the struggle in Southeast Asia.

The cost cannot be camouflaged by colorful flashes of patriotic rhetoric, nor mitigated by austere control of electric lights in the White House.

For the price stays precisely as high as ever: a cross of iron.

[From the New York Times]

SCHLESINGER SUGGESTS THAT WE RECOVER OUR COOL AND FOLLOW A MIDDLE WAY OUT OF VIETNAM

(By Arthur Schlesinger Jr.)

Our strategy in Vietnam is rather like trying to weed a garden with a bulldozer. We occasionally dig up some weeds, but we dig up most of the turf, too. The effect of our policy is to pulverize the political and institutional fabric which alone can give a South Vietnamese state that hope of independent survival which is our presumed war aim. Our method, in other words, defeats our goal. Indeed, the most likely beneficiary of the smashed social structure of South Vietnam will be Communism. "My feeling," Gen. Wallace Greene, commandant of the Marine Corps, has wisely said, "Is that you could kill every Vietcong and North Vietnamese in South Vietnam and still lose the war. Unless we can make a success of the civic-action program, we are not going to obtain the objectives we have set."

Much devotion and intelligence are at present going into the programs of reconstruction, but prospects are precarious so

long as the enemy can slice through so much of South Vietnam with such apparent immunity; and so long as genuine programs of social reform threaten the vested interests of the Saigon Government and of large landholders. In any case, as claimants on our resources, these programs of pacification are hopelessly outclassed by the programs of destruction. Surely, the United States, with all its ingenuity, could have figured out a better way to combat guerrilla warfare than the physical obliteration of the nation in which it is taking place. If this is our best idea of "protecting" a country against "wars of national liberation," what other country, seeing the devastation we have wrought in Vietnam, will wish American protection?

At the same time, our concentration on Vietnam is exacting a frightful cost in other areas of national concern. In domestic policy, with Vietnam gulping down a billion and a half dollars a month, everything is grinding to a stop. Lyndon Johnson was on his way to a place in history as a great President for his vision of a Great Society; but the Great Society is now, except for token gestures, dead. The fight for equal opportunity for the Negro, the war against poverty, the struggle to save the cities, the improvement of our schools—all must be starved for the sake of Vietnam. And war brings ugly side-effects: inflation; frustration; angry protest; attack on dissenters on the ground that they cheer the enemy (an attack often mounted by men who lead the dissent during the Korean war); premonitions of McCarthyism.

We also pay a cost abroad. Our allies naturally draw away as they see us heading down the road toward war with China. When we began to bomb the oil depots, James Reston wrote: "There is now not a single major nation in the world that supports Mr. Johnson's latest adventure in Hanoi and Haiphong." As nations seek to disengage themselves from the impending conflict, the quasi-neutrality of leaders like de Gaulle gains new plausibility.

On any realistic assessment, Western Europe and Latin America are far more significant to American security than South Asia; yet the Vietnam obsession has stultified our policy and weakened our position in both these vital areas. The war has clouded the hope, once mildly promising, of progress toward a *détente* with the Soviet Union. It has helped block agreements to end underground nuclear testing and to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. It has precipitated the decision of U Thant to resign as Secretary General of the United Nations and condemns the U.N. itself to a time of declining influence.

Our rejection of the views of our friends and allies—our conviction, as Paul H. Smith has put it, "that we alone are qualified to be judge, jury and executioner"—ignores Madison's solemn warning in the 63rd Federalist: "An attention to the judgment of other nations is important to every government for two reasons: the one is that independently of the merits of any particular plan or measure, it is desirable, on various accounts, that it should appear to other nations as the offspring of a wise and honorable policy; the second is that in doubtful cases, particularly where the national councils may be warped by some strong passion or momentary interest, the presumed or known opinion of the impartial world may be the best guide that can be followed. What has not America lost by her want of character with foreign nations; and how many errors and follies would she not have avoided, if the justice and propriety of her measures had, in every instance, been previously tried by the light in which they would probably appear to the unbiased part of mankind."

The Administration has called the critics of its Vietnam policy "neoisolationists." But surely the real neoisolationists are those who have isolated the United States from its allies and raised the tattered standard, last flourished 15 years ago by Douglas MacArthur, of "going it alone."

VIETNAM IN THE GENERAL DEBATE OF THE 22D U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY, SEPTEMBER 21—OCTOBER 13, 1967

PREFACE

In the "General Debate" of the regular sessions of the UN General Assembly, annually, in a period of about three weeks, almost every member State, through its Foreign Minister or other high representative, takes the opportunity to put its most serious international concerns before the world. Because little of this debate is heard outside of the General Assembly hall, these important speeches do not have the impact on world opinion that they should have. This is particularly unfortunate right now when the full force of world opinion, if heard clearly, might provide the critical pressure needed to bring to an end the war in Vietnam.

The Viet-Nam question is not formally on the agenda of the current (22nd) General Assembly, and although it was put on the agenda of the Security Council in February, 1966, it has not yet been debated there. Therefore, the Assembly's General Debate affords the principal forum in which national views on Vietnam are officially being aired. Because, as we listen to these expressions, we hear a commanding consensus for ending the war as soon as possible and for persuading the United States to take a far-sighted responsible initiative towards this, we have reviewed the speeches carefully for the purpose of reaching a summary view of their positions on the Vietnam war issue. We believe this material should get the widest possible distribution.

The form of the report is:

(a) Table I, showing positions on the Vietnam war with special emphasis on the questions of a return to the Geneva Agreements and of the cessation of U.S. bombing of North Viet-Nam.

(b) Excerpts from a number of speeches, showing the range of responsible voices raised to plead for the ending of hostilities and for negotiating peace.

These quotations are taken from the official U.N. verbatim documents, a public record, and may be used without restriction.

TABLE I—SUMMARY

Number of speeches in the General Debate: 109.

Number of speeches in the General Debate which refer to Vietnam: 96.

A. Number urging return to Geneva agreements: 44.

B. Number urging halt in U.S. bombing of North Viet-Nam: 45.

Total number included in A and/or B: 67.

C. Number at least expressing a concern to stop the fighting: 23.

Total number included in A, B, and/or C: 90.

D. Number favoring a more active UN role in dealing with the Viet-Nam question: 18.

E. Number strongly condemning U.S. policy: 15.

F. Number suggesting reciprocal action by Hanoi should accompany halt in U.S. bombing: 7.

G. Number supporting U.S. policy: 6 (includes U.S.A.).

Total number included in F and/or G above: 8.

H. Number making no reference or negligible reference to Viet-Nam question: 13.

TABLE I.—ANALYSIS OF 109 SPEECHES IN 22d U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY GENERAL DEBATE, SEPT. 21, 1967, THROUGH OCT. 13, 1967, WITH REFERENCE TO FOLLOWING POINTS ON THE VIETNAM ISSUE

[Key: A—Urges return to Geneva agreements; B—Urges U.S. halt bombing of North Vietnam; C—Expresses general concern to stop the fighting; D—Favors more active U.N. role; E—Condemns U.S. policy; F—Suggests reciprocal action by Hanoi should accompany halt in bombing; G—Supports U.S. policy; H—Makes negligible reference to Vietnam, or none.]

Country	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H
In order of speaking:								
Brazil								X
United States of America	X			X		X	X	
Denmark	X	X						
Sweden	X							
Japan	X			X				
U.S.S.R.	X	X			X			
Lesotho								X
Ghana	X			X				
Czechoslovakia	X	X			X			
South Africa								X
Guatemala	X			X				
Dominican Republic								X
Philippines						X	X	
Israel	X							
Gambia			X					
Uruguay								X
Chile			X					
United Kingdom	X						X	
Ecuador			X	X				
Luxembourg			X	X				
Upper Volta	X	X						
Argentina								X
Senegal			X					
Canada	X	X		X				
Somalia	X			X				
Belgium		X		X				
Trinidad and Tobago			X					
Tunisia								X
Kenya	X	X						
Paraguay			X	X				
Ireland								X
France	X	X						
Burundi	X							
Greece			X	X				
Colombia								X
Indonesia	X	X						
Costa Rica			X	X				
Venezuela								X
Albania		X			X			
United Arab Republic		X						
El Salvador			X	X				
Sierra Leone			X					
Bolivia			X					
Uganda	X							
Jordan			X					
Bulgaria	X	X						
Burma			X					
Iran	X							
Ukraine		X			X			
Netherlands		X						
Finland		X						
Poland		X			X			
Turkey	X							
Hungary	X				X			
Austria			X					
Norway		X						
Zambia	X							
Iceland			X					
Italy	X			X				
Ethiopia	X	X						
Botswana			X	X				
China							X	
Thailand							X	
Yugoslavia	X	X						
Mongolia		X			X			
Guyana		X	X					
Byelorussia		X			X			
Malaysia			X					
Lebanon	X							
Mauritania		X						
India	X	X						
Malta								X
Peru			X					
Nepal			X					
Kuwait	X	X						
Tanzania	X	X						
Barbados		X						
Chad	X	X						
Jamaica	X							
Romania		X			X			
Pakistan	X							
Sudan		X						
Cyprus		X						
Mali	X	X						
Libya	X							
Morocco	X							
Cabon	X	X						
Algeria	X	X			X			
Nigeria	X	X						
Iraq	X	X						
Cambodia	X	X			X			
Mexico			X					
Liberia		X	X					
Yemen		X			X			
Congo (Brazzaville)		X			X			
Ceylon	X	X						

TABLE I.—ANALYSIS OF 109 SPEECHES IN 22d U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY GENERAL DEBATE, SEPT. 21, 1967, THROUGH OCT. 13, 1967, WITH REFERENCE TO FOLLOWING POINTS ON THE VIETNAM ISSUE—Continued

[Key: A—Urges return to Geneva agreements; B—Urges U.S. halt bombing of North Vietnam; C—Expresses general concern to stop the fighting; D—Favors more active U.N. role; E—Condemns U.S. policy; F—Suggests reciprocal action by Hanoi should accompany halt in bombing; G—Supports U.S. policy; H—Makes negligible reference to Vietnam, or none.]

Country	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H
In order of speaking—Continued								
Cameroon		X		X				
New Zealand						X	X	
Madagascar		X						
Togo		X				X		
Saudi Arabia								X
Rwanda		X						
Syria		X			X			
Laos		X						
Australia						X	X	
Singapore		X						X
Malawi						X		
Cuba								
Congo (Democratic Republic)		X						
109 countries	44	45	23	18	15	7	6	13

EXCERPTS FROM SOME SPEECHES IN THE GENERAL DEBATE AT THE 22d U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY, SEPTEMBER—OCTOBER 1967

Denmark, Jens Otto Krag, Prime Minister: "... We believe that the conflict in Viet-Nam can be solved by political means only, that only negotiations can lead to durable peace in South-East Asia and safeguard the rights of the Vietnamese people. But without concessions there will be no solutions, and an initial move towards negotiations would be a halt in the bombing of North Viet-Nam followed by a reduction in the military activities by both sides. Participation in the negotiations must include all those involved in the conflict."

Sweden, Torsten Nilsson, Foreign Minister: "... It has been said from the North Vietnamese side that talks could be opened if the bombing of North Vietnamese territory ceased unconditionally ...

"... we appeal to the most powerful party in the conflict to take the initial step. We appeal for a willingness to start the de-escalation process which can lead to peace for the people of Viet-Nam. We address this appeal to a nation whose ideals of liberty, shown not least during the two world wars, the nations of Europe have particular reason to remember with gratitude."

Japan, Takeo Miki, Foreign Minister: "... as a first step, all the parties directly concerned should stop fighting and enter into talks on the basis and in the spirit of the Geneva Agreements of 1954. There seems to be no way to a peaceful settlement other than an arrangement to ensure the coexistence of South Viet-Nam and North Viet-Nam under some form of international guarantee and thus enable the eventual withdrawal of all foreign troops from the area."

[From the Washington Post, Feb. 11, 1966]

KENNAN STATEMENT ON VIETNAM
(NOTE.—George F. Kennan, former Ambassador to Moscow and now a member of the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton, N.J., testified on Vietnam yesterday before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Here is the official transcript of Kennan's prepared statement, as delivered:)

Mr. Chairman, and distinguished members of the Foreign Relations Committee, the subject on which I am invited to give my views this morning is, as I understand it, the complex of problems connected with our present involvement in Vietnam.

I have not been anxious to press my views on the public, but I gladly give them to you for whatever they are worth, claiming no particular merit for them except perhaps that they flow from experience with Com-

munist affairs that runs back now for some 38 years, and also from the deepest and most troubled sort of concern that we should find the proper course, the right course, at this truly crucial moment.

The first point I would like to make is that if we were not already involved as we are today in Vietnam, I would know of no reason why we should wish to become so involved, and I could think of several reasons why we should wish not to.

It is obvious on the other hand that this involvement is today a fact. It creates a new situation. It raises new questions ulterior to the long-term problem which have to be taken into account; a precipitate and disorderly withdrawal could represent in present circumstances a disservice to our own interests, and even to world peace greater than any that might have been involved by our failure to engage ourselves there in the first place.

But at the same time, I have great misgivings about any deliberate expansion of hostilities on our part directed to the achievement of something called "victory"—if by the use of that term we envisage the complete disappearance of the recalcitrance with which we are now faced, the formal submission by the adversary to our will, and the complete realization of our present stated political aims.

I doubt that these things can be achieved even by the most formidable military successes.

Any total rooting out of the Vietcong from the territory of South Vietnam, could be achieved, if it could be achieved at all, only at the cost of a degree of damage to civilian life and of civilian suffering generally for which I would not like to see this country responsible.

And to attempt to crush North Vietnamese strength to a point where Hanoi could no longer give any support for Vietcong political activity in the South would almost certainly, it seems to me, have the effect of bringing in Chinese forces at some point, whether formally or in the guise of volunteers, thus involving us in a military conflict with Communist China on one of the most unfavorable theaters of hostility that we could possibly choose.

This is not the only reason why I think we should do everything possible to avoid the escalation of this conflict. There is another one which is no less weighty, and this is the effect the conflict is already having on our policies and interests further afield. This involvement seems to me to represent a grievous misplacement of emphasis on our foreign policies as a whole.

Not only are great and potentially more important questions of world affairs not receiving, as a consequence of our involvement in Vietnam, the attention they should be receiving, but in some instances assets we already enjoy and, hopefully, possibilities we should be developing are being sacrificed to this unpromising involvement in a remote and secondary theater.

It is clear that however justified our action may be in our own eyes, it has failed to win either enthusiasm or confidence even among peoples normally friendly to us.

Our motives are widely misinterpreted, and the spectacle, the spectacle emphasized and reproduced in thousands of press photographs and stories that appear in the press of the world, the spectacle of Americans inflicting grievous injury on the lives of a poor and helpless people, and particularly a people of different race and color, no matter how warranted by military necessity or by the excesses of the adversary our operations may seem to us to be or may genuinely be,

this spectacle produces reactions among millions of people throughout the world profoundly detrimental to the image we would like them to hold of this country.

HOLLOW VICTORY

I am not saying that this is just or right. I am saying that this is so, and that it is bound in the circumstances to be so, and a victory purchased at the price of further such damage would be a hollow one in terms of our world interests, no matter what advantages it might hold from the standpoint of developments on the local scene.

Now, these are the reasons, gentlemen, why I hope that our Government will restrict our military operations in Vietnam to the minimum necessary to assure the security of our forces, and to maintain our military presence there until we can achieve a satisfactory peaceful resolution of the conflict, and these are the reasons why I hope that we will continue to pursue vigorously, and I may say consistently, the quest for such a peaceful resolution of the conflict, even if this involves some moderation of our stated objectives, and even if the resulting settlement appears to us as something less than ideal.

FEBRUARY 8, 1966.

HON. ROBERT S. MCNAMARA,
Secretary, Department of Defense,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I'm going to be frank respecting your testimony before our House Armed Services Committee over the past several days. You're certainly to be congratulated for your tenacity and ability to defend your policies both as respects those who would urge more or less force in Southeast Asia.

I regret to admit, however, that even though I think you are right most of the time, I have questions about our degree of commitment in South Viet Nam. Not because I am not willing to have those close to me risk death to keep the South Vietnamese free from enslavement to Communism, but because I am not convinced even yet that the bulk of the people in the South will follow the pattern of government that we lay out for them. Admittedly we are not trying to militarily defeat Red China but we would like them to collapse. We are not trying to defeat North Vietnam politically for the then brotherhood of Communism would involve first China, then the Soviets, then a nuclear real threat would be posed to the continued existence of the United States as we know it.

We have limited targets in North Viet Nam consistent with our limited offensive. We could trade Haiphong P.O.L. for Saigon P.O.L. but we would obviously be the greater loser. We can blockade, mine and bomb further but since the Viet Cong need such fragmentary logistics even this action as you point out probably would only strengthen the solidarity of the North Vietnamese—which solidarity you refuse to label as *morale*. Whether you realize it or not, I think you tend to seize on fragments of true fact and due to your extreme agility with the English language you are able to rearrange the probable fact situation to cover almost every dilemma posed to you. I compliment you and only ask you to fairly appraise the facts not colored by your zeal to vindicate a position.

You point out that our 52s are carving out multiple square miles with fractional mile degree accuracy. Though it is obvious that this kind of pattern land scarring will hit many non-combatants, you state rather matter-of-factly that no civilians are being hit and, in fact, that they like us for this action. The woman I saw crying over her dead husband killed by our artillery this morning in the paper I would not think is too favorably inclined. Yet you state that we can't use this

pattern bombing in the North because civilians might be hurt and this would affect the North's regard for us! I am cognizant of the 52 vulnerability problem.

You state that our existing level of activity is designed for victory because we are substantially stronger than we have ever been, that the North has a finite limit to which they probably will not exceed, while the logistics and port facilities do not limit the numbers that the U.S. can deploy—that our force level will be optimum when it exceeds the current number by a classified number.

We discussed our objective in South Viet Nam and you stated that it was to give the South Vietnamese freedom to develop as free people. You admit that the Viet Cong should have this right to peacefully determine their future. You were suspect that they could ever act peacefully. We must work with them peacefully, however, or plan to annihilate them or force them to the North. You base your estimate of strength required on the fact that there are an estimated 230,000 Viet Cong. You admit you could be substantially off on this estimate. The U.S. position is based on the fact that the 2 to 3 million people under Viet Cong control do not really want Ho Chi Minh government. You cite the forced barbarous conscription. You don't explain adequately why the Viet Cong soldiers fight as they do and how it is that the people North of the 17th have the zeal to "save their countryland" in the face of one year of almost undefended bomb attacks while the people South of the 17th have no philosophy.

To be sure, the Catholics of my faith moved South to South Viet Nam, the Buddhist monks want religious freedom, but I believe the evidence would be fairly appraised by an impartial jury that the South probably is amenable to political programs. You could just as easily say that it is only a few hundred political leaders in Washington who are highly motivated by political programs.

Secretary Rusk stated one year ago that the Viet Cong had 23% or 3½ million people. It is possible in our zeal to defend our actions that we could be substantially wrong on this estimate. These people could take Communist program. With the degree of corruption and brutality of General Ky, it is possible that some of many in the cities would prefer Ho Chi Minh. My evidence that the Saigon government has to pay off Viet Cong to get food into market and my direct contacts indicate that the Viet Cong are everywhere even in the cities though their action there is limited.

I know we defend our actions there because we say the people love us. They could love us for our dollars and besides if I believed everyone whom I contacted in an election, I would be surprised if any votes were cast against me. You have to admit that it is just possible that some Asiatics might be offended at white man dominance, they all have fought against the French. We state we're not making a conquest, but the Viet Cong who speak the language are spreading word to the contrary. Some Asiatics know, too, that since many leading Americans who speak really don't defend liberty of all people in their own land, then why should they be concerned about the liberty of another dark skinned people on the other side of the globe. Some could feel quite strongly on this matter.

With respect to numbers, it appears that the Viet Cong have raised their numbers over the last year about the same as we have. They control substantially more territory by the maps I have seen and published in U.S. News & World Report than they did one year ago. They have lost high casualties and we have suffered likewise. Yesterday we lost two pilots and probably \$12 million worth of pilot and craft—we probably dropped multiple million dollars of bombs. We made

much noise. We knocked out a bridge or two that will be rebuilt, but who is to say that our damage and loss was less than the enemy. I think it's arguable that maybe we don't win these encounters economically. According to my calculations we spent ¼ of our military budget on South Viet Nam last year and increased it ¼ for '67. This means our real level of commitment is \$24 billion, or about ¼ of our national income. Can we endure this indefinitely. The total budget of both North and South Viet Nam, I doubt, is much more than \$1 billion per year and this is not all for defense. The Chinese and Soviet dollar commitments are also relatively small.

I ask these questions not as a pessimist but because this is a time for dead realism. I've parroted your retorts and those of Secretary Rusk for the past year with conviction. I heard another this evening on the radio supporting Affirmation Viet Nam and the speaker was glibly defending our policy with factual analysis far more favorable to the U.S. than the figures that we are working with before committee.

The danger is that when the rightness or success of a position depends on a figure estimate, a horseback opinion compounded on a horseback opinion can be deadly.

Now if our policy is not to annihilate all of South Viet Nam or North Viet Nam but to negotiate for peace honorably, we must have in mind some concession.

The Viet Cong and North Viet Nam want an all Viet Cong government. We want an all Saigon government. A coalition then is the only result to negotiate with provisions for policing the coalition such that peace be maintained for at least several decades.

But when our policy is that we will not talk or negotiate with the Viet Cong but that they can sit at the table, we tip our hand in advance that a coalition—even "self determined" is untenable. But we say we are for self-determination of these people. You must explain this hiatus that is in our policy.

My own feeling is that if we should offer to negotiate with the group that must be accommodated, peace could happen. Our policy of non-recognition of the Viet Cong was primarily to involve North Viet Nam—this has now occurred. If the reason fails, the rule of non-recognition fails.

I chronicle these items now and urge you to review our program and not to be mesmerized by our obvious capability or by those who would garrulously precipitate us into battle on an honor commitment.

What will it gain us if we bring the Viet Cong to their knees after 50,000 to 100,000 young Americans are killed, only to have Ho Chi Minh win the first free election we stage. Your psychologists and Political Scientists say this won't happen, but it just so happens that many of the University community think otherwise. It occurs that that matter is perhaps more their specialty than yours or mine.

With the current growing cleavage in American position and the greater participation of the rightists in that policy, it is safe to say that we are simply not prepared to fight a long war. The people of the Great Society have a built-in impatience. They want the Society today. You say we must have patience. You can't have something you don't have. We can't for long cleave off our college brains and pursue a successful American policy.

I have not discussed at length our bombing in the North. Certainly it matters little if our basic purpose is confused, inconsistent and clouded. It merely further compounds and confuses an already dismal problem.

The day can still be saved. We're wasting men maybe needlessly if we don't sharpen our purpose and make peace a possibility.

Very truly yours,

ROBERT L. LEGGETT,
Member of Congress.

LEAVE OF ABSENCE

By unanimous consent, leave of absence was granted to:

Mr. GUDE (at the request of Mr. GERALD R. FORD), for today, on account of illness.

Mr. FOUNTAIN (at the request of Mr. ALBERT), for an indefinite period, on account of his attendance at the United Nations as an official member of the U.S. delegation to the United Nations.

Mr. HICKS, for Friday, November 17, on account of official business in district.

Mr. MOSS, for 8 days, beginning November 20, 1967, on account of official business in district.

SPECIAL ORDERS GRANTED

By unanimous consent, permission to address the House, following the legislative program and any special orders heretofore entered, was granted to:

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. RUPPE) to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous matter:)

Mr. SKUBITZ, for 15 minutes, today.

Mr. McCLURE, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. WOLFF (at the request of Mr. MONTGOMERY), for 15 minutes, today; and to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous matter.

Mr. LEGGETT, for 60 minutes, today; and to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous matter.

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

By unanimous consent, permission to extend remarks in the Appendix of the RECORD, or to revise and extend remarks was granted to:

Mr. O'HARA of Illinois in five instances and to include related matter.

Mr. BOLAND to extend his remarks in the Committee of the Whole today, during debate on the Conte amendment.

Mr. POLLOCK (at the request of Mr. RUPPE) immediately preceding the floor proceedings on the foreign aid appropriation bill.

Mr. KUPFERMAN (at the request of Mr. RUPPE) during Mr. WOLFF's special order of today.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. RUPPE) and to include extraneous matter:)

Mr. SPRINGER.

Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois.

Mr. BELL.

Mr. KEITH.

Mr. BETTS.

Mr. DOLE in three instances.

Mr. SNYDER in two instances.

Mr. BUSH.

Mr. DERWINSKI.

Mr. GURNEY.

Mr. KUPFERMAN in five instances.

Mr. SCHADEBERG.

Mr. ADAIR.

Mr. BROYHILL of Virginia.

Mr. HALPERN.

Mr. HORTON.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. MONTGOMERY) and to include extraneous matter:)

Mr. GILBERT in two instances.

Mr. ULLMAN in five instances.

Mr. LONG of Maryland.

Mr. FRASER in two instances.

Mr. GIAMMO.

Mr. DIGGS in two instances.

Mr. SATTERFIELD.

Mr. BOLLING.

Mr. DELANEY.

Mr. EILBERG.

Mr. MULTER in three instances.

Mr. BROWN of California.

Mr. KEE in two instances.

Mr. VANIK in two instances.

Mr. MATSUNAGA in two instances.

Mr. DULSKI in two instances.

Mr. O'NEILL of Massachusetts in two instances.

Mr. RARICK in three instances.

Mr. FASCELL in two instances.

Mr. GATHINGS in two instances.

Mr. RIVERS in two instances.

Mr. MURPHY of New York.

Mr. GIBBONS.

Mr. BRASCO.

Mrs. SULLIVAN in two instances.

Mr. KORNEGAY.

SENATE BILLS REFERRED

Bills of the Senate of the following titles were taken from the Speaker's table and, under the rule, referred as follows:

S. 323. An act to restrict the disposition of lands acquired as part of the national wildlife refuge system; to the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries.

S. 2447. An act to amend section 2 of the Migratory Bird Conservation Act; to the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries.

SENATE ENROLLED BILL SIGNED

The Speaker announced his signature to an enrolled bill of the Senate of the following title:

S. 780. An act to amend the Clean Air Act to authorize planning grants to air pollution control agencies; expand research provisions relating to fuels and vehicles; provide for interstate air pollution control agencies or commissions; authorize the establishment of air quality standards, and for other purposes.

ADJOURNMENT

Mr. MONTGOMERY, Mr. Speaker, I move that the House do now adjourn.

The motion was agreed to; accordingly (at 7 o'clock and 35 minutes p.m.) the House adjourned until tomorrow, November 17, 1967, at 12 o'clock noon.

EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS,
ETC.

Under clause 2 of rule XXIV, executive communications were taken from the Speaker's table and referred as follows: [Omitted from the Record of November 15, 1967]

1216. A letter from the Secretary of the Army, transmitting a compilation of laws relating to the improvement of rivers and harbors, passed between January 2, 1939, and October 22, 1966, pursuant to the provisions of section 106 of the River and Harbor Act of June 30, 1948 (H. Doc. No. 182); to the Committee on Public Works and ordered to be printed.

[Submitted November 16, 1967]

1228. A letter from the Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service, U.S.

Department of Justice, transmitting reports concerning visa petitions approved, according certain beneficiaries third preference and sixth preference classification, pursuant to the provisions of section 204(d) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

1229. A letter from the Secretary of the Army, transmitting a letter from the Chief of Engineers, Department of the Army, dated August 30, 1967, submitting a report, together with accompanying papers and an illustration, on an interim survey on Forestville Harbor, Mich., authorized by the River and Harbor Act approved March 2, 1945 (H. Doc. No. 183); to the Committee on Public Works and ordered to be printed with an illustration.

REPORTS OF COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 2 of rule XIII, reports of committees were delivered to the Clerk for printing and reference to the proper calendar as follows:

Mr. HAYS: Committee on House Administration. Senate Concurrent Resolution 40. Concurrent resolution authorizing the printing of the report of the proceedings of the 43d biennial meeting of the Convention of American Instructors of the Deaf as a Senate document (Rept. No. 933). Ordered to be printed.

Mr. HAYS: Committee on House Administration. Senate Concurrent Resolution 42. Concurrent resolution authorizing the printing for the use of the Senate Banking and Currency Committee, of additional copies of its hearings of the present Congress on housing legislation (Rept. No. 934). Ordered to be printed.

Mr. HAYS: Committee on House Administration. Senate Concurrent Resolution 46. Concurrent resolution to provide for the printing of additional copies of certain hearings of the Special Committee on Aging (Rept. No. 935). Ordered to be printed.

Mr. HAYS: Committee on House Administration. House Concurrent Resolution 487. Concurrent resolution providing for printing as a House document the study entitled "Study of the U.S. Office of Education"; with amendment (Rept. No. 936). Ordered to be printed.

Mr. HAYS: Committee on House Administration. H. Res. 834. Resolution authorizing the printing of additional copies of "Communist Origin and Manipulation of Vietnam Week (April 8-15, 1967)," 90th Congress, first session (Rept. No. 937). Ordered to be printed.

Mr. HAYS: Committee on House Administration. H. Res. 928. Resolution authorizing the printing of extra copies of part 3 of the hearings relating to "Activities of Ku Klux Klan Organizations in the United States," 89th Congress, second session (Rept. No. 938). Ordered to be printed.

Mr. HAYS: Committee on House Administration. H. Res. 929. Resolution authorizing the printing of extra copies of part 4 of the hearings relating to "Activities of Ku Klux Klan Organizations in the United States," 89th Congress, second session (Rept. No. 939). Ordered to be printed.

Mr. HAYS: Committee on House Administration. H. Res. 930. Resolution authorizing the printing of extra copies of part 5 of the hearings relating to "Activities of Ku Klux Klan Organizations in the United States," 89th Congress, second session (Rept. No. 940). Ordered to be printed.

Mr. HAYS: Committee on House Administration. H. Con. Res. 557. Concurrent resolution to provide for the printing of the Constitution of the United States as amended to February 10, 1967, together with the Decla-