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October 8, 1970

COST

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

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FILE SUBJ. H 825

Civilian personnel reductions	—\$48,130,000
Reduction in automatic data processing	—43,300,000
Increase for Vietnamization program	+58,500,000
Reduction in permanent change of station travel for the purpose of providing more stability in military assignments	—95,200,000

[The details of these and other reductions are described hereafter in this report.]

BASIS OF CONSIDERATION

The Committee on Appropriations is dedicated to maintaining the military superiority of the United States. Over the years the Congress has provided the money to accomplish this, and the funds recommended in the accompanying bill are deemed sufficient for fiscal year 1971.

But the competition with the Soviet Union is becoming keener everyday and there is no room for American bungling in the field of defense. In order to maintain our capability over the long-pull, a better job of managing defense dollars must be done. This fact has been a dominant consideration in the drafting of the bill which accompanies this report.

The American people know that the generous outpouring of defense dollars will not in itself get the job done. It does take money to do the job, but it takes money wisely spent and based upon down to earth planning.

The Soviet Union continues to increase its inventory of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles and sea-based submarine launched ballistic missiles. Soviet naval forces are being augmented steadily and modernized both in surface ships and in submarines.

Although the direct involvement of the United States in the war in Vietnam is decreasing from the peak when 543,000 American military personnel were in the area, we still will have according to the latest estimates, not more than 204,000 personnel in Vietnam in the spring of 1971, a reduction of 259,000 or more, about one-half. Spending for the war in Southeast Asia is expected to decline from a high of almost \$30 billion to a rate of \$14.5 billion by the end of fiscal year 1971.

The Strategic Arms Limitations Talks have not as yet become a significant factor in permitting a major reduction in defense spending.

This is not a time in which we can afford a "Business as usual" relaxed approach to the management of defense programs. The best performance of our best civilian and military personnel is required for our long range security.

The country has every right to expect that the appropriation of more than \$66,000,000,000 will provide formidable military forces throughout fiscal year 1971. Military personnel strength at the end of the fiscal year is estimated to be 2.9 million. The Navy will have 757 commissioned ships in the active fleet including 41 Polaris and Poseidon submarines carrying 656 ballistic missiles and the Air Force will have 1,054 ICBMs on launchers and an active inventory of 13,352 aircraft. These forces, which are described in more detail under "Major Military Programs" later in the report should be adequate to meet the contingencies which may arise.

The effectiveness of the Department of Defense cannot be measured solely in terms of the dollar level of expenditures. Unlimited resources do not overcome inefficiency and mismanagement. Instead, excessive funding produces more inefficiency and mismanagement. What this country needs is more defense for the dollar, not necessarily more dollars for defense.

MIDDLE EAST

The tense situation in the Middle East is of grave concern to the committee. The deepening involvement of the Soviet Union and the danger to world peace resulting from such involvement cannot be ignored by the United States.

In recognition of this situation, the Congress approved section 501 of H.R. 17123, the defense authorization bill.

Funds for this purpose are handled through the military assistance program.

STRATEGIC FORCES

Unless there is substantial progress in the current Strategic Arms Limitation Talks or some other arms limitation agreement, we may be required to begin another large step forward to buttress our strategic military strength. More Polaris type submarines and more Minuteman missiles on launchers may be required.

While statements presented to the Committee expressed alarm over the growing Soviet strategic power in submarine and land-based intercontinental missiles on launchers, neither the budget nor the authorization bill proposed any funds for additional strategic missiles on launchers at this time. Our country has not yet crossed this bridge, but if there is no arms limitation agreement and the Soviet buildup continues, we must increase our strategic forces or be strategically outgunned.

DEFENSE DEPARTMENT MANAGEMENT

One of the major objectives of many of the reductions which have been recommended by the Committee in the accompanying bill is to tighten up the operations of the Department of Defense and make the Department more efficient for the critical times ahead.

What is said in the report by way of criticism of the Defense Department should not be construed as special criticism of the present holders of defense positions. Our concern relates to problems and procedures of long standing which have been recognized by high Defense officials.

Too often in the past, funds have been appropriated for weapons and other objectives when Defense officials said they needed the money, only to find during the hearings in the following years, that they did not use the money for the purposes for which it had been appropriated. This practice has tended to downgrade the appropriation process. For example, over the last nine years, Congress has appropriated over \$1,600,000,000 for 71 new ships and ship conversions which have been canceled by the Navy and most of the funds have been diverted to other shipbuilding programs.

Too often, budget estimates have been made without firm foundations.

This is evidenced by the high level of reprogramming of defense funds which has taken place. For the past fiscal year, 1970, individual reprogramming actions for all purposes received by the Committee involved 299 increases totaling \$2,431,763,000 and 422 reductions totaling \$2,313,427,000, for a total dollar change of more than \$4.7 billion.

Some of these changes were minor. Some merely involved technical budgetary adjustments. But some involved major programs and major national defense decisions. All represent changes to Defense Budget programs presented to Congress and enacted by the Congress. Major programs changed include the Safeguard ABM, the F-14 and F-111 aircraft, the DD 963 destroyer program and other ships and claims for cost overruns in prior year shipbuilding programs, restoration of the USS Gultarro (SSN-665), and Minuteman missiles. In addition, a number of "below the threshold" reprogramming which, under present procedures, do not come before the Committee, have been accomplished.

The Committee does not propose to eliminate the reprogramming process. It fully realizes that some degree of flexibility is necessary. But the Committee does believe that a few more steps can be done in defense planning and that better planning would be reflected in fewer reprogrammings. The volume of reprogrammings is a strong indication that much defense planning is superficial and without firm foundation.

DELAY IN REPORTING BILL

The Committee regrets that the Defense Appropriation Bill is being presented at a late date again this year.

The Defense bill was scheduled to be reported from the Committee on Appropriations on June 3, 1970. The Committee completed the hearings on May 13th, exactly on the schedule laid down early in the year, and would have been able to meet the reporting schedule. However, most procurement and all research, development, test, and evaluation appropriations have, in recent years, required annual authorization. The annual authorization legislation conference report did not clear Congress until October 1. The House passed the authorizing legislation on May 6, the Senate on September 1. The conferees met first on September 22.

After authorization levels are established on a bill of the magnitude, importance, and complexity of the Defense Appropriation bill, it is desirable that the Appropriations Committee have a reasonable time in which to review the hearings, reach decisions on the many items involved in the bill, write an adequate report, and present the bill to the House of Representatives.

The lateness of the passage of the bill complicates efforts to effectively manage the programs of the Department of Defense. Program managers cannot firmly plan their efforts. Congress is to some extent frustrated in efforts to accelerate or reduce programs since spending for much of the fiscal year is accomplished under continuing resolutions and substantial spending takes place prior to final Congressional action. Programs which Congress wishes to delete or modify continue under the Continuing Resolution and savings which should result from Congressional reductions are diminished. Reductions made late in the fiscal year give Departmental managers a very short time to react to and implement Congressional decisions. Congress must make thorough reviews of Defense budgets, but Congress also needs to improve the timeliness of its actions.

CLOSER CONTROL OF CARRYOVER BALANCES

In its action on the Defense Appropriation Bill for Fiscal Year 1970, the Committee recommended the enactment of limitations which would have made appropriations for Procurement and Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation available for obligation for specific periods of time rather than available until expended. This action was recommended as a means of tightening Congressional control of Defense Department appropriations. The action recommended would have reduced the unobligated and unexpended balances in Defense Appropriations.

When funds remain available until expenditure, financial managers can recoup sums when contracts are cancelled, contingency funds are not utilized, programs slip or are changed in scope, or in other ways. Such funds are held and are applied to other programs as required in subsequent years. A recent example is in a reprogramming request submitted to the Committee on September 24th which "found" unexpended funds from fiscal years 1961, 1962, 1963, 1964, 1965, and 1966, primarily from the construction of POLARIS submarines, as a source of funding. The availability of these funds makes defense planners, to a limited extent, immune from tight Congressional fiscal control.

The Committees involved with defense funding apply a degree of control through the reprogramming process. Changing the present "no-year" appropriations to multi-year appropriations would provide an additional measure of control to the whole Congress.

The House concurred in the Committee's recommendation last year and the provisions referred to were included in the bill passed by the House.

The Senate Committee concurred in the objectives of the House but, after appeals made by the Defense Department, substituted an alternative proposition which continued "no-year" appropriations but required that future budget submissions identify all old balances and recommend them for rescission. The House agreed to the Senate proposition in conference.

The alternate procedure has proven to be difficult and confusing in operation. The fiscal year 1971 budget reported certain amounts for rescission, but contrary to the understanding given the House conferees, included like and offsetting amounts in the budget over and above the program amounts required. This made the proposed rescission action ineffective in reducing balances in that a rescission or reduction in new obligational authority is required in order to reach the budget authority or "President's Budget" amount.

Thus, as presented in the 1971 Budget, the rescissions recommended did not reduce balances since they were offset by appropriation requests in excess of program requirements. The sums appropriated above program requirements then become part of the unobligated balance. This is a fiscal game in which the Committee will not participate.

Further, the amounts estimated for rescission appear to be based on very optimistic obligation rates. Probably, considerably larger amounts should have been reported for rescission.

In order to reduce balances as was anticipated in the enactment of the alternate legislation last year, in the accompanying bill the committee has in each instance made an additional reduction in the same amount as the sum reported for rescission. This second reduction is a valid reduction in the new budget authority requested. The authorizing legislation included similar action.

Additional confusion was created by the way in which the estimates were presented to the authorizing committees. The submission of the Defense Department made it appear that a single reduction from the appropriation estimates would be a reduction in the budget request and erroneously ignored the rescission requirement entirely.

The Committee feels that the language proposed in the accompanying bill is more straightforward and clear and will effectively reduce unobligated balances. The language is the same, except that the dates are changed to reflect the passage of a year, as the language adopted by the House last year.

Appropriations for most major procurements will be available for only three fiscal years, shipbuilding appropriations will be available for only five fiscal years, and research, development, test, and evaluation appropriations will be available for only two fiscal years. The Defense Department recognizes these terms as approximate average spend-out periods and in its internal operations requires that the military departments obtain the approval of the Secretary of Defense for the reutilization of any balance available beyond these time periods.

[Further portions of this report will appear in a subsequent issue of the RECORD.]

I have been complaining to the Defense Department, as others have for

years, "Why don't you put a man on the job and give him time to do it?" Often about the time the project begins to flounder, he is transferred somewhere else.

If you were to run an American business and had a man on the job for a few weeks, a few months, or maybe a couple of years or a bit more, and then transferred him to some other job, you would often have nothing but chaos. That is one of the reasons we have had so much inefficiency in the Department of Defense. Officials often do not let people stay in jobs long enough to know what it is all about. If there is anyone who has hit that point hard, it is that great and admirable military statesman, Admiral Rickover. I am told by officials in the Pentagon that something is going to be done about this. I believe a policy change is in the offing and that is very encouraging. We can get a lot more for our money, and have less likelihood of tax increases, and perhaps additional funds for other programs of a high-priority nature if this can be achieved.

I could go on at great length, Mr. Chairman, but let me quote further from our report:

PERMANENT CHANGE OF STATION TRAVEL

The Committee has long been critical of the frequency with which the services move their people from assignment to assignment. It has been a common practice of the Committee for many years to apply reductions to this area. However, even though the reductions have been made, the services have shown only modest improvement in this area.

During this year's hearings many pages of testimony were devoted to the very serious retention problems now being experienced by the services. One of the major factors leading young officers and enlisted personnel to resign from the service is the frequency with which they are shuffled from assignment to assignment. Yet the rotation policies of the military departments continue unabated.

The Blue Ribbon Defense Panel in their Report to the President and to the Secretary of Defense was highly critical of current rotation policies. The Panel in their report stated:

Officers and enlisted men are rotated among assignments at much too frequent intervals.

It is clear from the evidence that the rotation practices which have been followed result in (a) excessive and wasteful cost, (b) inefficiencies in management, and (c) difficulty in fixing responsibility.

A staff study of Army, Navy and Air Force promotions to General Officer and Flag rank in 1969 revealed this situation: there were 174 officers in the group and their average service was 24 years; these officers had been given 3,895 assignments, or an average of 21 per man; the average duration per assignment was 14 months.

Looked at another way, the average officers had spent: 8 years in Operational assignments, 5 years in Service Schools and other educational assignments, and 11 years in Staff Assignments.

For fiscal year 1971 the budgets of all branches of the service reflect a reduction in Permanent Change of Station Travel below their 1970 budgeted level. However, this reduction results from decreases in troop strength and not from any improvements in rotation policy. These reductions are reflected in the following table.

PERMANENT CHANGE OF STATION TRAVEL

	Fiscal year 1970	Fiscal year 1971	Reduction
Army.....	\$613,441,000	\$524,691,000	-\$88,750,000
Navy.....	264,898,000	229,965,000	-34,933,000
Marine Corps.....	106,860,000	105,125,000	-1,735,000
Air Force.....	418,150,000	414,760,000	-3,390,000

While the Committee applauds the above reductions it must be reemphasized that these reductions do not reflect improvements in rotation policy. Therefore, the Committee has applied an additional reduction of 10 percent to each service. However, because of the fact that the fiscal year is now one-fourth over, a 10 percent reduction applied to three-fourths of the year will result in a dollar savings of 7.5 percent. This additional reduction totals \$95,175,000.

The Committee appreciates the problems faced by the Military Departments in connection with the high volume of personnel movement necessitated by our commitments in Southeast Asia. This has been taken into account in determining the appropriate reduction and the Committee's action in no way interferes with the funds required to support our withdrawal plans or any permanent change of station moves that will result from such plans.

The current rotation policies of the Military Departments are unrealistic and must be revised. The Committee expects the Department of Defense to thoroughly review existing policy and procedures and to initiate the necessary changes. The Department of Defense is directed to report to the Committee the changes in the permanent change of station assignment regulations as developed. The Committee likewise intends to closely scrutinize the budget request for fiscal year 1972 for Permanent Change of Station Travel and will expect to see a budget request that reflects meaningful change in existing rotation policy.

I might mention one other thing. I have here a newspaper article of August 3 which tells about our firing of a Poseidon missile, the follow-on to the Polaris missile, 20 miles off the coast of Florida. A Russian ship was a short distance from the firing point. We were being rushed more or less by the Soviet ship. Then, after the successful firing, when we attempted to pick up the debris, the Russian ship ran across the bow of our Navy ship, and our ship had to reverse at full speed in order to prevent a collision.

Do indignities like that grow out of the fact that America is weak? Is it evidence that we are weak that these kinds of things happen? Is it because the defense budget is too small? Of course not. That is ridiculous. There was the hijacking on the high seas of the U.S.S. *Pueblo*. Did that little Asian country, which we could liquidate in a few hours, do that because of the military weakness of our country? Was it because of the weakness of our Army or Navy or Air Force? Of course not. We had the power to react, but we chose another course, and I am not passing judgment on the course we chose.

Our lack of military might was not a factor in this incident. Some people do not seem to understand that.

Do Members think the trouble in the Mediterranean is because of the military weakness of the country or the lack of the expenditure of defense dollars by the

American people? Do Members think that? Of course not. We know of the troubles which have arisen in the Mediterranean area and of the inroads which have been made by the Soviet Union. Military might has not been the controlling factor.

What I am trying to say is that money will not buy everything. It is not the only factor in the equation. Money cannot give will and stability to people. We do have to spend a great deal of money, and I think the defense budget may be higher next year in some respects if the Soviet Union, which is almost as strong as this country now—although the President spoke last night and referred to us as the most powerful Nation in the world, and, of course, he is right—continues to build up its intercontinental ballistic missiles or the equivalent thereof in submarines, and if the arms limitation talks do not work out successfully, and the arms race continues. If this happens we are going to be outgunned strategically unless we increase our strategic power—and that would mean more intercontinental ballistic missiles. I hope the limitation talks will prove successful. If not, and the arms race continues, more Polaris submarines will be required, in my opinion. I strongly support the submarine launched missile as a deterrent to war.

What I am trying to say is if the President in his peace efforts—and he is devoting his best energy to peace—fails, we, in order to prevent our becoming a military second-class nation, are going to have to spend more in certain areas of defense. I just want to say that bluntly at this time, because in the interests of defense, the Committee on Appropriations believes we must do what is necessary to be strong. Regardless of cost, we must do that which is necessary to preserve the dignity and strength of the United States.

Mr. BYRNES of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MAHON. I yield to the gentleman from Wisconsin.

Mr. BYRNES of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the gentleman's remarks with respect to the defense bill, which is currently before us, but I would like to inquire as to whether the gentleman intends in some way to advise the House, before we recess next week, as to where we stand in the area of appropriations vis-a-vis the budget, and with respect to items that will still be held over, and where they are, and what will be before us when we reconvene in November.

I believe many Members would appreciate having a compilation or a tabulation when they go home with respect to where we stand as of the recess next week, and what remains before us.

Mr. MAHON. The gentleman has asked a very pertinent question.

Mr. Chairman, it now appears that in the 14 regular annual appropriation bills dealing with the current fiscal year 1971, the Congress will, in the aggregate, hold the approved total somewhat below the total requested by the President. It is too early to be too precise about the amount, but it seems clear that Congress will

probably be below the President's requests in the appropriation bills—perhaps in the range of \$1 billion, give or take a few hundred million.

In other words, the Members can say there is every indication that when this Congress adjourns, whenever it is after the election, we will be below the President's budget in the appropriation bills. Just exactly what the figure will be I do not, of course, know at this time, but perhaps it will be in the area of \$1 billion, give or take.

Mr. BYRNES of Wisconsin. I am asking the gentleman whether he will have a compilation as to where we stand that he will be able to put in the Record or in some way make available to the membership as to each of the appropriation bills on which we have acted, and what is the status of bills that have not gone to the White House as of the time we recess next week. I wonder if the gentleman could do that, either through his staff on the Appropriations Committee of the Joint Committee on Reduction of Federal Expenditures.

I would say to the gentleman, I have difficulty reconciling his last statement with the last report issued by the Committee on Reduction of Federal Expenditures. It seems to me—and perhaps the gentleman's recollection is better than mine—that the last report of that committee showed we were exceeding the budget in any number of areas, either in the House or in the Senate or in both.

Mr. MAHON. The gentleman is referring to a different aspect of the matter. I thought we were referring only to the appropriation bills.

On the nonappropriation bills, in mandatory Treasury spending through backdoor devices or otherwise, the latest budget scorekeeping report showed we were over \$2 billion above the budget, mainly by reason of bills from the legislative committees. But, of course, many of the bills—both appropriation and nonappropriation—have not been finalized.

I do not know what the final outcome will be.

Mr. BYRNES of Wisconsin. The gentleman's figure of a billion dollars under the budget, I assume, does not take into consideration the excess over the budget contained in the Independent Offices appropriation bill which was vetoed?

Mr. MAHON. Yes, I was hazarding a guess as to the probable final outcome for all of the 14 regular annual appropriation bills, including a new bill to replace the vetoed bill. Of course that bill, when it passes, will, I assume, be below the total of the one the President vetoed. But even taking that into consideration we are still below the budget, or will be, on the appropriation bills. In the other bills, of course, it looks like, a different story.

Mr. BYRNES of Wisconsin. Would the gentleman advise me—he has not advised me yet—whether it will be possible for him to have a compilation as to where we stand which will be available to us when we recess next week?

Mr. MAHON. We certainly will do so. We had planned to do so, just as we have been doing periodically.

Mr. BYRNES of Wisconsin. Then, you will have a current one for us up to date in the early part of next week?

Mr. MAHON. That is correct.

Mr. BYRNES of Wisconsin. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. ADDABBO. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MAHON. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. ADDABBO. On page 5 of the report we discuss the serious question of the Middle East. In the defense authorization bill we have a section 501 relative to aid in that area. Are there any funds or is there any provision in the appropriation bill that would cover any aid for that area?

Mr. MAHON. Yes. There are funds in this bill which would be available for increasing American strength in the Middle East area. Of course, we are aware of elements of the U.S. fleet which we have recently sent there at a cost of \$50 million, that is when we compute related costs. So these funds are in some respect available for increasing our strength in that part of the world.

Mr. ADDABBO. Relative to the authorization in the defense authorization under section 501, are those funds stated under the foreign assistance military assistance program?

Mr. MAHON. These have not been provided, but no doubt there will be an increased amount proposed to be made available for American participation in the way of aid, and that will be in a budget estimate that will come later in this session.

Mr. ADDABBO. I thank the chairman.

Mr. FOLEY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MAHON. I yield to the gentleman from Washington.

Mr. FOLEY. Mr. Chairman, the committee report refers in its remarks on page 5 to funding the provisions for military sales credits for Israel under the "Military Assistance Program." Am I correct in assuming that this is really a descriptive term and that the funds will eventually be appropriated pursuant to the Military Procurement Act?

Mr. MAHON. I do not know at this time just how the funding request will be forwarded to Congress. I know and I have on very high authority that a budget estimate will be submitted at a later date. How it will be handled by Congress will be determined at that time. I cannot tell how the request will be transmitted to Congress.

I yield to the gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. PASSMAN) for an answer on that.

Mr. PASSMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I assume the gentleman's question had to do with the military assistance for Israel.

Mr. FOLEY. Yes, indeed.

Mr. PASSMAN. I spoke with General Warren this morning, and in all probability, at a very early date, there will be a budget request for a supplemental and as quickly as the supplemental request reaches the House I am sure it will be referred to my committee and we will immediately start hearings in order to bring it out as expeditiously as we can.

Does that answer your question?

Mr. FOLEY. My question, Mr. Chairman, was for the purpose of correcting what I believe is a possible misunderstanding which could arise from the committee report. I assume that the reference in the committee report to military sales credits for Israel under the military assistance program is merely descriptive and that actually such funds will be appropriated pursuant to section 501 of the Military Act.

Mr. MAHON. The President can request funds under section 501 of the authorization act as he sees appropriate. The fact that section 501 is carried in one bill does not mean that this would necessarily control the appropriation. I think I have taken so much time, Mr. Chairman, and I know Members would like to get on with the bill, that I think I must not take further time.

Mr. HALL. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MAHON. I yield to the gentleman from Missouri.

Mr. HALL. Mr. Chairman, members of this committee are certainly familiar with the distinguished chairman of the committee, the gentleman from Texas, and his farflung subcommittees and their propensity for delving into the very details to which he has addressed himself this morning.

But somewhere in between broncos and mustangs and quoting from the Under Secretary's letter, with the gentleman's "Lincolnesque" oratory and his propensity for Shakespearean histrionics, I failed to get whether he is for this bill that his committee brings onto the floor of the House, or not.

Would the gentleman state in the affirmative or in the negative?

Mr. MAHON. I am overwhelmed by the gentleman from Missouri and I am glad to have the opportunity to say that I wholeheartedly support this measure and I hope it will be enacted. It is essential to our security as a nation.

As I said earlier, there are about \$70 billion in this bill and others that will be required for defense and then the supplemental which will run into hundreds of millions of dollars involving the Middle East which will be added to that. Then, added to that will be funds for increased pay. So this is not by any means the totality of the cost involved.

Mr. HALL. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will yield further, was the gentleman quoting from a letter from someone else or is it his own concluded opinion when, if I may paraphrase him, he said that the Department of Defense was overfunded, overstaffed, and under-accomplished?

Mr. MAHON. I was quoting from the Deputy Secretary of Defense.

Mr. HALL. This is not the distinguished chairman's conclusion, and he thinks we should continue as I heard another part of the gentleman's speech to provide adequate funds—

Mr. MAHON. Yes. Yes. We must provide necessary funds.

Mr. HALL. So that we do not become a second-rate defensive-power nation?

Mr. MAHON. That is right.

Mr. HALL. Becoming a second-rate defensive nation in the world of nations without letting the people of the United States know it, before the fact; is that the gentleman's position? Does he favor this bill with or without amendment?

Mr. MAHON. I favor this bill. However, there are some problems in O. and M. which we will discuss later. Otherwise, I think it is the best we can do under the circumstances and at this time. Additional funds can always be provided if required.

I must say that Mr. Packard is devoted to defense and is devoted to the security of the United States. He is an able man. He is so concerned and anxious to get the house in order so that the credibility of defense will be so great that he can get the money that he needs in future years.

Mr. HALL. Is the gentleman referring to the Fitzhugh panel?

Mr. MAHON. Yes, I am. It endorses everything in the panel—

Mr. HALL. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman's current calmness and equanimity is reassuring me and is very worthwhile.

Mr. MAHON. I thank my friend.

Mr. HALL. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, a great patriot, a great leader. We have all worked together, as friends for the security of the United States and we have helped keep it the strongest power in the world.

Mr. RIVERS. I just want to say to the distinguished chairman that I have listened to his statement. I think, however, that in his zeal to try to save money—and I commend him for his effort to save money—he did say some things which, perhaps, he will want to look over again. We try to save money in our committee all the time. I am sure the gentleman can document the statement he has made that waste exists in the Department of Defense. Everyone else talks about waste in the Department of Defense and the chairman of the Committee on Appropriations, of course, can talk about waste in the Department of Defense.

But, Mr. Chairman, I hope the gentleman will read his speech carefully before he leaves it in the Record, because I think when he reads it he will want to modify some of his remarks in order that his real meaning may be perfectly clear to everyone who reads them.

Therefore, I urge the great chairman of the Committee on Appropriations to reread his remarks very carefully lest they be taken out of context, and could be hurtful to Defense officials.

And I am not here trying to give you a lesson in logic, but I have made some remarks myself that I would like to have changed. But as a friend I hope that you will review your remarks carefully.

Mr. MAHON. Well, for example?

Mr. RIVERS. I have finished. But I do want to thank the distinguished gentleman for the nice things he said about me before he finished his statement.

Mr. MAHON. I do not recall any remarks which are out of character; but I would say to my good friend that I am a man of caution and I will carefully review my remarks. I am very pro defense and my only interest is to be helpful. I do believe we must face up to our shortcomings if we are to adequately cope with waste and management.

We cannot sweep the shortcomings of the military or of Congress under the rug. But we must recognize perfection is unattainable. We stand together for strong defense. If we are to err it is better to err on the strong side. I thank my good friend.

Mr. MINSHALL. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 15 minutes.

Mr. Chairman, at the very outset I think I would be remiss if I did not at least briefly comment on the President's peace proposal that he made to the Nation and to the world last night. I hope and trust that it is a step toward peace that we all earnestly desire. It was met with acclaim in all of the capitals of the world with the exception of one, and that was Hanoi, and of course silence from Peking and Moscow. I should like also to recall to the House that on September 1 of this year I telegraphed the President recommending that he make such a cease-fire proposal.

Mr. Chairman, as always, my good friend and colleague, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. MAHON), and the distinguished chairman of our Defense Subcommittee, has presented the defense appropriation bill to the House in what I believe to be a very succinct and understandable form.

Last December we who serve on the subcommittee took justifiable pride in presenting to the House after many, many months of work, a military budget showing the greatest dollar reduction since fiscal year 1954, at the end of the Korean war. So it is even with more pride that we bring to you today the 1971 appropriation which is more than \$6 billion less than the fiscal 1970 figure reported by our subcommittee last year.

Further, the \$66 billion plus is almost \$2.1 billion below the amount requested for fiscal 1971.

I should also like to point out to the committee that the defense appropriation subcommittee has decreased the budget, the military budget, in the past 4 years alone by \$14.5 billion, which is a credible figure and a record that this subcommittee is also very proud.

Now these reductions have real meaning for the taxpayers and added significance in that they indicate a scaled-down level of spending on the Vietnamese conflict. In that respect, I think all fair-minded Members on both sides of the aisle will agree that the President is doing an admirable job of resolving this tragic and over-prolonged war.

This administration has fulfilled and is fulfilling every promise and pledge that the President has made regarding the war, including the withdrawal of our troops from Cambodia by last June 30. After the years of frustration and disillusionment created by the overly optimistic promises and broken pledges of the

previous administration, the American public is beginning to realize that the new administration keeps its promises—that its word is its bond.

President Nixon said he would Vietnamize the war and this he is doing—the Vietnamization program is working and working well. When he took office 21 months ago, there were 540,000 American troops in Vietnam. That graph has gone down to 375,000 American troops today—that is 165,000 less—with every assurance that at least—and I emphasize that—at least 260,000 will be out by next spring.

President Nixon promised to use every honorable means to bring about peace through negotiations, and I think we are all heartened by the fact that again last night he called for a cease-fire in the hope of encouraging meaningful talks at the peace table in Paris.

President Nixon made that pledge—"to reduce American involvement and not to increase it, to bring peace in accordance with the 1962 Accords and not to prolong the war"—and he is keeping that pledge.

I think tribute is due in great measure, too, to our friend and former colleague, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, who at with us in the subcommittee and we ought side by side against the policies of President Johnson and Secretary McNamara.

Mel Laird is a great Secretary of Defense, totally dedicated to the objectives of peace, a man of the highest principles and integrity who is a strong right hand of President Nixon in restoring credibility to our National Government. He stands in sharp contrast to his predecessor.

Though there is still a road for us to travel, I sincerely believe that the end of this tragic episode in our history is in sight. We can see, at long last, light at the end of the tunnel.

The President's message last night assures us of his unceasing efforts to bring about peace through negotiations. The fact that he has kept every pledge and promise made about the war in the past augurs well for the fact that the pledge he made to end the war, and the bill before us today, with its great reductions, is evidence that the war is indeed being phased out.

It is with great distress that I call to the attention of the House that we had another unfortunate tragic crash of an F-111 aircraft last night in Texas. This is the 16th such crash that the F-111's have had. I want to advise this Committee of the Whole that at the appropriate time, when the bill is being read for amendment, I am going to offer an amendment to take out the funds for the F-111 program which total \$548 million in this bill. I hope that the House will agree with me and strike out those funds.

Mr. WRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MINSHALL. I am glad to yield to the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. WRIGHT. I thank the gentleman for yielding. I also want to thank the gentleman for having been considerate enough to have advised me in advance

that he plans to offer such an amendment at the appropriate time.

The gentleman is correct in some of what he says. There have been 16 accidents in F-111's. This is the sixth one that has produced a fatality, and it produced two fatalities. That much is true.

I wonder if the gentleman has compared, however, the fact that considering all other planes that have been built since the early 1950's, for the number of hours flown, there have been more accidents and more crashes in each of those others than in the F-111's. For example, there have been 285 F-111's flown, and six of them have had fatalities. All of us feel deeply regretful of any fatality. In the past year there have been several hundred combat planes that have crashed. I wonder if the gentleman knows that in 1967 there were 67 major accidents in F-4's; there were 62 in 1968; there were 27 F-105's that crashed in 1967 and there were only two F-111's? Each of these others has had more accidents in the past 2 years than the F-111's. Does the gentleman feel that all these other military planes should be cut out of the budget?

Mr. MINSHALL. I understand the concern of the gentleman from Texas over this particular aircraft. I would be glad to discuss the subject at the time I offer my amendment. I have the highest regard and, of course, understanding of why you have such a tremendous interest in this program.

In closing my only additional comment would be I hope that next year, when we bring before you a defense budget again, we can make even greater reductions than we have in fiscal 1971.

Mr. TEAGUE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MINSHALL. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. TEAGUE of Texas. I just returned from a trip to the Strategic Air Command in Omaha, Nebr. Would the gentleman also, when he offers his amendment, tell us the attitude of the Air Force or the Department of Defense toward this airplane? I heard nothing but praise about the airplane from the people who are flying it and the people who are managing it.

Mr. MINSHALL. I should be glad to answer the gentleman from Texas' comment at the appropriate time. I understand your interest in this program. I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. SIKES), the ranking majority member of the subcommittee.

(Mr. SIKES asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. SIKES. Mr. Chairman, a great deal of work has gone into the preparation of this bill. I believe that more effort has been made, under the leadership of a great chairman by a committee which is genuinely concerned about America's defense, and by a very dedicated staff, than in any other bill that has come before us.

The committee has tried, and tried very hard, to pinpoint areas where it was felt that cuts could be made. It has tried very hard to eliminate nonessential

items and to withhold funds from those items which are not ready for development or production. We feel we can say at long last we are going to prevent cost overruns. We are trying harder to stop waste in defense. We have tried, and tried very hard, to do these important things.

That does not change the fact that, in my opinion, we have cut too deeply in some sensitive and important areas. I think some cuts are more serious than can be justified, and I think they will do harm to our defense posture in the years immediately ahead. We have become accustomed to saying that, militarily, we are the strongest power in the world. There is some question about that now. There is serious question about it now. Those who are really familiar with Communist power know they are making very significant progress militarily. Mr. Chairman, this bill does not contribute to maintaining our status as the strongest military power in the world. This bill, and two or three more like it, will assure that we become a second-rate power. While we are cutting back, the Russians are forging ahead, and they are forging ahead in very important areas.

We shall have to forge ahead also. We are lagging in modernization and in new weapons and equipment, and in new techniques. We are in that critical posture where we may soon start dropping appreciably behind the Soviets in military strength, and the world will be quick to get the signal. The Soviet Union knows how to flex its muscles, and the world is not fooled when we substitute words for weapons.

The report, which is a very useful one and a very thorough piece of work, does not fully spell out the Soviet threat. It does not fully spell out the strength of the Communist forces. I am afraid, Mr. Chairman, it makes our own forces look more impervious than they are. We are strong and I do not downgrade our strength, but strength is relative. I am convinced that, unless we step up our defense expenditures in important areas, we will be bypassed by 1975 and become a second-rate military power.

Mr. Chairman, I would hope that the Members here today will look carefully at the figures that are before us. The report indicates the committee has taken \$2.1 billion out of this bill, but the cut does not include a \$400 million add-on for naval ships. That means we have actually cut \$2.5 billion out of this bill. That is 3.5 percent below the budget recommendation. But more significantly, the 1971 budget estimate proposes a \$4 billion cut below the 1970 defense program. So we are \$6.5 billion below the 1970 level of spending, and that is about a 10-percent reduction in funds for our defense forces and our equipment, and modernization for the United States.

This is more significant if we take into consideration the fact that the cut is being made despite much higher costs of defense. This is the smallest fund bill percentage-wise for defense expenditures that has been presented to the Congress in years, and, unless I am mistaken, the lowest since before the Korean war.

Now let me add also the fact that the Department of Defense is one of the very

few agencies of Government, and I think the only agency, where budget recommendations are lower than they were last year. This is one of the few bills that has been brought to the floor by the Committee on Appropriations this year where there have been significant cuts. In quite a few bills there were add-ons above the budget. This despite the fact that we are short in many areas in defense needs. We are short in equipment for ourselves and our allies. We are short in modernization. We are headed for trouble if this continues. Low budgets are not the fault of the committee, but over-cutting adds to the gravity of the problem. Here we have both.

I want the Members to think on the boldness with which the Russians are moving out—diplomatically and militarily. They can read the temper of the American people and of the Congress. They see the demands for less defense and more domestic spending. They see a gradual scaledown in our defense posture. They are encouraged and emboldened. Their progress in the Middle East is too well known to require comment here. Now, for the first time in history, Russian naval units have held maneuvers in the Caribbean. They dared to hamper U.S. testing of its Poseidon missile. They have had the colossal nerve to begin building a submarine base in Cuba.

Mr. Chairman, that submarine base in Cuba is more dangerous than the missile sites which President Kennedy forced the Russians to withdraw some years ago. But the Russians are building it and thus far they have met with nothing more serious than a single protest.

Mr. Chairman, this bill takes into account many different programs and activities. It takes into consideration reductions in personnel which are proposed by the administration for the Armed Forces. I am glad to state this committee does not require any reduction in military personnel. It forces no one out of uniform. It makes cuts because the administration has proposed reductions in uniformed personnel and all of the budgeted figures will not be needed. I am concerned that those cuts in uniformed personnel may be greater than they should be, but I realize that reductions in personnel can be remedied reasonably quickly, although to remedy reductions is costly. It is the slowdown in modernization and the lack of equipment that is most dangerous. Modernization depends upon the development of new weapons and weapons systems, and this takes time. It takes a great deal of time to develop a weapon and to put it in production.

We know ours is an aging Navy with great need for modern ships.

Look at Navy ships. We have money in the bill for a few additional Navy ships. Yet the number is small and it will be years before those modern ships are ready to join the fleet. We need many more and we need them much earlier than they can possibly be made available.

The snail's pace of some of our programs should be shocking to us, but I am afraid the American people have been made to feel we are making tremendous progress.

Look at Safeguard. We are arguing about whether to build one or three or 12 Safeguard sites. We are embarked now on three Safeguard sites, at a very slow pace. Despite all the publicity, a program of this magnitude will not give the American people or our missile sites any significant protection. At this level it is a prototype program only. It should be expanded, for at the present rate it is going to be years and years before the system is a brake on aggression from any source.

These things do not fool the Russians, but I am afraid they may be fooling the American people.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Florida has expired.

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I yield the gentleman from Florida 5 additional minutes.

Mr. SIKES. Mr. Chairman, I am not going to spell out the procurement cuts and operation and maintenance cuts, and research and development cuts. They will be discussed later in sufficient detail. But let me say again, I fear the procurement cuts, the operation and maintenance cuts, and the research and development cuts, in some instances, may be entirely too deep.

Operation and maintenance is cut 12 percent below the figure of a year ago, yet it is in operation and maintenance of forces that we find the heart and the guts of a military organization. If the military organizations cannot maintain their equipment and keep it operational, if they cannot have adequate training and operational funding for personnel, they cannot have effective fighting forces.

If we have cut too deeply in procurement, it means there will not be follow-on of the weapons which will be needed so very badly in the years ahead.

If we have cut too deeply in research and development, it means that the development of new weapons for the next generation is going to be stunted, and we will drop even further behind in this all-important area called modernization.

Yes, Mr. Chairman, I support the efforts for cuts in defense costs where they can be justified. But, in all sincerity, I am afraid we have gone too far in some of the reductions that are made in this bill.

I say that not to be critical of the committee, for its work was done in good faith, but in genuine apprehension for what may happen to our defense on tomorrow.

I know that the taxpayer wants reductions in costs everywhere, but I know also, if I know anything about the American people, that the taxpayer realizes a second-best defense is the most costly luxury we can have. There is no such thing as a second-best poker hand, and we cannot afford the second-best defense in the dangerous world in which we live.

Mr. BRAY. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SIKES. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. BRAY. Referring to title IV, dealing with procurement, on page 15 of the bill, line 3, it says:

Provided, That none of the funds provided in this Act shall be available for the maintenance of more than two active production

sources for the supplying of M-16 rifles or for the payment of any price differential for M-16 rifles resulting from the maintenance of more than two active production sources.

I discussed this matter with the gentleman. My interest is that I was the ranking minority member of the committee that went into the investigation of the M-16 rifle. There were serious problems as to both procurement and malfunctioning of the rifle. Congress finally, after 3 or 4 years of effort, did get the Army to secure additional sources of supply. This provision in this legislation is cutting out at least one of those three sources of supply at a time when the M-14 rifle has gone completely off the production line and we are totally dependent on the M-16. I do have information that the plan is to move production of this line, or at least one of those lines, to a foreign country where it will take away business from American labor, and from our experience it costs a good deal more to build these rifles abroad.

I have discussed the matter with the gentleman, and I would like to have it as a matter of record that the gentleman stated he would oppose with all of his ability any plan to move the production line that is being cut down and moved to a foreign country or to stop any production line of this rifle being moved to a foreign country.

Is that correct?

Mr. SIKES. The gentleman's committee should have credit for the effort that it made to increase production of the M-16 rifle at a time when we needed it badly. This was done through their efforts. There are now three production lines for the production of this rifle.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has again expired.

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I yield the gentleman 2 additional minutes.

Mr. SIKES. The Department of the Army testified before our committee that we now actually need, because we have much more capacity than the foreseeable requirements for the M-16, only one source of procurement. It also was stated, to maintain three production sources would cost an additional \$14 million a year. Therefore, the committee, not wanting to deny competition but not feeling that we should insist on three sources of supply, wrote language into the bill which was intended to provide that there could be competition and to insure that there would be at least two sources of supply.

I know of no plan to move the third source of supply to another country and produce rifles there for our own forces. I certainly think it would be a mistake to do that, and I would oppose any such effort.

Mr. BRAY. Then, the gentleman would oppose any plan, to the best of his ability, to move production lines for the production of these rifles into a foreign country?

Mr. SIKES. I do not want to state that I would attempt to interfere with the construction of plants in other countries whose governments feel that they need those plants for their own requirements. However, I have said, and I repeat, that I have heard of no efforts to move one of the present production lines in the

United States to another country to produce weapons for our own forces. I certainly would oppose that.

Mr. BRAY. Then, you would oppose any appropriation of American money from any source to accomplish that?

Mr. SIKES. To accomplish the purpose that I spelled out.

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may require to the gentleman from New York (Mr. Addabbo).

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 19590, the Department of Defense appropriation bill for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1971. As a member of the House Appropriations Committee and its Defense Appropriation Subcommittee, I am pleased with the general approach taken by the committee in reducing nonessential spending. I commend the staff for its outstanding help and work on this bill.

This measure provides a total appropriation of \$66,656,561,000, a reduction of more than \$2 billion below the appropriations enacted for fiscal year 1970. This rather dramatic shift in emphasis away from increasing defense expenditures I believe meets in part the growing demand and need that tighter controls be placed on Defense Department budget requests and greater emphasis be placed on domestic programs.

This reduction in defense spending together with the \$5.2 billion reduction in the 1970 appropriation reflect the greatest cutback in defense spending since the conclusion of the Korean war. I am concerned that this administration has not seen fit to shift priorities with the Congress and assign the necessary priorities to domestic programs in housing, health and education. Unfortunately legislation designed to provide greater assistance to programs in these three areas were all vetoed. I can only hope that by passing this bill before the House today and by overriding vetoes we can convince this administration that Congress intends to establish priorities through the appropriation process.

On balance I am confident that this measure will provide adequate flexibility and funding to assure a strong defense posture for the United States during the next fiscal year as well as in subsequent years. Some of the major areas covered by the bill are:

SAFEGUARD ABM SYSTEM

This bill provides funds for the continuation of phase I sites and deployment at Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri as well as advanced preparation at Warren Air Force Base in Wyoming. This bill, however, does not include any funds for the four Safeguard sites recommended by the administration for deployment of an area defense against a Chinese Communist ICBM attack. This request was struck from the authorization bill and I supported the deletion of funds for that purpose. This reduction in the scope of the Safeguard ABM program represents a major victory for those of us who have urged a slowdown in our ABM deployment pending the results of the SALT talks and closer scrutiny of the entire ABM program.

PROCUREMENT

The largest reduction in the 1971 Defense appropriation bill is under the broad category of procurement. Here the committee has obtained the agreement of the Department to follow the recommendation of a blue ribbon defense panel whose report of July 1, 1970, states that production efforts should be postponed until development programs are completed, thereby avoiding simultaneous development and production and the errors which can result from such simultaneous programs.

One of the items deleted from the authorization bill was the proposed funding for advanced procurement of nuclear propulsion plant components for a third new naval aircraft carrier—the CVAN-70. I have opposed funding for this carrier after testimony before our subcommittee that its development would not increase our protection at home but would merely increase our ability to land more troops abroad. This program, in my opinion, does not involve the threat of Soviet Union naval buildup.

SOUTHEAST ASIA

Mr. Chairman, while I support H.R. 19590 and believe this is on balance a good bill, there are several sections which I oppose and wish to point out to my colleagues. These sections relate to our involvement in Asia and the limitations on the use of these appropriated funds for future involvements.

Section 843 of H.R. 19590 provides that no funds shall be used "to finance the introduction of American ground combat troops into Laos or Thailand." The section does not mention either North Vietnam or Cambodia and I am concerned that the absence of reference to these countries may cause some administration officials to believe they may use funds for future invasions of these nations without the consent of Congress. The intent of Congress should be clear—that we oppose the introduction of U.S. combat troops in any part of Asia without prior authorization by the Congress. Naturally, unless of by reason of national emergency.

Another section which concerns me is section 838(a)(1) which provides that funds appropriated under this bill may be used "to support: First, Vietnamese and other free world forces in support of Vietnamese forces." This provision does not require that the forces need be fighting in South Vietnam and I am concerned that this section may be construed by some to mean that funds can be used to aid South Vietnamese forces fighting in Cambodia or other forces fighting in countries bordering Vietnam. Again, I believe we should clarify the congressional intent that our role in Vietnam be limited and decreased as rapidly as possible with no repetition of invasions such as the Cambodia invasion of earlier this year without congressional resolution.

MIDDLE EAST

I strongly support the language in the committee report—page 5—which expresses the sense of the committee that the President should have the authority

to provide military assistance to Israel in order to restore the balance of military power in the Middle East and lessen the danger to world peace from the crisis in that area. I have been disturbed by the failure of this administration to respond in a more timely manner to the requests by Israel for Phantom jets and other military equipment. Because of this failure our relations with Israel have deteriorated and there is confusion concerning our policy in the Middle East. The statement in the committee report should make clear the position of Congress and give the President the support for appropriate steps to bolster our relations with Israel and we ask that the request for supplemental funds for these needs be immediately forthcoming and acted upon.

Mr. MINSHALL. Mr. Chairman, I yield 15 minutes to the gentleman from Arizona (Mr. RHODES).

(Mr. RHODES asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. RHODES. Mr. Chairman, I wish at the outset to commend the members of the subcommittee and particularly the distinguished chairman of the subcommittee for a very hard-working effort which culminated in the bill which we have before us today.

The hearings were long, the hearings were arduous, they were sometimes interesting and sometimes deadly dull. But they were certainly thorough. I can say to the members of the Committee that insofar as I know there were figuratively speaking, very few stones in the Pentagon building which were not taken out, scraped off and replaced, and we hope that the defense of the country is stronger because of the bill we have before us than it was previously.

I particularly want to thank the Chairman for all of the courtesies which he has extended to the members of the subcommittee, as he always does. He is a very thoughtful, a very thorough man, a very valuable Member of the House of Representatives. It has always been a real pleasure to have the privilege of serving with him and under him.

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. RHODES. I am glad to yield to the distinguished chairman of the committee.

Mr. MAHON. I want to thank my friend, the gentleman from Arizona (Mr. RHODES), for those very kind words.

Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from Arizona is a man of stature, of ability and strength. The gentleman is well informed and has performed a good job, along with the other members of the subcommittee.

I do appreciate those generous remarks.

In the markup of the bill, as the gentleman knows, we tried to listen to the views of everyone and, generally, from those views we accepted them or compromised them and came to a compromise agreement on the entire bill which is before the House today; is that correct?

Mr. RHODES. The Chairman is absolutely correct. The markup I think was particularly well handled. The staff was exceedingly well prepared with some very good rifle-shot cuts which I think should and will be sustained.

I would like to say, however, that I have a wide area of agreement with the gentleman from Florida (Mr. SIKES) who preceded me in the well because I think in certain instances we probably cut deeper than we should have.

I am informed that the Chairman at the proper time will offer an amendment to restore certain funds, and I certainly intend to support that amendment and I think most of the members of the subcommittee will.

Mr. Chairman, I think it is fair to go into the recent fiscal background of the Department of Defense. In the years, since the fiscal year 1969 to the present fiscal year, the budget request of the administration is some \$5.5 billion lower. In other words, the amount of money appropriated for 1969 was some \$5.5 billion higher than the amount of money requested by the administration in fiscal year 1971. During this time the unobligated balances available to the Department of Defense have gone down from a figure of \$11.666 billion to \$6.233 billion. So, the pipeline has been cut down in those years and in effect the Department of Defense has been living on its fat.

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. RHODES. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. MAHON. The gentleman is making a very interesting talk. I think it would be good to exchange a few ideas here. As the gentleman knows, with the funds provided in this bill and carryovers from previous years, the Department of Defense will have available to it during the current fiscal year \$105 billion. But, of course, the gentleman knows that most of these funds, but not all, have been committed. Some of the funds will not be spent this year.

Mr. RHODES. The Chairman is correct.

Mr. MAHON. I think it ought to be said that as the President is winding down the war in Vietnam, there have been many hundreds of millions of dollars that have not been spent that would have been spent had the war continued at the same tempo.

So that is one of the reasons why the reductions have been made possible.

Mr. RHODES. The total figure of unexpended balances at the end of fiscal 1971 will be \$35,383,000,000. All but \$6,233 billion are unobligated, so that in my way of figuring, whether it is right or wrong, if a dollar is obligated it is the same as spent. There is of course a certain leeway to deobligate, and reobligate funds, but I do not think we can assume that this will be done.

So the figure we use for the funds available for the next fiscal year is \$6.233 billion, which is unobligated in the next fiscal year, plus the amount which will be appropriated which is something like \$66.5 billion, which makes a total of \$72

billion which will be available in the coming fiscal year.

So the pipeline has been reduced.

And I think it would not be fair to say that the Department of Defense is now overly endowed with *avoirdupois*. It has been cut very considerably, perhaps to the bone, perhaps in some cases into the marrow.

On top of that, we all know that in the past years there has been an erosion in the purchasing price of the dollar, so that perhaps 10 percent of the dollars which we now have available must be taken off if we are to compare the total with the dollars which were available in the year 1969. So we see not only a reduction in dollar balances, but an even greater reduction in the purchasing value of the dollar available which is even more significant.

Now, as a Member of the Congress and as a member of this committee, I would like to beat my chest a bit about these cuts. I think in many ways we can thank the hearings we have held for some of the cuts which we have made, but I think in all fairness that we have to agree that the lion's share of credit for the making of these cuts goes to the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the people with whom they work.

In the first fiscal year in which Secretary of Defense Laird was in office, the expenditure level of the Department of Defense was cut by over \$3 billion. And as I have stated, the total cut since the Nixon administration took office is something like \$5.5 billion, comparing what was appropriated in 1969 as against the request for 1971, and if the cut or cuts stand up, that figure will be \$7.5 billion, which shows a very marked decrease.

Most of this has been possible because of the winding down of the war in Vietnam. However, I believe it also is due to the fact that a management team has come to the Department of Defense which knows how to manage a business which is as large as this one is, and it is the largest business in the world. There are still inefficiencies, and there will probably always be inefficiencies. There are still practices which make very little sense, and this will probably always be the case, but by and large the blue-ribbon panel, the Secretary of Defense, and the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the people under them, has resulted in what I consider to be an outstanding fiscal performance by the Department of Defense.

As I mentioned before, this is a time when we are fighting a war in Vietnam, and also at a time when we are faced throughout the world with a potential enemy which is predatory, which pushes at every chance it gets, and which will probably continue for the foreseeable future to continue to probe throughout the world to try to find a weak spot. I think it is obvious from the actions of the Communist world that it has not given up the dream of world conquest. I cannot help but believe it has less hope that conquest is possible, but still they probe in the hope that weak spots will be found. Consequently it is necessary for us to maintain a defense as strong as a defense can possibly be.

In the past several months we have in the United States found it necessary to revise certain priorities.

We are spending more money now on nondefense items than we spent 2 years ago. We are spending much more than we spent 5, 6, and 7 years ago on nondefense items. This has been a revision of priorities that the American people obviously wanted.

I assume that this revision will continue and the cuts that have been made in this bill will help the Federal Government to finance some of the non-defense activities upon which it had entered and which it will enter, without risking the economic ruin which might ensue if we were not able to come very close to a balanced budget. We will have even worse fiscal problems in the fiscal year 1972 and it will be necessary for the Department of Defense and for all other departments to practice the utmost economy in order to do the jobs that are necessary, and still to maintain a strong economy in the United States, bolstered by a budget that is balanced or very near to being balanced.

Let us go too far in shifting priorities, let me warn that if the Communist probing finds a fatal weak spot, the good life we seek for all Americans would be a lost dream. Such a life does not exist in a Communist society.

I think it is necessary to take stock of what has happened in the Department of Defense in the last 10 years. We have not had one single new weapon system developed from 1961 to 1969 except the F-111. I intend to support the appropriation for the F-111. It is an airplane which I hope will do the job for which it was intended. It is in difficulty. Even so, its safety record, I am told, is as good as the safety records of other airplanes that have been built from scratch with brand new concepts—advances in the state of the art, if you will, at this time in the development of the system.

More than that, we need this plane. We have to have it. It is the only airplane that I know of that can have the requisite penetration capabilities to be effective today.

If the Department of Defense in the 1960's had been more alert to the problem and the requirements of the 1970's, it might not be necessary for us to continue to try to perfect an airplane which has certainly been ridden with problems from the very beginning. But it is necessary to have the plane, and I think we will have to go ahead with it.

However, in the last 2 years we have started two airplanes, the F-14 and the F-15, which promise to be very fine weapons systems, one an aerial superiority plane for the Navy and the other for the Air Force.

I am glad to say that all of the funds which are asked for research and development for these aircraft are in this bill. We have supported this effort by the Department of Defense 100 percent.

I am also pleased to note that ships requested by the budget for the Navy not only are funded, but there are ships funded which are over and above the budget.

The Committee on Armed Services felt that it was necessary to authorize more ships than were requested in the budget, and the Committee on Appropriations has gone along with the Committee on Armed Services.

I certainly feel that the events of the last few weeks in Jordan and in the Middle East point out the absolute necessity for this country to maintain a strong Navy. I think there is very little doubt that without the presence of the 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean, and without the resoluteness with which the President and the Secretary of Defense used that 6th Fleet that there might have been serious trouble develop in Jordan which might have resulted in a conflagration throughout the Middle East. There certainly is no intent on the part of any member of this subcommittee to do anything other than to make sure that the U.S. Navy, Air Force, and Army are able to take care of the obligations of this country throughout the world.

Again though, may I say, there are those of us who feel that we are very badly extended throughout the world and we hope in the years to come that it will be possible for us to reallocate our global priorities and perhaps restudy some of our commitments. The time is long past when the United States of America can afford to police the whole world.

We have our vital interests and those vital interests must be and will be protected.

But the Nixon doctrine which says and articulates this principle, puts the burden on each nation to be foremost in the effort to defend itself. This is a doctrine which makes sense. It must be rearticulated often, so that the world will know that this is exactly what the United States means when it talks about its relationship with other countries.

Mr. Chairman, before I sit down I want to thank also my good friend from Ohio (Mr. MINSHALL), distinguished and able ranking minority member of the subcommittee, the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. DAVIS), and the gentleman from New Hampshire (Mr. WYMAN) for the fine work they have done and their cooperation, which all of us have appreciated throughout these very arduous months when this bill was being prepared. I have particularly appreciated the outstanding leadership, industry, and perspicacity exhibited by BILL MINSHALL. He has been most considerate to all members, and it has been a pleasure and an honor to serve with him.

Mr. STEIGER, of Arizona. Mr. Chairman, I make the point of order that a quorum is not present.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will count.

Fifty-nine Members are present, not a quorum. The Clerk will call the roll.

The Clerk called the roll, and the following Members failed to answer to their names:

[Roll No. 334.]

Abhatt	Belcher	Bush
Adair	Berry	Button
Addabbo	Betta	Cabell
Alexander	Blanton	Clark
Ashbrook	Brock	Clauson
Ashley	Brooks	Don E.
Aspinall	Burlison, Mo.	Clawson, Del
Beall, Md.	Burton, Utah	Clay

Collier	Horton	Ottenger
Corbett	Hosmer	Patman
Cowgar	Howard	Pirnie
Crane	Hungate	Pollock
Crane	Jonas	Powell
Daddario	Jones, N.C.	Pryor, Ark.
Dawson	Karh	Purcell
Derwinski	King	Quillen
Diggs	Kleppe	Reid, N.Y.
Donohue	Landrum	Reifel
Dowdy	Lowenstein	Roudebush
Dwyer	Lujan	Rousselot
Edwards, La.	Lukens	Ruth
Fallon	McCarthy	Sandman
Feighan	McClary	Satterfield
Fisher	McMillan	Scheuer
Flynt	Macdonald,	ShIPLEY
Foreman	Mass.	Smith, Calif.
Gallagher	MacGregor	Snyder
Garnatz	Maillard	Stephens
Gilbert	Mayne	Stratton
Gray	Meskill	Talcott
Griffiths	Montgomery	Tierman
Hagan	Morse	Tunney
Haley	Morton	Weicker
Halpern	Nedzi	Wiggins
Hansen, Wash.	O'Konaki	Willson, Bob
Harvey	Olsen	Wold
Hebert	O'Neal, Ga.	

Accordingly the Committee rose; and the Speaker having resumed the chair, Mr. ROSTENKOWSKI, Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that that Committee, having had under consideration the bill H.R. 19590, and finding itself without a quorum, he had directed the roll to be called, when 321 Members responded to their names, a quorum, and he submitted herewith the names of the absentees to be spread upon the Journal. The Committee resumed its sitting.

Mr. MINSHALL. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. DAVIS).

(Mr. DAVIS of Wisconsin asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. DAVIS of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, I take this allotted time to express a strong personal vote of confidence in this bill which is now being considered by the House. Although I just returned to this subcommittee at the beginning of 1969, my expression of support is not that of a neophyte. In other years past I have had sufficient experience on this subcommittee to be able to compare this bill—including the staff work on it, and the detailed knowledge, cooperation, and candor of representatives of the Department of Defense—with the situation that existed 20 years ago. I am more satisfied with the action of our committee on this Defense appropriation bill than any Department of Defense appropriation bill in my experience.

Two years ago we had before us an \$81-billion recommendation for appropriations in defense. Today we are talking about a \$66-billion bill. This reduction is all the more impressive when we take into consideration the reduced purchasing power of the defense dollar. I believe I can assure you that, in spite of this reduction in funds, we are receiving more defense per dollar than at any previous time in my experience. Our committee can take only a portion of the credit for the reductions that have been made. But we can certainly take pride in the committee report which we have submitted to you. This report reflects an admirable effort on the part of the staff, complimented by the inquiring and dedicated concern of our committee members. I am also certain that every member of the

subcommittee would want to give due credit to the accomplishments of the Secretary of Defense, his deputy, Mr. Packard, and the man whose job it is to oversee the expenditure of Defense Department funds, Bob Moot. We should give credit to them for many of the improvements that have been made. These include improvements in procurement procedures, and especially the abandonment of total package procurement which has proven so costly, and have accompanied the overruns that scandalized the minds of so many Americans, and the review of personnel, both military and civilian.

A large percentage of the reductions that have been made in this bill reflect the work of Secretary Laird and his staff.

Last year we did not officially receive a revised budget after the new administration had completed its review, based upon the downward reductions which that review accomplished. However, we did receive those suggested revisions in our subcommittee, before final action was taken, and there was a sort of tacit understanding that the committee and the Congress would be permitted to take credit for the reductions that were made. This year this bill also reflects numerous savings which came to light within the Defense Department between the time that the budget was prepared and submitted to us some 10 months ago and the time of our markup.

The report has some harsh words, but I urge you to read the criticism in the light of some of the real accomplishments within the Department, and to interpret the comments in the overall context of the report.

I think in the report the Members will be able to read between the lines and will want to give credit to the efforts of the Department. At the same time Members will want to recognize the need for our committee to keep the Department's feet to the fire in pursuing the improvements that have been so commendably instituted, and in accelerating reforms that have not yet been sufficiently advanced.

In our hearings—and as my colleague, the gentleman from Arizona pointed out, they were both lengthy and detailed—we did uncover a number of situations requiring the direct efforts of our committee, and Members will note on specific pages of the committee report the actions of the committee in relation to those situations.

For instance, on page 24 of the report, there is a discussion of the Public Affairs program. I think it is fair to state that what many people include under the term "public affairs" is not just propaganda by the Defense Department. It certainly includes the information that is provided to the public so it can gain an understanding of our defense effort. It includes the liaison offices of which we make so much use in serving our constituents. And it includes the recognition of the citizen soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines of this country for their part in defending our entire Nation and its people. All of these are part of the public affairs program.

On page 26 there is committee com-

October 8, 1970

ment relating to the temporary promotion of higher ranking officers and helicopter training for some of the senior officers in the Army.

On page 46 there is language that will be of interest to many Members relating to Air Force Reserve units, and the follow-up by our committee of the action taken first by the Price Subcommittee and then by the full Armed Services Committee in connection with the retention of those units.

On page 54 there are comments relating to procurement practices, and beginning on page 72 there is an explanation of the add-ons to enforce our recognition of the outdating of our Navy and its need for modernization.

In the report, at the end, there are three separately expressed views. One of these comes from a member of our subcommittee, the gentleman from New Hampshire (Mr. WYMAN). I think he raises a point that all of us ought to be greatly concerned with, but it is something which unfortunately we could do nothing about in the light of language that was included in the Defense Procurement bill. Then, two of those separate views are expressed by Members of the House who are members of the full Appropriations Committee, but not the subcommittee that held hearings on the bill. I believe they relate to matters this House has carefully considered before, and made its decision on. I hope we will not take up too much time rehashing things upon which the House has already forcibly expressed itself.

Like my colleague, the gentleman from Arizona, with whom I have the pleasure of serving on two subcommittees of this Appropriations Committee, I intend to support the adjustment in operation and maintenance funds. This, I believe, will come before us by means of an amendment to be offered by the chairman of our full committee. Other than that, and with that single exception, I intend to stand firm with respect to this bill as it has been reported. I believe it has been carefully considered, and I believe it deserves the support of the Members of this Committee of the Whole.

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 20 minutes to the gentleman from South Carolina, the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Armed Services (Mr. RIVERS).

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the distinguished chairman of the Appropriations Committee for giving me this opportunity to further expand on something which I said on this floor on the 28th of September.

I also want to thank the distinguished gentleman for the response he gave to the request I made before his committee, when I asked him to add additional money for one submarine, long leadtime items for another, plus two tenders and other craft at that time. He gave me almost everything I asked for.

On the 28th of September, I spoke at considerable length on the floor of the House on the Soviet threat, especially the naval threat.

Today, I shall be very brief. And I shall speak about one thing: submarines.

Soviet submarines.

One newspaper said of my speech on the 28th that my rhetoric was rather appalling but the facts were hard to challenge.

Today, there will be no rhetoric, only facts. But the facts will be as appalling as any you could hear.

I want to show the House today as quickly, as simply, and as plainly as I can the true facts of the Soviet submarine challenge.

I used a lot of statistics on the 28th. I could throw a lot of numbers at you now. But only a few should get the message across to a thinking citizen.

I talked desperately in the House-Senate conference on the authorization bill, as I am talking desperately now—and for what? To get your support to add two additional submarines to our shipbuilding program. Just two. That will mean four new nuclear subs in this bill and advanced procurement for three more.

If I had the rhetoric of Edmund Burke, the passionate voice of Daniel Webster, the ringing logic and orderly thought process of John C. Calhoun, perhaps I could talk you into supporting as many submarines as all of the shipyards in all of the United States could build. And if I did, how many would that be?

Ten to twelve.

Twelve submarines in 1 year is the most that we could realistically build under present conditions.

The Soviets have one yard that can produce more than that in a year.

The Soviets can build 20 a year on the day shift. Working several shifts, they could probably produce 35.

What does that mean?

It means that the present Soviet drive to overtake us in all categories of submarines is irreversible—irreversible.

The Soviets are ahead of us in total submarines—they have about 360 to our 147. They are ahead of us in most categories of submarines, and they are moving to be ahead in all categories by 1975—and there is nothing, nothing, nothing we can do about it.

Let me tick off the numbers for you:

The Soviets have 220 nonnuclear attack submarines to 59 for the United States.

They have 50 or slightly more ballistic-missile submarines to 41 for the United States. But all 41 of the United States submarines are nuclear, and about 20 to 23 of the Soviet submarines are nuclear.

They have about 65 submarines that fire the cruise missile, about 35 of which are nuclear powered. The United States has no submarines that fire cruise missiles. The cruise missile will go 400 miles. We have nothing like it.

Supposedly, the Russian numerical superiority is offset by our lead in nuclear submarines. But the Russian buildup in nuclear submarine construction capability means that our lead is rapidly disappearing. At present, in total nuclear submarines we have 88 and the Soviets about 80. In all probability, they will be ahead of us by the end of the year. What the relative building capability means is this: Even if we decided now—not tomorrow but now, today, in this House—to try to reverse the trend, it would be

at least 5 years before we could begin to do so. And before we could start catching up, the Soviet lead would grow substantially.

The submarine is the best strategic weapon in the world.

That statement should not surprise anybody. We have long referred to the Polaris as our most invulnerable deterrent.

For the Soviets, their attack submarines provide a capability in nonnuclear warfare which promises the best possibility of strategically outflanking us and cutting us off from our allies. By simple numbers alone their submarine force gives them the threat to interdict our sealanes and deny us free use of the seas.

It is impossible for the United States to exercise influence on any continent in the world except the North American Continent without free use of the seas.

But the Soviet ballistic-missile and cruise-missile submarines provide the capability of bringing nuclear warfare to our shores.

The latest Russian Polaris-type submarine, the *Yankee* class, has the ability to fire from a submerged position a ballistic missile with a range of 1,300 miles.

I would like to illustrate to the House the threat that a Soviet submarine with a 1,300-mile-range missile poses to the United States.

If such a submarine is in the Gulf of Mexico, this is the range its missiles would have.

(Mr. RIVERS referred to map in the well of the House.)

Mr. RIVERS. It could lay a missile on Chicago, Detroit, New York, St. Louis, and any city within this range.

But the Soviets are testing a new submarine ballistic missile with estimated range of 3,000 miles. This missile may be back-fitted into the *Yankee* class or put into a new class of submarines being specifically designed for the missile.

The Soviets in the last 2 years have introduced more new submarine designs than have ever been put to sea in all of naval history during a comparable period. They continue to strive for improvement in sub design. The United States in the last 10 years has introduced only one new design submarine.

My authority for those two statements, in case you question them, is Hyman Rickover.

If those Russian submarine missiles have a range of 3,000 miles, you can see on the map here what it means in terms of the threat to the United States.

But a new and dangerous development has come upon the scene to double—yes, I said double—the threat.

Today the Russian *Yankee* class ballistic-missile-firing submarines operate from bases in the Soviet Union. They travel through the Norwegian Sea and across the Atlantic Ocean—a distance of over 4,000 miles—until they get in a position to where they can fire their missiles on our east coast cities. To return home for repairs and crew rest they must again travel over 4,000 miles. It is estimated that half of a 60-day patrol will be spent by a *Yankee* submarine going to and from its patrol station, and during its transit time it will not be within

striking range of our cities. But now the Soviets are building a nuclear submarine base in Cuba—at Cienfuegos.

Let us not beat around the bush with conjectures. I tell you the Russians are building a sub base in Cuba.

And I challenge any official of the executive branch to issue an outright denial of that statement.

No one will do so.

Now let me show you where this base is. Here is a map of the Caribbean. They sail submarines into this place here. It becomes their lake.

Now, let me show you photographs of Russian ships that have gone into this harbor—including a submarine tender which is there right now. They have this tender right here, right now, not yesterday.

That submarine tender is not down there on vacation. You can look at this and the other photographs.

Imagine that you had an automobile in Washington that you operated almost continuously, like a day and night taxicab, but that the nearest garage was in Boston. So that every time you needed repairs or an oil change or a little rest away from the automobile for the driver, you had to go to Boston. You would spend half your time going and coming to Boston. But if somebody built a new garage for you in Washington, you could double the time of your taxicab on the streets of Washington.

It would mean the same sort of thing for the Russians to have a submarine base in Cuba.

The submarines could operate within the range of more than half of the United States during their entire patrol period, including the time they are going to and from their base in Cienfuegos. Even when in that port for upkeep, they could maintain their missiles in a state of readiness easily within range of many major U.S. targets.

And they can also blackmail all of South America. They are sure we will back down as the gentleman from Texas (Mr. MAHON) said a while ago.

Cuba as a Yankee class submarine base would enable the Russians to about double the time "on target" for their underwater-launched ballistic missiles.

To put it another way, by using Cuba, the Soviets reduce by approximately one-half the number of missile-firing submarines they need to maintain the same coverage.

I am including as a part of my remarks a chart which illustrates the great advantage of a base in Cuba by showing the comparative transit time and days on station for submarines operating out of the Soviet North Fleet area and operating out of Cuba. It will be seen that in a 2-month patrol the on-station time for a ballistic missile submarine in the middle Atlantic is 32 days when operating from the North Fleet and 50 days when operating from Cuba. For a Gulf of Mexico station, it is 20 days on station when operating from the North Fleet and 56 days when operating from Cuba. In addition, as I mentioned, during transit time the subs based in Cuba are within range of targets in the United States. The chart also shows that for attack sub-

marines the days on station are at least doubled if the subs can operate out of Cuba.

The chart follows:

DEPLOYMENT COMPARISON: NORTH FLEET VERSUS CUBA

Station	Transit Time ¹ (days)		Days on station	
	North Fleet	Cuba	North Fleet	Cuba
SSBN:				
Middle Atlantic.....	14	5	32	50
Vicinity Bermuda.....	15	4	30	52
Gulf of Mexico.....	20	2	20	56
SSN:				
Panama Canal.....	19	2	22	56
Florida Str.....	18	2	24	56
Windward Pass.....	16	2	28	56
Mona Pass.....	16	3	28	56

¹ Assumes 12 kt.

This great increase in the military effectiveness of this strategic force must certainly be appealing to Soviet leaders.

In closing, I want to read you a paragraph:

The peace of the world and the security of the United States and of all American States are endangered by reason of the establishment by the Sino-Soviet powers of an offensive military capability in Cuba, including bases for ballistic missiles with a potential range covering most of North and South America.

This is the first paragraph of the proclamation issued by President John F. Kennedy in 1962 ordering the interdiction of ships carrying offensive weapons to Cuba. That sentence describes the development that was the basis for President Kennedy taking the action that he did in the Cuban missile crisis of 1962.

I ask you to reflect on what the difference is between that development and the development taking place in Cuba today.

Regardless of what is done on this bill today, the Congress has got to be ready to support the buildup of our submarine force.

In the next Congress I intend to introduce legislation calling for a program—maybe a crash program—at least to start us on our way.

I intend to introduce legislation to force whatever reorganization is necessary in the command structure of the Navy to assure the success of a revitalized submarine program, which the distinguished chairman so eloquently referred to.

But the country must be ready now to face the threat posed by the Soviets.

No one has more sympathy than I have—and you will not see me getting up and criticizing Richard Nixon—for the President of the United States. He has a terrible job, and awesome job. The Constitution puts the responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs on the shoulders of the President whoever he may be. He has to make the decision. As Truman said:

The buck stops at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue.

Whatever decision he makes, I know you, like I, will back him up because he has to make a decision—and it is as simple as that.

Mr. Chairman I include the following material at this point in the RECORD:

Vice Adm. HYMAN G. RICKOVER,
USN, Director, Nuclear Power Directorate,
Naval Ships System Command, Department of the Navy, Washington, D.C.

DEAR ADMIRAL RICKOVER: I am deeply concerned that the members of Congress and the people of the United States have not been sufficiently informed on the growing threat posed by the Soviet nuclear submarine force. I know that you have repeatedly warned the Congress of the substantial buildup in this area and the emerging facts are bearing out your statements.

In June 1968, you testified before this Committee and gave valuable information on this growing menace and what needed to be done. Your testimony reinforced our support for the continuation of the new design Turbine Electric submarine and the development of a new High Speed submarine.

In spite of these actions it appears to me that our position relative to that of the Soviet Union in submarine warfare continues to deteriorate. I agree with your recent assessment that our defense posture is dangerously growing worse. The more I see of what the Soviets are doing in comparison to our efforts the more I am concerned.

With this in mind I would appreciate your views and opinions on a number of questions relating to the submarine aspects of our defense. I know that the members of the House Armed Services Committee value your comments. If appropriate, I will call a special hearing to focus Congressional attention on this matter.

My questions are:

1. What is the latest assessment of the present and future Soviet submarine program?

2. How does this compare with the United States submarine program as of today?

3. Based on our presently planned submarine program over the next 5 to 10 years, how will the United States submarine force compare with that of the Soviets?

4. In your opinion, what should the United States program be over the next ten years?

5. Do you feel that the methods presently employed by the Department of Defense to produce major weapon systems are capable of handling a matter as urgent as this?

6. What actions must be taken by Congress to strengthen our nuclear submarine program and reestablish our supremacy?

I would appreciate your responses to these questions in an unclassified form. If, for security reasons, you are unable to do this, please supply a supplemental report containing the classified information. However, I would hope that to the maximum extent possible you will provide answers on an unclassified basis. This subject is too important to keep it from the American people.

Sincerely,

L. MENDEL RIVERS,
Chairman.

U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION,
Washington, D.C., August 4, 1970.

HON. L. MENDEL RIVERS,
U.S. House of Representatives.

DEAR MR. RIVERS: This is in response to your letter of July 24, 1970, in which you expressed concern over the growing Soviet nuclear submarine threat and asked for my views and opinions on a number of questions related to that subject.

Before answering your specific questions I would like to say a few words on where we stand relative to the Soviets and on the changing role of the submarine in modern naval warfare—its part not only in today's defense but also in the future.

These remarks are not—nor do I intend them to be—a report representing exhaustive empirical research into every aspect of our naval strength. They should rather be re-

garded as comments representing my personal convictions—convictions based on much thought, a not inconsiderable knowledge of our present-day naval situation, and a searching examination of some of the issues that face us today.

There are those in this country who with majestic neutrality deprecate the need to maintain military parity with the Soviets, arguing that peaceful coexistence can be maintained without it. It is an appealing argument to many but expresses, in fact, merely a hope. But we must face facts as they are. In military matters as in politics, one should not base judgments on emotion but on fact. A reluctance to face facts is a sort of involuntary moral blindness. We cannot rely on hope or on what seems to us reasonable in choosing the position from which to deal with the Russians.

History shows that calamities can be brought about by persons of great good will, especially if they are given to abstraction and are themselves not directly involved in decision making. Any abstract theory tends to be neater than life—that is why it appeals to certain people. Then too, remoteness from the consequences of one's actions mists over one's perceptions. Responsible decisions are not likely to be made unless those who make them have to answer personally to all who will be directly or indirectly affected by these decisions.

Reason, too, is an uncertain guide when those we deal with think differently from ourselves. It is highly probable that even the most brilliant application of reason to the conduct of daily diplomacy would have failed to prevent World War II. Hitler's goals, as well as his rhetoric, put him beyond rational communication. The Soviets have made it clear by words as well as by daily actions that they intend their system of government to prevail throughout the world, and that to this end our system of government must be destroyed by whatever means available. Reason cannot prevail against such an avowed policy. Why do we not believe that this is what they intend to do? Hitler, too, in "Mein Kampf" plainly announced his intent to dominate the world. We did not believe him either—until it was nearly too late.

If we cherish our freedom and our form of government, though we may not have achieved perfection in either, we must preserve our military strength. We shall lose both if we take the position that if one country is peaceful and the other is not, the peaceful nation need not maintain its military strength. If history teaches anything it is surely that weakness invites attack; that it takes but one aggressor to plunge the world into war against the wishes of dozens of peace loving nations—if the former is militarily strong and the latter are not.

As long as we have power which matches theirs and the will to use it, they will be dangerous only if we should fail to recognize the significance of their actions. It is worth recalling that of the numerous treaties signed by the Soviet Government during the Stalin period, the Nazi-Soviet pact was the only one they did not break—because Hitler was too strong. We have reason to assume that the present Soviet leaders also will seek to avoid serious trouble with a United States that remains strong. But history also tells us that whenever the United States weakened its defense structure or ignored its world responsibilities or when its leaders hesitated or vacillated, we rarely escaped trouble. Moreover, when the trouble came, it was worse and cost us more dearly in lives and money than had we maintained our strength.

There can surely be no doubt that the overwhelming majority of the American people are opposed to relinquishment of our defense capability, recognizing full well that there will then be no one left to prevent the takeover by Communist power. Whether one

takes the optimistic view that a permanent East-West detente can be negotiated, or the pessimistic view that ultimately we shall have to fight for our liberties, this Nation has no future if it allows itself to be outmatched militarily.

We cannot accurately assess our current defense situation vis-a-vis the Soviets, unless we understand the difference between their requirements for naval power in war and ours.

They do not have to transport large quantities of supplies over the seas; they can do it over land. They have under their control a large contiguous land mass which contains the raw materials they need. The United States is an island lying between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. We do not have contiguous land masses whence we can conduct military operations to protect our national interests or from which we can obtain the fuel and materials necessary to sustain our war effort. For these reasons, naval power is not nearly as vital to the security of Russia as it is to that of the United States.

Russia's predominant land position has required mutual defense treaties with but two nations with which she does not share a land border. Our island position, on the contrary, has led us to negotiate treaties with 43 overseas nations. Given our geographic position, the only way by which we can project our national power beyond the range of our land bases is through the Navy.

Despite the tremendous technological progress made in transportation and weapons systems in this century, free use of the seas—which cover three fourths of the earth's surface—continues to be essential to the security of the United States, whether to defend ourselves or to help defend our allies. Please remember that ninety-seven percent of all the material sent to Vietnam has gone by sea. The United States—a maritime nation—cannot maintain its position as a first-rank world power if it does not have free use of the seas.

Because they understand how vital it is for the United States to maintain free use of the seas, the Soviets have structured their naval general purpose forces with the objective of interdicting our sea lanes. Since World War II they have placed increasing priority on submarines as an instrument for denying us free use of the seas. They are fully aware—even if some of us are not—that World Wars I and II were almost lost because of our difficulty and that of our allies in keeping the sea lanes open.

I am sure you remember the large numbers of tankers sunk in World War II by German U-boats—submarines that were much slower and far less capable than those the Soviets have today. Moreover, Germany started the war with only 57 submarines. The United States lost over 130 tankers in the Atlantic Campaign, mostly to German submarines. By mid-1942 the situation was desperate. So many tankers were being sunk that the supply of military fuel to Europe and the Pacific was threatened. Then, too, the deciding factor in our defeat of Japan—also an island empire—was the ability of United States submarine and air forces to interdict the flow of oil from overseas to the home islands; this strangled Japan's industrial and military effort and brought about her collapse.

With the rapid advancement of technology since the end of World War II, the role of submarine in naval warfare has expanded. Nuclear power, long-range missiles, sophisticated electronics, computers—all combine to make the submarine many times more potent and versatile.

Developed within the past fifteen years the nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine has become our most viable deterrent strategic weapon. The Soviets are now engaged in a massive construction program to build a

fleet of similar, though faster, missile submarines—some of which are now on station off our coasts. It is expected that by 1973 or 1974 the size of their ballistic missile submarine fleet will equal or exceed ours.

The Soviets are also building large numbers of high-speed, torpedo-firing nuclear-powered attack submarines, as well as large numbers of modern surface ships and nuclear-powered submarines which can fire long-range cruise missiles. These missiles can probably be armed with nuclear or conventional warheads.

In 1969 the tempo of world-wide Soviet submarine operations reached an all time high. During recent large-scale naval maneuvers which included over 200 ships in both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans and in nine adjoining seas, the Soviets deployed a large number of nuclear submarines away from their home bases. Admiral Gorshkov, Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy said:

"The pride of our navy is atomic submarines, which are fitted out with missiles of various purposes which can be launched from under water. The submarines, together with naval missile-carrying and anti-submarine aviation having high-speed, long-range airplanes, are the basis of the striking might of the Navy. Up to date surface ships with perfect weapons on board are assigned a major role in solving tasks of the Navy. Ships of the Soviet navy are systematically present in all oceans, including the areas of the presence of the navies of NATO."

In light of these facts it is clear that if our Navy is to carry out its mission of insuring free use of the seas—a mission essential to our national survival in war—we must expand the High-Speed nuclear attack submarine development and building program and also develop a long-range cruise missile-firing nuclear submarine capability.

Today it is fashionable to advocate a reduction in defense spending and to urge use of the money saved for domestic purposes; to speak of a "reordering of priorities," as if constantly repeated rhetoric could change fact. Those who so advocate do not test their theories or their deductions against human experience. Soviet Russia is building a military establishment which is already ahead of ours in some respects and by 1975 will be ahead of ours in virtually all respects. These facts should be weighed when assessing the judgment of those who argue for a reduction of American military power while Soviet military power is rapidly expanding.

"Peace for our time!" declared Neville Chamberlain. And what was to follow was six years of one of the bloodiest conflicts ever experienced by mankind—a conflict that nearly wrecked Western Civilization. Let us hope the lessons of appeasement and unpreparedness have not receded into the dim shadows of past victory.

I now turn to your specific questions.

Questions 1 and 2: What is the latest assessment of the present and future Soviet submarine program?

How does this compare with the United States submarine program as of today?

Answer: First, a brief review of the historical background.

Entering World War II with 200 submarines, the Soviets then had the largest submarine force in the world—over four times the size of Hitler's U-boat fleet. However, most of the Soviet submarines were short range and designed primarily for coastal defense. During the war they lost numerical leadership in submarines to Germany. That position, however, was regained shortly after the war and has not been challenged since.

Starting with 200 diesel-powered submarines at the end of World War II, most of which were obsolete, they embarked on the largest peacetime submarine construction program in history, producing over 570 modern submarines in 25 years—most designed for long-range operations. During the

same period the United States built 105 submarines. In two years alone, 1955 and 1956, the Soviets completed 150 submarines, one and one half times the total number of submarines this country has produced in the past 25 years.

The Soviets have applied tremendous resources to the expansion and modernization of their submarine construction yards. They now have the largest and most modern submarine building yards in the world, giving them several times the nuclear submarine construction capacity possessed by the U.S.

They are credited with a nuclear submarine production capability of 20 ships a year on a single shift basis. They have the facilities to increase this rate of production considerably. At present, while our Poseidon conversions are going on, the maximum U.S. capacity to build nuclear submarines is less than half that of the Soviets. Upon completion of these conversions—about 1977—the best we could do would still be well below their capacity.

One of the most important steps they have taken has been the development of a large reservoir of trained engineers to support their submarine design and building program. They graduate ten times as many naval architects and marine engineers per year as we. With such an imbalance it is no wonder we are falling behind in submarine technical areas.

According to the latest unclassified data the Soviets now have a total of 355 to 363 submarines, all built since World War II. More than 75 of these are nuclear-powered. The total U.S. force is 147 submarines, 88 nuclear-powered, the remainder diesel-powered. Most of our diesel units are of World War II vintage. A comparison according to types of submarines, nuclear and non-nuclear, is shown below:

COMPARISON OF UNITED STATES AND SOVIET SUBMARINES
JULY 1970

Submarine type	Soviets	United States
Attack:		
Nuclear.....	20-24	47
Nonnuclear.....	220---	59
Ballistic missile:		
Nuclear.....	20-23	41
Nonnuclear.....	30---	0
Cruise missile:		
Nuclear.....	35-36	0
Nonnuclear.....	30---	0
Total:		
Nuclear.....	75-83	88
Nonnuclear.....	280---	59
Grand total.....	355-363	147

One of the arguments put forth to justify our having a substantially smaller submarine force than the Soviets has been our numerical lead in nuclear submarines. But today, as a result of the Soviets' large-scale construction program, that lead is rapidly disappearing. Based on current force levels and estimated Soviet nuclear submarine building rates, they will be ahead of us numerically before the end of this year. Even if we should decide at once to reverse this trend, our efforts could not begin to bear fruit for half a decade at least; in the interim the Russian lead will grow substantially.

Of even greater concern than total numbers is the fact that since 1968 the Soviets have introduced several new designs besides converting older designs to improve their capabilities. They have introduced significantly improved second-generation versions of their first-generation attack, cruise-missile and ballistic-missile nuclear submarine designs. In the last two years they have introduced more new submarine designs than have ever been put to sea in all of naval history during a comparable period. The U.S. on the other hand, has introduced only one

new design submarine in the last 10 years.

It should be realized that the Soviet designs we are now seeing were started several years ago. Having completed these, it is only logical to assume that their design talent is now being used to refine design techniques and to work on the next generation of submarine designs. Within a few years we shall probably see a whole new series of submarine designs.

One of their current new designs is the YANKEE class nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine introduced in 1968. These submarines look very much like our ETHAN ALLEN class—our latest Polaris type—and are capable of submerged launching of 16 ballistic missiles with a range of over 1000 miles. Their earlier class of nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines can fire only three missiles with a range of 600 miles.

They now have 13 of the YANKEE class operational; additional units are under construction at a rate of about 12 a year. It is estimated that they will surpass our Polaris fleet of 41 by 1973 or 1974, possibly sooner. Further, it must not be forgotten that the Soviets also have over 30 conventional and nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines of the earlier design. Thus, we are faced with imminent loss of our lead in numbers of sea-based strategic missiles—no matter what action we take today.

While the extent of their submarine design and construction effort is alarming, this is not the only area of concern. We have long relied on superior quality in our submarines to compensate for lack in numbers. This quality-quantity comparison of effectiveness is valid only when the quantitative advantage of the opposing force remains within reasonable bounds. There is obviously a point at which a large numerical advantage will overcome a qualitative disadvantage. But recent evidence indicates that the Soviets are making considerable progress in all aspects of their submarine capability, thus markedly reducing whatever qualitative advantage we may have had.

One of the most important aspects of submarine quality is speed. For years our planners were confident that U.S. submarines had a speed advantage over the Soviets. We now know that their submarines are much faster than our planners believed. Their entire nuclear-powered submarine force is now credited with a high speed capability. As you know, this one aspect of submarine performance was a key factor in determining the speed of our newest class of attack submarines, the SSN 688 Class, which we are now starting to build. But the first ship of this class will not be completed before 1974.

In varying degrees, they have also made significant improvements in other important submarine areas, such as detection devices, quietness of operation, reliability, crew performance, and operating efficiency. In all these areas our qualitative advantage has decreased, and the designs they are now developing may well be superior to ours.

Take operating efficiency for example. Soviet submarines continue to operate out-of-area for longer periods and at greater distances than ever before. They have established mobile task forces providing for repair of their submarines by large tenders—sea-going bases—thus greatly extending their operating capability. These sea-going tenders can remain at sea for 6 months, servicing and repairing submarines while underway. In addition, the Russians have small tenders which service the large tenders. This is a new and unique contribution to the art of submarine warfare.

The Soviet submarine force, like the entire Soviet Navy, has become capable of sustained open-ocean operations and is being used to support foreign policy in various areas of the world. In 1969 the tempo of worldwide Soviet submarine operations was at an all time high. This tempo has contin-

ued to increase in 1970. During the recent large-scale naval maneuvers that included over 200 ships in both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans and nine adjoining seas, they deployed a large number of nuclear submarines away from their home bases. Admiral Gorshkov commented on these maneuvers:

"Whereas until quite recently some areas of the world's oceans were considered restricted areas in which the navies of imperialist powers ruled supreme and where our ships seldom ventured, now there are no such areas."

"The success of such big ocean naval exercises shows a high level of preparedness of forces of our navy, its tactical maturity, the ability of commanders and headquarters to organize and carry out complicated multi-stage and many-sided combat actions."

Today the Soviet submarine fleet has competent leadership; the scope of their operations reflects the training and ability of their personnel; they have larger numbers of trained personnel than we.

They are also pulling ahead in submarine weaponry. We rely almost exclusively on the torpedo as our principal tactical submarine weapon. Even here we do not have a modern weapon, due to the continuing delay in the Mark 48 torpedo program. While the Soviets possess a torpedo capability comparable to ours, they have also successfully developed and put to sea some 65 submarines capable of firing long-range anti-ship cruise missiles. These submarine cruise missiles represent a threat to our worldwide surface shipping, our naval surface forces, and our free use of the seas. A comparable weapons capability does not exist in the United States Navy.

The Soviets issued the following press release, describing an encounter during their recent naval exercise:

"Somewhere beyond the horizon a large force of ships was moving. A strike against this force was to be launched by various forces of the fleet. First to go into action was a missile-carrying submarine. Its sonarman detected the hostile force. Officer Blednyy, a Division Commander, carried out the calculation, and then up from under water, one after another, flew missiles that are able to carry a nuclear warhead. Such a salvo can destroy an entire task force of surface ships."

In the area of sea-going ballistic missiles the situation appears more favorable to us at present. As I pointed out earlier, the latest Russian Polaris-type submarines, the YANKEE Class, carry a submerged-launched ballistic missile with a range of over 1000 miles. The ballistic missiles carried in 10 of our Polaris submarines have a range of about 1700 miles while the remaining 31 Polaris submarines carry missiles having a range of about 2500 miles. Work is underway to convert these 31 submarines to carry the POSEIDON missile with its larger and more sophisticated payload.

However, the Russians are testing a new submarine ballistic missile estimated to have a range of 3000 miles. This missile may be backfitted into their YANKEE Class or, more likely, into a new class of submarines specifically designed for it.

In summary, the Soviets have established an impressive technical and industrial base devoted solely to realization of their aim of a submarine force without peer. This has enabled them to pull ahead of the United States in almost every aspect of submarine design, development and construction. We have no comparable resources, nor are we taking the necessary steps to acquire them. Our loss of numerical leadership in nuclear submarines is close at hand; our claim to superior quality is questionable. We must face the bitter truth that we no longer lead in submarine warfare capability. To rest on one's laurels invites disaster.

Question 3: Based on our presently planned submarine program over the next

5 to 10 years, how will the United States submarine force compare with that of the Soviets?

Answer: Projections of this kind are difficult because of the imprecise nature of our knowledge of Soviet plans. We know pretty well what they have today; based on current trends, we can try to project what they are likely to have in the future. As I have mentioned, by the end of this year the Soviets will probably assume numerical leadership in nuclear-powered submarines. By the end of 1975, when we put into operation the last submarine currently authorized, the United States will have a total of 109 nuclear submarines. During the same period the Soviets will probably add at least 70 nuclear submarines for a total of 145 to 153—giving them a numerical superiority of fifty percent in nuclear submarines. It should be recognized that the actual Soviet submarine force level in 1975 may well be even higher than this estimate. On the other hand, the U.S. program through 1975 is essentially fixed by budget and procurement decisions already made.

Ten years from now the situation could be even worse if action is not taken *now* to increase beyond three the number of U.S. submarines authorized to be built each year. If this is not done, the Soviets can be expected to keep on outproducing us in nuclear submarines by at least 3 or 4 to 1. Assuming that the U.S. continues to produce submarines at a rate of three a year, our total nuclear submarine force in 1980 would be 124; assuming the Soviets continue to produce at the present rate, their total nuclear submarine force will be 220. Thus, by 1980 they may have almost twice as many nuclear submarines as we. Further, their higher output means that the greater part of their nuclear submarine force would be far more modern than ours: about 65 percent of the Soviet nuclear submarine force would be less than 10 years old compared to 30 percent of ours. We must also assume that they will continue to improve their designs and will turn out several new classes during the next ten years.

Question 4: In your opinion, what should the United States program be over the next ten years?

Answer: Overall, I believe we must undertake a submarine program that will ensure our ability to meet our worldwide commitments in the event of war. In view of the increasing capability of the Soviet submarine force and what we can expect them to accomplish over the next ten years, this will require us to undertake a far-reaching program on an urgent basis; it will require redirection of many outworn policies and practices of our present submarine effort. The advances made in some areas of our submarine program, impressive as they may seem, have not kept pace with the dramatic changes in technology. If we are to have any hope of holding our own in undersea warfare within the next ten years, we must start now to overhaul our submarine effort.

First, the current high-speed attack submarine (SSN 688 Class) building program should be increased from the present level of three to at least five per year, just to maintain the presently approved force level of attack submarines, taking into account the probable retirement of obsolete submarines. I am not in a position to comment on what the SSN force level should be. This depends on many factors and is the responsibility of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

At the present time the most advanced design available for construction is the SSN 688 Class. We should continue building these at the rate of five a year until new, more sophisticated designs become available sometime in 1974–75.

Second, we must be willing to try out several new design submarines on a single ship

basis. The years of wrangling and fighting it took to get approval to build the Turbine-Electric submarine, and the years it took to get approval to start the first High-Speed submarine, and the years it took to get approval to start the first High-Speed submarine attest to the unwillingness of the Navy and the Defense Department to prove out new concepts. Under the present system, it takes longer to obtain authority to proceed than it takes to develop the hardware. We cannot hope to make progress, unless a new system is set up that will assure quick approval for trying out new concepts, as they are identified.

Third, development should be started immediately on a new design high-speed submarine capable of firing long-range submarine-to-surface cruise missiles. A parallel effort should be started on an urgent basis to develop for this submarine a reliable missile capable of various modes of guidance. It is patently clear to me that within the next ten to twenty years our Navy will be forced to go more and more underwater. The key to this type of warfare is a submarine that can fire a conventional or nuclear warhead several hundred miles with extreme accuracy from a submerged position. Our attack submarines cannot continue to rely primarily on torpedoes with their limited range and speed. I consider this to be the single most important tactical development effort the Navy must undertake.

Fourth, from the strategic point of view, a replacement for the present Polaris system needs to be started. The advantages of the Polaris system are well-known and will become even more important with time. Yet, Polaris continued invulnerability, secure as it is today, cannot be depended on to last. The obvious solution to insure continued invulnerability is to increase the range of the missile—thus providing greater ocean areas to hide in. Early stages of development of such a system, the Undersea Long Range Missile System (ULMS), are presently underway within the Navy and funds have been provided by Congress. This program should be continued.

Question 5: Do you feel that the methods presently employed by the Department of Defense to procure major weapon systems are capable of handling a matter as urgent as this?

Answer: No. The record documented over the past six years by official Navy and Department of Defense correspondence, by voluminous testimony before Senate and House Armed Services and Appropriations Committees and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, and by reports of these committees constitutes *prima facie* evidence that the capability is not there. The record shows that under present methods and procedures the Department of Defense and the Navy are incapable of recognizing the magnitude of the rapidly expanding Soviet submarine threat, or of formulating an adequate submarine development and building program, or of marshaling the necessary resources to prosecute the program with vigor.

As you are well aware, we would not be developing and building *any* submarines at all had it not been for the powerful and sustained opposition of the Congress to the determined efforts of the Department of Defense in recent years to terminate the nuclear submarine building program entirely.

A factor which greatly contributes to the situation we presently find ourselves in is the lack of submarine design capability in the Navy. The Navy has so fragmented its submarine design process, and it has so dispersed its submarine design talent that it is questionable whether it can develop a new submarine design with significant improvements in any area other than the propulsion plant.

To design a submarine today, many special interest groups in the Navy have to be coordi-

nated: the Naval Ship Systems Command, the Naval Ship Engineering Center, the Naval Ordnance Systems Command, the Naval Electronics Systems Command, the Naval Materiel Command and the SSN Program Coordinator in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. For ballistic missile submarines, the Strategic Systems Project Office is also involved. It is almost impossible to develop a new submarine weapons system under these conditions. No one has the authority to do it.

To further complicate matters, the Navy has been told by the Department of Defense that ships must be designed by a process called "Concept Formulation-Contract Definition." Basically, this involves having industry do the design and construction, constrained only by rudimentary government performance specifications. The idea is that the technical resources of industry will be applied for the benefit of the government. The basic flaw in this concept is that industry works to make a profit, not to turn out the best product for the government. I have learned that to deliver a viable product, given the complexity of today's nuclear combatant ship, it is essential for the government to have men with detailed technical knowledge who control the entire process from conceptual and detailed design fabrication and testing. A contractor can never be in a position to control and coordinate, financially or technically, the myriad developments required for an advanced nuclear submarine design. It is simply not feasible to expect a contractor to meld the constantly varying output of large developmental programs into the most modern combatant submarine. To date, no naval combatant ship has progressed past the design stage using the "Concept Formulation-Contract Definition" process. To proceed down such a path for a nuclear submarine would be disastrous.

When the former Bureau of Ships was reorganized in 1966, it was restructured around the "Concept Formulation-Contract Definition" process, thereby greatly reducing its in-house technical capabilities. To the Naval Ship Systems Command were relegated only managerial functions. Technical support was to be supplied on request from the Naval Ship Engineering Center.

Most of the technical personnel previously involved in submarine work are now widely dispersed in project managers' offices, or at the Naval Ship Engineering Center where they act as advisers with no real responsibility or authority, or they have transferred to other work. The once capable Bureau of Ships has become a center for "managers" who rely on organization charts, progress reports, management studies, cost-effectiveness comparisons, improvement programs and brochures, while neglecting the technical details. In this they are aping the systems set up several years ago within the Department of Defense. It is well to remember that no number of gardening books will make plants grow in a drought.

The Soviets have overtaken us in submarines, while we have let our submarine design capability wither away. The seeds were sown many years ago; to catch up will be an immense task requiring resolute and drastic action.

We must find a way to formulate and gain approval of an adequate submarine development and building program and then marshal the resources to carry it out. The present organization and methods prevent this. Most officials in the Navy and DOD bureaucracies actually perform only one major function in the procurement of weapons systems, and that is to give their consent to requests for funds. Until all these officials agree to release funds nothing can or does get done. Because of the decreasing availability of funds, people at all levels of the bureaucracy demand that an ever increasing volume of information be forwarded

through the long chain of command, for their review prior to consenting to release of funds. By the time the man in charge of a program translates the actual situations facing him into the forms prescribed by his superiors and in terminology they can understand; by the time he answers all the questions raised by the many principals and staff personnel in the bureaucracy, little time is left over for him to actually manage his job. A working level manager finds countless people in staff positions in organizations superior to his own, each of whom can make demands on his time and require him to justify his actions. He has to funnel the collective technical intelligence through the relatively untrained and undisciplined minds of many of these administrative officials. However, he finds hardly any one among them who appears to realize that he also has a responsibility—other than that of benevolent neutrality—to help get the job done. The failure to understand the distinction between abstract principles and specific problems tends to mute action; those responsible hide their indecision and lack of action behind a screen of rhetoric and mountains of paper. When help is given it is often in the manner of a lord granting a favor to his vassal.

So long as the bureaucracy consists of large numbers of people at many levels who believe they perform their function of evaluation and approval properly, by requiring vast and detailed information to be submitted through the many levels of the bureaucracy, program managers will never be found who can effectively manage their jobs. A program manager today would require at least 48 hours a day of his own time just to satisfy the requests for detailed information from the Navy and DOD bureaucracies, the Congress, the General Accounting Office, and various other parties who have the legal right—and use it—to place demands on his time. As long as we operate a system where the checkers (those charged with the responsibility of evaluating and approving) outnumber the doers (those responsible for carrying out the work), the doers are condemned to spend their time doing paper work for the checkers. Meanwhile the Soviets move forward unhampered by theoretical management doctrines.

The situation compounds itself because the number of people in this world who are truly capable of getting design and technical work done is small, and most of these will not knowingly seek employment under such conditions. Therefore, the system itself inhibits producing capable program managers.

Also, few people are capable and qualified intellectually to evaluate and approve actual performance of complex technical work. Since a reviewer or evaluator who is incapable of performing his job intelligently does more harm than good, it would be far better to abolish these jobs and rely on the program managers, ineffective though some of them may be. That way, at least, the program managers would be spending their time actually getting the technical job done.

You may think I have overstated the case. I assure you I have not. At the working level there is disenchantment with the present system and a deep-seated frustration and resentment at the hordes of reviewers and evaluators let loose on them—let loose to consume so much of their time that they are unable to pay attention to their own responsibilities—even though in many cases these responsibilities may stretch their capabilities to the utmost and call for their fullest attention and energy.

We must establish an adequate submarine program and then we must establish groups of technically competent people with clear authority and responsibility for executing the program, similar to the strong technical management approach that prevailed in the

nuclear propulsion program and later in the Polaris program. There is also a need for strong technical groups in the shipyards and industrial contractor organizations to carry out the technical development work under close technical direction from the government headquarters organization. These needs are not being met and will not be met until the present methods are changed.

Another question which must be answered is: are we capable of manning and operating a fleet of highly complex submarines, particularly with the changing mood of young Americans? Under existing policies, the answer is no. Today we find it difficult to operate and maintain our submarine fleet with a 50 percent turnover in crews every year. It takes a long period of training before a young man can be relied upon to operate and maintain the sophisticated equipment in these ships. Means must be found to keep these men in the Navy long enough to provide the necessary stability. If this means more pay, then we must provide it, although pay is not the sole issue.

All of the above point to the need to increase awareness of the importance, and acceptance, of the priority of the submarine role within the Navy and the Defense Department. Without recognition of and emphasis on this priority, the program I have outlined will not succeed. To this end I recommend as a start:

(a) establishing a Deputy to the Chief of Naval Operations for Submarines with the rank of vice admiral

(b) establishing within the Naval Ship Systems Command a Deputy Commander for Submarines of flag rank, and having overall responsibility for submarine design and construction, and with an in-house submarine design organization under his command.

(c) establishing within the Naval Ordnance Command a technical organization for developing a long-range, submerged launched submarine cruise missile; and

(d) establishing within the Bureau of Naval Personnel an office of sufficient authority to be responsible for all submarine personnel matters.

I fully recognize that even if these steps were taken there is little hope for improvement unless present policies and practices within the Navy and Defense Departments are changed.

Question 6: What actions must be taken by Congress to strengthen our nuclear submarine program and reestablish our supremacy?

Answer: This is the most difficult of the questions you have put to me, for it has no simple, factual answer, but I shall try.

Taking into account the magnitude of the Soviet submarine program and current budgetary pressures, I do not think it is possible to reestablish our submarine supremacy in the near future. It will require heroic measures just to establish a submarine program that will halt further erosion of our position and enable us to hold our own in undersea warfare.

We must recognize at the outset that the root of the problem lies not with the Congress but with the labyrinthine and sluggish organization of our defense establishment, the all-pervasiveness of paper men in the bureaucracy. It is most difficult for the Congress to correct this since the Congress cannot assume the burdens and responsibilities of the Defense Department.

I believe the most valuable role Congress can play in the present situation is to goad the defense planners into doing their jobs by requiring them to explain to your satisfaction the steps they will take to establish an adequate submarine program. If we are not to repeat past mistakes it will probably be necessary for Congress to authorize and appropriate funds before agreement is reached with the Defense Department. It was precisely this type of impetus from the Con-

gress that enabled the United States to achieve its original preeminence in nuclear submarine capability and to enjoy our Polaris fleet—now so vital to our defense. As you well know, it was the Congress, not the Executive Branch, that supplied the initiative, wisdom, foresight, determination and courage that gave this country our nuclear Navy.

I think your suggestion to "call a special hearing to focus Congressional attention on this matter" would help to force correction of the bureaucratic inertia and inefficiency which have resulted in dissipation of our lead in this field, and which stand in the way of establishing an adequate submarine program.

Further, such a hearing would help to insure that the Congress and the public thoroughly understand the serious implication for our long-range national interest if we allow Russia—the dominant land power—to become the world's dominant naval power as well.

It is in my opinion that with respect to our submarine program the Congress cannot properly fulfill its constitutional responsibilities "to provide and maintain a Navy" unless it insures that the Defense Department and the Navy are, in fact, responding to this problem as rapidly and effectively as is essential to our national security. This will require constant and thorough familiarity with the Soviet naval threat, the needs of the Navy, and the progress being made to meet those needs. I recognize this will not be easy to do, but I am convinced that without constant, expert oversight from the Congress our ponderous defense bureaucracy, with its glacial slowness, will not take the necessary actions.

CLOSING REMARKS

I would like to end this letter with some observations you may find useful. No one believes more firmly than I that in a free society the military must be under civilian control. But the principle as such does not guarantee that the interests of the people as a whole will be competently executed in military matters. This depends on the quality of the civilian direction; on the caliber and experience of the men in the civilian high command on general staff, as well as on its organization and procedures.

For at least a decade, the civilian high command of our military establishment has made decisions concerning design and procurement of military hardware, largely on the basis of the principles of so-called "scientific management," and specifically of systems analysis and cost-effectiveness. This process continues. It is inappropriate for the management of our military establishment which has as its primary and overriding purpose the protection of this country against enemy attack. Numbers like facts are good servants, but bad masters.

At today's level of military technology, the best protection—the only truly effective protection—of this country is an effective deterrent to foreign aggression. Systems analysis and cost-effectiveness as they have been practiced in the Department of Defense are irrelevant when it comes to evaluating how much of a deterrent we need and what will provide the most effective deterrent at the least expenditure of funds. Even the money angle alone is beyond the capacity of those expert in nothing but systems analysis and cost-effectiveness; technical military competence is the indispensable *sine qua non*.

The proof of the pudding is in the eating. The ten year systems analysis-cost-effectiveness regime in the Department of Defense leaves us today in imminent danger of losing the substantial lead we once had in our nuclear submarine Navy. This erosion, moreover, has not been accompanied by more efficient expenditure of taxpayers' money; quite the contrary. My own experience has been that the "scientific-management" people

have made it more difficult to keep costs within reasonable limits, even as they have held up the vitally necessary technical work of design and of building nuclear ships to keep abreast of the Russians, besides wasting the time of our few capable technical people by ordering them to do useless paper work for their "studies." We must give up computer thinking on a subject that cannot be computerized, a subject which means your future and mine, the future of the whole American people.

Wherever the social sciences have permeated American life, they have down-graded competence within a specific field and glorified vague generalities supposedly applicable to all situations. This springs from their determination to appear "scientific" in the sense that the natural sciences are so termed. That is, they try for "general laws"—comparable to the law of gravity, for example. No such thing can ever be found in areas concerned with the behavior and interactions of human beings, for people are both free and diverse—they cannot be made into "atoms" or other inert units. In education, pseudo-sociological notions account for the emphasis on competence in teaching *methods* and the neglect of competence in subject *knowledge*; in matters of military procurement, they account for emphasis on management "science"—pseudo-science at best—and neglect of competence in the science and technology of military equipment and operation. Unless the incubus of the social sciences can be removed from our civilian high command, I fear we can count on being made and kept inferior to the Russians. This is an exorbitant price to pay for a doctrine that, however much it is valued by its practitioners, has nowhere proved itself.

We used to be an immensely practical people. Perhaps we admired concrete technical achievement a little too much and theories and research not enough. But under the dominance of the social sciences, so-called—which include the whole "scientific management" concept—we have gone too far the other way. We allow the theoretical research expert to control the technical expert who knows how to get the practical job done. Theory and research are important but where practical work has to be done, they can never be a substitute for technical expertise.

It is the fashion in our business schools to claim that managing is an art or a profession that can be learned in the abstract and applied to any kind of activity—kings used to claim that they had inherited or learned the art of governing and nobody else could do it as well as they. Conglomerates today operate on the notion that an organization that does well manufacturing shoes can equally well—with the same management or its equivalent—manufacture ships, toasters and what have you, even nuclear submarines. But it just isn't so.

You remember that Mirabeau said, "to administer is to rule." The "scientific management" people claim to have learned the art of administering *anything*. It is paradoxical that we who began our life as a nation by depreciating the notion that to be raised a king made one fit to rule a country—that we now bow down to those new rulers of ours, the professional administrators, setting them above those who have technical knowledge, skill, and experience and giving them final decision in evaluating their technical work. You can be sure that the Russians would never have made such spectacular advances in the science, technology, and operation of nuclear submarines, had they allowed themselves to be constrained by systems analysis and cost-effectiveness rules. And this, too, is paradoxical. For the Soviet Union is the first nation to have been built entirely on social science doctrines.

One could make a good case, I think, showing that they have been highly successful where they abandoned these doctrines—as

in education, science, military technology—and equally unsuccessful where they held on to them against all common sense—as in agriculture and consumer production.

To recapitulate: My criticism of the capability of the Defense Department is based on personal experience extending over a period of a half century of Naval service and nearly a quarter century in the design, development, construction and operation of our nuclear Navy.

Not one technical idea having merit for the naval nuclear propulsion program has emanated from Department of Defense Headquarters although numerous worthless ideas have been urged on us—ideas which have required us to devote much time to refuting them. Conversely, the technical ideas I have recommended have ultimately been accepted—but only after constant opposition and detailed justifications endlessly repeated at every level of the chain of command. In many cases, starting with a NAUTILUS, it was only after Congress intervened that approval was granted. *It is my considered opinion that if today we stood at the threshold of nuclear propulsion as we did in 1947, it would be impossible to obtain Defense Department approval to build a nuclear submarine.*

I know that with growing uneasiness Congress and our people ask themselves whether the Department of Defense is capable of regenerating itself or, for that matter, whether it realizes that such regeneration is essential if the nation is to survive. I am aware that on July 1 the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel submitted a report to the President on the Department of Defense, and I know that the members of that Panel are an intelligent and patriotic group. But I also know that no outside group, no group that has not been subjected to the "management" practices of the Defense Department can "feel" what is wrong, can recognize the impossibility under present rules and procedures of getting anything accomplished within a reasonable time. Some of the most important information in the world, information on how we feel and react, about our fears and passions is not transferable information. It is information that has to be experienced rather than simply listened to or read.

The Blue Ribbon Defense Panel has recommended major changes in the structure of the Defense Department. Things in this world are accomplished by people, not by systems. Therefore, these organizational changes, while they may provide an improved framework, will not by themselves correct the malaise. Such a correction can only come from a change of attitude.

This letter is long. I have been unable to give meaningful answers to the complex issues you raise in any other manner. If I appear too bold in my comments it is because I have taken it for granted all my life that it was my duty to bear a part of the responsibility for the future of our country, and I have never doubted that in a small manner it did lie within my power to affect the future.

I thank you for giving me the opportunity to express my views.

With my warm regards,

Respectfully,

H. G. RICKOVER.

Mr. MINSHALL. Mr. Chairman, I yield 15 minutes to the gentleman from New Hampshire (Mr. WYMAN).

Mr. WYMAN. Mr. Chairman, as the newest member of the subcommittee on the Department of Defense, it was a real privilege to succeed the late, distinguished, dependable workhorse on that subcommittee, the late Honorable Glenard P. Lipscomb, of California.

Everybody misses Glen. But I would like to observe also that his place as rank-

ing minority member on this subcommittee has been filled by one of the hardest working men, one of the most sincere and most effective cross-examiners and conscientious Congressman that it has been my privilege to be associated with, the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. MINSHALL).

I hope people realize his dedication and the extent of his work for America and his efforts to save money while making sure that our country stays strong.

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WYMAN. I yield to my distinguished chairman.

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I want to join in the words of commendation with reference to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. MINSHALL). He has worked closely with all of the members of the committee in a spirit of cooperation so that economies might be achieved and waste reduced in the Defense Department. It would have been difficult if not impossible to have achieved the \$2.1 billion reduction recommended by the committee without the efforts and the cooperation of the gentleman from Ohio. I commend my friend for his outstanding contribution to the bill.

We lost our beloved friend, Glenard Lipscomb, and BILL MINSHALL has stepped into the breach and has done a good job.

Mr. WYMAN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the distinguished and congenial gentleman from Texas whom I am honored to be associated with.

I would like to observe, as I have worked within this subcommittee, that the same high standard applies for all of the members of the Subcommittee on Defense on both sides of the aisle. The gentleman from Arizona, is, as the chairman has described him, as solid and dependable as the Rock of Gibraltar. The gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. DAVIS) is similarly indefatigable in his work as are the very senior members on the Democratic side who have lived and worked with the problems of defense since the days of World War II. They deserve the respect, gratitude, and appreciation of every American citizen.

I am constantly impressed by the awesome responsibilities of the members of the Defense Subcommittee. The job that faces them is so enormous that it is almost beyond the ability of the individual to grasp. More than half of the controllable spending of the United States budget is in this single subcommittee. The future of the United States, in terms of weapons systems to be planned for, lies with them, and as the gentleman from Arizona has said, there has not been a new one from 1960 to 1969. The ability of a Member of this House to take on a member of the subcommittee in debate on the floor of this House is severely limited because, after all, the responsibilities of the subcommittee involve a great deal of classified information—more than half of the work of the subcommittee and the knowledge of the subcommittee cannot be printed in any report—we are not at liberty to discuss it on this floor. So when a person undertakes to challenge something that the

Subcommittee on Defense has done, he can easily be met with the rejoinder, which in many instances is so, that "The gentleman cannot be aware of all the details and all the responsibilities and all of the facts." This is difficult to rejoin.

Weapons systems take years from the time they are first authorized to the time they are off the drawing boards and in the field. Subcommittee members must evaluate the testimony of countless "experts" and then pray they have chosen the right weapons systems to fund.

I would like at this time to make some basic observations in simple language about the defense of the United States of America. I know that later, as this bill is read for amendment, there will be Members in this body who will seek to amend it and to cut it even further. There will be arguments made about ABM and arguments about various technical aspects of the various segments of the report that are funded in the bill. But this country must stay strong, and if there is any system of priorities that is to have true meaningfulness in the United States of America, the defense of this country must remain the first priority of this Nation.

I do not want anyone to suggest that any member of this subcommittee or any Member of this House would imply that a Member who has sought to reduce a particular funding within the Defense Establishment was by that action unpatriotic, or turning the other cheek to what the gentleman from South Carolina has so graphically described as the Soviet threat in the Caribbean at this hour. The truth of the matter is that this budget is cut down below what really ought to be in consequence of tremendous pressures for increased spending for domestic concerns.

The B-1, to follow the B-52, as a manned bomber, is underfunded. Its progress has been too slow. The Poseidon conversions—the gentleman from South Carolina argued for two or more. There ought to be six or eight, if we had the facilities to handle them, but apparently we do not.

ABM, as has been said, is only increased to a third site and even as to this it is not fully funded. The truth of the matter is, that in the long run this country's main defense must look to the ULMS program—for deep sea, submarine weaponry of long range, capable of prolonged concealment under the water, and able to reach any part of hostile areas with its missiles. That is where we must go with defense money in future years because ABM has to depend on eyes in radar on the surface of the earth, and its eyes can too easily be knocked out. If you knock out the eyes, you do not have this defense.

But in the meantime the Soviet all over the world is growing in its missile capability. It has its ABM. It has its new Yankee class submarine. It is not controlled by any such deliberative processes as apply to this great body here or to the other body. It has installed cruise missiles without domestic discord. It must be recognized that we do not have the kind of opponent that we can engage in general discussion with. That is why SALT

does not work, and never will work until we are so darned strong that we have something they want to trade out in order to protect themselves. The Soviet's naval strength today is such that the 6th Fleet exists in the Mediterranean today at the will of the Soviet Union. We do not have many really new ships. We voted \$427 million in this bill for additional ships at the request of the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, but it is not enough. I would vote for \$1 billion more if that is what is necessary to keep America strong.

Yesterday on this floor I urged that our great President use the "hot line" to call the Kremlin and tell them to knock off what they are doing in Cuba, because a Communist nuclear submarine base in Cuba is as much a confrontation at this time as it was for the late President John Fitzgerald Kennedy.

No one can remain indifferent to the fact that it is little short of nonsense to be fighting a war and be spending billions of dollars in a confrontation with communism in Southeast Asia and Indochina and still let the Soviets build a submarine base 90 miles from our shore that is going to lead to control of the waters of perhaps the whole Western Hemisphere.

Mr. Chairman, we are hated by the Communist nations. We are despised by Red China and the Soviet Union. We are recognized by the Communist bloc as the only real obstacle to world domination that remains between them and their declared goal of world domination. It is our obligation to our people to continue to remain strong. It is the primary obligation of the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee to make sure that this is the case.

I think we ought to recognize too what has been frequently pointed out in the debate today, that the dollars that are appropriated in this package do not buy what dollars used to buy. We are not going to have for the \$68 billion-odd that are involved here the buy that we had just a year ago. As the gentleman from Arizona observed, there is a 10-percent difference, a 10-percent loss. Actually the cut in defense, instead of being on the order of \$2.5 billion, is on the order of about \$9 billion, and the deeper cut is of very, very serious concern, because the question is whether or not we are going to have what we need to protect this Nation.

The F-111 had another crash yesterday in Saginaw, Tex., but as the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Wright) has pointed out, it still has a pretty good safety record. I intend to vote to keep the money for the F-111 in this bill. I think we have to do it, and I am going to vote, as I have in committee, for the money for the C-5A. The cost overruns are deplorable but we must have the planes.

We have got to have more in-house capability, however, within the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee and the full committee to enable the Congress to go out with a staff and keep an eye on these procurements. The staff of the Appropriations Committee is terribly limited for an agency that is given the entire responsibility in the legislative branch to determine how many billions

of dollars or tens of billions of dollars or fifties of billions of dollars of the taxpayers' money is to be spent on national defense. Every year there are cost inefficiencies that might have been avoided, that have run into billions of dollars, if we had the staffmen out in the field to observe in the first instance and to report early enough. I believe we should also have a contract review function as a matter of continuing legislative oversight.

The trouble is best illustrated by the problem concerning which I have written separate views in the report, and to which the gentleman from Wisconsin made a brief reference a moment ago. In this bill there is a second incremental funding for the DD-963 class destroyer which is the lead destroyer for the Navy for the next 10 to 20 years, on the order of \$500 million. Although this House had passed an amendment requiring that the procurement of this item should be at least from two shipbuilders, this contract was let out and committed by the Navy under the gun and despite the House amendment, and it was given to one single source. I will not mention on this floor at this time who the single source is, and it makes no difference to me as to who a second source might be, but it does seem to me that a great deal of the problem in procurement that defense faces every year is due to the fact that businesses get too big, and too much money is given to a single source.

In this instance, the package on the DD-963 is \$2.1 billion. That is \$2,100 million. That is a great deal of money to put in one place. Too much. Despite this fact, they put this package into a facility that already had several billion dollars in ongoing defense procurement contracts.

This is not only wasteful, and leads to a prospect of cost overruns or underbidding or concealments of one sort or another, or administrative inefficiencies, but more importantly, what it also does is put all the eggs of the United States in terms of its new destroyer into one basket. I do not think this makes sense nor reflects adequate response to security interests of the Nation.

What we should do, and what I hope this Congress at the next session will do, is to require that procurement of ships of this class or any procurements of this magnitude be from a common specification. But manufactured and assembled and put together in diverse locations by at least two separate shipbuilders. There should be at least two outfits building the DD-963.

The prospect of subcontracts does not answer the problem. Nor is it a valid objection that separate builders would have variable components. And I will wager we will find that the variable pitch propellers and the powertrain and some other elements are going to be subcontracted outside the United States of America.

This does not help American jobs or American industry or the American working man. It is a matter of major concern.

I should like to see the Congress take another hard look at this in the next year, and perhaps come up with a re-

quirement of dual source procurement. I am informed it is likely to be some time before this ship is actually in production. I feel that we will be able to come up with a diversity, with a separation of facilities and production that will do a lot to contribute to the security of the United States, even though in so doing it may be necessary to unfeather some nests.

Mr. CHAIRMAN, there is no greater cause than the defense of our Nation. If we do not stay sufficiently strong in the United States of America to deter attack upon us, whether it be from Cuba or from any other source, then all the social welfare programs in the world are to no avail. Those who are so "gung ho" these days for new priorities in this country would do well to reflect on this fact.

I hope that there will not be a major effort made on this floor to reduce the defense appropriations called for in this bill any lower than they have been reduced in the bill. I feel it is essential for the United States to stay strong, and particularly essential at this time for us not only to have something to bargain with at the SALT talks but also to be able to give the impression to the world that we are going to protect our friends and that we have enough reserve to stay with them.

As Members know, we have had Soviet vessels pop up in the midst of our training exercises, and we have had them affront us and affront other nations of the world on the high seas all over the world.

It is a matter of very distressing concern, for our respect of international law on the high seas is well known to the Soviet Union. They take advantage of this to stage confrontation after confrontation that the world takes as evidence of weakness on our part when we fail to respond. Recently, they have intruded upon our naval operations, cruised in the midst of our task forces, and even interfered with underwater missile test launches within sight of U.S. shores.

Mr. CHAIRMAN, with the reservation stated relating to the DD-963 procurement, I support the bill and urge its passage.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from New Hampshire has expired.

Mr. RHODES. Mr. Chairman, I yield the gentleman 2 additional minutes.

Mr. ANDREWS of Alabama. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WYMAN. I yield to the gentleman from Alabama.

Mr. ANDREWS of Alabama. I want to say that the gentleman has made an excellent speech. I have served on this subcommittee a long time, and I can truthfully say that the gentleman in the well now has served as ably as any member with whom I have ever served. He has grasped the problem quickly. He has been regular in his attendance at committee meetings. He is able. He is a great and loyal American. I want to commend him for the excellent speech he has just delivered.

Mr. WYMAN. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WYMAN. I yield to the gentleman from South Carolina.

Mr. RIVERS. I have been around this place for a long time, Mr. Chairman. I have seen no one who has assimilated the technical terms and the technical know-how of this complicated Military Establishment with all its sophisticated systems more quickly than the gentleman who has just addressed the Committee. He is a scholar. He assigns himself to his task. He has done a splendid job.

The gentleman talks like a veteran on this Committee, and he has done a lot of good. I am happy to associate myself with what the gentleman has said. He is rendering great service to this Committee, to this Congress, and to the Nation. He is a great patriot.

Mr. WYMAN. I thank the gentleman very much for his kind remarks.

I should like to respond by saying that when I was fortunate enough to be assigned to join my brethren the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. MINSHALL), the gentleman from Arizona (Mr. RHODES), the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. DAVIS), and the other fine gentlemen on the subcommittee I told Mr. Bow, our good friend the ranking minority member, "Put me on only the Defense Subcommittee because it is a full-time job for the country."

I am just beginning to try to get enough learning to be able to comprehend the terms and the technology in the thousands and thousands of pages of hearings. As for assimilation of that to which the gentleman made reference, I doubt it I could adequately do that in 5 years, but I am profoundly grateful to the gentleman for his generous remarks.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from New Hampshire has again expired.

Mr. MINSHALL. Mr. Chairman, I yield the gentleman 2 additional minutes, and ask the gentleman to yield.

Mr. WYMAN. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.

Mr. MINSHALL. Mr. Chairman, I, too, would like to commend the gentleman from New Hampshire for the outstanding work he has done on this subcommittee. When he was chosen for this new assignment we looked over his record in the House and we found it was an excellent one. He has certainly proved it in the short time he has taken over his duties.

Mr. WYMAN. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. YATES. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WYMAN. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. YATES. I want to join in commendation of the gentleman's speech. He made an excellent speech.

I should like to ask the gentleman about the C-5A and the Lockheed proposal. As I understand it, from reading the report and the proposal in the bill, Lockheed is to receive an extra \$200 million this year and an extra \$200 million next year in order that 81 C-5A's may be completed. This \$400 million, as

I understand it, is above the contract, a gratuity.

How much do we have to pay for weapons system of this kind? Suppose \$300 million or \$400 million had been requested, would the committee have approved it?

From what I can get out of the hearings and from speaking to members of the staff, Lockheed has had poor management. As one of the great weapons-producing corporations of the country, if it is guilty—

Mr. WYMAN. May I respond to the gentleman?

Mr. YATES. Let me finish my question first and then you can respond.

If Lockheed is guilty of bad management, even if there is a need to foster our national security, is there not some other way of doing it than by pouring endless money toward building this aircraft?

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has again expired.

Mr. MINSHALL. Mr. Chairman, I yield the gentleman 1 additional minute.

Mr. WYMAN. Before I yield to the gentleman from South Carolina who seeks to respond, I would like to make this observation. It is cheaper in the long run to put this money in this bill for this procurement than to wash them out. If we wash them out the billions already spent are lost. We have to have these C-5A's. There have been inefficiencies and problems, but sooner or later I am hopeful under the direction of the able gentleman from Texas and the staff, which is extraordinarily competent, we may be sufficiently implemented by additional staff in the field so we can keep an eye on these things and prevent these overruns.

Mr. RIVERS. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WYMAN. I am glad to yield to the distinguished chairman.

Mr. RIVERS. We are giving Lockheed \$200 million, and we believe that is justified. We will keep separate accounting on Lockheed to make sure that the expenditure is justified. We in the Government owe them \$700 million that we have not paid them. Lockheed is producing this aircraft. It is out of the woods now. Does the gentleman think the 747 is not having trouble? They are. And do you think we ought to knock that down because they are? If we stop production, we will be in trouble, because we need these aircraft.

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Mississippi (Mr. WHITTEN).

Mr. WHITTEN. Mr. Chairman, I doubt that any of us who will speak today can qualify as experts in this area. We are all dependent upon what we believe after listening to the intelligence community.

The President, the Bureau of the Budget, and the committee have all studied all the facts available to us—and the bill before you is our recommended actions based upon a composite of such study.

Except for a few years, I have served since 1943. With that background I want to take this time to say that I can find

much to agree with, in everything that has been said here.

However, all viewpoints can be met if the President and the Congress agree—within the funds recommended here.

The need for additional nuclear submarines has been mentioned. We provided for more than was requested and because the executive department did not agree, you will see that from 1961, 1962, 1963, 1964, 1965, and 1966 a large part of funds the Congress appropriated for the Polaris submarines were not spent for that purpose but for others. The committee approved other uses when not spent for submarines.

My point in taking the floor at this time is to say we have before us a bill that will provide more than \$66 billion for Defense for the next fiscal year. But, Mr. Chairman, what has not been stressed is that the Department will have \$9 billion that is not committed for expenditure which is available to meet any emergency that might arise. Actually the total available for the year exceeds \$105 billion.

I grant you that we would have to straighten it out—and frequently do—after the fact but the fact is we reprogrammed more than \$4.7 million this year. They tell the Congress about the changed need and the Congress agrees. We say: "OK, go ahead," which is as it should be.

Mr. Chairman, in the past the Department had so much money in so many pockets that it did not know what it had. Operation "Smoke Out" followed and the Air Force alone found more than \$4 in dormant accounts.

I am glad here we are limited—the time for which appropriations are made are limited: 3 years for major procurement, 5 years for shipbuilding, and research and development only 2 years. This is a great forward step to regain control. This action should save billions. Under the old system funds secured for a high-priority use frequently ended up being spent for a fifth-rate use.

I repeat, if you get amendments adding funds for additional items, you will be dependent upon the Department of Defense as to whether they use the funds. But if the Department of Defense feels that such items are necessary there are funds—more than \$9 billion—that could be so used.

I urge you to support the committee bill, because above all we must retain an economy that can support a war. And may I say if we have one I hope and trust we will have a plan to win—something we have not had in Vietnam where we have used more bombs than World War II and Korea both, mostly dropped in the sea or unoccupied forest—while prime targets have been ruled "off limits." It is a shame.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Mississippi has expired.

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from New York (Mr. PIKE).

(Mr. PIKE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. PIKE. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the chairman of the committee yielding

to me and I have asked for this time in order to commend him and the committee as a whole for doing what I believe to be a reasonable job in cutting this appropriation down to the point where it is. I am going to support it wholeheartedly.

We were told initially that this was a rockbottom budget. Well, it was not a rockbottom budget. I am glad that the Appropriations Committee has taken some of the rocks out of it. There are some more items I would have liked to see removed, a few I would rather have seen left in, but the committee has been responsible.

I would like to suggest to you that we all too often erroneously justify the tremendous waste which exists in these programs by saying that these are sophisticated programs and that they are breakthroughs. We have new technology and new things we have got to do, and it is this which causes waste.

Well, Mr. Chairman, I want to show you an unsophisticated program which is under procurement right now. This is the total drawing of the program. It constitutes a felt washer, a simple felt washer, 1½ inches in diameter and ½-inch thick. The person to whom the program was submitted told me they could produce it probably for about one-tenth of a cent apiece.

Now, this is not a technological breakthrough, but in order to bid on it the Pentagon first requires a bidder to look through 61 computer cards, each with a microfilm insert, and the first one blows up into this, and that is the only drawing in the bunch, but there are 61 computer cards each with a microfilm insert, and after that there are 3 pounds and 6 ounces worth of plans and specifications and regulations and instructions to build a felt washer.

If we are truly in danger of becoming a second-rate power, as some people have suggested, it is not because Mel Laird has cut the Defense budget, it is not because the Committee on Appropriations has cut the Defense budget, it is because the Pentagon is peopled with paperpushers, and the defense industry in the United States of America is absolutely drowning in a sea of paper.

The company that sent me this has said they would not bid on this. If they bid \$2,000 for the whole procurement, they would probably make \$1,000 on it, but the paperwork that they would have to go through to do this simply was not justified.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 additional minute to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. PIKE. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for the additional time.

Mr. Chairman, I commend the committee for doing what they have done, but anybody who thinks that this is a rockbottom budget now is really a person who acts on faith and love, and not intellect. Anyone who says that it is necessary to have 61 computer cards with microfilmed instructions, 3 pounds and 6 ounces worth of plans and specifications and regulations and instructions in order

to bid on a felt washer which is worth, maybe, one-tenth of a cent, and this is a rockbottom budget, has rocks in his head.

Mr. MINSHALL. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. BRAY).

Mr. BRAY. Mr. Chairman, I am not on the Committee on Appropriations, but there is a matter which I would like to bring to your attention, and I will be brief.

There is a provision in this Defense appropriation bill on page 15 that would cause the Army to cut out a source of supply for the M-16 rifle. I understand an amendment will be offered to eliminate this clause, and I will certainly support that amendment.

The bill as reported originally by the House Armed Services Committee, the authorization bill, and overwhelmingly approved by the House, contained a provision requiring three active production sources for the M-16 rifle during fiscal year 1971.

That provision which passed the House was objected to by the Department of the Army to the Senate Armed Services Committee. The information supplied by the Department of the Army in attempting to justify their objection has proved to be not only misleading, but factually incorrect. In the conference committee on the authorizing legislation the House position prevailed, and the proviso for three active production sources for supplying this vital infantry weapon remained intact, when the facts were brought to the attention of the Senate conferees they readily agreed with the House conferees.

The conference report was approved by the House by a vote of 341 to 11, and approved by the Senate with only one dissenting vote.

The proviso in the authorization bill was not challenged during general debate by any Member of the House, and no amendment was offered by any member from the Committee on Appropriations or any other committee to strike that proviso or to amend it in any way.

After the Congress had exercised its will on this matter the Committee on Appropriations brings before us a bill under a rule waiving points of order and in effect is legislating in an appropriation bill.

If the House goes along with this type of legislating you might as well eliminate all requirements for legislation authorizing appropriations, turn everything over to the Committee on Appropriations, and abolish the legislative committees.

Now, in all fairness, I am sure that the members of the Committee on Appropriations who sponsored this provision of the bill will tell you that it was done so at the request of someone in the Department of the Army on the basis that it would save money, possibly as much as \$14.3 million. Of course, that alleged saving vanishes when one examines the facts. The facts presented by the Army are clearly inaccurate, and they were studied very carefully by the members of the committee.

The alleged saving is based on the

Army's claim that the available unit cost of rifles procured in the manner recommended in the authorization bill would be \$163.50.

This is pure speculation because the Army has never requested bid prices from the three producers to continue production at a minimum sustaining rate in order to maintain three hot production lines.

I want to say further that certain officials of the Army came to members of the committee, that is the authorization committee, and asked to eliminate both additional sources of supply and resort to only one.

However, the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee did request prices from the two secondary producers of the M-16 rifle, in an attempt to evaluate the cost data submitted by the Army in their objections.

They wanted to know whether or not the Army data was true or not.

I can report to the Members of the House that the prices received by the Armed Services Committee at the request of the chairman of the full committee were approximately one-third less than those projected by the Army and would, in effect, eliminate any alleged increased costs for maintaining the two additional sources to produce a critical weapon system.

I want you to keep in mind that the same officials in the Army asked us on the Committee on Armed Services, or came to several of us, to eliminate both additional sources and go back to one source, and please remember that it took Congress over 3 years to get the Army to approve of an additional source for the M-16 rifle.

Many of you will recall the efforts made by a number of the Members of the Congress to force the Army to establish the additional production sources for the M-16 rifle. This effort was strongly opposed by certain officials in the Army.

Finally, after 3 or 4 years of effort on the part of the Congress, both the House and Senate authorization committees and also the Committee on Appropriations, the Army negotiated with Colt Industries to acquire the production rights and the technical data package for this weapon system. Finally, additional sources of supply of the M-16 were obtained, principally because of congressional efforts and over the opposition of the Army that are difficult to ascertain.

Just to refresh your memory, the Army paid Colt's \$4.5 million for that rights and data package, plus agreeing to pay Colt's a 5½-percent royalty for all rifles procured by the Department of Defense from any source other than Colt's. It has been estimated that this cost to establish two additional production sources of the M-16 rifle totaled more than \$30 million. Since the establishment of these additional production sources, most of the problems previously experienced by our soldiers with the M-16 in Vietnam have been eliminated with the deficiencies corrected.

(Mr. BRAY asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. TEAGUE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, over the past several years I have been a

witness—I regret to say a relatively silent witness—of the controversy that has raged around the F-111 fighter-bomber. The principal reason for my silence to date has been my belief that the discussion and appraisal of this aircraft would best be left to those who are truly expert on the subject. But I now feel I must abandon that attitude, and I feel this way for three reasons:

First, the heated discussion in the Congress over the ABM system caused me to start thinking about the alternatives, or I should say the supplements, to our intercontinental missile strength; and entering into these thoughts was the obvious age of even our newest B-52 bombers and the discussions that have centered around the advanced manned strategic aircraft, now called the B-1;

Second, information had come to me concerning the F-111—both the tactical and strategic versions—from a number of sources: congressional, military, and some from interested experts with no particular ax to grind.

In looking into it I came to the conclusion that, regardless of the very bad impression that has been created in the nonexpert public mind about the F-111, there was no plot against the plane, but there certainly was an almost suspiciously large amount of misinformation about it. It seemed to me that for some reason that was not at all clear the F-111 had become a kind of football to be kicked about by some newspaper writers who were short on other material to write about.

My third, and last reason was that the F-111 is made in Texas. Made in Fort Worth, represented by my friend and colleague, JIM WRIGHT, the most articulate defender of the F-111 that can be imagined.

All of these things then, the proper defense of the country, the seemingly irresponsible and often misleading attitude that I had seen in the press, and the parochial interest of my own State pointed out that I had a responsibility to find out the true story on the F-111.

There was only one way to do this and that was to examine into the facts myself. I have done this and these remarks are designed to set forth what I learned.

I will go into some details later on but I would first like to convey the overall impression that I gained from my study.

My reference here might appear to some to be frivolous but I can assure you that I have no such intent, I merely want to convey as a first thing the kind of immediate impression that arose from my study of the facts. All of here have at some time or other, probably when we were very young, read "Aesop's Fables." Aesop was a fabulist. He did not tell lies, he told fables, and fables are good fun, especially when they point up a moral precept or tell a story in a fashion that makes some fundamental aspect of human life live in a more vivid fashion. That is what fables are for. But when fables are directed at specific people or specific things they lose their innocence and they lose their true function. My clear impression, Mr. Chairman, is that what we have been hearing and reading about over the years about the F-111 are fables, and little else. But they have been

dangerous fables, unfair and unjust fables. If these stories—and I am still referring to the fables—had been directed at air power generally, directed at all aircraft, they would have been recognized for what they are. But having been directed as they have been at an individual kind of aircraft they have taken on the appearance of truth. The events preceding World War II taught us that the constant repetition, for whatever motive, of a particular statement gives that statement the appearance of truth after a certain period of time.

I am certain that there never has been an instance in our history where an aircraft, or any other weapons system for that matter, has been so incorrectly and so unjustly treated by the press of this country. I will not even begin to attempt to explain why this has been so, I will leave that up to someone working on a Ph. D. thesis. Maybe it all goes back to Secretary McNamara and the strong feelings that he generated, maybe it is the drama—and, therefore, the newsworthiness—of the airplane itself with its swiftness and its almost unbelievable ability to fly faster than the speed of sound only 200 feet above the ground while automatically avoiding everything that might lie in front of it. I do not know what the reason is but one thing I am sure of is that one of the supreme achievements of combat technology has suffered deeply because of this unjust treatment, and the loser, if it continues to be the defense of this country, I am sure of this with deep conviction. No, I cannot explain why all this has happened, I just know it has happened.

Of course, the true story is told once in a while, usually in a trade or technical journal that is never seen by the public and only seen by Members of Congress who have a special interest or responsibility with respect to the defense of the country. An example of this was a story that appeared in Executive Aviation Report, dated July 31, 1970. I will express the belief that it will be a rare member of this body who had his attention drawn to this article or would ever have heard of it except for the fact that I am going to insert the whole of it—it is brief—at this point in my remarks. I recommend it very highly to not only those who are interested in the F-111 as an aircraft but to every Member of the House because every Member is interested, and responsible for, the defense of this country. Here are just a few of the highlights of the article from this whole responsible and objective journal. It points out, for example, that—

The F-111 offers twice the range, 3 times the bomb load and several magnitudes smaller CEP: its adverse weather CEP is better than current aircraft clear day CEP.

The article also points out that four F-111's can deliver 62 bombs on a target a 1,000 nautical miles combat radius. It makes a comparison with an F-4 in this respect and says that at this radius the F-4 can carry two bombs. It says:

So to put 62 bombs down would require 31 F-4 with a routine of tankers, electronic scramblers and fighter escort.

It goes on to say that to maintain these 31 F-4's would cost \$37.8 million a year.

compared with cost of maintenance of four F-111's \$6.3 million—one-seventh as much.

These are just a few of the highlights of the brief article, but the whole thing should be read as it appears in these remarks.

This is what it says:

F-111

The 34th aircraft was inspected yesterday. The 35th will be completed the end of this month, 19 in August and then 33 per month until all are inspected by early next year. All will be in service by May. They are cold soaked for 8 hours in a -40 deg C environment and 7.33 g proof-loaded.

Decision on the 40 for FY71 will be taken in about 5 weeks. Cost of the wing fix, estimated at about \$31 million would be reduced from the buy. Presumably this would be 2 or 3 aircraft less.

F-111 will take 24 M117 bombs a distance of 750 NM combat radius compared with 6 bombs 420 NM on the F-4. If the F-111 is also restricted to 8 bombs it will take them 1,250 NM. Thus it offers twice the range, 3 times the bombload and several magnitudes smaller CEP: its adverse weather CEP is better than current aircraft clear day CEP.

4 F-111s can deliver 32 M117 bombs on a target 1,000 NM combat radius. An F-4 at his radius can carry 2, so to put 32 bombs own would require 31 F-4s with a retinue of tankers, electronic scramblers and fighter escort. To maintain these 31 would cost \$37.8 million a year, compared with cost of maintenance of 4 F-111s \$6.3 million—one-seventh as much. If target demollishment instead of bomb release were the test, it would obviously require about 100 F-4s, but the comparison becomes almost meaningless.

In Vietnam 80% of F-111 missions were flown in bad weather, and no aircraft were lost. On 44 of the 50 missions North Vietnamese tried to hit the F-111s but were too late. The record compares with B-29s sent out at a comparable stage in their career and over half were shot down.

GD did not build that piece of steel in the wing pivot. The perpendicular crack that escaped magnaflex and ultrasonic scanning devices was a defect not in the F-111 but in aeronautical quality control as a whole.

"We in the Systems Command are accustomed to problems in the development of new weapons systems. The F-111 has encountered problems no more numerous and no more severe than have other weapons systems. Perhaps it has had even fewer difficulties than its predecessors when one considers its advanced capabilities and its complexity". Chief, Systems Command (Gen. Ferguson).

It is a great statement. It gives the facts, facts that are not in any way distorted by the Department of the Air Force but, as I say, it appeared in a journal that has relatively limited and specialized circulation, one that is read almost entirely by people in the business of aerospace. This kind of coverage, accurate as it is and important as it is and obviously well intentioned as it is, simply does not get to the general public. And very much more importantly it does not get to the vast majority of us here in the Congress who are called upon to vote on the authorizations and appropriations that support and continue the F-111 program. I do not want to belabor the point—I should say destructive—coverage of the F-111 in the large circulation press but recently, and while I was making my own study of the F-111, one of these distorted articles appeared in a Washington newspaper. Fortunately, it was read and ob-

jected to by my colleague BOB PRICE who took the article item by item and literally demolished it. This superb job of setting the records straight appears in the August 14, 1970, CONGRESSIONAL RECORD at page E7721 and I commend it to all Members of the House as a great example of fact answering allegation.

While free and open discussion of matters of national interest—and certainly the future of the F-111 program is just that—is something to be welcomed and encouraged it is my own view that the press has a great responsibility to illuminate the issues, to inform the public, not confuse them.

As a matter of fact any one of us here in the House has readily available to him all of the information—truly factual information—that he needs to make his own decision with respect to the F-111. I am referring of course to the hearings and reports of the committees that have the responsibility for recommending the course of action that the House and the Senate should follow in legislating on our defense.

What do the experts say? Well, one of them, Gen. Otto J. Glasser, Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff, Research and Development, testified this year to the Congress:

Operationally the Air Force is completely satisfied with the Aircraft (F-111) with respect to its ability to perform the mission for which it was designed.

General Ryan, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, has testified:

The F-111 is now coming into its own as the best fighter attack aircraft in the world for the task of all-weather deep interdiction.

With respect to the questions as to whether the present plans of the Department of Defense contemplate a sufficient number of F-111's, General Glasser testified:

Given our wishes, we would naturally want to have more of the aircraft.

General Glasser goes on to point out that it is budgetary restrictions that are preventing the acquisition of more of these "best fighter attack aircraft in the world".

This year's House Armed Services Committee report says:

The F-111 is a unique aircraft. The aircraft inventories of this country and possibly other countries, will someday contain fighter-bomber aircraft superior to the F-111. Such is clearly not the case today and will not be the case for some years to come."

The committee report goes on to refer to the "superb safety record" of the F-111 and to "unquestionable need" and "the unmatched capabilities" of the F-111.

The Senate Armed Services Committee report for this year, although taking a view with which I do not agree with respect to the future of the program, states in unequivocal fashion:

No other aircraft in the Air Force inventory can compete with the F-111.

And goes on to describe the uniqueness of the F-111 in considerable detail.

The safety record of the plane which is the subject of the grossest misrepresentation of all has been the subject of a number of statements made here on

the floor of the House. It is to be hoped that by now this matter has been finally set straight. Suffice it to say that no matter how you figure it, the F-111 has the best, and by far the best, safety record of any of our combat aircraft, a remarkable achievement in view of the very advanced design of the aircraft.

A few minutes ago when I was referring to the overall first impression I got when making my study of the F-111 I said that I would go into some detail later on in my remarks. There are several ways that I could do this but I think the best way of all is to insert at this point in my remarks some direct testimony by the Department of the Air Force itself during its appearance before the House Armed Services Committee. The colloquy that I am going to insert is one between Congressman O. C. FISHER and General Esposito who was representing the Air Force. I will not read this colloquy—it is quite detailed—but I do want it to be printed as part of my remarks as an example of an expert speaking on a subject for which he has personal responsibility. The colloquy is as follows:

THE CHAIRMAN. I am going around the board, now. Are there any questions?

MR. FISHER. I share the concern of many during the past few years about the F-111, its performance, its capability, and the mistakes that have been fed into it and fed out, and so forth. But as a part of the permanent record here that we are making today, I thought it appropriate to ask a few questions based upon a letter written by Congressman Wright of Texas earlier this year, in which he made certain statements about the F-111.

I will repeat them and ask for your comments on each of them. It will just take a moment. I think that would help to firm up the record and make it more complete, as long as we have gone into various aspects of the F-111.

He made this statement:

"In view of the sensational news treatment which has accompanied every single accident suffered by an F-111—treatment never accorded to any other aircraft—it no doubt will come as a very pleasant surprise to many that the F-111 actually has the very best flight safety record of any military aircraft of the Century series."

Do you agree with that statement?

General Esposito. I do, sir.

MR. PRICE. I wonder if you could elaborate a little bit on that. Give a comparison of the safety record with other aircraft, in the same state of development.

MR. FISHER. Incidentally, I have in front of me a chart showing the complete record of all the Century series, the F-100 down to and including the F-111, of the 5,000, 10,000, and 20,000 hours, and I would be pleased to put that in the record at this point to make it more complete. It shows the accident record of each of those; and the F-111 is considerably lower than any of them.

(The information referred to is as follows:)

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR —: You will be enormously pleased, I know, with the truly magnificent record which the F-111 aircraft has achieved in two years of actual flying. This record is a thorough vindication of the confidence and judgment of the Congress in authorizing this program and subsequently appropriating monies for its development and production. Even previously critical news media—as evidence the enclosures—finally are recognizing

that Congress was eminently right in authorizing the plane!

In view of the sensational news treatment which has accompanied every single accident suffered by an F-111—treatment never accorded to any other aircraft—it no doubt will come as a very pleasant surprise to many that the F-111 actually has the very best flight safety record of any military aircraft of the Century Series.

Here is the comparative record, in number of accidents, based in each case upon 5,000 hours, 10,000 hours, and 20,000 hours of actual flying.

NUMBER OF ACCIDENTS—ALL CENTURY SERIES AIRCRAFT

Aircraft	5,000 hours	10,000 hours	20,000 hours
F-100.....	7	14	29
F-101.....	9	16	18
F-102.....	9	12	22
F-104.....	14	17	28
F-105.....	8	12	14
F-106.....	7	8	11
F-111.....	13	16	10
F-4.....	6	8	11

¹ F-111 in each case has produced fewer accidents per hours flown.

Mr. FISHER. Now this additional statement: "The escape module in the F-111, designed to throw the pilots free in event of a crash, is probably the best and most effective yet built. In most of the highly celebrated F-111 accidents, the pilots actually escaped injury. Unlike many escape systems, the F-111's is effective at the lowest attitude—and even over water."

Do you agree with that statement?

General ESPOSITO. Yes, sir. In fact, the module is effective from sitting still on the runway, throughout the full [deleted] mach envelope of the airplane.

Mr. FISHER. Very well.

Another quotation from the letter:

"The short takeoff and landing characteristic of the F-111 is in one sense a safety factor for emergency operations of various sorts. This aircraft will take off and land on shorter airstrips than any other Air Force model capable of such advanced speeds."

Do you agree with that statement?

General ESPOSITO. Correct, sir; for airplanes in the similar category as the F-111, I do, sir.

Mr. FISHER. "No other aircraft has such a complete redundancy of systems—in other words, a series of spare electric and mechanical systems designed to actuate and take over automatically if the primary systems should fail. So far as possible, these have been designed to protect even against pilot errors."

Do you agree with that statement?

General ESPOSITO. Yes, sir; in general I agree with it. The reliability of the system under operational conditions, this is one of the factors that satisfies the contract requirements.

Mr. FISHER. Very well. One other, quoting again:

"Undoubtedly the most significant—and most revolutionary—safety development of the F-111 is its terrain avoidance system which operates by radar. I've tested this system personally at very, very low levels over extremely mountainous country. It works. With this system actuated, it is just almost impossible for a pilot to fly the plane into a mountain or building even on the darkest night and in the worst of weather."

Would you comment on that statement?

General ESPOSITO. That is what the automatic terrain-following radar is designed to do. It allows the pilot to fly at 250 feet or above, under all weather conditions, and it itself clears any terrain that may be ahead of it.

Mr. FISHER. Very well. One other now.

"Combat tests in Vietnam." We have read

quite a bit about those. I have collected a little bit of a file on it, because of understandable interest in this whole subject, and I have noticed a number of pilots have been highly complimentary of the performance of the F-111 in Vietnam, in the limited operations that they had there.

Here is this statement:

"These particular innovations were given an extremely thorough testing in most adverse conditions in Southeast Asia, where the Air Force flew 854 missions including training missions. Fifty-five of them were actual combat strike missions. The planes flew in at such low altitudes that the enemy radar could not pick them up and enemy anti-aircraft weapons could not focus on them. They came back without a single hole, and Lt. Colonel Dean Salmel, who flew some of these missions, has said: 'There is no question in my mind that on most missions the enemy did not even know we were there until we were gone. . . . The aircraft is definitely capable of making strikes at night, in all weather, and with extreme accuracy.'"

Now, does that seem to be a fair statement?

General ESPOSITO. Yes, sir; that is a factual statement.

Mr. FISHER. Is that in accord with other reports you received from these test flights of those actually in combat in Southeast Asia?

General ESPOSITO. Yes, sir.

Mr. FISHER. One other quote:

"The F-111, in spite of its relatively small size, will carry a bigger bomb load over a longer distance than any interdiction aircraft in our arsenal. The next best is the A-7 and the third best is the F-4."

Do you agree with that statement?

General ESPOSITO. I agree with the F-111 and the A-7, and I don't know whether the F-4 has a better range than the F-105 or not.

Mr. FISHER. Very well. One other:

"Compared with the A-7, the F-111 will carry 50 percent more 2,000 pound bombs for more than twice the distance. Or, it will carry 30 percent more bomb load for almost three times the distance."

Do you agree with that?

General ESPOSITO. I don't know what the A-7 can carry in terms of 2,000-pound bombs, so I can't really make a comparison.

Mr. FISHER. Is there anyone here who can answer?

Mr. BLANDFORD. I have it right here.

Mr. FISHER. OK.

Mr. BLANDFORD. A-7 will carry [deleted] bombs for a radius of [deleted] miles, with [deleted] minutes time on station.

General ESPOSITO. The F-111 can carry from, let's say [deleted] bombs, for a little over [deleted] nautical miles, of which [deleted] is at sea level.

Mr. BLANDFORD. How much time on station?

General ESPOSITO. Well, it drops and returns.

Mr. BLANDFORD. I think this is the point. It is an exceedingly outstanding interdiction aircraft. I tried to make that earlier this morning. I think personally it is a mistake to criticize the F-111. I think the only thing we are trying to do here is to try to establish for our own guidance how we can do better on the F-15 contract as a result of the errors made in the F-111. The F-111 is an outstanding airplane.

Mr. FISHER. A lot of this is more less water over the dam. I did recognize that. But I felt it appropriate to make the record complete.

There are two other quotations.

Incidentally, General, if you can add anything, you may, in response to the last question, and put it in the record. I would be pleased.

(The following information was received for the record:)

"A typical weapons load for the F-111A aircraft on a Hi-Lo-Lo-Hi mission, (Hot day

conditions) is [deleted.] and the maximum mission radius is [deleted] nautical miles (NM). Later aircraft equipped with the TF-30-P-100 engines will carry the same weapons load for a radius of [deleted.]

In terms of the A-7 type mission with air on station loiter, the F-111A can carry [deleted] bombs out [deleted] nautical miles spend [deleted] on station—making weapon deliveries on targets of opportunity, and return to base."

The CHAIRMAN. The committee is responsible too. The committee gave McNamara every dime he wanted. So we can't beat the 111 to death. What we want to know is the good things about it now.

Mr. FISHER. Here are two other quotations and I will be through in just a minute:

"The F-111 has the most accurate navigation system of any aircraft ever built. The figure below represent the error in nautical miles for each hour of flight when the navigation system is not updated to a correct position en route."

And then he lists the F-105, error per hour in miles, [deleted.] The F-4, [deleted.] The F-111A [deleted]. The F-111D [deleted].

I don't know how significant that is.

General ESPOSITO. The numbers for the F-111 are correct. Here is one place where I think I can add a little more. The SOR of the F-111 had originally established something around [deleted] nautical miles per hour. We are achieving [deleted]. The contract asked for [deleted] nautical miles per hour. So in this one parameter we are doing considerably better than the contract.

The F-111D, guaranteed [deleted] per hour error. All of our tests to date show it is like around [deleted.] We are doing very well. This is one parameter that is very important to accuracy in bombing.

The CHAIRMAN. So the mistakes you make in this flying laboratory—that is what it is. It is really not operational now; is it?

General ESPOSITO. Yes, sir. Well, we have some 70 airplanes at Nellis that are assigned to—

The CHAIRMAN. You don't have any operational units now. You moved them out Vietnam.

General ESPOSITO. That is correct, sir.

In the colloquy that appears at the point in my remarks is a chart comparing the safety record of the F-111 with number of other of our combat aircraft. Since this colloquy took place last year the F-111 has of course flown a good many more hours. As a matter of fact, more than twice as many hours as it has at that time. I have, therefore, brought that chart up to date and I am inserting this up-to-date information at this point. The safety record of each of the several other aircraft that are being compared with the safety record of the F-111 is at the 60,000-hour point and the F-111 figures at the 55,000-hour point. The reason being, of course, that the F-111 has flown only about 55,000 hours up to this time. Here are the figures.

	Accidents
F-100.....	-----
F-101.....	-----
F-102.....	-----
F-104.....	-----
F-105.....	-----
F-106.....	-----
F-4.....	-----

And how does the F-111 safety record compare with these other combat aircraft? The F-111 has had 18 accidents which should be added the three aircraft lost in combat in Vietnam. Actually the figure 18 is the fairer and more telling figure to use because none of the other aircraft in any way involve combat. &

in one more attempt to put the subject of the safety of the F-111 to rest, the F-111 has lost 18 aircraft as against those other aircraft that I have mentioned. The safety record of the F-111 is, in a word, superb.

It is interesting to note that the next best safety record, that of the F-106, was made by an airplane built by the same manufacturer, General Dynamics.

Again testifying this year, before the Congress on the F-111, General Esposito, in referring to the F-111 crash of last December pointed out a very significant thing—and one to which I have referred previously; that is, what I will call the nonaeronautical difficulties that the F-111 program has been subject to. General Esposito said:

Primarily the problem has been the tremendous amount of attention that we get on every technical failure . . . if it had not been the F-111 Program . . . I would have recommended to the Washington Staff that we unground the airplanes in January because we were quite confident that this was a material flaw of a very rare occurrence.

The key words here of course are "if it had not been the F-111 program."

I am not going to speak further about this, although there is a great deal more that could be said. I will only say that I hope I have made my points which are, simply, that all those who are hearing these remarks or who will read them should forget just about everything that has been said against the F-111, and that we in the Congress should give the deepest and most serious consideration to what the F-111 in its strategic and tactical versions means to the future of the defense of this country. The F-111 program is very much alive although there are those who, with what I must call unthinking shortsightedness, would call for the end of the F-111. I can think of nothing that would be more expensive—in both senses of the word—in dollars and in national security—than the pursuit of a policy based on a shortsightedness that would dictate the end of the F-111 program.

Let us face it, the B-52's are getting old. There is a controversy raging about our intercontinental ballistic missile force and about an anti-ballistic-missile system. The B-1, which I strongly support, cannot be in our inventory for another 10 years. Just exactly what are we going to do? Are we going to take the chance of the peace talks providing the answers to all-out nuclear-missile war? The alternative is a few aging B-52's and a few strategic FB-111's, 76 of them to be exact. Are we going to tie our whole future security to ICBM's and ABM's? The B-1 may ultimately provide the answer to this question, but the B-1 as an answer is a long way into the future. Our answer for today and the next several years is the F-111.

Mr. Chairman, my study of the F-111, in both its versions, strategic and tactical, have made me a believer. I am persuaded that it is the greatest, most capable aircraft in the world today. Let us not permit inattention to cause this program to end. When it comes time to regret it, it may be too late.

Mr. FOUNTAIN. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 19590, the Department of Defense appropriation bill, 1971.

The vast sums of money involved in this bill, though no surprise after 25 years of not-so-cold war, are certainly enough to call for close scrutiny.

In connection, while I applaud the committee's action in carefully eliminating \$2.089 billion from the 1971 Defense budget, leaving it at the level of approximately \$66 billion. I have mixed emotions about it. I hope the cuts were not too deep. Of course, \$66 billion is an awful lot of money and certainly we should save wherever we can responsibly do so. These are most assuredly times which demand a sense of fiscal responsibility in allocation and expenditure of the taxpayers' money. Neither the Congress nor the Defense Department is exempted from this requirement.

However, we should never lose sight of the extremely serious dangers facing this Nation and the pressing need to maintain a strong national defense force at all times.

We must never let our guard down. The nature of the Communist menace has not changed. It faces us now not only in the land mass of Europe and Asia, but also in the Middle East and on the high seas at every point on the compass.

Defense of liberty has never been cheap or easy. This is as true today as it was in 1776 or 1812. Of course, weapons for defense are vastly more complex today than they were when long rifles and knives were used to defeat the foe at Kings Mountain in the Revolutionary War.

But, thankfully, American know-how and ingenuity, as well as vastly expanded national resources, provide us today with the means to protect ourselves against all comers, no matter who. In addition, the whole free world depends on us for protection against aggression, protection while they themselves are too weak to provide alone.

The actions of the committee in attempting to secure more defense for the dollar is commendable. Wastefulness in military expenditures cannot be tolerated. Our taxpayers do not want and should not have to pay for unnecessary military spending. They are I am convinced, quite willing to support an adequate level of defense preparedness, remembering that, if we keep militarily strong, it is far less likely that we will ever have to engage in open battle with our major opponent, Communist Russia. And make no mistake about it, Russia is our major foe and our strongest in many ways.

Our Army, Navy, and Air Force—as well our Reserve arms and the National Guard—must have adequate funds to support needed troop strengths and to buy needed weapons. They also ought to be able to conduct necessary research and development. And regrettably, all these things will have a higher cost so long as the unfortunate war in Vietnam continues.

Never should we become so engrossed in other concerns—whether domestic or international—that we overlook the necessity for strong defense forces. Russia is an implacable foe and understands nothing but power and our ability and willingness to use it, if necessary.

As we consider the expenditures pro-

posed in this bill, let us also be aware that we have a lot of catching up to do in the years directly ahead, especially militarily speaking. We should not forget that Russian naval strength has grown tremendously to confront an aging American fleet in the Mediterranean, as well as the Atlantic and elsewhere; and that Russian missiles and fighters and bombers now may have almost caught up with ours in numbers as well as design.

How well we know—we certainly ought to—that weakness on our part is simply an invitation for trouble with the masters of the Kremlin. We just cannot allow ourselves to become militarily weak.

And so, Mr. Chairman, in passing this bill today, in adding \$66 billion more to the defense of this Nation, I sincerely hope we are again serving notice to the world, friend and foe alike, that America intends to remain strong and free.

Mr. SLACK. Mr. Chairman, the Defense Department appropriations bill for fiscal year 1971 represents the sum total of the committee's judgment after extensive and concentrated hearings dating back to January. It recommends a total of \$66.6 billion, which is \$2 billion below the budget request and \$6 billion below the appropriation for fiscal year 1970.

This reduction and the total recommended comes from a determination to tighten up the use of defense funds, and from very thorough investigation of the justifications offered to support requests for individual items.

The total amount requested—\$66.6 billion—should be considered against the background of recent trends. The fact is, we have already been readjusting national priorities for several years in the appropriations field.

Nondefense spending has grown by \$65 billion since 1964, and now almost equals the defense budget of today.

The defense appropriation recommended will constitute the lowest percentage of the total Federal budget, or of the gross national product, in the last 20 years.

Our domestic programs must be maintained and encouraged, but the shield behind which they find freedom to serve our domestic goals is a strong national defense. We must have a strong national defense as a war deterrent, and as recognized power which will permit our representatives to negotiate for peace and disarmament from a position of strength rather than weakness either real or implied.

Mr. DENT. Mr. Chairman, I would like to address myself at this time to a specific section of this bill which provides relief to a relatively unknown but essential element of our Armed Forces. I am speaking about section 807 of the bill and the revision which will result in the provision of schooling in schools operated by the Department of Defense for the minor dependents of DOD personnel who died while entitled to compensation or active duty pay. This provision will allow widows who are foreign nationals to educate their children in American schools if they return to their country of origin.

Mr. Chairman, this provision is substantially like H.R. 16725, which was introduced by my good friend and col-

league, the Honorable **WILLIAM D. FORD**, and cosponsored by myself and other members of the Committee on Education and Labor.

Back in 1965, I had the honor of leading a subcommittee of the Committee on Education and Labor into the field to visit many overseas schools operated by the Department of Defense. That trip represented the first comprehensive investigation of the school system by a congressional committee. We made subsequent trips—the last of which took place in January of this year—and published reports and recommendations which we feel have resulted in tremendous improvements in the school system. Our most recent report—published this June—listed as a recommendation the precise matter that section 807 of this bill deals with. This problem first came to our attention in Germany and, more recently, in Japan.

So, Mr. Chairman, I salute the distinguished chairman of our Committee on Appropriations, and our other able colleagues on the committee for providing assistance to a group of people whose voice is very soft, but whose need is very great. And I also commend Congressman **BILL FORD**, and the other members of the Committee on Education and Labor, who have all demonstrated a deep and abiding concern for the education afforded our dependent children overseas.

Mr. **REUSS**. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Moorhead-Whalen amendment to reduce defense appropriations by \$1.6 billion and to bring defense spending more into line with our real needs and available resources.

The President says we cannot afford to spend what this Congress has authorized and appropriated for schools, housing, water pollution control, hospital construction, education and health care. I say we can afford these congressionally approved programs if we follow the wise injunction set out in the Appropriations Committee's report on this year's defense budget:

What this country needs is more defense for the dollar, not necessarily more dollars for defense.

The Appropriations Committee has made a good start by cutting some \$2 billion from the bill before us. I applaud this action. I particularly applaud their record which nines no words in criticizing swollen headquarters staffs, the failure of the three services to get together on joint weapons development programs, seemingly uncontrollable spending on public affairs, premature leaps into production before weapons are adequately tested, and congressional add-ons unrequested by the administration.

I support a strong and modernized Navy. I particularly support the bill's funding of the most effective strategic deterrent we have—our Polaris submarine force. I vigorously oppose spending \$417 million for ships not requested by the administration—spending opposed by the other body, and opposed by the Appropriations Committee, which said:

The Committee is firmly convinced that what is needed, therefore, is an immediate, energetic, and concentrated effort to improve

the planning and management of the ship building and conversion program of the Navy, rather than continuing to add funds above the President's budget.

The logic of their adding \$417 million above the President's budget for the Navy somehow escapes me.

I oppose rushing into production of a costly new Navy tactical fighter—the F-14—to the tune this year of \$658 million. This program is a patent violation of the Secretary of Defense's announced policy of fly before we buy. Cost overruns are already predicted for the engine. \$274 million is provided in research and development funds. The \$658 million for procurement should be cut by at least \$200 million.

I support a low-level research and development effort on a new manned bomber for the Air Force, in the extremely unlikely event that we may need this \$30 million bomber in the future. At least \$65 million left over from last year's appropriation is available for this year. I oppose appropriating an additional \$75 million for this year.

I applaud the committee's telling the Department of Defense that we simply cannot afford to develop and procure three different close-support aircraft for the only marginally different needs of three services. I oppose proceeding to fund continued work on all three. I approve the other body's suggestion that we take out \$17 million for the trouble-ridden Cheyenne helicopter.

I oppose rewarding defense contractors for gross mismanagement of weapons programs and intolerable waste and cost overruns. I particularly oppose allotting \$200 million to bail out Lockheed Aircraft for bad performance on the C-5A and other programs.

I recognize that the Department of Defense, like other agencies, has to spend a modest amount to keep the public informed about what it is doing. I do not support funding this effort at anywhere near the level of \$28 million a year when that money is going for such shenanigans as cross-country junkets and sea cruises for civilian dignitaries. I amply documented this waste in a statement on July 6 this year. Let us cut this spending by the \$11 million spent on these activities last year over and above the ceiling the Appropriations Committee thought it had set.

I support a strong and continuing research and development effort on anti-ballistic-missile defense, so that if need be, we may obtain the best possible protection for our land-based strategic deterrent. I oppose deployment at this time of an ABM system that according to a preponderance of expert testimony will not work, will cost twice as much as the \$12 billion now predicted, and will jeopardize the success of the arms talks underway. If we doubled the \$365 million research and development effort for this year by adding the funds allotted to the ABM in the separate military construction bill, we could save \$700 million in procurement and maintenance money in this bill. I believe we should take that step.

I have reached a savings figure of \$1.6 billion without even mentioning sums

such as \$22 million for tinkering with a tank which committees in both bodies have shown to be undeserving of such salvage efforts, or \$80 million for a torpedo that has experienced enormous cost overruns without anyone being sure yet that it can be made to work.

I urge adoption of the amendment proposing a \$1.6 billion cut in this defense bill.

Mr. **DORN**. Mr. Chairman, I will tonight fulfill a longstanding engagement to speak to the Boy Scout Court of Honor in North Augusta, S.C. During the ceremonies, I will present the highly coveted Eagle Scout Award to seven outstanding young men. I do not recall attending an occasion when so many Eagle Scout Awards were presented. Mr. Chairman, I feel that communicating with our Nation's youth, particularly those dedicated to Scouting and to God and country, is an important part of our responsibility. The dedication and perseverance of these young men in their pursuit of this high award is truly an inspiration.

Were I present, Mr. Chairman, I would vote in favor of the crucial appropriations bill now before the House. This is a measure for peace. The passage of this bill will guarantee our strong military posture. By sustaining our present military strength the United States will remain a deterrent force against the evils and aggressions of communism and those who would seek to destroy freedom throughout the world.

Mr. **FUQUA**. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of this measure and in so doing, commend the Committee for the very excellent job which it has done.

In my opinion, this is a sound budget which provides adequately for the defense of this Nation while making certain that every possible nonessential expenditure has been pared.

Providing for the security of this Nation is the most important of the tasks which the Congress must provide and I feel very strongly that this particular measure has accomplished exactly that. I join in urging its passage.

Mr. **RYAN**. Mr. Chairman, the military appropriations bill, which provides \$66.6 billion overall, underwrites the war in Vietnam. For the first time the administration's budget estimate did not include the estimated cost of the war for the forthcoming fiscal year. When the Secretary of Defense testified before the Committee on Appropriations on February 27, 1970, he said that the costs of the war in fiscal year 1969 were \$28.8 billion, and that they were estimated to be \$23.2 billion for fiscal year 1970. However, he asked that the estimate for fiscal year 1971 be classified, and whatever figure he did give the committee was deleted in the printed record of the hearings—hearing, page 411. Although in past years Members of Congress have been told the cost of the war, that information is now being withheld. The administration's concealment is not compensated for by the committee report which states that the rate of spending for the war is "expected to decline from a high of almost \$30 billion to a rate of \$14.5 billion by the end of fiscal year 1971." (Rept. No. 91-1570, p. 5.) Mem-

bers are still denied the estimate of the actual costs of the war for fiscal year 1971. Whatever the cost may be—and I suppose \$20 billion is a fair guess—another penny is too much.

For the sixth consecutive year since Congress was asked to appropriate money for the war in Vietnam, I point out that, by exercising its power of the purse, Congress can bring about a change in the Vietnam war policy by refusing to finance that tragic war.

Since the first supplemental appropriations bill for the war in Vietnam was before the House on May 5, 1965, I have voted against funding it. It is no more supportable today, October 8, 1970, than it has been in the past.

Frequent commentary by the political pundit in the last few months has centered on the point that the President has "de-fused" the war as a political issue. Perhaps some may confirm this observation in light of last night's address by the President, in which he supposedly made new overtures for peace in Indochina. However, I do not think that the war should be treated as a political issue—acute at some times, quiescent at others. Men are dying. In August there were 319 combat deaths. Innocent civilians are dying. Children are being maimed.

Even the manner in which men are elected to die is unfair—assuming there could be any fair way of making such an awesome decision. Draftees—unwilling pawns in this conflict—shoulder much of the burden. While draftees comprised only 9 percent of the 1.4 million men now serving in the U.S. Army, on July 1 slightly more than 30 percent of the Army's draftees were serving in Vietnam. Of the approximately 43,775 American servicemen who have been killed in combat in Vietnam since the beginning of our involvement, about 32 percent have been draftees. And looking at only the Army personnel, draftees accounted for 55 percent of the battle deaths among Army enlisted men as of August 1970.

I have sought legislative correction of this situation. My bill, H.R. 15030, amends the Selective Service Act of 1967 to prohibit the assignment of any person inducted under that act from serving on active duty in Vietnam unless he consents to such service. By opposing H.R. 19590, which provides funds for sending and maintaining draftees in Vietnam, I am expressing my opposition to the use of unwilling conscripts as the fodder for an undeclared war which serves to prop up a dictatorship engaged in what is essentially a civil war.

To make clear the tragic inequity inflicted upon draftees by this war, I will include at the close of my remarks an article by Andrew J. Glass, published in the August 15, 1970, issue of the *National Journal* at page 1747 et seq., and entitled "Defense Report/Draftees Shoulder Burden of Fighting and Dying in Vietnam."

The war must end now, regardless of the political repercussions for this, or any other administration or political party.

Thus, as I have done since the beginning of the war, I intend to vote against the bill which provides the money to continue this war. We, the Congress, possess

the power of the purse. Exercise that, and we end this nightmare of death and destruction.

For these reasons, I also support the amendment which I have cosponsored, and which will be offered on the floor by our distinguished colleague from Minnesota (Mr. FRASER)—the McGovern-Hatfield amendment to end the war. And for these reasons, also, I am supporting the other amendments to speed withdrawal from Indochina.

I also shall vote against the Department of Defense Appropriations bill for fiscal year 1971 because, in appropriating \$66.6 billion for the military, it robs our country of desperately needed funds for dire domestic needs.

I do not wish to appear to dismiss out of hand the efforts of the Appropriations Committee, which under the leadership of the distinguished chairman (Mr. MAHON) did result in cutting the bloated budget request of \$68,745,666,000 made by the administration. The \$2 billion reduction is to be commended.

However, \$66.6 billion is still too much. It is too much when our air is becoming unbreathable and our water undrinkable. It is too much when our cities are festering with inadequate housing, inadequate transportation facilities, and inadequate sanitation systems. It is too much when our educational system desperately needs help, and when health services are far too little and too expensive. For these reasons, I support the amendment to be offered by our colleagues from Pennsylvania (Mr. MOORHEAD) and Ohio (Mr. WHELEN) setting a \$65 billion ceiling on defense expenditures.

In brief, our national priorities are awry, and this bill is the main culprit in sustaining a budget which in terms of meeting the needs of the people, is very far out of balance. Because our national priorities must be reordered, and because this bill perpetuates the imbalance, it should be rejected.

Finally, this bill provides moneys for weapons systems which are of dubious wisdom. For example, H.R. 19590 appropriates \$1.07 billion for the ABM, and \$474 million for land-based MIRV's. There is, in fact, considerable question as to whether the ABM missile system is even workable. But that consideration aside, and more importantly, these systems encourage the devastating arms race which at the least will suck more billions down into the armaments barrel, and at worst, may spur the dreaded day of nuclear holocaust.

I think one point must be made very clear: Our defense apparatus must be sustained in its fullest necessary strength and capability, so that the security of the United States will not be imperiled. But, pouring billions upon unneeded billions of dollars into the military budget is not the answer. As the committee itself says in its report (H. Rept. 91-1570) on the bill before us at page 5:

The effectiveness of the Department of Defense cannot be measured solely in terms of the dollar level of expenditures. Unlimited resources do not overcome inefficiency and mismanagement. Instead, excessive funding produces more inefficiency and mismanage-

ment. What this country needs is defense for the dollar, not necessarily more dollars for defense.

The article follows:

DEFENSE REPORT/DRAFTEES SHOULDER BURDEN OF FIGHTING AND DYING IN VIETNAM

(By Andrew J. Glass)

Army draftees were killed in Vietnam last year at nearly double the rate of non-draftee enlisted men.

During 1969, Army draftees were being killed in action or wounded at the rate of 234 per 1,000. Draftee deaths were 31 per 1,000.

By contrast, Army enlisted volunteers were killed or wounded at a rate of 137 per 1,000, and 17 per 1,000 died. Both draftees and volunteers serve 12-month tours of duty in Vietnam.

Draftees comprised 88 per cent of infantry riflemen in Vietnam last year while first-term Regular Army men comprised 10 per cent of the riflemen. The remaining 2 per cent were career Army men.

In the past two or three years, draftees have suffered comparatively higher death rates as their proportion of the Army's combat forces has risen from earlier phases of the Vietnam war.

Battle deaths among Army enlisted men have totaled 23,890 men through March 31, 1970, of whom 13,093, or 54.9 per cent, were draftees.

Previously unavailable draftee casualty statistics reveal that over the five years in which Americans have been engaged in combat in Vietnam, draftee casualties (killed and wounded) have run 130 per 1,000 per year and non-draftee casualties have run 84 per 1,000 per year. The Army General Staff prepared the study at the request of *National Journal*.

HOW POLICY IS SET

Under broad guidelines established by the Defense Department, draftee utilization policies reflect the manpower needs of the service that conscripts the draftee.

Jonas M. Platt, the Defense Department's newly named director of manpower utilization, under the assistant secretary of defense for manpower and reserve affairs, Roger T. Kelley, reported that draftee policy for the Army is formulated within the Army. (The Army has inducted 97.2 per cent of all draftees called to duty during the Vietnam war period.) In an exception to that rule, Platt, a retired Marine Corps major general, noted that since 1967 the Office of the Secretary of Defense has sought to impose a uniform policy of using the skills of college graduates who enter the armed services to the best advantage of the military. Three of five college graduates who enter the Army are draftees.

DRAFTEES IN COMBAT

In discussing with *National Journal* the reasons for the disparity between draftee and non-draftee battle deaths, William K. Brehm, assistant secretary of the Army for manpower and reserve affairs, said:

"The popular jobs are the ones for which people enlist. They don't enlist for the hard-core combat skills. That is why draftees tend to populate the hard-core combat skills: 70 per cent of the infantry, armor and artillery are draftees."

Brehm said that President Nixon's Vietnamization policy will have the effect of bringing Army troop replacements below 20,000 a month by May 1971. But he estimated that one-third to one-fourth of the replacements will still have to be combat soldiers.

"That means we'll have to supply somewhere between 5,000 and 6,000 hard-core combat skills a month. My estimate is that we couldn't come anywhere near the 5,000-man level without the draft," Brehm added.

(For background on Brehm, see biographical box).

ENLISTMENTS VS. INDUCTIONS

The disparity between draftee and volunteer casualty rates directly reflects the tasks that the Army assigns each group of soldiers.

Regular Army volunteers may enlist for two or three years. In the first six months of 1970, 16,243 men enlisted for two years. They were placed in the same manpower pool with the 92,750 draftees called to duty for two years by the Army during the same period.

Three-year volunteers, however, have the option of selecting their Army jobs and four out of five make their own choice. In 1970, less than 3 per cent have asked to serve in the infantry.

"As strange as it sounds," Brehm said, "only 800 young men a month out of 200 million Americans are enlisting for combat. If we went to an all-volunteer force in Vietnam, it's quite conceivable that that's all we might get."

PROCEDURES BEING REVIEWED

The Army Audit Agency, a semi-autonomous watchdog unit, is currently studying the full range of job classification and assignment procedures within the Army.

However, there are no present plans to withdraw or alter the option to serve in non-combat roles being offered three-year volunteers, Brehm said.

"I think, given the circumstances, the draftee is getting a pretty fair shake from the Army," he added.

Several high-level officers and Pentagon civilians interviewed by *National Journal* agreed with Brehm's analysis of the draftee-combat problem—but not with his judgment of the equities involved.

A Defense Department manpower expert, who asked not to be identified by name, said:

"We've studied this problem very carefully. People don't seem to enlist in the Army to fight. We recognize the inequity this causes in a shooting war but we don't know what to do about it."

An Army general who has served more than two years in Vietnam and who asked anonymity said: "Given the way draftees are used by the Army, it's quite obvious that they'll take the brunt of the casualties."

"It's very sad, really. But the whole god-damn war is very sad."

VIETNAM

In Southeast Asia, "grunt" is GI slang for a frontline soldier. (The term comes from the grunting sound foot soldiers make while carrying heavy field packs.) The vast majority of grunts in Vietnam are draftees.

FIGHTING FORCE

On July 1, slightly more than 30 per cent of the Army's draftees were serving in Vietnam while 25 per cent of Army volunteers were stationed there.

In Vietnam itself, the ranks of the Army's enlisted and officer force (293,200-men) now include 115,100 draftees, or 39 per cent of the total. (This total is scheduled to drop to about 225,000 Army personnel by May 1971, with a proportional—or better than proportional—drop in grunt-draftees as more and more combat units are deactivated.)

While the Pentagon keeps no statistics on the chances of a draftee serving in Vietnam during his two years in the Army, a comparison against draft calls reveals that a draftee's chances of going to Vietnam have fluctuated between 50 and 80 per cent. (Currently, draft calls are running at a rate of 10,000 men a month, and draftee replacements are being flown to Vietnam at a rate of 8,000 men a month.)

KILLED AND WOUNDED

Draftee casualties in Vietnam are a sensitive matter to the Pentagon. While the Defense Department issues weekly summaries

of casualties in Southeast Asia, detailed statistics for draftees are difficult to obtain.

Through March 1970, 13,997 draftees (including four who had become officers) had been killed in Vietnam as a result of enemy action. Another 1,545 had died from other causes, such as air crashes or diseases. Separate records are not kept on the number of draftees who are wounded, hospitalized, missing or captured.

Percentage of draftee deaths—Over the course of the Vietnam war—in which some 43,500 American fighting men have died through mid-August—draftees account for about 32 percent of the total killed in action, 49 percent of the Army dead and 55 percent of the dead among Army enlisted men.

Casualties among draftees, and the implications they raise, have been analyzed by the Army General Staff. The studies have been conducted within a unit known as the Equal Rights-Personnel Affairs Army Command Service Branch, Special Affairs and Review Division, Directorate for Military Personnel Policies, under the deputy chief of staff for personnel.

Chances of surviving—By comparing average monthly force levels in Vietnam against actual deaths, and extrapolating the number of draftee-wounded, the Army has been able to compute the statistically valid chance that a draftee or a Regular Army volunteer has of being killed or wounded during his 12-month tour of duty there.

The Army study shows that, for the course of the war, an average enlisted man or Army officer had a 1.96 percent chance of being killed and an 8.47 percent chance of being wounded seriously enough to require treatment at a medical facility.

Draftee vs. volunteer—However, for an Army draftee, the chance of being killed was 2.44 percent and the chance of being wounded was 10.54 percent—or a total of 12.98 percent.

For a non-draftee enlisted man, the chance of being killed was 1.58 percent and of being wounded 6.84 percent, or a total of 8.42 percent. Thus, a draftee had about a 54 percent greater chance of being killed or wounded than did his Regular Army counterpart.

Early airborne influx—These results are influenced, however, by the fact that the initial surge of Americans in Vietnam brought elite (and largely Regular Army) air cavalry and airborne divisions. (While draftees serve in airborne divisions, they do so voluntarily.)

By contrast, in the later phases of the war, when Americans suffered their heaviest loss of life in Vietnam, the fighting was largely in the hands of infantry, armor, and artillery units with higher proportions of draftees.

Employing the same statistical procedures as in the Army study, the relative chance of a draftee or a volunteer being killed or wounded in 1968 were calculated by *National Journal* as follows:

Draftee—killed, 3.89; wounded, 11.79; total, 15.68.

Volunteer—killed, 2.3; wounded, 6.63; total, 8.96.

Rating previous wars—In revealing these statistics, the Army notes that draftee death rates in Vietnam—even though higher than total Army enlisted losses—are still significantly lower than death rates sustained by the U.S. Army during both the Korean war and World War II.

(In both those wars, the present enlistment system—under which a prospective soldier is guaranteed a non-combat Army assignment if he agrees to serve for three years—did not exist.)

In Korea, Army killed as a percentage of its forces in the war zone came to 4.32—more than double the 1.96 percent over-all rate in Vietnam. During World War II, the figure was 5.19 per cent for the European theater in 1944-46.

Vietnam wounds higher—However, wounded rates for draftees in Vietnam in 1968-

69 ran at levels comparable to or higher than Korea or World War II. (For Korea, the figure was 12.11 per cent; for World War II, 15.20 per cent.)

The Army study further shows that 72 per cent of enlisted casualties were sustained by personnel in grades E5 (sergeant) or below. Most of these men do not plan on Army careers and serve either two or three years.

REASONS BEHIND STATISTICS

Disparities between draftee and non-draftee casualties in Vietnam stem from two main factors:

Career Regular Army soldiers, counted as enlisted men in the study, tend to serve in rear-echelon units and in non-combat roles.

Enlisted men who arrive in Vietnam in non-combat jobs (selected by themselves before they enlisted) are subject to less hostile fire than draftees, who have no choice in their Army tasks and who consequently fill about 70 per cent of the combat jobs in the Army.

In private conversation, some high-ranking Army officers express surprise that draftee casualties, given the present system of enlistments, are not actually higher than they have been.

In the course of the war (fiscal 1965-70), about 56 per cent of new enlisted personnel entering the Army have been draftees; this is close to the percentage of draftees who have died in Vietnam among total Army enlisted deaths.

The Army tends to assign its draftees to more hazardous combat roles—a fact which should and does yield higher casualty rates. However, a career Army man sometimes must serve several tours in Vietnam, thus exposing himself to a higher over-all risk of being killed or wounded than a single-tour draftee.

Re-enlistment practices: Until very recently, the Army offered a draftee who was serving in Vietnam a chance to terminate his draftee status and re-enlist for three years from the date of his change of status.

Draftees are eligible for this "re-up" provision after serving eight months in the Army. Most draftees arrive in Vietnam after five months of training and leave time in the United States.

Usually, if a draftee in Vietnam elected to "re-up," he was shipped back to the United States for training in a new MOS. In all likelihood, he would return to Vietnam as a Regular Army enlistee, but to serve in a rear area in a combat-support MOS.

Battlefield recruiting—In an article published last Feb. 8 by *The New York Times Magazine*, entitled "Close-up of a Grunt," James P. Sterba, a *Times* correspondent in Vietnam, reported that Army re-enlistment sergeants regularly approach draftees in infantry rifle companies just after they have been through combat, seeking to induce them to "re-up" in exchange for not having to serve "out there" any longer.

An Army spokesman said that the Sterba report led to an investigation, but he did not disclose its results. William Brehm, the Army's manpower chief, said, however, that re-enlistment rates for draftees, which had been running at about 5 per cent, have more recently fallen off to close to zero.

Infantry MOS frozen—On Aug. 11 the *Times* reported in a dispatch from Vietnam that new orders were distributed several weeks ago which, in effect, bar draftees with combat MOS's from re-enlisting in exchange for immediate transfer from the battlefield.

The *Times* cited a confidential Army directive, issued by Lt. Gen. Frank T. Mildren, deputy Army commander in South Vietnam. The directive said 1,298 combat soldiers in the command had changed their MOS's between March 1 and May 1, 1970.

ASSIGNMENTS

Before he receives his first duty assignment, the Army draftee spends, on average,

about 19 weeks in what the Pentagon calls the "pipeline."

Draftee pattern: Typically, a draftee's Army career would begin with a day of processing at one of 74 Armed Forces Examination and Entrance Stations throughout the country.

A draftee next spends three or four days at one of 11 Army Reception Stations. From there, he enters a mandatory eight weeks of basic combat training at one of nine Army Training Centers.

On completing basic training, which emphasizes infantry skills, a draftee receives advanced individual training (AIT) in a military occupational skill (MOS). This occurs in one of three ways:

Eight weeks of AIT in such combat MOS's as infantry, armor or artillery at an Army Training Center. (Before they are shipped to Vietnam, infantrymen receive an extra week of training in the combat conditions they may expect to find there.)

Four to 10 weeks of MOS training at one of 71 Army schools. The average school cycle is eight weeks.

On-the-job training or an immediate duty assignment in a civilian-acquired skill (CAS) at an Army installation within the continental United States. Most CAS personnel enter the Army with skills that the Army values highly; scientists, engineers, carpenters, electricians and architects are typical of this group. A draftee outside the '4S program may be given an MOS called "duty soldier" and receive on-the-job training in, say, cutting grass.

After AIT, a typical draftee is granted two weeks leave, plus the time he needs to travel his first assignment. He arrives there having received about four months of Army training.

VOLUNTEER PATTERN

A typical Regular Army volunteer begins his Army career in the same fashion as a draftee. But, after basic training, he may spend the rest of his time in the Army in an occupation he has chosen for himself.

In each case, a volunteer makes this choice before he enters the Army. His recruiting sergeant notes his choice and a place is reserved for him at a school for the time that he would be ready to begin AIT.

In the first six months of 1970, 43,703 three-year volunteers exercised their option to receive specialized training of their choice. This group represented 79.3 per cent of the three-year enlistments (55,099 men) in that period.

COMPUTERIZED SELECTIONS

Since 1965, the Army has assigned virtually all of its MOS's for combat and for specialized training through a computer program.

(One exception to the rule is the MOS for operating the MOS-selection computer program. These soldiers, who work in the Pentagon and who include draftees, are hand-picked.)

Two-tier process:—In essence, the Army employs a two-stage formula to assign MOS's to its soldiers. The first stage is relatively simple; the second, highly complex.

In the first stage, the computer matches three-year enlistees with the specialized training berths they have selected. Some coveted MOS's—such as the MOS for optical laboratory specialists—are fully subscribed in this way.

However, less than 5 per cent of the volunteers ask to be trained in a combat-arms specialty. These combat assignments are virtually left open once the "first cut" is completed and must be filled during the second and final "cut."

When the "deck" (as in a deck of cards, the Army's term for prospective MOS holders) is run again, draftees, two-year Regular Army volunteers and three-year volunteers who have not exercised their option are placed in a common manpower pool. (Some

volunteers are found to be unqualified for the option they want but enlist anyway and find themselves in the pool.)

Accessions breakdown:—In the first six months of 1970, of the 164,092 men who entered the Army, 56 per cent were drafted, 10 per cent enlisted in the Regular Army for two years, 7 per cent enlisted in the Regular Army for three years but failed to exercise their job option and the remaining 27 per cent enlisted for three years with a guarantee from the Army that they would be given the MOS of their choice.

The "second cut" by the computer, therefore, includes the 73 per cent of all new accessions into the Army who are given no choice in picking a military job by the Army or who fail to make a choice.

Shuffling the deck:—The computer program attempts to fill each MOS, insofar as vacancies still exist, at what the Army regards as a satisfactory level.

This level is known as "desire" in the computer program. Criteria for what is "desirable" include such factors as the manpower needs of the Army at the time, the qualifications set for a particular MOS, the distance of a soldier from a prospective training site (calculated to minimize transportation costs), the soldier's civilian background, his own preferences as determined during a post-induction interview, and, finally, a detailed profile of the soldier's physical and mental background.

Among the 46 individual bits of information scanned by the computer before it matches a new soldier with an MOS requirement are such factors as his aptitude and intelligence test scores, physical profile, previous education and language proficiency.

"Relax" program:—If the computer is unable to fill the quota set for a particular MOS at the "desire" level, it is programmed to "relax" its standards in several successive stages until all the vacancies are filled.

If, after reaching the lowest rung of the "relax" program, the computer has still been unable to fill the quota—known as "the white book requirement"—the machine goes through a final searching sequence.

Down in the pit:—This time, the computer is programmed to operate at a "mandatory" level, below which the Army refuses to lower standards for a particular MOS. (For example, the computer is told that it is "mandatory" that no one with a criminal record in civilian life be made a military policeman.)

Sometimes, the program is written in such a way that a set and limited percentage of substandard soldiers is permitted to take a particular MOS. Informally, this is known as a "goofball ceiling."

All combat MOS's now carry a high priority, some of them 100 per cent. Such troops requirements must be filled even if the computer has already scraped the bottom of the barrel and has ceased assigning men. In that event, the quota is filled by hand; Pentagon staff officers use their judgment in further dropping the standards.

These "standards" do not necessarily reflect on the quality of the soldier. For example, the standards the computer follows may prohibit using a college graduate in a menial job or flying a man for training from the East Coast to California.

Operational center:—These policies are carried out by the Trainee Assigning Section, Training Input Branch, Requirements Division, Enlisted Personnel Directorate, Office of Personnel Operations of the Army.

Computer vs. draftee:—In theory, there is no MOS for which a draftee is ineligible. In practice, however, the computer is programmed, often down to the "mandatory" level, to accept only three-year volunteers for MOS's that involve long training periods.

Such MOS's as medical lab processor, which requires a total of 64 weeks' school-

ing, are virtually free of draftees. Other MOS's for which the Army prefers (because of the training time involved) to shun draftees include the mechanics who service the Army's various tactical missiles as well as the soldiers who repair such devices as radars, television and microwave systems, teletypewriters and code machines.

Special considerations:—Apart from receiving a general set of instructions, the computer is also given certain special orders:

No soldier under the age of 17 years, eight months can be assigned to a combat-arms MOS. (Draftees are usually inducted at age 19.)

College graduates cannot be assigned to such jobs as cook, ammunition handler and tent repairman.

But college graduates can be—and often are—selected as infantry riflemen on the Army theory that they would have a full opportunity to exercise what the Army terms their "leadership potential" in such an MOS.

Analyzing the results: In fiscal 1970, 16,362 (9 per cent of the draftees inducted during the period) were handpicked for the civilian-skills (CAS) program of the "deck." This group was certain to serve its entire two-year tour within the continental United States.

About 80 percent of the draftees who remained in the pool were put into a group of MOS's in which draftees have comprised 50 percent or more of the manpower over the course of the Vietnam war.

This group, heavily laden with draftees, includes the basic infantry, armor and artillery MOS's, various radio and telephone communications jobs, light vehicle drivers, cooks, clerks, military policemen and medical corpsmen. (For number and percentage of draftees and enlistees trained in selected combat-arms MOS's, see table.)

About 63 per cent of all draftees entering training were given jobs within this cluster during fiscal 1970—with 20 per cent alone being trained as infantry riflemen.

In the Army as a whole, 11.4 percent of all personnel are assigned to the infantry rifleman MOS—which Pentagon generals call "11 bravo" but which grunts in Vietnam call "11 bush." Two-thirds of the infantry riflemen trained in fiscal 1970 were draftees.

Combat Duty: Only 11 percent of Regular Army volunteers voluntarily serve in an MOS that is heavily laden (50 per cent or more) with draftees. And even among that 11 per cent, there is a strong statistical tendency to become a clerk, a cook or a telephone operator rather than an infantry rifleman, an armor crewman or an artillery spotter.

Only those Regular Army volunteers who select an option under the guarantee program may escape the possibility of combat-arms duty; remaining volunteers, including two-year Regular Army men, are assigned to combat MOS's in about the same proportion to their over-all numbers as draftees.

College men:—A college degree also offers no guarantee of being assigned to non-combat duty in the Army. (About 15 per cent of the men entering the Army graduated from college.)

A study of college graduates who entered the Army during fiscal 1969 shows that 61 per cent of them (23,111 men) were draftees. (No statistics are available, however, on the number or percentage of draftees who are college graduates.)

Of the college graduates who entered the Army in fiscal 1969, 50.5 per cent were assigned to combat-support units and 24 per cent were assigned to combat-arms units, with some 16 per cent entering the infantry.

A separate study released June 18 by Kenne Peterson, a civilian manpower expert attached to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, revealed that 36.2 per cent of the college graduates who entered the Army in calendar 1969 were given combat MOS's, compared with 49.3 per cent of all enlisted men, including draftees.

Duty stations: Once a soldier is assigned to and trained in an MOS, no distinction is made between draftees and volunteers in the selection of their duty stations.

These decisions are made by Policy Branch, Distribution and Readiness Division, Procurement and Distribution Directorate, under the deputy chief of staff for army personnel, Lt. Gen. W. T. Kerwin Jr.

The Pentagon staff officer under Gen. Kerwin who actually makes the theater assignments shuffles a stack of cards (to break up the computerized alphabetical sequence in which he receives them) without knowing which card represents a draftee and which a Regular Army enlistee.

Personnel just completing their advanced training (AIT) are taken first, as a matter of policy, in meeting the levies of overseas commands. About 60 per cent of AIT graduates are assigned directly to a one-year tour of duty in either Vietnam, Thailand or Korea.

Since 70 per cent of the combat-arms MOS's in the Army are filled with draftees, a higher proportion of draftees serve in Vietnam than elsewhere because combat MOS's are in more urgent demand in Vietnam than elsewhere.

At any given time, 54 per cent of all draftees are serving within the continental United States, 30 per cent are in Vietnam, and the remaining 16 per cent are in other overseas assignments.

PRESSURES

The draft utilization issue comes before the Army at a time when it is reacting with extraordinary sensitivity to public criticism.

Westmoreland view: In a speech before the National Exchange Club, delivered July 27 in Atlanta, Gen. William C. Westmoreland, the Army's chief of staff and former over-all commander in Vietnam, said:

"Some of the criticism leveled at us is indeed justified. Some of it is misdirected, emotional tirade. . . . Some who undoubtedly are well intentioned are doing the country a disservice by unknowingly undermining the confidence of the public in the Army. Others, I believe, have motives less innocent."

In this climate, the Pentagon is encountering political pressure to stop sending draftees against their will to Southeast Asia.

Congressional initiatives: On both sides of Capitol Hill, there is talk over instituting an all-volunteer policy in Vietnam as an interim step before undertaking a complete American military withdrawal.

House—Rep. Garry Brown, R-Mich., introduced a bill (H.R. 18719) on July 30 under which draftees who are inducted after Jan. 1, 1971, could not be assigned without their consent to Vietnam or any other area where the United States is engaged in an armed conflict.

"Philosophically, my proposal is right; pragmatically, it can be implemented," Brown said. "Especially in view of the reduction in personnel in Vietnam, I am confident the Pentagon can work within this limitation on combat service," he added.

Senate—While the Brown bill is likely to be buried in the House Armed Services Committee, the Senate is virtually certain to hold a test vote on this issue in late August.

The initiative is being pressed jointly by three Democrats—Sens. William Proxmire, Wis., Gaylord Nelson, Wis., and Harold E. Hughes, Iowa—in the form of an amendment to the military procurement bill (H.R. 17123), which is the pending business on the Senate floor.

If adopted, the amendment would prohibit the Defense Department from sending draftees to the war zone after President Nixon signs the procurement measure into law.

In presenting the amendment on June 30, Proxmire said on the Senate floor:

"The connection between campus unrest, the war and the inequities in the present Selective Service system lend an urgency to this proposal."

"To stop sending draftees to Southeast Asia," Proxmire said, "is not only feasible and urgent—I also believe it is right. Not only is this an undeclared war, but the draftee has borne an unfair proportion of the fighting burden."

PENTAGON RESPONSE

Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird has responded to such pressure by publicly holding out the hope that an all-volunteer policy in Vietnam might begin next year.

Thus, in mid-May, Jerry W. Friedheim, deputy assistant secretary of defense for public affairs, told a Pentagon news briefing: "The Secretary (Laird) has said he feels that when we get down to 200,000-240,000 men, that's the time we can begin seriously to think about that possibility."

Troop withdrawals—Laird's overall timetable calls for turning over the ground combat mission to the South Vietnamese Army by May 1971.

By that time, according to the timetable announced by the President, U.S. troop strength in Vietnam will total 284,000 men—a reduction of 265,500 men since Mr. Nixon took office in January 1969.

Pessimistic estimates—In sharp contrast to the hopeful tone being struck by Secretary Laird and his chief spokesman, Army manpower planners see a continuing need to assign draftees to combat roles—a need that stems directly from the policy of granting three-year volunteers a choice of available support assignments.

In the calculations of the Army manpower planners, the fact that draftees comprise only a quarter of the men who entered the U.S. armed forces during the course of the Vietnam war, and only 12 per cent of the combined services' present total strength has little bearing on the problem.

"Even if we hold to the most optimistic schedule of Vietnamization," Brehm told *National Journal*, "we would still need two or three times what we could supply next year without the draft."

Brehm, however, sees no conflict between the Army's continuing need to draft soldiers for combat duty and Laird's all-volunteer planning.

"The Secretary understands the problem," he said. "He is committed to making the Vietnamization policy work. But he also knows that it would not be possible for us to continue with our present plan if we had to go to an all-volunteer group in Vietnam."

Counterthrust in Senate—In the meantime, the Pentagon is quietly seeking to undermine support in the Senate for the Proxmire-Nelson-Hughes amendment.

On July 9, Leonard Niederlehner, who was serving at the time as acting general counsel of the Defense Department, wrote to Sen. John C. Stennis, D-Miss., chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, to express the department's official disapproval of the proposal.

"A great part of the problem," Niederlehner wrote Stennis, "is providing in required numbers personnel who possess the required skills without incurring shortages of these skills in Army units elsewhere."

"Until it is reasonably sure that this problem can be mastered, it would be unwise to restrict the pool of military personnel eligible for service in Vietnam to those who would enter the armed forces voluntarily."

While Niederlehner did not say so, Army manpower experts who echoed his views made it clear that the "skills" to which he referred were infantry, armor and artillery—the hard-core combat group. Niederlehner's letter has not been officially released.

Non-governmental pressures: Peace groups

opposed to the American military involvement in Southeast Asia have focused their political efforts on seeking a speedy withdrawal of troops, and have not widely raised the draftee issue.

Draft resistance, however, is tied closely to the Vietnam war.

Court cases—the courts have been reluctant to deal with the issue of whether it is constitutional to send servicemen to fight in Vietnam without a congressional declaration of war. They have ducked the issue by ruling that the question is not justifiable—that it is too broad in scope to be decided in the context of a lawsuit, or that it is a political question.

However, in two recent cases, the courts have addressed the issue. Both cases were brought up by volunteers, but the decisions would apply to draftees as well.

Berk v. Laird—Berk contested the Army's right to send him to Vietnam to fight an undeclared war. On June 19, the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the issue was narrow enough to decide, but that it was a political matter. The appeals court remanded the case to the U.S. district court for the Eastern District of New York. The Justice Department has filed a petition there to dismiss the case, which is being argued by Theodore C. Sorensen for the New York office of the American Civil Liberties Union.

Orlando v. Laird—The U.S. district court for the Eastern District of New York decided the case on the merits; it ruled July 1 that the Army could send Orlando to Vietnam, because Congress, in authorizing and appropriating funds for Vietnam, had acquiesced as if it had actually declared war.

Massachusetts law—The Supreme Court will have an opportunity when it reconvenes in October to consider the legality of sending draftees to fight in Vietnam. On July 22 the state of Massachusetts filed suit in the U.S. Supreme Court contesting the Defense Department's right to draft Massachusetts citizens to fight an undeclared war in Vietnam. The suit was brought under a state law enacted April 2, challenging the legality of the Vietnam war. The Defense Department has until Sept. 22 to file a response to the state's petition.

All-volunteer Army: The problem facing the Pentagon is further compounded by the President's commitment to a policy of reducing draft calls to zero and instituting an all-volunteer Army.

Gates study—In March 1969, Mr. Nixon, fulfilling a campaign pledge, created a 15-member commission headed by Thomas S. Gates Jr., chairman of the executive committee of Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. and a former Secretary of Defense (1959-61), to study the feasibility of an all-volunteer armed force for the United States.

The Commission reported to the President Feb. 21, 1970, unanimously recommending the creation of an all-volunteer force by July 1, 1971, concurrently with the expiration of the present Selective Service Act (81 stat. 100).

An April 23, in a special message to the Congress, Mr. Nixon said: "After careful consideration of the factors involved, I support the basic conclusion of the commission. I agree that we should move now toward ending the draft."

Hatfield overture—The initiative for an all-volunteer Army has been taken up in the Senate by Sen. Mark O. Hatfield, R-Ore., who is planning to offer an amendment to the military procurement bill that would implement the Gates Commission's findings. He has attracted 14 cosponsors for his proposal, ranging across the political spectrum from Sen. George McGovern, D-S. Dak., to Sen. Barry Goldwater, R-Ariz. (The White House has expressed opposition to the Hatfield bill on the grounds that it is premature.)

One feature of the Hatfield bill would compensate servicemen who face enemy fire an extra \$200 a month. The measure would also raise the base pay of a first-year enlisted man by \$1,700 a year. (Currently, all enlisted men serving in Vietnam, whether or not they are actually in combat assignments, draw an extra \$65 a month in "hostile fire pay" and are exempt from federal taxes.)

Insufficient incentives.—Army manpower experts doubt that pay incentives alone, no matter how generous, would bridge the gap between the number of combat soldiers now needed in Vietnam and the number who volunteer for combat duty.

"If I put myself in the position of these young men, money alone wouldn't convince me," Brehm said. "Moreover, it would be a mercenary force. I don't think I like that."

Alternative policy: As a means of giving its draftees and non-draftees a relatively equal chance of surviving in Vietnam, the Army could suspend its enlistment-option system for the duration of the war.

This approach has been followed by the Marine Corps, an elite group whose over-all manpower needs are far smaller than the Army's.

Army manpower experts predict that such a step would increase draft calls sharply as enlistments fell off.

"We've brainstormed this," Brehm said, "and we've discarded this approach because the policy is to keep the number of draftees in the Army as low as possible." (The Army took about 200,000 inductees in fiscal year 1970, the lowest number since the 102,555 inductees the Army took in fiscal 1965; and the Pentagon has announced a lower rate of draft calls in the first half of fiscal 1971.)

"It's too bad that the draftees have to do most of the fighting," Brehm added. "Believe me, I don't enjoy signing those draft calls. But, after all, one of the things the Army is all about is combat."

Mr. HANLEY. Mr. Chairman, the current congressional debate over the extent of the U.S. commitment to NATO and the defense of Europe involves one of the more important foreign policy issues of the decade.

Few of us would deny that the security of Western Europe is of utmost importance to the defense posture of the United States. A weak Europe, subject to strong pressure from the Soviet Union, would critically endanger our external security.

Nevertheless, the time has come for us in the Congress to state emphatically and firmly that we cannot—and will not—continue to bear such a disproportionate share of the defense of our European neighbors.

I, therefore, support the amendment to reduce U.S. forces in Europe by 50,000 troops by June 30, 1971.

NATO was created in the wake of World War II to provide a protective shield for a weak Western Europe. At that time it was logical and necessary that the United States assume the great majority of the defense burden for these countries. Our own interests decreed that Europe remain free, our altruism decreed that a stronger neighbor help those ravaged by war get back on their feet.

The economies of France, Germany, Belgium, and our other European allies are humming along beautifully. There is no reason why they cannot come up with their fair share of the cost of defense programs. If they were poor, it would be one thing—but they are not. We have an

obligation to the free world, but so do they.

Yet the United States continues to bear the brunt of NATO costs and manpower. The total cost to the United States as a result of our NATO commitment is estimated at \$14 billion. Approximately \$7 billion is used for the maintenance of troops on the Continent, and \$3.1 billion is spent annually for the actual operating costs of U.S. forces in Europe. Our NATO-connected expenditures create an estimated annual balance of payments deficit of more than \$1.5 billion.

None of the European countries has lived up to its NATO commitments in terms of money or manpower. In recent years, in fact, Great Britain has eliminated the draft and other European countries have reduced the conscription period. However, we in the United States have kept our 2-year draft—in part so we can maintain a large force in Europe.

For several years now, we have been pressing our allies to assume a fairer share of NATO costs. While these countries agree in principle, they have not yet come up with an acceptable proposal. There have been recent indications that the European countries may be willing to raise as much as \$300,000,000 per year. In the face of our own staggering costs and tremendous burdens at home, this figure is unacceptable.

If we cannot be assured of at least enough money to cover our balance of payments deficit, the United States should make immediate plans for withdrawal of a significant segment of our European contingent.

And, in the long run, we should seriously consider a permanent withdrawal of a large number of our troops for budgetary purposes. We could bring many troops home without reducing our ultimate responsibility to our European allies. If our troops are kept prepared on bases throughout this country, they could be airlifted to Europe in a matter of hours if an emergency occurs.

Mr. Chairman, all of us are aware of the many needs which we have here at home. Of course, we must maintain a strong defense and we must help protect our friends.

But the time has come when we must cease to overextend ourselves beyond our means. We have long carried the free world on our shoulders. It is time that some of this burden is shifted and that other nations assume a fair share of their own defense.

The amendment to cut our troop force by 50,000 is worthy of our support for it will put the Europeans on notice that the U.S. Congress is emphatic in its resolve that our allies pay their fair share.

Mr. SCHMITZ. Mr. Chairman, as an American concerned with the safety of the Nation, I vote for the current military appropriations bill with misgivings. In my estimation we are not allocating a large enough portion of our resources for defense purposes. Providing for the common defense of the Nation and promoting the general welfare are not antagonistic concepts. Rightly understood they are complementary functions. When we sacrifice the common defense for nebulous notions of what promotes the

common welfare we are embarking on a course which will neither protect nor for long provide.

Neither should we allow the prospect of a possible agreement with the Soviet Union at the strategic arms limitation talks to incline us in the direction of defense cuts. Recent examples of Soviet perfidy are numerous. The latest Soviet test of their fractional orbital bombardment system took place just 2 weeks ago. Many people are of the opinion that the testing of these nuclear attack weapons is a clear violation of the 1967 Space Treaty which the Soviets signed. It is a little difficult to see any sense in holding up deployment of the ABM system, partially on the hope that the Soviets will abide by a new agreement yet to be made, the Soviets are testing a weapons system which gives us only 3 minutes warning time and whose testing is in violation of an agreement they have already signed.

Conservatives such as I, heartily endorse and press for fiscal responsibility. Most conservatives do not, however, endorse insufficient funding for national defense purposes. I would suggest that lowering our defenses to the point of Soviet victory is unwise. There is one thing worse than a nuclear war—losing a nuclear war.

Mr. OTTINGER. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to note that the Appropriations Committee has finally given overdue recognition to the obvious truth that we can and must get more defense for the dollars we are spending, not more dollars for the low caliber of performance we have been getting over the past years.

There will be some who will cry that the \$2 billion lopped off the budget request will harm our national security, but we can dismiss this for the nonsense it is now widely recognized to be. The public has been too well informed of the irresponsibility of both the Pentagon and defense contractors in cases such as the C-5A to be willing to put up with the inviolability of the military budget any longer.

Mr. Chairman, we do indeed have an obligation to provide security for the people of this country. But we have the corollary obligation to see that the services and equipment involved are obtained with efficiency and at equitable cost to the taxpayer. It is only in the last few years that Congress has begun to exercise its responsibility for military spending oversight, and until that time we faced mutely an annual appropriation that grew year by year to totally unnecessary and unwise proportions. The action we will take today is but a further step in the direction of introducing sanity into providing of funds for the military establishment. There will be attempts to cut the expenditure level back even further, perhaps to a \$65 billion maximum, and I am fully in support of these efforts.

Most importantly, we have once again an opportunity to express the sense of Congress in regard to the funding of the war in Southeast Asia, and I hope that the bipartisan move to write the provisions of House Resolution 1000 into this bill will be successful. By approving

the amendment to limit fiscal 1971 funds for Vietnam to \$15 billion we will give clear expression to the necessity for winding down the war, and then by voting to terminate funds for ground combat operations after June 20, 1971, we will give the American people a clear signal that we are fully ready to exercise our responsibility to extricate ourselves from our disastrous involvement in Indochina. The people of this country clearly want us out of the war, and today we have the opportunity to set the limits for our engagement in Vietnam. I hope we take it.

Mr. VANIK. Mr. Chairman, upon leaving office, President Eisenhower, a general of the Army, warned the Nation against the dangers of the growing "military industrial complex." In his farewell address to the Nation on television and radio on January 17, 1961, the former Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Forces said:

In the counsels of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist. We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes. We should take nothing for granted. Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals, so that security and liberty may prosper together.

For 8 years we have ignored the General's warning, despite the fact that the Department of Defense's budget increased from \$41.3 in fiscal 1961 to a fiscal 1971 request of \$66.6 billion.

However, I am pleased to say, Mr. Chairman, that at last in this year—and to some extent last year—the Congress has lived up to its responsibility of examining and questioning the military budget. We have begun to return to our constitutional obligation "to raise and support Armies," "to provide and maintain a Navy," and "to make rules for the Government and regulation of the land and naval forces."

This is the first Congress of the eight Congresses in which I have served, which has seriously questioned and cross-examined military money requests, the advisability of certain weapons systems, and the validity of certain strategic concepts—such as maintaining 535,000 American military personnel and dependents in Europe at a cost of around \$2.9 billion.

This examination is a most encouraging development. Congressional examination and review in this area—an area where the generals and admirals were formerly given carte blanche—is saving the taxpayer literally billions of dollars.

For example, this year's bill before the House today makes cuts in a number of new programs which are untested or which have run into technical difficulties. It makes no sense to push forward into production of weapons systems in the hope that future research will solve the problems which have already developed. For example, production went ahead on hundreds of Sheridan tanks

which had a turret designed to fire a missile shell. Production went ahead on the promise that this new type of shell could be and would be developed. Technical difficulties arose, and hundreds of tanks have had to be stored away since they have no firepower to deliver. This situation may be cleared up, but the interim waste has been fantastic. We must move, as Secretary Laird says, to a "fly before you buy" policy.

Unwanted new weapons systems, such as a new nuclear aircraft carrier and its escorts, have been cut from the budget. It would have been unconscionable for Congress to have provided funds for this project which the administration was uncertain it wanted. The Congress has also raised questions in debate about the strategic soundness behind the idea of a carrier-oriented Navy. The remarkable success of the Soviet built ship-to-ship missile Styx raises real questions about the safety of relying on large surface warships.

The Appropriations Committee is to be commended for expressing concern about the redtape and bureaucracy which has turned our Defense Establishment into an unresponsive and lethargic monster. In cutting the administration's budget request by nearly \$2.1 billion, the distinguished chairman of the Appropriations Committee has said that this can be done "without denying programs essential to the basic military strength of the country." He noted that:

The "effectiveness of the Defense Department cannot be measured solely in terms of dollars. Unlimited resources do not overcome inefficiency and mismanagement. Instead, excessive funding produces more inefficiency and mismanagement.

A similar view of bureaucratic inefficiency has been expressed by Hyman Rickover, one of America's most brilliant admirals.

In addition, to making cuts in the budget request, the committee has put time limits on which appropriated moneys can be spent. Previous defense appropriations bills had made money available until expended—a practice in direct violation of the Constitution which provides that the Congress in raising and supporting armies, shall not make appropriations to that use—for a longer term than 2 years. In their wisdom, our Founding Fathers saw the dangers of unlimited and uncontrolled appropriations accruing to the military. It is time that we returned to that wisdom.

Despite the committee's improvements, Mr. Chairman, I feel that further improvements can be made.

Total NATO related costs are \$14 billion per year, a significant part of which is due to 330,000 servicemen and 205,000 support personnel and dependents stationed in Europe. This force level—and especially the dependent level—should be cut. This commitment of manpower is a terrible drain on our resources. It lightens the defense burden for European nations which have used the resultant saving to improve their productivity and produce consumer goods that have undermined our markets abroad and flooded our markets at home. In addition, from a strategic point of view, we

do not have enough—we could not maintain enough men in Europe to stop a massive Soviet attack on Western Europe. And if such an attack occurred, the possibility of it remaining a minor war limited to Europe is extremely remote. Our presence and commitment of defense to the people and democracies of Europe could be demonstrated by a few air units, the 6th Fleet, and a few Army units. But half a million Americans in Europe makes no sense at all.

For these reasons, I supported the amendment to cut the size of our manpower commitment in Europe.

As the Member who offered an amendment in the public debt bill to limit the Department of Defense budget, I will support the amendment being offered today to put a ceiling of \$65 billion on the Department's budget. This amendment will not cut any specific program—it leaves the determination on cuts of \$1.6 billion to the President and the Defense Department.

This amendment is entirely feasible since there are numerous areas where cuts can be made. For example, we now have 429 major and nearly 3,000 minor bases scattered in 30 nations around the world. Many of these are obsolete and no longer necessary. Admiral Rickover has pointed out that the Uniform Accounting Procedures Act, just signed into law, should save up to \$2 billion annually. In line with the President's peace initiatives of last night, troop withdrawals from Vietnam should continue with further reductions in expenditures.

In light of these possibilities, in light of pressing domestic needs and probable budget deficits due to recession-caused reductions in Federal revenues, I believe that the \$65 billion ceiling is vital.

Finally, the President's speech of last night offered hope for a cease-fire but was vague on the question of the timing and amount of further withdrawals. As an indication of my support for a definite, continued process of withdrawal, I will support an additional amendment to today's bill which will require that funds appropriated by this act be used only for those operations which are necessary to carry out the safe and orderly withdrawal of United States forces and prisoners of war from Vietnam while working toward a goal of ending U.S. military commitment.

These amendments are important; these amendments are sound.

Our defense spending must be more efficient and more responsive.

I cannot support this huge, conglomerate of expenditure. In its present form it constitutes an invitation to waste.

Mrs. MINK. Mr. Chairman, I would like to commend the chairman of our House Committee on Appropriations for his invaluable assistance in obtaining a singularly important addition to the Department of Defense appropriation bill, H.R. 19590.

I refer to the committee's wise and praiseworthy decision to provide funds in the bill for the schooling of minor dependents of Department of Defense personnel who died while entitled to compensation or active duty pay. This provision will allow such minor dependents

to attend school in schools operated overseas by the Department. Widows who are foreign nationals will be able to educate their children in these American schools if they return to their country of origin.

To accommodate this new provision, the limitation on obligations for dependents' education is increased in the bill to \$134,400,000 from \$129,900,000.

This program is in accordance with legislation, H.R. 16725, which I cosponsored with my colleague, the Honorable WILLIAM D. FORD of Michigan, to accomplish this commendable purpose.

Mr. Chairman, this is a very modest amount for such a worthy objective. One of the most tragic results of our Nation's current military operations is the arbitrary cutoff of funds for educating the children of our military-service personnel if the father is killed in the service of his country.

I believe the least our Nation can do for the sacrifice of these personnel is to proceed with the education of their children while they are located overseas. This is a most fitting addition to the bill, and I thank the chairman and other members of the committee for including it in this most important legislation.

I also commend Congressman FORD for his diligence in seeking so successfully this benefit for our defense personnel.

Mr. MINSHALL. Mr. Chairman, I have no further requests for time.

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I have no further requests for time.

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will read.

The Clerk read as follows:

**TITLE III—OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE—
OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE, ARMY**

For expenses, not otherwise provided for, necessary for the operation and maintenance of the Army, including administration; medical and dental care of personnel entitled thereto by law or regulation (including charges of private facilities for care of military personnel on duty or leave, except elective private treatment), and other measures necessary to protect the health of the Army; care of the dead; chaplains' activities; awards and medals; welfare and recreation; recruiting expenses; transportation services; communications services; maps and similar data for military purposes; military surveys and engineering planning; repair of facilities; hire of passenger motor vehicles; tuition and fees incident to training of military personnel at civilian institutions; field exercises and maneuvers; expenses for the Reserve Officers' Training Corps and other units at educational institutions, as authorized by law; and not to exceed \$4,000,000 for emergencies and extraordinary expenses, to be expended on the approval or authority of the Secretary of the Army, and payments may be made on his certificate of necessity for confidential military purposes, and his determination shall be final and conclusive upon the accounting officers of the Government; \$6,219,011,000, of which not less than \$220,000,000 shall be available only for the maintenance of real property facilities.

AMENDMENTS OFFERED BY MR. MAHON

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I have amendments which I have discussed with many members of the Committee on Appropriations and the subcommittee which would increase the funds for operation and maintenance in three separate items. One of the items appears on page 6,

another on page 8, and still another on page 10. The purpose of this action is to increase funds by \$150 million for operation and maintenance of the Armed Forces. I ask unanimous consent to have the amendments read and considered en bloc.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Texas?

There was no objection.

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I offer amendments.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendments offered by Mr. MAHON: On page 6, in line 25, strike out "\$6,219,011,000" and insert in lieu thereof "\$6,269,011,000"; and

On page 8, in line 7, strike out "\$4,681,910,000" and insert in lieu thereof "\$4,731,910,000"; and

On page 10, in line 5 strike out "\$6,117,136,000" and insert in lieu thereof "\$6,167,136,000".

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, the amount in the bill for operation and maintenance is \$19,213,630,000. The amendments I have offered would add \$150 million, \$50 million each to the Army, Navy, and the Air Force.

Mr. Chairman, the committee made careful reductions in the operation and maintenance appropriation. We insist that these reductions are right and proper as specified.

The Secretary of Defense, upon returning from his trip to the Mediterranean, discussed with me and some of the other Members the fact that he had some concern about operation and maintenance funds. He pointed out that the movement of an aircraft carrier and a brigade of Marines to the Mediterranean had cost some \$50 million. He pointed out the expenses that have been incurred in providing hospital facilities in Jordan. He pointed out some of the other unforeseen operation and maintenance costs.

It will be recalled that at the time of the great tragedy in Peru, the Air Force flew large quantities of supplies to that country at considerable cost.

For this reason, I believe it would be wise to increase the operation and maintenance budget by \$150,000,000 so that funds would be available for these unbudgeted and unforeseen purposes.

As I stated, the reductions specified are valid and should be carried out as specified in the committee report.

The Congress should be advised in a timely manner of the use of the additional \$150,000,000.

As I pointed out earlier, the Secretary has broad transfer authorities which he can utilize in the distribution of the funds according to the requirements as they arise. I believe that this will provide the flexibility requested by the Secretary and still provide the reductions in unnecessarily spending which the committee has tried to achieve.

These amendments are being offered as subcommittee amendments.

Mr. YATES. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MAHON. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. YATES. Do I correctly understand the gentleman to say that it cost \$50

million to move a carrier into the Mediterranean?

Mr. MAHON. No, I said that and other purposes incident to the Middle Eastern situation.

Mr. YATES. Does the gentleman mean that the posture struck by the United States in the Middle East recently cost \$50 million?

Mr. MAHON. The Secretary of Defense stated that the movement of a portion of the fleet, the supplying of additional equipment, and other costs incident to the whole Middle Eastern affair, brought about an additional cost of \$50 million, which I am not able to document in detail at this time.

Mr. YATES. I must say that that is an extreme amount of money.

Mr. MAHON. This is a large amount of money, but it covers many other purposes than the purpose to which reference has been made.

Mr. YATES. As one member of the committee, may I say that I was not consulted on this. Most of the committee, I think, probably has not been consulted on this. I certainly believe that members of the committee should be consulted with respect to matters like this before amendments are brought to the floor and represented that they do have the approval of the committee. \$50 million is a substantial sum. It ought not be approved by conferring with the Secretary and a few members of the committee.

Mr. MAHON. I am not offering this as an approved committee amendment. I believe I said it had been approved by the members of the subcommittee. It was discussed at the White House last night with some of the Members of the House and with the Secretary of Defense.

Mr. SIKES. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I strongly support the action that has been proposed. The bill as presented to the House is \$2,321,000,000 below the fiscal year 1970 bill in operation and maintenance funds. This account covers support directly related to the maintenance of combat readiness of Army divisions, air wings, and U.S. fleet units. A further reduction to this degree on top of the very austere administration program will result in a degradation of military readiness. It means equipment and weapons will fail. It means the ability of the Armed Forces to respond to emergency situations will be sharply restricted.

The imposition of reductions of this magnitude will require further reductions in civilian personnel strengths below the 130,000 already programmed from June 30, 1969, to June 30, 1971, forcing a curtailment in vital material maintenance and supply support programs for operational units. Under an annual account of this nature, a reduction of this magnitude after the end of the first quarter of the fiscal year magnifies the impact of the cut, since effective reductions in personnel and levels of activities cannot be made prior to January 1, 1971. This has the effect of doubling the impact of the reduction on an annualized basis. It would severely disrupt planned programs for support of military forces. The Department of Defense has stated

that a minimum of \$250 million should be restored to this account.

Mr. Chairman, I support the amendments.

(Mr. SIKES asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. MINSHALL. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the committee amendments.

I sincerely hope the committee will adopt them.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendments offered by the gentleman from Texas (Mr. MAHON).

The amendments were agreed to.

Mr. FLOOD. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.

Mr. Chairman, I rise for the purpose of asking the chairman of the full committee, the great gentleman from Texas, do I understand that the overall increase under the amendments will be for general operational expenses and maintenance only?

Mr. MAHON. The gentleman is correct. The answer is "Yes."

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will read. The Clerk read as follows:

OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE, DEFENSE AGENCIES

For expenses, not otherwise provided for, necessary for the operation and maintenance of activities and agencies of the Department of Defense (other than the military departments and the Office of Civil Defense), including administration; hire of passenger motor vehicles; welfare and recreation; awards and decorations; travel expenses, including expenses of temporary duty travel of military personnel; transportation of things (including transportation of household effects of civilian employees); industrial mobilization; care of the dead; tuition and fees incident to the training of military personnel at civilian institutions; repair of facilities; departmental salaries; procurement of services, special clothing, supplies, and equipment; field printing plants; information and educational services for the Armed Forces; communications services; and not to exceed \$4,280,000 for emergency and extraordinary expenses, to be expended on the approval or authority of the Secretary of Defense for such purposes as he deems appropriate, and his determination thereon shall be final and conclusive upon the accounting officers of the Government; \$1,125,750,000, of which not less than \$14,000,000 shall be available only for the maintenance of real property facilities.

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, I make the point of order that a quorum is not present.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will count.

Fifty-six Members are present, not a quorum. The Clerk will call the roll.

The Clerk called the roll, and the following Members failed to answer to their names:

Abbutt	Cabell	Dwyer
Adair	Celler	Edwards, La.
Ashley	Clancy	Evins, Tenn.
Aspinall	Clark	Fallon
Baring	Clausen,	Farbsteln
Beall, Md.	Don H.	Feighan
Belcher	Clawson, Del	Fish
Berry	Clay	Fisher
Betts	Corbett	Flynt
Blackburn	Cowger	Foreman
Brook	Cramer	Frelinghuysen
Brooks	Daddario	Fulton, Tenn.
Burlison, Mo.	Dawson	Fuqua
Burton, Utah	Derwinski	Gilbert
Bush	Diggs	Gray
Button	Dowdy	Griffiths

[Roll No. 335]

Hagan	McMillan	Relfel
Haley	MacGregor	Roudebush
Hammer-	Mailliard	Roussetot
schmidt	May	Ruth
Harvey	Meskill	Satterfield
Hays	Montgomery	Scheuer
Hébert	Morse	Shipley
Hungate	Nedzi	Snyder
Ichord	Nix	Stephens
Jonas	O'Konski	Stratton
Jones, N.C.	Olsen	Talcott
King	O'Neal, Ga.	Thompson, N.J.
Kleppe	Ottlinger	Tunney
Kuykendall	Patman	Wampler
Landrum	Pirnie	Weicker
Leggett	Podell	Wilson, Bob
Lowenstein	Pollock	Wilson,
Lujan	Powell	Charles H.
McCarthy	Price, Tex.	Wold
McClory	Purcell	Young
McCulloch	Quillen	

Accordingly the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr. ALBERT) having assumed the chair, Mr. ROSTENKOWSKI, Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that that Committee, having had under consideration the bill H.R. 19590, and finding itself without a quorum, he had directed the roll to be called, when 322 Members responded to their names, a quorum, and he submitted herewith the names of the absentees to be spread upon the Journal.

The Committee resumed its sitting.

The CHAIRMAN. When the Committee rose, the Clerk had read through line 5 on page 11. There being no amendments pending, the Clerk will read.

The Clerk read as follows:

TITLE IV—PROCUREMENT

TITLE III—OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE—ARMY

For expenses necessary for the procurement, manufacture, and modification of missiles, armament, ammunition, equipment, vehicles, vessels, and aircraft for the Army and the Reserve Officers' Training Corps; purchase of not to exceed five thousand two hundred and fifty-four passenger motor vehicles for replacement only; expenses which in the discretion of the Secretary of the Army are necessary in providing facilities for production of equipment and supplies for national defense purposes, including construction, and the furnishing of Government-owned facilities and equipment at privately owned plants; and ammunition for military salutes at institutions to which issue of weapons for salutes is authorized; \$2,933,100,000, to remain available for obligation until June 30, 1973: *Provided*, That none of the funds provided in this Act shall be available for the maintenance of more than two active production sources for the supplying of M-16 rifles or for the payment of any price differential for M-16 rifles resulting from the maintenance of more than two active production sources.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I have no amendment to offer. I merely wish to call the attention of the House to one of the items under title IV which should receive, I think, further consideration. I know the committee gave very close consideration to this item, the British-developed Harrier aircraft, a number of other close-support aircraft. The reason why I take the time of the House at this moment to mention this aircraft is that it is truly a plane of the future, and it is definitely a plane of the present. The Marine Corps is very anxious to have it, and I am confident the other services would eventually

like to have an adaptation of it. The United States has tried without success and at a cost of hundreds of millions, to develop such an aircraft.

As matters stand, because of the fact the plane is built in Britain and costs, of course, less at the moment to buy there, the committee has suggested we proceed in that fashion at least for the first 114 planes on order. It is my sincere hope that the paper which I am submitting herewith to the House and for the Record with information concerning tax recoupment and overhead costs shared with other defense production, will be carefully considered.

Mr. MINSHALL. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SYMINGTON. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.

Mr. MINSHALL. Mr. Chairman, I think, as the gentleman pointed out in the committee, we have been advised that to manufacture this aircraft, the Harrier, in the gentleman's home State of Missouri, in St. Louis, would cost nearly twice as much as to manufacture it in England, and this particular item would cost the taxpayers \$238 million more.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Ohio. That is the figure contained in the report.

Mr. Chairman, I am submitting a statement to show that over the 5-year period of time of U.S. manufacture, through the recoupment of taxes, the generation of domestic employment, and shared overhead costs, there would be very small difference economically between the purchase of the Harrier aircraft from U.S. sources and from sources abroad, and that the premium for U.S. manufacture could be as low as \$36 million.

What I believe even more important is that once we have this technology here in the United States we can build on it ourselves and adopt it to our particular requirements with minimum difficulty. I do suggest this is the very kind of plane this country would wish to have, in considerable numbers and soon perhaps for all the services. It can take off from a small flattop. It needs no runway. It travels 700 miles an hour and can land and take off vertically. With minimum vulnerability on the ground, it greatly outperforms its competitors in the air.

Certainly in the interests of national security we would not wish to rely on a foreign source for a weapons system of this magnitude and this importance.

The gentleman is correct that there is a contract extant between McDonald Douglas Aircraft Co. and a firm in Great Britain, Hawker-Siddeley for the production of this plane.

It is my hope that the House will study carefully all the arguments that can be adduced on both sides of the question of where to get this plane at this time before making a final decision later in conference.

Mr. Chairman, a strong case can be made, I believe, for purchasing the Harrier aircraft from a U.S. supplier. The decision, as reflected in the fiscal year 1971 Defense appropriations bill now before us, to withhold funds for the establishment of a Harrier production line in

the United States, merits the attention and careful consideration of this body. The serious implications of this decision, not only for my own constituency, but for this Nation's defense capability and our economy, require that we carefully examine the case for manufacturing this major weapons system here in the United States.

There are two important and fundamental questions we must answer before committing ourselves to dependence on a foreign supplier for this unique aircraft: First, are we willing to rely, in times of calm as well as conflict, on a foreign government, foreign corporation, and foreign labor force, regardless of their traditional relationship to the United States, for the production and support of what will likely prove a major element of our defense forces? And, second, are we willing to forgo the participation of America's defense industry and manpower in the current generation of V/STOL technology represented by the Harrier aircraft?

Dealing with a manufacturer in this country, rather than relying on a foreign producer, provides many advantages stemming from DOD's familiarity with and proximity to the contractor as its source of engineering and service capability, the manufacture of spare parts, and parts for repairs. Beyond these advantages, however, is an even more serious consideration. In this country, as my colleagues well know, the U.S. Government has the authority, even though carefully circumscribed and defined, to insure that the production and delivery of defense-related goods is not interrupted in times of peace or war. Without elaborating on these provisions, it is quite clear that the American people would have no such guarantees if the Harrier aircraft were to be manufactured abroad. If we consider this weapons system essential to our own security and that of our allies then we cannot afford to allow the supply and support of this aircraft to be contingent on the policies and problems of a foreign, even if allied, nation; the decisions of managers subject to foreign stockholders; the policies of foreign labor unions; or in these times of active and sometimes destructive and disruptive political dissent, the political opinions and activities of foreign nationals. If this weapons system is, indeed, essential, then its availability and support must be assured.

At the present time, moreover, European industry is ahead of U.S. industry in one significant area of defense technology: V/STOL. The Harrier aircraft, designed and produced in the United Kingdom, is the first and only successful operational V/STOL fighter. The United States can take advantage of this technology at a fraction of what a normal development cycle would cost through a license agreement between American and British manufacturers. Not only would this provide an advanced Harrier type tactical aircraft at a low technical risk to the United States, but more importantly, the technological transfusion afforded by a U.S. Harrier production program would allow us to develop the technological capability for follow-on V/STOL aircraft

at a fraction of the cost. This opportunity is especially noteworthy in view of the history of U.S. efforts to develop this technology. Over half a billion dollars has been expended in the United States in research and development support for V/STOL programs over the past 10 years without producing one U.S. designed system suitable for introduction into the tactical inventory. Especially for this reason, we should welcome this opportunity to fill a void in our technological capability.

Beyond these two fundamental and overriding arguments for producing the Harrier aircraft in the United States, there are sound economic reasons for doing so. These include U.S. tax recoupment, substantial savings on other defense programs through sharing of fixed overhead costs, additional employment in the shrinking aerospace industry, and a more favorable balance of payments.

An example, based on a production program of 114 aircraft, will help to illustrate the economic effects of the decision. Under such a program, the premium paid for a United States-United Kingdom coproduction program over direct purchase from the United Kingdom has been estimated to be \$238.5 million. Offsetting this premium are two factors: tax recoupment and savings from overheads shared with other defense programs.

Estimates of tax recoupment vary. However, Federal taxes will approximate 48 percent of expenditures in the first year and a total of about 65 percent in the second year. Using these figures, tax recoupments are calculated to be \$184 million for the U.S. production program. U.S. manufacture would also result in lower costs on other defense programs through sharing of fixed overhead costs. This is particularly true if the Harrier were manufactured by the McDonnell Douglas Corp., which currently has a contractual agreement with the Harrier manufacturer. Placement of the planned Harrier contract with McDonnell Douglas would result in the absorption of approximately \$27 million in fixed overheads of which \$18 million will be a direct savings to other defense programs. Adding tax recoupment to the savings through sharing of fixed overhead costs brings the total savings related to these two factors to \$202 million, if both first and second year Federal tax recoupments are considered.

Applying the offset of \$202 million dollars from tax recoupment and sharing of overhead costs against the \$238.5 million premium for U.S. manufacture produces an estimated premium cost of only \$36 million for U.S. production. Moreover, it is my understanding that more recent estimates, related more directly to the program options now being considered, actually produce a premium in favor of U.S. production when tax recoupment and shared overheads are considered. And these estimates do not include the reduction of gold outflow, estimated to be \$41 million in the first case, increased U.S. employment, estimated to be 17,000 man-years over a 6-year period, or the unquantified benefits gained by technological transfusion to a well-known U.S. manufacturer. Cer-

tainly this makes a sound case for purchasing the Harrier aircraft from a U.S. supplier.

One final factor we should consider in evaluating this decision is its effect on our domestic aircraft industry. The entire European aviation industry has been going through a period of mergers, consolidations, and joint development and production programs mostly at the initiative of their governments and always with full support of these governments. These actions have pulled their previously fragmented operations into a cohesive and very competitive production operation of 470,000 people. With the potential entry of the United Kingdom into the Common Market, European cooperation can be expected to grow and the European aviation industry, with the integration of the United Kingdom industry, can only become even more competitive with the United States, with obvious effects on the U.S. balance of payments.

On balance, the technological and production capability in the United States still leads that of Europe, but the gap is closing and we will be faced with the possible loss of the second largest aircraft market in the world in the mid-to-late 1970's, together with increasingly aggressive competition worldwide. Failure to permit the transfer of the Harrier production under a license program can only contribute to widening the lead the Europeans now have over us in V/STOL technology or force expenditure of large amounts of U.S. funds to permit us to close the lead. Either action would appear to be an illogical response to the challenge of the increasingly competitive European aircraft industry. While no weapons system can be justified on the basis of support for one industry or another, this is one final factor which must enter into the equation.

I am hopeful that my colleagues will agree that this decision must be very carefully considered and that the need to maintain a U.S. supplier for a major weapons system, the need to develop defense-related V/STOL technology in this country, as well as the economic aspects of the decision including tax recoupment, shared overhead costs, increased employment and balance-of-payments effects, not to mention effects on our domestic aircraft industry, argue persuasively for a reevaluation of the decision to purchase this major weapons system from a foreign supplier.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. COHELAN

Mr. COHELAN. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. COHELAN: On page 15, line 2, strike out "\$2,933,100,000" and insert in lieu thereof "\$2,282,100,000".

(Mr. COHELAN as named was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. COHELAN. Mr. Chairman, I rise, as I have in the past, to oppose the deployment of the ABM.

The \$1.07 billion appropriation in this bill for the ABM is to my mind money that is being wasted. We have heard over and over again the arguments both

for and against this system. Yet, one fact stands out above them all: the ABM is not operational; it does not work as an integrated system. In my additional views in the committee report on this bill I noted that the central component of the ABM—the soft ware that is to link the radars and the missiles—is not completed and there is no indication of when this complex computer arrangement will be operational. On the other hand, many qualified and competent technicians have told me that the state of the art of computer technology is not capable of handling the demands required to link up the entire ABM system.

The Members of course know from where I come. I am sure they know with whom I have been talking. I suggest in all honesty that what we have here is a battle of the intellectual giants, because there are differing authorities on both sides of this question. I will say that I have been listening to men of the stature of Panofsky of Stanford and Drell of Stanford and many of the great physicists and mathematicians at my own university, and there is strong opposition to the deployment of the ABM system.

One of the most recent papers, by the distinguished Dr. York, was a book recently published on this very point. The whole thesis of the book is on the subject of extending the deployment of the ABM system because of the state of the technology.

So we can see that many qualified and competent technicians have suggested that the state of the art of computer technology is not capable of handling the demands required to link the entire ABM system.

We must remember, too, that none other than Secretary of Defense Laird has stated that the ABM is obsolete against a heavy Soviet attack. What followed from this candid admission was a desperate search for a new opponent and a new rationale for the ABM. Then first the Chinese threat was resurrected, and now the "bargaining chip" theory is being offered as a rationale for the deployment of the ABM. As I said in my additional views:

This latest rationale—the bargaining chip theory, i.e. we need the ABM to force the Soviet Union to negotiate at the SALT talks—assumes that the Soviets will be forced to negotiate by a weapon system that is not operational and which many knowledgeable specialists say will never work. This assumes incredible naivete on the part of the Soviets.

The cost of the ABM continues to escalate. I have the gravest fears that we are putting money into an illusory defense, a maginot line. It is important for the Members of this House to realize that even though there was a modification in the phase II ABM authorization, deployment is still going ahead as planned at Malinstrom and Grand Forks and Whiteman and we have advanced preparation at Warren Air Force Base. We are slowly approaching a full-scale ABM system whose total cost estimates range from \$12 to \$30 billion.

I might also point out that the ABM represents a major violation of the pub-

licly announced fly-before-you-buy approach to procurement which Secretary Laird announced recently. It will take more than the contrived tests, such as those of August 31, to convince me that the ABM as an integrated system is operational. To go ahead with deployment seems to bode the same type of cost overruns and nonoperational capability problems as those of the C-5A and the RS-70 bomber. This type of oversight on the part of military planners should not be taken lightly because it will further undermine the confidence of many of our citizens in the ability of the Military Establishment to adequately provide for the defense of this Nation. Therefore, Mr. Chairman, I urge that this money for the deployment of the ABM be deleted from this bill and that the appropriations for the ABM be limited to research and development.

Mr. YATES. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. COHELAN. I yield to the distinguished gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. YATES. I support the gentleman's amendment. Did not Secretary Laird also admit the vulnerability of the radar proposed to be used in Safeguard? Did he not concede in the hearings before the committee the probability of having to move to small radars in order to protect our ICBM sites?

Mr. COHELAN. I agree with the gentleman. In his own great fashion in the House on many occasions he himself has made these arguments. If we only had the time to study these questions, there is so much in the record to support the view that we are arguing here at this moment.

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, the ABM issue has been debated many times, and we have voted on it many times. It has been approved many times by the Congress.

I ask that the amendment be defeated.

Mr. MINSHALL. Mr. Chairman, I, too, rise in opposition to the amendment.

If we are going to deal from a position of strength with the Russians in the SALT talks, we should have this as one of our bargaining points.

Mr. YATES. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MINSHALL. I am glad to yield to the gentleman.

Mr. YATES. Does not the gentleman go along with the statement made by the gentleman from New Hampshire (Mr. WYMAN) earlier today in which he said that our real defense in this sort of a situation comes from our sea-based submarines armed with Polaris and Poseidon missiles?

Mr. MINSHALL. That is just one of the defenses we have in this country.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from California (Mr. COHELAN).

The amendment was rejected.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. PHILBIN

Mr. PHILBIN. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. PHILBIN: On page 15, line 3, strike all after the colon and through line 8.

Mr. PHILBIN. Mr. Chairman, the House Armed Services Committee remains dissatisfied with the Army's management of the M-16 rifle program, and this necessitated the proviso contained in the procurement bill: namely:

That none of the funds authorized for appropriation by this Act shall be obligated for the procurement of M-16 rifles until the Secretary of the Army has certified to the Congress that at least three active production sources for supplying such weapons will continue to be available within the United States during fiscal year 1971.

Since 1964 both the House and Senate Armed Services Committees have urged the Army to acquire the patent rights to the M-16 rifle and establish additional production sources. Finally, in 1967, patent rights were acquired at a cost of \$4.5 million plus 5.5 percent royalties on all rifles produced by sources other than Colts, Inc.

Production contracts were awarded in April 1968 to the Hydromatic Division of General Motors and to Harrington and Richardson, Inc., whose work force includes many people residing in my district. Also, during 1968, two additional production contracts were awarded to Colts, Inc. Thus, beginning in late 1968 and early 1969, the Army after a long wait finally enjoyed three production sources for this important weapon systems.

The cost to the Government for acquiring the rights-and-date package from the original producer of the rifle—Colts, Inc.—plus the cost of test equipment and facilities provided to the additional producer, exceeded \$30 million.

Within less than a year after production began in these two new facilities the Army released proposals to procure an additional 687,000 rifles to meet worldwide requirements. Instead of awarding contracts to meet this requirement on a basis that would take advantage of the newly established capability, and maintain the broadest mobilization base, the Army chose to ward contracts to only two of the companies: one receiving a contract for over 458,000 rifles and the other, for 229,000 rifles.

On the basis of the award, one of the production sources was required to produce at a high rate of 40,000 per month, whereas the other was required to produce at 20,000 per month. It was obvious that it would have been to the advantage of the Government at that time to continue three production lines, each at a rate of 20,000, rather than to require the one source to produce at the high rate of 40,000 rifles per month. In fact, the requirement for the 40,000 rifle production rate—in effect—was a set-aside for one producer alone, since the other two sources did not have the capacity to produce at that high rate.

This year the Army has stated a requirement to the committee for additional M-16 rifles. Army witnesses testified that the M-16 rifle production capabilities would be reduced to one source after the award of the contract to meet these latest requirements.

Mr. Chairman, it does not make sense for the Government to spend more than \$30 million to establish two additional

production sources for a sophisticated weapon system that is in great demand to meet worldwide commitments for defense and then within 2 years time force the closing of one of these production lines before the military requirements have been fully met.

This is especially critical at this time of worldwide tension. The U.S. Government is committed to support a number of our allies in other areas of the world now experiencing great political tension.

Because of this world tension, I do not believe that we should allow the dismantling of even one capable production line, which would require a minimum of 1 year to reestablish, once the equipment is placed in mothballs, but insure the continued production at a minimum, economical rate until the requirements for the foreseeable future are fully met. The Government urgently needs three-source rifle procurement at this time.

The House approved three sources of production in the procurement authorization bill and this amendment was subsequently adopted in conference. It is now law.

I hope and urge that the committee may adopt this meritorious amendment.

Mr. BOLAND. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PHILBIN. I am happy to yield to the very distinguished and able gentleman from Massachusetts.

(Mr. BOLAND asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BOLAND. Mr. Chairman, I support the amendment which has been offered by the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. PHILBIN).

As the gentleman has so well stated, all this amendment actually proposes to do is to provide for three sources for the production of the M-16 rifle.

I do not think the Members of this House and, certainly, the chairman of this committee and the ranking member of the committee have to be reminded of the problems which we have had in the production of rifles in the past several years, not only problems in the production of the M-16, but the M-14 as well.

It seems to me that what the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. PHILBIN) is attempting to do here is to say to the Department of Defense, "You have got to maintain three sources of production of the M-16 through fiscal year 1971."

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. PHILBIN) has expired.

Mr. BOLAND. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

(Mr. BOLAND asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BOLAND. Mr. Chairman, what we are saying through the amendment which has been offered by the gentleman from Massachusetts is that the Department of Defense is committed to maintain three sources of production of the M-16.

It is my understanding that the U.S. Government and the Department of Defense is now committed to supplying M-16's worldwide and that we have

mothballed our M-14 production capability and that is gone. The only production capability we have is now for the M-16. Therefore, it would seem to me it would be the better part of wisdom to maintain three production lines.

My understanding is, and I can be corrected by the subcommittee, that it will cost just as much to mothball the third production line on the M-16 as it would to keep it in operation. If that is so, it would seem to me it would be wise to keep this production line in operation.

What are we doing here? We are saying there ought to be three production lines for the M-16 rifles. We are not going to give it to two companies, we are going to spread the competition around, and three companies will have the job. That is all we are doing.

That is what was done in the armed services authorization bill. And that bill, as the gentleman from Massachusetts pointed out, does for three sources for fiscal year 1971—and only through 1971.

Mr. Chairman, for years the Congress encouraged the establishment of more than one production sources for the M-16 rifle.

The cost to the Government in establishing two additional sources exceeded \$30 million.

In view of the present world uncertainties and tensions, we should not phase out or place these production lines in lay-away at this time.

The Army contends that to sustain three producers at the minimum sustaining rate would increase the total program cost by \$14.3 million. The average cost of rifles allegedly would be \$163.50 instead of \$107 each if all rifles are procured from one producer.

Mr. Chairman, both General Motors and Harrington & Richardson have assured the Armed Services Committee of the House that they can produce the rifle on a minimum sustaining rate, that is, 5,000 per month—which the Army indicated in their reclama letter as the rate for General Motors and Harrington & Richardson—at the cost of \$107 per rifle or less. They have not been asked to submit a bid proposed on that minimum rate.

Based on these assurances by General Motors and Harrington & Richardson the armed services properly challenged the figures used by the Army in their reclama to the provision that was written into the authorizing legislation providing for three sources of production for the M-16 rifle.

Mr. BRAY. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words, and I rise in support of the amendment.

First let me say, Mr. Chairman, that it happens that none of the three sources of supply for the M-16 rifles are within hundreds of miles of the State in which I live.

My special interest in this matter is as a member of the Committee on Armed Services, and also that some years ago I was the ranking minority member of the subcommittee that made a thorough investigation on the M-16 rifle both as to its malfunctioning and the fact that its production was limited to one source of supply, say that for more than 3 years certain officials of the Army had been

attempting to prevent the obtaining of additional sources of supply for the M-16's. It was only through the efforts of the Committee on Appropriations of the House and Senate and the authorizing committees of the House and Senate that we were finally able to work out additional sources of supply.

The additional sources of supply—two in number—were determined by the Army, and no one on the committee had anything to do with it. I was utterly disgusted not long ago when members of the Army came into my office and wanted to limit the production of the M-16 to one source of supply. And the fact of the matter is they are planning now to move one of the production lines outside of the United States, and do not let them tell you they are not planning to do so. And again I say that no part of my district is even close to these sources of supply.

We were told by the Army officials that to maintain the additional sources of supply was going to cost a lot of money. The chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. RIVERS) sent telegrams and found out that absolutely everything they said about the additional costs were absolutely false. The Army has already closed down the only other rifle production line, that is on the M-14, so that they are really trying to place all rifle production into two sources, and the Army wanted to limit it to one source.

Then they went to the Senate, and they got them to go along with a single source of supply, that is Colt. However, after the facts came to the attention of the Senate conferees, then they also went along with the House conferees.

Mr. Chairman, if this body allows the Army to close down one source of supply of the M-16, next the Army will attempt to manufacture their rifles abroad and reduce production in the United States to one source, that is Colt.

Mr. MINSHALL. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words, and I rise in opposition to the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I hold my friends from Massachusetts in the highest regard, and I can well also understand why they are interested in having three sources of supply for these rifles, but I would merely like to point out that our highest military men have advised us in committee that we have adequate supplies of the M-16 rifles, not only for our own use, but also adequate supplies of the M-16 rifles that we might need for our allies.

Furthermore, the addition of a third supplier will add 54 percent to the cost of producing this weapon at a time when we are trying to save money.

And in view of the fact that we have adequate M-16's on hand for the immediate future, I see no reason why we should have three sources of supply.

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word.

Mr. Chairman, I have the highest personal regard and respect for the distinguished gentleman from Massachusetts. He has been a dedicated Member of this body for a long time and has served diligently and well.

I realize he has in his district a plant

that is one of the three sources for manufacture of the M-16 rifle. I can only give you what the facts are as I understand them.

Because of the provision adopted in the authorizing legislation, the Army would not have the freedom of awarding a competitive contract to the lowest bidder. The Army would have to award a noncompetitive contract to all three bidders in this country who are capable of making the M-16 rifle.

Therefore, under the authorization language which requires that the contract be split among three suppliers, I do not see how there could be any real competition because there are only three manufacturers that make the rifle. The provision in this bill will provide for not more than two manufactures of the M-16 and will provide for competition.

The gentleman from Massachusetts has one of the plants in his district in a position to compete for the proposed fiscal year 1971 buy of the M-16 rifle. So the gentleman's area is in the running, as I understand it, and under the provision in this bill at least two of the three firms could be selected. This will assure competition.

As chairman of the committee, I do not like to oppose any of my colleagues on amendments that are important to them in their district. I just want to point out that the M-16 rifle is estimated to cost about 50 percent more, if we follow the provision in the authorizing legislation. I think the Members are entitled to know that. However, I am perfectly willing for the House to work its will on this matter. This issue depends on how we look at the matter of spending taxpayers' dollars and related matters. My friends views should be carefully weighed by the House.

Mr. O'NEILL of Massachusetts: Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask the chairman of the committee insofar as there are three at the present time and they bid and there is an award to two, then the one that has failed would have to go out of business. So you know when your contract is coming up next year that there would be no competition whatsoever, there would be just those two companies left.

Mr. Chairman, I too support the amendment offered by the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. PHILBIN).

Mr. HALL. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to this amendment as, indeed, I opposed it in the Committee on Armed Services, on the authorizing legislation.

I do this on the basis of a studied opinion long ago, of the M-16 rifle, having lived through but not served with the special subcommittee of our Committee on Armed Services on the M-16 rifle. But primarily because of the increased cost, I oppose it.

Insofar as the last gentleman's question is concerned, it might well be that if there are adequate stores in magazines and in the armamentarium of the country and around the world, we would in our wisdom see fit to reduce the "hot"

lines to one in the future, so there would still be competition.

Competition is the key word here—keeping the requisite number only of assembly lines open is the secondary word.

Mr. Chairman, I think the members of the committee should know that if we wish to vent our spleen on one of the three armed services, that is one thing. But to prejudice our position of being able to award a contract at the lowest price and still keep the requisite number of assembly lines open for the production of automatic rifles is quite another thing.

I too was angry with the Army in 1961, when I was responsible for continuing work on the M-16 rifle, by a ruse, if you please, of having a "pilot buy" by the U.S. Air Force and their Air Police of 15,000 of these rifles after the second, third, and fourth Army evaluation board had rejected it as a new principle at the Aberdeen Proving Grounds, and in the Pentagon.

It turned out to be a great rifle. There is no question about the individual companies. As far as I am concerned, like the gentleman from Indiana, there is not one source of such manufacture within a thousand miles of the Ozark hills where I live, for this rifle. I have no interest or conflict involved herein. But I do know the cost of these rifles by lot and contract production. I know the production delivery capability of the companies. If you want to discover it, all you have to do is to read the special report of the subcommittee on the M-16 rifle when tested in the field.

They went to Vietnam and saw it used by the Marines, the Army, the Air Force, and anyone else who was equipped with it. The cost of the three, as far as production of one company being less than \$100 per piece, the other being over \$100, but none being as high as \$164 per piece, except the one company, and that is unconscionable. I do hope that we adhere to the wisdom of the saving shown by the committee and do not vote for this amendment to strike lines 3 through 8 on page 15.

The amendment should be defeated.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. PRICE of Illinois). The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. PHILBIN).

The question was taken; and on a division (demanded by Mr. PHILBIN) there were—ayes 24, noes 40.

So the amendment was rejected.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will read.

PARLIAMENTARY INQUIRY

Mr. YATES. Mr. Chairman, a parliamentary inquiry.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The gentleman will state his parliamentary inquiry.

Mr. YATES. At what page of the bill is the Clerk reading, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk read down to line 9 on page 15. The Clerk will read.

The Clerk read as follows:

PROCUREMENT OF AIRCRAFT AND MISSILES, NAVY

For construction, procurement, production, modification, and modernization of

aircraft, missiles, equipment, including ordnance, spare parts, and accessories therefor; specialized equipment; expansion of public and private plants, including the land necessary therefor, and such lands, and interests therein, may be acquired, and construction prosecuted thereon prior to approval of title by the Attorney General as required by section 355, Revised Statutes, as amended; and procurement and installation of equipment, appliances, and machine tools in public or private plants; \$3,005,800,000, to remain available for obligation until June 30, 1973.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. BINGHAM

Mr. BINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. BINGHAM: On page 15, line 18, delete "\$3,005,800,000" and insert in lieu thereof "\$2,616,400,000".

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The gentleman from New York is recognized in support of his amendment.

(Mr. BINGHAM asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, on previous occasions, I have raised the question of the procurement funds for the F-14 aircraft. In the authorization bill this year and in the authorization bill last year I sought to delete the funds, not research and development for the F-14, but procurement funds for the F-14, and that is what this amendment does.

The F-14 has not yet been flight tested. It is scheduled for testing beginning in January of next year, and that testing will last for quite some time, so the procurement funds in this bill for the F-14 are contrary to the fly-before-you-buy principle. The Secretary of Defense has announced that he is in favor of the fly-before-you-buy principle, and this distinguished committee in its report has devoted considerable space to the fly-before-you-buy principle and upholds that principle at several points in the report.

So it is difficult for me to understand why it is that in this instance the committee is recommending procurement funds for this complex controversial aircraft before it has been tested. Last year the authorization bill included procurement funds. The Appropriations Committee in its wisdom deleted the procurement funds. This year, however, the Appropriations Committee has recommended the sum which is aimed at in this amendment, the sum of \$389 million for procurement.

Mr. Chairman, we are not just talking about \$389 million. We are talking about whether we are going to spend wisely a much larger sum for the projected purchase of these aircraft. The announced number of these aircraft to be purchased is at this time 722. The present estimates are that the total cost will run over \$7 billion. It may run much higher before we are through. The question is: Is it wise to embark upon procurement of this complex and controversial aircraft before it has been thoroughly flight tested? It seems to me it is unwise to do so, that this runs contrary to the principle of fly-before-you-buy that the Secretary of Defense has announced, and contrary to the principle of fly-before-you-buy that

is defended and encouraged in the committee report.

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment. I want to say to the distinguished gentleman from New York that I personally have a great deal of respect for the view which has been suggested that perhaps in this aircraft the contract was let too early, and that we should have had more of the fly-before-you-buy element in the contract.

However, the fact is that the contract has been let and that the Government is obligated, and we would necessarily under these circumstances have to proceed with this procurement. I think it would be very harmful and very wasteful and very disturbing for us to incur this great additional cost if we should not proceed with this aircraft.

The indications are that the aircraft will be completely successful. The first flight, I believe, will be late this year, earlier than had been predicted.

One of the reasons why the Navy—and I have great respect for the Navy and the people in the Pentagon who represent the Navy—has had a problem is that it was delayed for several years, because the Navy had planned to participate in the F-111 aircraft buy and it was tied to this program for a long time, but last year the Navy portion of the F-111 buy was canceled, with the concurrence of Congress, and so the Navy desperately needs to proceed with the F-14. That was one of the reasons why the contract was let and the funds provided last year, rather than proceeding with a more delayed approach.

The Navy was somewhat in desperation to get an aircraft to meet their needs in view of the fact that they were denied the use of the F-111.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MAHON. I yield to the gentleman from Minnesota.

Mr. FRASER. The question I am about to ask is to get a better understanding of the procurement policy of the Navy. As I understand what the chairman has said, there is a contract now for the procurement of the F-14 already outstanding.

Mr. MAHON. Right.

Mr. FRASER. There is a valid legal obligation on the part of the Navy.

Mr. MAHON. That is correct.

Mr. FRASER. Is the chairman saying that at the time that contract was entered into there were not the funds on hand to be obligated in support of that contract?

Mr. MAHON. The funds were on hand to support the contract, and funds were provided last year for the contract. There was nothing extraordinary about that.

That is one of the things we are trying to do in this bill. We are trying to prevent going on contract prematurely. We believe premature funding of programs is not good.

Under the circumstances, this development has already taken place. The plane is desperately needed by reason of the matters I have explained. There is nothing irregular. It is a matter of judgment. We cannot turn back now. We must proceed.

Mr. FRASER. If the funds were provided at the time the contract was signed, why in fiscal year 1971 are you asking for new funds?

Mr. MAHON. This is to carry out the contract. There were funds available for the initial phases of the contract last year. This was when the contract was entered into. This will carry on the program and provide for 26 additional airplanes. Otherwise the program would be suspended in midair and it would be a wasteful operation.

Mr. FRASER. How many planes did we contract to buy last year?

Mr. MAHON. My recollection is it was 12.

Mr. BINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MAHON. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. BINGHAM. I thank the gentleman.

Is it not true that the planes which were bought last year, which the Appropriations Committee approved, were for research and development purposes? There were no planes in the procurement line last year. This year \$274 million is proposed for research and development planes, which my amendment would not touch.

Mr. MAHON. The gentleman is correct. Those were research and development planes which were on order and on contract. This would carry on the program into operational production.

Mr. BINGHAM. Is it not true that this is the first time the Appropriations Committee has approved appropriating funds for procurement of these aircraft, as distinct from research and development aircraft?

Mr. MAHON. This is the first contract for the operational version. For the research and development version, of course, we provided the funds last year.

Mr. BINGHAM. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. RHODES. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I hope this amendment will not be agreed to.

The F-14 is, as the chairman of the committee said, a follow-on from the F-111B.

The reason for the haste in production has completely to do with the fact that the Navy in the next few years will have to have an airplane which is adequate for fleet defense and air superiority. The F-14 is an air-superiority fighter. In another version it has a capability of launching missiles which from long range will provide defense for the fleet.

It is needed not only next year; it is needed right now. It is too bad it is not available, but it is not.

It certainly would not be a good idea for us to hold back this program.

The plane will work. All the testimony we have had before the committee indicates it is a good airplane and that the plane will do the job it was intended to do.

The buy this year is for only phase 3 of the whole procurement program.

I say to my friend from New York and to my friend from Minnesota, this apparently is the policy which the Armed Services will be following in the future. At least, we have strongly indicated we

want them to follow that policy. They are to buy as little hardware as possible and mitigate possible cancellation costs, until the performance has been proved by testing.

There is a necessity for keeping a production line going, but we do not intend that a production line be accelerated to the peak of production until there has been tests made and we know for certain the airplane not only will fly but also will do the job for which it is intended.

As the gentleman from New York pointed out, the airplane will be tested and there will be an evaluation made early next year. Certainly this will be available to the committee before we go beyond phase 3 of procurement.

Mr. SIKES. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. RHODES. I yield to the gentleman from Florida.

Mr. SIKES. I believe it would be well, Mr. Chairman, for the members of the committee to bear in mind the fact that this is the first modern aircraft in its field the Navy has had since the F-4 was developed some 10 years ago.

The Navy had anticipated the use of the Navy version of the F-111B, but it did not work out satisfactorily. It had to be dropped, and the Navy had an entire generation gap in modern fighter-type aircraft. It is very important that we move ahead on the F-14 program without further delay. This is probably the most carefully planned and engineered aircraft in our history. The Navy has great hopes for its performance capabilities.

Mr. RHODES. The gentleman will agree with me when I say that the Navy needed this plane yesterday?

Mr. SIKES. Yes.

Mr. BARRETT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield to me?

Mr. RHODES. Yes. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. BARRETT. Mr. Chairman, I take this opportunity to commend the Committee on Appropriations and its chairman, the gentleman from Texas, for presenting us with a Department of Defense appropriation bill for fiscal year 1971, which is more than \$2.1 billion below that set forth in the budget estimates and more than \$6 billion below that enacted for fiscal year 1970. However, I believe there is room and need for still reductions in the military budget and I intend to support a number of the amendments proposed for that purpose.

I understand that an amendment will be offered to reduce U.S. forces in Europe by 50,000 troops by June 30, 1971. I do not believe that such a reduction will adversely affect our resolve or ability to meet our NATO obligations and will, therefore, support the amendment. I will also support the amendments to limit expenditures in South Vietnam and our military involvement in Indochina.

Mr. Chairman, as I said, I do believe that there is room for further reduction in the total dollars provided in this bill. I will support the amendment to put a total dollar ceiling of \$65 billion on this act. This will allow the President and the Department of Defense to determine the specific areas where to apply the cuts.

Mr. Chairman, our domestic needs—

the needs of our people here at home—must be squarely faced and met. And to meet these needs there must be a reduction in military spending. The Education and HEW appropriation bills were vetoed on the grounds of excessive spending. The dollars cut out of this bill can go to meet the domestic needs and used in this manner will be less inflationary and more productive.

I urge my colleagues to support the proposed amendments to redirect the use of our Federal dollars; to cut military expenditures and increase the dollars available for our domestic needs.

Mr. BYRNE of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. RHODES. I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.

[Mr. BYRNE of Pennsylvania addressed the Committee. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.]

Mr. MINSHALL. Will the gentleman yield to me?

Mr. RHODES. I am glad to yield to the gentleman from Ohio.

Mr. MINSHALL. I heartily concur with my colleague from Arizona that this amendment should be defeated. The F-14 program was initiated by this administration. It did not inherit the F-111B program which was fortunately finally canceled in June 1968 after a series of failures and mismanagements and flight failures throughout the years. I certainly think it is time that we go ahead with this program. I would merely say in passing that the Navy never did want the F-111B, but it was forced down their throat by the then Secretary McNamara.

Mr. EVANS of Colorado. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. RHODES. Yes. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. EVANS of Colorado. I am sorely tempted to vote in favor of this amendment because of the experience we had with many other weapons systems, particularly the F-111, where a contractor had to take back 25 planes at one time because they did not pass the G test. We bought many of them at that time. But the fact that we have a contract signed—and I am sorry we do have—before we flew and tested this plane, but since we are obligated, I hope we can count on the assurance of the gentleman that the plane will be successful and we will not go through the same experience as we did with the famous F-111.

Mr. RHODES. Bear in mind that the contract only obligates us through phase 3. Before we get into the actual procurement phase, there will be another determination concerning performance and suitability.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.

Mr. Chairman, I will not take my 5 minutes, but I want to make clear from what the chairman said we do not have a legal obligation to appropriate this money. There is no contract outstanding that this money is required to fund. The contract was entered into last year, as I understand it, to procure 12 airplanes. They have yet to be fully tested. Now what we are funding is a new con-

tract to purchase 26 additional airplanes.

Mr. MAHON. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FRASER. I am glad to yield.

Mr. MAHON. The contract which was made last year was a contract with an option to buy the additional planes. This would be lot No. 3 of the aircraft buy. There is an option, but I do not question the fact—

Mr. FRASER. We are not under any legal obligation.

Mr. MAHON. Defense could cancel the contract, but I believe it would be most ill advised at this time.

Mr. RHODES. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FRASER. Yes. I am glad to yield to the gentleman.

Mr. RHODES. We are under a legal obligation in that if we cancel now we may be liable for cancellation charges which would have accrued through phase 3.

Mr. FRASER. Let me make clear my understanding. When the contract was entered into there were funds on hand to pay for the contract obligation which was incurred. What we are now doing, according to the chairman, is picking up an option to purchase 26 additional planes. We do not have to pick up that option. It is not the same thing as canceling a legal obligation already in force, as I understand it.

I do not want to prolong this point, but it seems difficult to imagine what scenario is in the minds of those who are planning at the Pentagon for a combat battle between aircraft flown off of our carriers and aircraft from some other country.

I do not know what scenario they have in mind. But I find it difficult to believe that we are in any imminent danger of the kind of air battle that would involve highly sophisticated foreign aircraft that would not move us very rapidly into a much higher level of warfare.

Mr. RHODES. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will yield further, of course the gentleman is correct in many ways. I have some doubt in visualizing an air battle between major fleets at the present time. However, this plane can operate in support of ground troops. Certainly, aerial superiority over the battlefield is very important and this airplane is designed to assure such air superiority.

Mr. BINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield to me?

Mr. FRASER. I would be glad to yield to the gentleman.

(Mr. BINGHAM asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BINGHAM. Is it not true that one of the problems in the design of this aircraft is that it is intended to cover so many roles, not only fleet defense but also as a missile-carrying aircraft which means additional weight and loss of maneuverability.

In the debate on the procurement of this aircraft last year, it was pointed out that a great many different operational responsibilities were being loaded on this aircraft and this was one of the reasons why it was considered controversial and

in some quarters in the Pentagon they thought that the fleet would be better off with a lighter, much cheaper and more maneuverable aircraft in carrying out a fleet defense role.

Mr. RHODES. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield further?

Mr. FRASER. I yield further to the gentleman from Arizona.

Mr. RHODES. Actually, the airplane is much lighter than the F-111B. The reason it failed was because of the reasons that the gentleman from New York stated. It was overloaded. It was an airplane which was not qualified to carry out all the missions which were laid out for it. It couldn't even take off from a carrier, fully loaded. However, this airplane, if it is to be used as a fleet defense system, can carry the Phoenix missile. In other modes, it can be used for other purposes.

Mr. BINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, I would like to comment that I fully concur in the sentiments which have been expressed by the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. FRASER), that this is not a desperately needed weapon at the present time. This is something the Navy feels it will need down the road somewhere. But I do not see how it can be justified as an emergency need.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from New York (Mr. BINGHAM).

The amendment was rejected.

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will read. The Clerk read as follows:

AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT, AIR FORCE

For construction, procurement, and modification of aircraft and equipment, including armor and armament, specialized ground handling equipment, and training devices, spare parts, and accessories therefor; specialized equipment; expansion of public and private plants, Government-owned equipment and installation thereof in such plants, erection of structures, and acquisition of land without regard to section 9774 of title 10, United States Code, for the foregoing purposes, and such land, and interests therein, may be acquired and construction prosecuted thereon prior to the approval of title by the Attorney General as required by section 355, Revised Statutes, as amended; reserve plant and equipment layaway; and other expenses necessary for the foregoing purposes, including rents and transportation of things; \$3,203,000,000, to remain available for obligation until June 30, 1973.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. YATES

Mr. YATES. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. YATES: On page 18, line 9, strike out "\$3,203,000,000" and insert "\$3,003,000,000."

(Mr. YATES asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. YATES. Mr. Chairman, this amendment strikes out \$200 million which the committee has gratuitously made available for the Lockheed Corporation in order to obtain delivery at someplace down the road of 81 C-5A aircraft.

I thought the House ought to take a look at this tragedy of errors which is known as the C-5A program.

The committee takes the position that

we must have 81 C-5A planes for airlift purposes, no matter what it costs.

We have already paid the Lockheed Corp. under the original contract. There is appropriated under this contract which my amendment will not touch the sum of \$344.4 million. This is for the accelerated costs of extras and various kinds of additions to the contract to which the company was not originally entitled, but which it has been given through its negotiations with the Pentagon.

Lockheed, however, has represented to the Department that it cannot deliver the planes unless it received additional money, and so the committee has gone along with a program under which there will be given to the Lockheed Corporation an additional \$200 million this year, and another \$200 million next year in the hope that this will bring delivery of the 81 planes. We have no assurances that even this extra \$400 million will achieve delivery of the planes. If the past be any precedent, the \$400 million will be followed by additional requests.

How much must we pay for the C-5A? Is there no limit to the purchase price? One gets the impression from reading the report, which appears on page 80, that the committee would have been willing to advance any sum of money to obtain the 81 planes from Lockheed, that the C-5A is so vital to national security it will pay any price.

The Pentagon says that in the event the money is not made available to Lockheed the corporation will be forced to go into bankruptcy. That was the same argument that was made with respect to the Penn Central when the amount of \$200 million was requested in order to keep that corporation from going into receivership. Yet today, Mr. Chairman, the Penn Central is still continuing to operate, perhaps better under its receivers than before.

As was stated in the hearings, perhaps it would be the best thing for the corporation and for the Air Force if there were a receivership of this corporation. The Government might get the plane at a better price. As it stands now, this Government proposes to make a gratuitous donation of \$400 million extra above the \$344 million to the Lockheed Corp. in order that that company should keep going, and I do not think it ought to be done. That is the purpose of my amendment to strike the \$200 million from the appropriation. I urge support of my amendment.

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.

Mr. DAVIS of Georgia. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MAHON. I yield to the gentleman from Georgia.

(Mr. DAVIS of Georgia asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. DAVIS of Georgia. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the members of the Appropriations Committee for having given a great amount indeed of its time and thought to the question of providing \$200 million as a reserve or contingency fund to assure continuous production of C-5A aircraft pending resolution

of the differences between the Lockheed Aircraft Corp. and the Air Force.

I particularly want to emphasize the word "assure" and I want my colleagues to know that in my considered judgment, the word is accurate and the correctness of the amount needed is as well validated as men of integrity and experience can make it be.

It is a fact that the record of the Lockheed-Georgia aircraft factory as to meeting its production schedules, producing quality aircraft that fulfill Air Force specifications and staying within contract costs is better than any major company engaged in building aircraft for the Government.

There are too many people who blandly assume that the only problem involved in building larger and larger aircraft is simply to make a small aircraft longer and higher and wider. Nothing could be more fallacious and those who are victimized by such an assumption have unwittingly jeopardized the security of our country in the area of airlift.

The C-5A represents a whole new concept in airlift. Many, many systems and systems-components had to be invented and developed in the course of the building of this, the largest aircraft by far that mankind has ever made. This is not a case of building an aircraft which has been developed as a shelf item. In the instance of the C-5A there was no testing and no opportunity to test. There was no prototype. There was no shadow of acquired knowledge on the total cost of the bringing into being of such a behemoth.

True there was a cost overrun, but it is equally true that there has been a comparable cost overrun in the construction of the Interstate Highway System, an undertaking which lies well within the skills possessed by our highway builders for many decades and on which the cost should have been quite susceptible to accurate estimation in advance.

The gentleman from Illinois wonders how we know that \$200 million is the right amount. I would say to the gentleman that we know it is right because the Lockheed folks say it is and no one can come forward to show that it is not. Not from the Air Force nor from anywhere else.

I would be the first to say that the action we take today needs to be in the best interest of the Air Force which is to say of the Nation—it needs to be fair to the American taxpayer which is again to say fair to the Nation—and it also needs to be fair to Lockheed where many, many thousands of my constituents work and where a reputation for integrity, fair play, and excellence of workmanship was not earned without long years of deserving work. Therefore, Mr. Chairman, I earnestly urge this committee to defeat the amendment.

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, page 80 of the report outlines this situation very well. If we want this aircraft in our inventory, we have to provide the additional funds. In the authorization bill from the Committee on Armed Services certain provisions are laid down in the law which relate to this matter, and restrict the ways in which the \$200 million

can be used. It can only be used through strict policing of the Department of Defense by the Congress.

The Department of Defense has convinced the committee that we have no alternative under the circumstances. And I am sure it must have been disturbing to the people in the Department of Defense to ask for this money, to place these funds in the budget; but there appears to be no other alternative if we are to have these 81 aircraft, on which we have spent so much, and which are so vital and essential to our military airlift requirements.

Mr. YATES. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will yield, is it not the truth that to date we have spent over \$2 billion for three aircraft?

Mr. MAHON. As of the time of our hearings in April 1970, 13 were flying, eight had been delivered, but only three had been accepted by the Government, and the other five had been accepted conditionally by the Air Force. If we cancel this program now and bankrupt the company, we will get only a relatively few aircraft for that money. If we proceed with this program, we will get the 81 airplanes which will be, of course, of great benefit to the country.

Mr. YATES. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield further?

Mr. MAHON. Yes; I am glad to yield further to the gentleman.

Mr. YATES. Mr. Chairman, I would say to the gentleman that his argument amounts to this, that even if the \$400 million is not adequate, the committee will then come forward with whatever appropriation is necessary to build the aircraft; is that so?

Mr. MAHON. No; the solution to this problem has not been resolved, as I understand it, between the Department of Defense and the Lockheed Corp.

There are negotiations that will be required. This seems to be the only sensible step that we can take at this time. I might point out that Lockheed has apparently overextended its financial position and there appears to have been a lot of bad judgment in this program. There is no doubt about that. But I am not going to undertake to fix the blame for the mistakes that have been made.

Lockheed is in the business of producing the Poseidon missile, building destroyer escort ships, the S-3A aircraft, and working on numerous other highly important defense programs. I hope that we can rely upon the assurance of the Defense Department that this situation will not be allowed to rise again in the future. As you know this contract and this project has been in operation for quite a number of years. This is the best that can be done about this situation at this moment. Maybe, if we look backward, we can see ways that the Defense Department could have done a better job.

Mr. YATES. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MAHON. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. YATES. However, the basic appropriation was in excess of the contract cost.

Now it is proposed to add another \$400 million because the department is trying to negotiate some sort of settlement that

may not be adequate. This goes on and on.

Mr. MAHON. If the gentleman would permit me to point out, Lockheed takes the position that the Government had ordered 120 planes and was so obligated under the contract.

This is a controversial question between the Government and Lockheed as to how this matter can be resolved.

In view of the reduction already made in the number of planes to be delivered, and in view of the dispute that has arisen, these additional funding requirements have arisen.

I am not undertaking to pass on the merits of the decision which has to be made by the Department of Defense. But this was the appropriation request that was presented to Congress. We had to approve this conditionally if we expect to get any substantial return for the funds spent on this program.

I would hope that additional funds beyond those which have been requested will not be required.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. YATES).

The question was taken; and on a division (demanded by Mr. YATES) there were—ayes 11, noes 44.

So the amendment was rejected.

AMENDMENTS OFFERED BY MR. MINSHALL

Mr. MINSHALL. Mr. Chairman, I offer two amendments.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendments offered by Mr. MINSHALL: On page 18, in line 9 strike out "\$3,203,000,000" and insert in lieu thereof "\$2,719,500,000"; and

On page 21, in line 1 strike out "\$2,701,100,000" and insert in lieu thereof "\$2,636,600,000".

Mr. HALL. Mr. Chairman, I make the point of order that a quorum is not present.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will count.

Eighty-six Members are present, not a quorum. The Clerk will call the roll.

The Clerk called the roll, and the following Members failed to answer to their names:

Abbitt	Corbett	Harvey
Adair	Cowger	Hays
Alexander	Cramer	Hébert
Anderson, Tenn.	Daddario	Holifield
Ashbrook	Dawson	Hosmer
Aspinall	Derwinski	Hungate
Baring	Diggs	Jonas
Barrett	Dingell	Karsh
Beall, Md.	Dorn	Keith
Belcher	Dowdy	Kastenmeier
Berry	Dwyer	King
Betts	Edwards, Calif.	Kleppe
Biaggi	Edwards, La.	Kuykendall
Blackburn	Eilberg	Landrum
Blanton	Esch	Long, La.
Brock	Evins, Tenn.	Lowenstein
Brooks	Fallon	Lujan
Broyhill, Va.	Farbstein	Lukens
Buchanan	Feighan	McClary
Burleson, Mo.	Fisher	McCulloch
Burton, Utah	Flynt	McMillan
Bush	Ford, Gerald R.	MacGregor
Button	Foreman	Mailliard
Cabell	Fulton, Tenn.	Meskill
Clancy	Gilbert	Mills
Clark	Griffiths	Morse
Clausen,	Hagan	Nedzi
Don H.	Haley	Nix
Clawson, Del.	Halpern	O'Konski
Clay	Hammer-	Olsen
Cohelan	schmidt	O'Neal, Ga.
	Harsha	

[Roll No. 336]

Ottenger	Rosenthal	Stuckey
Fatman	Rostenkowski	Talcott
Finkle	Roudebush	Thompson, N.J.
Pollock	Rousselot	Tunney
Powell	Ruppe	Watson
Price, Tex.	Ruth	Weicker
Purcell	Satterfield	Whitten
Quillen	Scheuer	Widnall
Reid, N.Y.	Shipley	Wilson, Bob
Reifel	Snyder	Wold
Rogers, Colo.	Stephens	
Rooney, N.Y.	Stratton	

Accordingly the Committee rose; and the Speaker having resumed the chair, Mr. PRICE of Illinois, Chairman pro tempore of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that that Committee, having had under consideration the bill H.R. 19590, and finding itself without a quorum, he had directed the roll to be called, when 302 Members responded to their names, a quorum, and he submitted herewith the names of the absentees to be spread upon the Journal.

The Committee resumed its sitting.

The CHAIRMAN. When the Committee rose, the Clerk had read through line 10 on page 18, and the Clerk had read the amendments offered by the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. MINSHALL).

Mr. MINSHALL. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that my amendments be considered en bloc.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Ohio?

There was no objection.

Mr. MINSHALL. Mr. Chairman, I have offered an amendment which in very simple terms takes out \$548 million for the F-111A program.

I want to point out that I am no newcomer or Johnny-come-lately in my opposition to the F-111A program.

I have here on the desk in front of me a file that goes back to 1962. It starts first with the F-111B program, which I opposed, and which, if I may quote from a speech I made on the very floor of this House. I first appeared in the well here in 1960 in opposition to what many of you remember as the Bomarc program.

That program was in the amount of some \$347 million. At that time my amendment failed.

A short time later the Bomarc program was subsequently voluntarily curtailed by the Air Force. But before it did, it vanished into limbo, with nearly \$3 billion of your tax dollars.

Again on June 13, 1967, when I quoted that statement, I spoke out against the F-111B program which is the Navy version of the F-111 program. At that time, I said, "In all candor, I feel that this will be the fate of the F-111B program," and I referred back, of course, to the Bomarc. Just 13 months later the Navy voluntarily abandoned that program after wasting billions on it.

Today we come up with the F-111A program, to the tune of \$548 million of your tax dollars, \$483 million of it for aircraft procurement, and \$64.5 million for R.D.T. & E. This is turning out to be the biggest billion-dollar boondoggle in this Nation's history. What started out to be an aircraft estimated to cost only \$2.6 million, it is now costing, according to the very latest estimates—these are all facts and figures right here in the RECORD—it will cost the taxpayers nearly \$14

million per aircraft. This is utter nonsense and I think we should give up on this program and scrub it before we go any farther down the road.

In the committee they said, "This is a buyout. This will be the end. It is only for 25 more aircraft. In addition there is \$200 million in contract adjustments to the manufacturer."

I say to you it is not a buyout. I think it is a sellout of the American taxpayers to go ahead with this ridiculous program. Sixteen of these planes have crashed. The last one crashed, unfortunately, killing two men, only last night at 9:30 near Fort Worth, Tex. I know my friends on the other side of the aisle will say this aircraft has a good safety record compared to other test and evaluation programs. But this is the only program in which structural failure has been accounted for in 14 of these crashes. Two of the aircraft were never found that were lost over Vietnam, but in every case out of the 14 able to be investigated, the crash has been caused by structural failure and not by pilot error or any other cause.

I would like to read to the committee, rather than going through page after page of the testimony that we have, the salient remarks or the essence of the remarks I made when we had these hearings last June. At that time we had General Ferguson, the head of the Air Force R.D.T. & E. program before us. I said:

I don't want to belabor the F-111 problem any further this morning, but for anyone who thinks that this committee has not inquired into the subject in detail, in previous years, all I ask them to do is refer to the past research and development hearings of the Navy and the Air Force and the hearings with the Secretary of Defense for the past several years. You will find we have inquired into the F-111 program very carefully and in much depth. Each time we have been given a lot of "sugar-coated pills" about how wonderful the program is going, and yet they come back and hang a "carrot" in front of our noses and say, "Give us a little more and everything will be all right." This has been going on too long as far as I am concerned. I have had it up to my eyeballs and I am sure the public feels the same way about spending this amount of money on things like this. It concerns me very much to have people come up here and say, "This will be all right. Just give us another chance." This is the history of the F-111 program.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Ohio has expired.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. MINSHALL was allowed to proceed for 5 additional minutes.)

Mr. MINSHALL. This is the history of a plane, 16 of which have crashed, one as recently as last night.

If I may for a moment, for the uninitiated, just give you some of the salient facts about this construction program. I gave you the cost figures. Let us look into the specifications that were originally made, and I refer now to a staff report which was completed 2 years ago.

On page 7 of the report, dated February 1968, they said:

As denoted in the chart above, the F-111 aircraft has not met Specific Operational Requirements or contract specifications in several categories. The most significant degradations have occurred in areas of accelera-

tion capability, ferry range, combat ceiling, and the low-low-high nuclear mission of the Air Force.

The report also goes on to say:

From the above chart it is evident that the F-111A will not perform the Air Force mission for which it was designed, which is a low-low-high nuclear mission, with a total range of 1,600 nautical miles.

It goes along and describes in detail the shortcomings that this bird has had in its actual performance as compared to the contractual specifications that were given to the manufacturer. I could carry on and on and describe the shortcomings of this aircraft. In closing I think we have gone far enough down the road with what I consider to be the worst billion-dollar boondoggle in the history of our Defense Department. I emphasize this is another one of the numerous programs that Secretary Laird and his administration inherited from Secretary McNamara and the Johnson administration.

Mr. TEAGUE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MINSHALL. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. TEAGUE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I have just recently spent 24 hours with the commanding general of our Strategic Air Command in Omaha, Nebr. In the presence of a number of people the general praised this plane and said it was a great plane, and said the Air Force needed it and wanted it, and he said they had no plane to take its place before the B-1 was completed.

The gentleman has quoted himself quite a bit in this debate, but how do we know if we cannot trust the commanding general of the Strategic Air Command? Did the gentleman's committee have the general before the committee? He is the one who manages the flying of this plane.

Mr. MINSHALL. We have had generals and program managers before our committee in countless numbers. We have gone into the F-111A program in every detail.

As long as the gentleman has brought this up, I must admit the fellows who fly it say it is a nice handling plane when it stays in the air, but the trouble is the wings pull off and the skin peels off and they are still not flying at contract specifications. This is one thing I got from the Air Force a few minutes ago. I asked them if there were any restrictions on this bird. They said until they complete the structural integrity program they have an 80-percent flight load restriction on this aircraft today. Only some 80 are flying and over 400 are grounded.

Let me go a little further. Another F-111 incident:

General Dynamics and the Air Force reported today—

That was about 3 months ago—that a team of experts is currently investigating two incidents in which the leading edge of the horizontal tail surface of two F-111E's was damaged in flight while both aircraft were undergoing acceptance flight testing by Air Force crews.

Mr. TEAGUE of Texas. Has the gentleman compared this with any other plane?

Mr. MINSHALL. I certainly have, and it has the worst history of structural failure of any plane this country has tried to develop.

Mr. TEAGUE of Texas. Has the gentleman gone into this in any detail?

Mr. MINSHALL. We have gone into this in great detail, as we do on all military programs.

Mr. TEAGUE of Texas. If this is so, how does the gentleman account for the fact that the pilots are for it and want it?

Mr. MINSHALL. I just told the gentleman that those who fly it like it when it flies, and while it stays in the air, but unfortunately it has crashed because of structural deficiencies.

Mr. TEAGUE of Texas. I will take their point of view as against the gentleman's any time.

Mr. MINSHALL. It is a structurally bad airplane.

Mr. WRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, the distinguished gentleman from Ohio (Mr. MINSHALL) has offered an amendment which would completely eliminate all the moneys for the F-111 aircraft. The gentleman is correct in pointing out that he has been an opponent of this program from its inception.

It was born in stormy criticism. It has had a record of controversy, particularly in the other body.

But the people who ought to know, the Armed Services Committee of the House, which extensively investigated it this year, insisted on this floor only a few days ago that it is the best aircraft we have in our defense arsenal, that it is needed, and that we need to procure F-111's not only for this fiscal year but additional numbers in the years immediately ahead.

The people who fly it insist it is the best plane they have ever flown, and they need it.

Members of this House, including the gentleman from California (Mr. PETERS) the gentleman from Texas (Mr. PRICE) and numerous gentlemen on my side of the aisle, including the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee (Mr. RIVERS) have talked personally with pilots who fly it and with commanders who command it, and they are enthusiastic about the airplane.

Let us address ourselves to this question of safety. I have the figures here.

The gentleman from Ohio suggests that one of the reasons which motivates him to offer this amendment today is because there has been an accident. There has been an accident. It is the sixth fatal accident out of 285 airplanes that have been flown in the F-111 series. The sixth.

We lament each of them. Nobody gloats over an accident.

But, my friends, have we ever eliminated an entire program that the military says it needs simply because there has been an accident?

If we had adopted that policy, we would have no military aircraft. All of them have had accidents, tragic as that fact is.

Other aircraft of recent development have had more accidents, and more fatalities, than the F-111.

Mr. MINSHALL. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WRIGHT. Only if the gentleman will agree to let me get some more time after I complete my statement.

Mr. MINSHALL. I will do my best to do so.

Mr. WRIGHT. Then I will yield at this time.

Mr. MINSHALL. I do not believe the gentleman means to say six fatal accidents.

Mr. WRIGHT. I am saying that there were six aircraft accidents which resulted in fatalities.

Mr. MINSHALL. Yes; but they have lost 16 "birds".

Mr. WRIGHT. That is correct. There is no argument about that.

Let us compare that with the record of every other aircraft in the century series. Let us compare that number of accidents with the number of accidents for every new aircraft we have built since the early 1950's, including the F-100 and since, at the equivalent number of hours flown.

I have here the figures for the same number of hours of actual flight, almost 60,000, which in the F-111 have produced according to the gentleman from Ohio 16 accidents, six of them fatal.

For the F-106 it is 22 accidents for the same number of flight hours which the F-111 now has logged.

For the F-105 it is 34.

For the F-102 it is 40.

For the F-104 it is 51.

For the F-100 it is 59, more than three times as many as for the F-111.

The difference is that each one of these F-111 accidents has produced a headline story in the news media. The others went largely unnoticed in public print.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WRIGHT. Of course I yield to the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Armed Services.

Mr. RIVERS. In 1967 the greatest aircraft we have in our inventory, the F-4 had 44 structural failures. It is the greatest airplane on earth today. We cannot get an airplane without some problem. It would be a mistake to change this program. It would be suicidal. The F-111 is the only aircraft we have to meet certain operational requirements.

Mr. WRIGHT. I thank the distinguished chairman for that comment. He is eminently qualified as a judge. The Committee on Armed Services has looked into this question exhaustively this year, and unanimously issued a report recommending not only this procurement for this fiscal year but also continued procurement so that we could secure the minimum of four wings the Air Force says are minimally necessary and hopefully the six wings it desires. So the question at issue here is not merely the procurement for fiscal 1971 but the continuing, on going program beyond fiscal 1971.

Let us look at one or two other matters, not just safety, so far as the comparative record for aircraft in the century series is concerned. Let us not limit our consideration simply to accidents and fatalities, the measurement of safety. Let us

look at the really more significant question: Why do we need the F-111?

We need it because it is the only aircraft which is capable of low-level all-weather day-or-night interdiction. It is the only one we have.

The F-111 is an aircraft which will carry three times the bomb load for more than twice the distance as our next best tactical bomber.

It is the one aircraft which has been repeatedly mentioned by the Soviets, the only one they have mentioned, in the SALT talks. Obviously they are aware of its capability and concerned about its capability. It is being stationed in England now. Clearly the Russians are concerned about it.

I would call the attention of the distinguished gentleman from Ohio to the fact that only a few moments ago, addressing himself in opposition to the amendment relating to the ABM, he made the point that we need to be able to move from strength in the SALT talks. Why should we at this moment gratuitously give up the one aircraft about which the Soviets are obviously concerned? Why should we give that up if we want to move from strength?

This airplane has cost a lot of money. Let us make no bones about that. Of course it has. Every time we try to stretch the state of the art that much farther, for every new sophisticated aircraft, it will cost a lot of money—a lot of it. This will be true of the F-14. It will be true of the B-1. Each will cost more than the designers figured at the beginning. But the only way to get cost effectiveness from procurement of any new aircraft is to build enough of them to do the job.

The really big money in any new program is absorbed in the beginning, in the research and development phase. The F-111 is right now at the point where we can begin to capitalize on the original investment in lower unit costs. This is one reason why it is imperative not only that this year's procurement be approved, but that we continue procurement beyond the present fiscal year.

It is true that the F-111 has not met some of the most optimistic original hopes of its designers, but no aircraft has. The General Accounting Office report to which the gentleman from Ohio referred could be made on any aircraft with respect to what it will do compared with what its designers initially hoped that it would do.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. WRIGHT was allowed to proceed for 5 additional minutes.)

Mr. WRIGHT. Do you know that every aircraft would suffer by the same comparison? Every single one that we have ever developed would suffer by the same comparison. To compare what an aircraft will do ultimately with what its designer set out initially to do is like trying to compare any one of us mature mortals with the man his mother hoped he would be. I surely would not like to be judged by that kind of a yardstick. Could any man measure up?

It is true that this airplane, as pointed out in the GAO report, does not take off

in quite as short a runway as its design specifications called for. It takes 770 more feet for takeoff than its planners had hoped. But what the critics do not tell you is that the F-111 requires only one-half—and get this—only one-half the takeoff distance consumed by any other combat aircraft in our arsenal with a single exception of the F-4, and it requires less takeoff distance than the F-4. Compare it with like things, and you will see that it compares very well. Compare it with everything else that we have in our arsenal, and you will find that it is needed. The Air Force says it is needed. They want not only this year's procurement, but they want four wings as a minimum.

The landing distance, equally important with the takeoff distance, is not mentioned by the GAO report, but how about this: equally significant, the distance for landing is 19 percent better than the specifications called for. Now, if you want to nit-pick any design we have, and if you want to talk about accidents, well there have been so-called short falls in all of them and there have been accidents in all of them.

There is one military aircraft which a little more than 1 week, in a 9-day period—and I will not mention the aircraft by name, because I do not want to besmirch its reputation—had five major accidents in 9 days. Yet we did not hear anything about that because it did not get into the newspapers. And nobody tried to cancel the program.

Mr. MINSHALL. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WRIGHT. Of course I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. MINSHALL. If you will turn to page 753 of our hearings, part 5, in which we had the testimony of General Glasser, in that part of it on the point that the gentleman just mentioned, the landing distance, that is one of the spots where you are in error. The specifications were 2,250 feet for the landing distance. According to this, it is 2,500 feet.

Mr. WRIGHT. Will the gentleman compare that with any other existing military airplane?

Mr. MINSHALL. My point is—you said it was better than the specs.

Mr. WRIGHT. I understand that it is 19 percent better than the required specifications.

Mr. MINSHALL. No, it is not. It is actually over the specifications.

Mr. WRIGHT. Compare it with any other combat airplane that we have. Is there one that will land and take off in less distance?

Mr. MINSHALL. I was not comparing that, but you said that it was better than the specifications, and it is actually worse.

Mr. WRIGHT. The gentleman's figures and my figures are at variance, and I think that mine are accurate.

Mr. MINSHALL. These are Air Force figures not mine.

Mr. WRIGHT. Let us ask some Air Force generals. The gentleman from Ohio quotes General Glasser. General Glasser is for the F-111. Call General Thomas Power, former Air Force Chief of Staff, as a witness. General Power will

tell you that it is a very badly needed aircraft in our arsenal today. Let us call Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard, whose testimony was read into this RECORD only 10 days ago or so, who says that the F-111 will do everything that it was required to do with a reasonable life expectancy of one and one-half times the requirement.

Mr. McCORMACK. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WRIGHT. Of course I yield to the distinguished and beloved Speaker.

Mr. McCORMACK. I thank the distinguished gentleman from Texas for yielding.

I might say I remember when this matter was up before, the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, a great American, was discussing it with me, but also another great American discussed it with me, the distinguished gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. PHILBIN) who strongly supported this authorization. I want that fact to be noted.

Mr. WRIGHT. I am grateful to the distinguished Speaker for that statement.

Mr. WAGGONER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield to me?

Mr. WRIGHT. Of course I yield to my good friend from Louisiana.

Mr. WAGGONER. I think while we are talking about comparisons and costs, would it not be correct to say that in order to service this airplane with tankers, the C-135 tankers, we have to have a lot fewer than we do for one of the F-4 and, as is the case with the B-52's, and do we not save a lot of personnel with the F-111 as compared to all of our other planes that are designed for the same mission?

Mr. WRIGHT. The gentleman is absolutely correct. When we talk about the cost of operation, let us talk about the cost of maintaining and operating. Let us think about that. Four F-111's on a 1,000-mile trip, without refueling, can deliver bombs on an enemy target, in a specific number which is classified.

But in order to deliver that same number of bombs that same distance on an enemy target without the F-111 would require a total of 31 separate aircraft, including tankers, radar scramblers and fighter escorts. Now the four F-111's required to perform that mission can be maintained and operated at a cost of \$5.2 million a year, but a year's maintenance and operation of the other aircraft necessary to perform that same identical mission is \$37.8 million a year, or seven times as much when you consider the number of aircraft involved to maintain and operate.

I should simply like to say one additional thing, and that is with respect to cost. The F-111 has cost a lot of money. Every new aircraft has cost a lot of money and every other new aircraft that we bring into production is going to cost a lot of money because of the new metals involved, the developmental costs and the installation of new and sophisticated techniques. The only way to get our money's worth is by building the full four operational wings, and I hope the vote against this amendment will be a ringing affirmative on the part of the House that we want this program to

continue through this fiscal year and beyond.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Texas has expired.

Mr. SIKES. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

(Mr. SIKES asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. SIKES. Mr. Chairman, I would like to call the attention of the House to some of the fiscal considerations that are involved. This bill contains \$283 million for 24 F-111F aircraft and another \$102.5 million for the cost of testing and improving the wing structure.

This latter sum is a contractual commitment which cannot be avoided by termination. The actual cost of terminating this contract—and I want you to hear this—is estimated to be \$80 million to \$100 million, and you get absolutely nothing to fill out that F-111 wing. For an equivalent amount to that \$80 million to \$100 million which is the estimated termination cost and for other unavoidable costs connected with termination, the Air Force would secure 24 additional new modern aircraft which they need very much.

Mr. Chairman, to kill the program now would cost our country much more in defense capability than the savings could possibly justify. The F-111 has been a hard-luck aircraft in that every accident it has had has made the headlines. Yet, and this has been said time and time again, the accident rate is comparatively low. It is lower than for most modern aircraft.

It is a costly aircraft, but so would any other advanced modern aircraft be costly today. This is a very advanced and very intricate aircraft and it does cost a lot of money. But it is the only modern aircraft we have in inventory. The F-4 is 10 years old. It is a great airplane, but it has been modernized in just about every way that we can possibly hope to modernize it.

In the period since we last developed a new aircraft, the Russians have developed two or three very good ones. Please remember, modernization is one of our serious shortcomings.

Mr. Chairman, the Air Force needs this aircraft. We cannot develop another aircraft for several years. The F-14 is moving along very satisfactorily, but procurement is just getting underway.

The F-15 is still under development and it will be years before that one is ready for operation.

Mr. Chairman, the men who fly the F-111 say they are satisfied with it. They call it a very good aircraft. That is the test. They know what the aircraft will do. They know it is the only modern aircraft we have. We now have a new advanced functional aircraft. To kill the program now would be costly, it would be unwise, it would be sacrificing the money and effort that has gone into it through all the years.

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SIKES. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. MAHON. I would like to say for the benefit of the Members of the House

who have not lived as closely to this problem as some of us have, it is true that the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. MINSHALL) has long opposed the F-111. It is true that this aircraft has had a bad press, but it has a good safety record.

The design and manufacture of this aircraft stretched the state of the art; it was a big leap forward. It will be a valuable plane in our inventory for a decade or more. The plane is not manufactured in my district, far from there, but it is made in my State.

I want to say that the remarks made by the gentleman from Texas (Mr. WRIGHT), insofar as I know are corroborated generally speaking by the people who have appeared before us. As far as I know the members of the Committee on Appropriations generally are in favor of the F-111. Defense has problems with most of its programs, but I do not know of any ground swell of opposition to the F-111. I think we can go ahead and vote on the issue, because I believe we have all made up our minds, and I do not believe that we should force the Department of Defense to cancel the program at this time.

Mr. Chairman, I oppose the amendment.

Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the procurement of this aircraft, and I join in the remarks of the gentleman from Texas. I do not believe this is necessarily just a Texas airplane. I think you have to keep in mind that when we decided to contract for this plane we were contracting for a vehicle far beyond the current state of the art, of supersonic high and supersonic low speed, and with a tremendous bomb carrying capacity.

I do not believe we have brought out the fact that it is 42 percent better in navigation than the Government asked for in the contract which inures to the use of the vehicle. It is 33 percent more available, as far as utilization, and it is 8 percent more reliable than the Government asked for. It meets the criteria for maximum speed at sea level, maintenance hours, it meets the maximum sustained speed at altitude, and it has the 800-mile primary mission radius that was required.

When you weigh those factors, I think that the Air Force is correct in making the determination that they have a good aircraft. I would certainly hope that we build these planes, and add them to our inventory.

Mr. ANDREWS of Alabama. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. LEGGETT. I yield to the gentleman from Alabama.

Mr. ANDREWS of Alabama. I would ask the gentleman if it is not true that this is the only aircraft we have to follow on with the B-52, and the newest, the latest B-52's came off the line in October 1962, and the age life of a bomber is 10 years, so the B-52's have about had it, and we cannot possibly have any other before the B-1, and during that time we could well wind up with no aircraft.

Mr. LEGGETT. The gentleman is correct.

(Mr. MILLER of California asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record.)

Mr. MILLER of California. Mr. Chairman, earlier the gentleman from Ohio announced that he would submit an amendment to deny all funds designated to procure additional F-111 aircraft. Initially, and somewhat emotionally, since last night's accident this amendment may appear to be a wise one. However, under closer scrutiny I do not believe that to accept this amendment would be a wise decision. As in the development of every new fighter aircraft, the F-111 has had its share of development problems and as our colleague, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. WRIGHT), mentioned earlier today, the F-111 fares better in this category than other modern fighter aircraft. Thus, we should not let the emotion of last night's tragedy blind us to the very real capabilities and potentials this aircraft possesses.

The F-111 has evolved as an attack aircraft with speed and maneuver capability well beyond Mach 2, with adequate ferry range to deploy to Europe without refueling, equipped with advanced penetration aids that will substantially enhance survivability in a hostile environment. The F-111 penetrates hostile areas by hugging the terrain during night or zero visibility weather conditions. As a comparison with other U.S. Air Force and Navy fighter-bomber aircraft, an F-111 will carry three times the payload about twice as far and deliver weapons around the clock with greater accuracy.

This deep penetration weapons delivery capability I have just described will fulfill an urgent Department of Defense need for a long-range all-weather interdiction aircraft. This is by far the most prevalent role of tactical aviation. Historically, the combat sortie distribution for tactical aircraft indicates that the majority are against interdiction targets. These are strikes against airfield, surface-to-air missile sites, and aircraft-missile control and warning sites wherein the low-level delivery capabilities of the F-111 may be exploited. More importantly, these strikes must be made while avoiding enemy air defenses.

As a strategic bomber, the FB-111 displays even more virtues than the F-111 in an interdiction role. The FB-111 has additional navigation features and a later and more accurate navigation-bombing system. It exploits the other deep penetration features of the F-111 and can escape at high speed. It is the only supersonic bomber we have today or will have for many years to come.

We hear much about the F-111 accidents and cost growth, but little about the impressive performance characteristics of this aircraft. How does it compare on a day-to-day basis with similar aircraft? Let me give you some statistics.

Last year the 474th Tactical Fighter Wing at Nellis Air Force Base, Nev., flew 26,515 hours for an average utilization rate of 36 hours per month. Their average operationally ready rate was 75 percent. Is this good? Yes, it certainly is—comparable to the Air Force's most tactical fighters.

Again, much has been said about the

dramatic cost growth which the F-111 has experienced. The critics have given little credit to the true reasons for this growth. Let me place this in, what I believe it to be, its proper context.

The initial procurement for the Air Force was 1,388 aircraft. This was subsequently reduced to 531 aircraft. That factor alone has accounted for almost half of the total of the increased cost per aircraft. To achieve increased operational effectiveness we have added an advanced avionics package at a cost of approximately \$1 million per airplane, but this has bought us the most effective avionics capability in the world. Another 25 percent of the growth can be attributed directly to inflation.

The \$16 million cost figure which has been publicized so highly in the recent past includes the support costs for these aircraft while they are in use by the Strategic and Tactical Air Forces through 1975. In other words, it is a figure far larger than the unit production cost of the aircraft which is the usual way to describe weapon system costs. Latest Air Force calculations on acquisition costs indicate a unit production figure of less than \$11 million.

The inherent penetration capability, range, and payload of the F-111, coupled with its great accuracies and kill capability, make it an extremely effective and efficient weapon system. Since the budgets we are now considering will affect our defense capability for years to come, this fact cannot be overlooked.

Thus, I urge my colleagues to join me in voting against Mr. MINSHALL's amendment.

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the necessary number of words. (Mr. GROSS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, what is the value of an inventory of F-111's if they are on the ground, and cannot be flown?

According to this morning's newspaper story they have been grounded since last year. Is that not correct? Except for test purposes?

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will yield, permit me to say there were some problems with the aircraft.

Mr. GROSS. I asked the question if they have not been grounded since last year?

Mr. MAHON. The answer is "No."

Mr. GROSS. Well, then the newspaper story is wrong that they are grounded?

Mr. MAHON. Some were grounded. They were given certain proof tests after which they were released. The planes used in the research and development test program were not grounded as long as were the others.

About 80 have been now released for flight. While we have funded about 500, only 230 had been delivered through fiscal year 1970. These aircraft have had the most rigorous tests of any other aircraft in history.

Mr. GROSS. Then the newspaper report is inaccurate? They are not grounded; is that correct?

Mr. MAHON. That report is not entirely correct. Some are flying, others are grounded.

Mr. GROSS. How many of them are flying?

Mr. MAHON. About 80 are now flying. The others are being proof tested, and undoubtedly they will be flying too.

Mr. GROSS. How many others, and what kind of security and defense can they contribute to this country if any appreciable number of these so-called planes are grounded as of today.

Mr. MINSHALL. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GROSS. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. MINSHALL. The gentleman in the well is absolutely right. Some of these planes are grounded. There are 80 of them flying today, but are under restrictive weight limitations.

Eighty percent of the weight limitation is all that these 80 planes are allowed to carry.

Mr. GROSS. I am afflicted with at least a small-sized memory. I can remember when the deal for the F-111 was hatched in the Pentagon. The contract had to go to Texas and the General Dynamics Corp., irrespective of any other consideration, and at \$400 million more than Boeing offered to build these planes.

General Dynamics was to furnish a dual purpose supersonic plane that would serve both the Air Force and the Navy. The Navy got out of the deal long ago when it found General Dynamics could not live up to its contract and produce a serviceable aircraft.

My memory also tells me that last year or 2 years ago the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. RIVERS), the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services said the authorization that year would be the last contribution to the F-111. I do not know where or when he got F-111 religion or how he transmitted it to the distinguished Speaker of the House, because he told us then on the floor of the House and for the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD that this plane was going to be washed out and he admitted to having made that previous statement when the authorization bill was before the House a few days ago.

Yes; I remember when this F-111 deal was hatched and some of the principal characters who participated in it. They included a former Fort Worth, Tex., banker who became Secretary of the Navy; Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatrick, and last but not least Secretary of Defense Robert Strange McNamara.

It was the former Comptroller General of the United States, Joseph Campbell, testifying under oath before the McClellan Committee investigating the award of the F-111 contract, who said that when his investigators sought to obtain vital information as to the specifications and related costs, they were told by McNamara that he was carrying the information in his head.

This is one of the reasons why we now have the nonflying Edsel, and I reiterate that the original contract was awarded to the Texas-based firm at a cost of \$400,000,000 above the cost figures submitted by Boeing.

Mr. MINSHALL. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GROSS. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. MINSHALL. Mr. Chairman, for the gentleman's information, from the best current figures we have available here at the desk, some 300 of these planes are presently grounded and not allowed to fly. The other 80 in inventory are restricted in their weight-carrying limitation.

Mr. GROSS. Now I yield to the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. RIVERS) if he wishes me to yield.

Mr. RIVERS. I told the gentleman plainly and simply, I had changed my mind.

Mr. GROSS. Yes.

Mr. RIVERS. Now just wait a second.

Mr. GROSS. I said you got religion of some sort.

Mr. RIVERS. And I have sense enough to admit when I get religion, too.

I went down to Texas on my own to talk to the young men flying this aircraft, and I sat in the cockpit. I checked them the best way I knew how with experts on the performance of this aircraft.

These planes were already built when I answered the gentleman. Today I have changed my mind. Originally, I did not like the way it was done, but the plane is now out of the woods. I defy anyone to contradict that statement.

Mr. GROSS. All right; I heard the gentleman, and, in view of what happened yesterday, I take issue with the gentleman. Let me say—

Mr. RIVERS. I will get the gentleman more time. You know we can get more time.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. GROSS) has expired.

Mr. RIVERS. Of course, if we have to get time, we can get plenty of time. People like to hear us talk anyway because you and I understand each other.

(By unanimous consent Mr. GROSS was allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)

Mr. RIVERS. Will the gentleman let me finish?

Mr. GROSS. Let me finish, please.

Mr. RIVERS. To finish what I started to say, this plane was the most tested aircraft in our defense and it cost more than it should have cost. But now it is out of the woods, so for heaven's sake, let us give it a chance. There is always the possibility of pilot errors causing accidents. But this is a sophisticated aircraft. I want to say to the gentleman from Iowa that he is as wrong as he can be on this aircraft.

Mr. GROSS. Let me say to the gentleman that there are two more test pilots from whom he will not get any information. They lost their lives yesterday in Texas test-flying one of these nonflying Edsels.

Much has been said this afternoon about the alleged low accident rate of this plane. It is impossible to have accidents when planes are grounded and cannot be flown except for test purposes.

Yes, we need a new plane for the security of the United States, but we do not need, nor should we depend upon a

plane that will not stay in the air. I hope the amendment is adopted.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The question is on the amendments offered by the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. MINSHALL).

The question was taken; and on a division (demanded by Mr. MINSHALL) there were—ayes 28, noes 89.

So the amendments were rejected.

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will read. The Clerk read as follows:

RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION, NAVY

For expenses necessary for basic and applied scientific research, development, test, and evaluation, including maintenance, rehabilitation, lease, and operation of facilities and equipment, as authorized by law; \$2,156,200,000, to remain available for obligation until June 30, 1972.

Mr. HICKS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. Hicks was allowed to proceed for an additional 5 minutes.)

(Mr. HICKS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HICKS. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if I might have the attention of the chairman of the committee.

This is a picture of what is known as a surface effects ship. Two of them were authorized by the Armed Services Committee. On page 93 of the report of the Appropriations Committee. Members will find they have determined in their wisdom that one is sufficient. One is being built in Louisiana and one is being built in my district in Tacoma, Wash. This is being built by Aerojet and the one in Louisiana is being built by Bell. They are of different specifications and are different type ships.

With that background I would like to address some questions to the chairman of the committee, Mr. MAHON, if he would be so kind as to respond.

Has the Appropriations Committee determined that a surface effects ship is not a practicable project to pursue, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. MAHON. I would say that I, for one, have not determined that this is not a practicable project to pursue. As I understand the situation, this ship, which would more or less propel itself on top of the water rather than cut through the water like most ships, was a joint project of the Maritime Administration and the Navy. There was a 50-50 program cost sharing arrangement. This year, the funding was to have been \$10 million by the Maritime Administration and \$10 million by the Navy. But the Maritime Administration withdrew its financial support this year and the Navy is now saddled with this whole burden. Since the Navy needs more attack submarines, and possibly additional Polaris-type submarines, as well as so many other ships, aircraft, and weapons of all kinds it did not seem fair for the Navy to be forced to assume the full financial burden for this development.

Mr. SIKES. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HICKS. I yield to the gentleman from Florida.

Mr. SIKES. Mr. Chairman, I favor the development of this ship, for I think it can provide a useful new development. We must have new concepts and this appears to be a promising one. Nevertheless, it is the belief of the committee that the Navy can use the \$10 million which is left in the budget to continue the effective development of one ship. This will be possible even though the Maritime Administration is no longer interested and has withdrawn its support. The construction of one ship should provide useful information.

The committee feels it is not necessary to have the two ships in order to determine its value.

Mr. HICKS. May I ask the gentleman, is he the one on the committee who is most familiar with this project?

Mr. SIKES. I doubt that I am. I know something about it.

Mr. HICKS. The gentleman was on the Appropriation Committee when the nuclear submarines were developed?

Mr. SIKES. Yes, that is correct.

Mr. HICKS. Is it not true that two were built, the *Sea Wolf* which contained a sodium-cooled reactor and the *Nautilus* with a water-cooled reactor, because they did not know which would be the better design?

Mr. SIKES. I think that is true, but nuclear submarines are a very different story than surface ships. The Navy and the Maritime Administration were working together to build two ships. Now the Maritime Administration has withdrawn its support. The committee does not feel it is necessary for the Navy to absorb an additional \$10 million for the second ship.

Again, I support the concept of the ship. It is a matter whether or not we should spend \$20 million, when we think we can learn a very considerable amount from the \$10 million which is proposed in the bill.

Mr. HICKS. May I ask either the chairman of the committee or the gentleman from Florida (Mr. SIKES) if this is the position the other body took in the military procurement bill. Is that correct?

Mr. MAHON. Exactly. The Senate Armed Services Committee and the Senate took the same action as that which we propose.

Mr. HICKS. The position that the Appropriations Committee is taking now is the exact position that the other body took. This is not the position that the Armed Services Committee took in the authorization bill. Is that correct?

Mr. MAHON. I believe that is correct.

Mr. HICKS. The House Armed Services Committee in the conference prevailed on the other body to recede and report the full \$20 million. Is that correct?

Mr. MAHON. In the conference report, yes; that is correct.

Mr. HICKS. But the Appropriations Committee in its wisdom has elected to go back to the other body's position. Is that correct?

Mr. MAHON. The committee supported only the \$10 million program for the Navy.

Mr. HICKS. May I ask this question. Is it not true that the full \$10 million, with the Navy operating under the con-

tinuing resolution, has been obligated already?

Mr. MAHON. It may have been obligated but it has not been expended.

Mr. HICKS. I understand; but it has been obligated.

Mr. MAHON. I believe so.

Mr. HICKS. Is it not true that this ship and the one built by Bell are both about 50 percent completed?

Mr. MAHON. I am not familiar with the accuracy of that statement. However, ships of this general type are not too unique, except that these two are of a larger size. As I understand it, there is a surface effect ship on scheduled commercial crossings of the English Channel.

Mr. HICKS. That is a hovercraft, Mr. Chairman. This is not the same.

Mr. MAHON. The gentleman is talking about a new ship which would provide a step forward in the state of the art. In many ways it is quite similar to other ships throughout the world.

Mr. HICKS. If the chairman please, I am on the Research and Development Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, and that is not our understanding. That was not the testimony presented.

Let me go further. If this \$10 million has been obligated, not expended but obligated, and if we will assume that this ship is 50 percent completed and the one in Louisiana is 50 percent completed, what would be the termination costs for each one of these contracts, if they decide not to go forward?

Mr. MAHON. I would think that the Maritime Administration, which agreed to the joint 50-50 program with the Navy, might very well work out some arrangement whereby it would continue this program if we stand firm. We just did not feel that the Navy ought to pick up the whole tab.

Some are saying that the Defense Department should not fund research which is not strictly for defense purposes. The committee felt that the \$10 million for the Navy, as had been planned originally, was sufficient under the circumstances for the Navy portion of this program.

Mr. HICKS. The difference in expenditure is the difference between \$20 million to finish it and \$10 million to leave it half finished. It is the committee's position that the money will be found from some place by some other agency if they restrict the Navy.

It is true, is it not, Mr. Chairman, that the Navy is pushing hard for both ships to be completed? Is that not correct?

Mr. MAHON. The Navy requested the funds, of course.

Mr. HICKS. Let me ask a further question. If in the rare possibility that the other body should decide to put \$10 million back in, making the total \$20 million, would the committee take another look at it with a view to permitting that?

Mr. MAHON. The committee would certainly take a careful look at it. If the other body felt some change should be made in the program, it would be very closely considered.

Mr. HICKS. Let me ask one last question.

On page 93 of the report it is stated that there is \$10 million from the budget and from the amount that the House had approved in an authorization bill for this particular item, is that not correct?

Mr. MAHON. The gentleman is correct. I hope I am making a good witness.

Mr. HICKS. The point is that I had intended to offer an amendment to put the \$10 million back in. Then I found out that such an amendment would be subject to a point of order, based purely on the statement of the chairman, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. MAHON), who confused the gentleman from New York (Mr. BINGHAM), with me, and the chairman started to make a point of order. He did not give me the courtesy of telling me that my amendment was subject to a point of order.

I should like an explanation, if the chairman cares to give one, as to how the committee can cut \$10 million and when one attempts to restore the cut, it is subject to a point of order. This is just for my own edification.

Mr. MAHON. I apologize to the gentleman. I was not at the desk, I believe, when the amendment of the gentleman was presented; it was some member of the staff.

I must say there is not an identical similarity between the distinguished gentleman and the gentleman from New York, but both are very handsome and attractive gentlemen.

Mr. HICKS. I appreciate the gentleman's comment.

Mr. MAHON. I did not have an opportunity to discuss the matter with the gentleman as to the point of order.

From actual experience, as a committee chairman, if one points out a defect in an amendment the Member generally goes back and drafts one that may possibly not be subject to a point of order.

Mr. HICKS. But not possible in this instance, Mr. Chairman, as I understand it.

Mr. MAHON. So one is required, if he is in charge of a bill, to try to see that the bill is passed. That is his responsibility, so long as he deals honestly and forthrightly with the Members.

Now, the reason why the amendment is not in order is that the Committee on Armed Services said that the S-3A, the antisubmarine aircraft, was not ready for production but should stay in research and development and that the funds should be transferred to the research and development account. However, they did not actually put the money in the research and development account. We put the money in research and development, where it was supposed to have been. That brought the amount of the appropriation to just under the authorization ceiling imposed by the gentleman's committee. So we are caught here by an authorization technicality.

Mr. HICKS. I thank the gentleman for his explanation, and I do hope that if the other body does happen to add the \$10 million, so that both surface effect ships can be continued that the committee will accept it in conference.

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will read. The Clerk read as follows:

TITLE VIII—GENERAL PROVISIONS

SEC. 801. No part of any appropriation contained in this Act shall be used for publicity or propaganda purposes not authorized by the Congress.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. BINGHAM

Mr. BINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. BINGHAM: On page 23, line 24, delete the period and insert in lieu thereof the following: ", and no more than \$15,000,000 of the funds appropriated by this Act shall be used for public affairs, public information, and public relations, including the personnel costs thereof."

Mr. BINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, last year I proposed an amendment to this appropriation bill which would limit the amount the armed services could spend for public information, public affairs, and public relations programs to \$10 million.

My amendment this year calls for a limitation of \$15 million, which is 50 percent more than I suggested last year and which represents about a 50-percent cut in the amount that the committee contemplates be spent for such purposes.

I would like to call the attention of the Members to page 24 of the committee report. At one time apparently the committee considered a limitation in the bill to about \$30 million for this purpose, but that was apparently changed and there is no fixed limitation in the bill today for these purposes.

What is really striking about this whole matter is the enormous rate of increase that has prevailed here. The increase for these purposes over the last 10 years is about tenfold for the DOD as a whole. If you will look at the top of page 24 of the committee's report, just in the last 3 years the increase for public information, public relations, and public affairs programs is from \$9 million to over \$34 million. It seems all out of proportion. We are trying to save the taxpayers' money and trying to provide for the national defense. Do we need to provide for elaborate public information and public relations programs?

Some of these funds have been used in the past for the purpose of trying to persuade the American people to go along with controversial weapons systems, but it is not my purpose here to try to attack this particular activity. Certainly, there would be room for that sort of activity under a ceiling of \$15 million.

Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that a ceiling of \$15 million for public affairs purposes is adequate and the Pentagon ought to be able to operate within it.

I think the Members would be interested to know why the committee decided not to impose even a ceiling of \$30,590,000, as apparently was the case, judging from an examination of the draft committee report.

Mr. Chairman, I hope the Members will support me in asking for a cut of approximately 50 percent in the elaborate and expensive public information and public relations programs of the armed services.

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.

(Mr. MAHON asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, the budget request for public affairs—and there is a place for public affairs in the sprawling Defense Department with its more than \$100 billion of available funds for expenditure for the security of the Nation—was \$37,663,000. The committee recommended an appropriation of \$30,590,000, a reduction of over \$7 million.

Under the continuing resolution the Defense Department has probably expended approximately \$10 million.

Under the amendment which has been offered by the gentleman from New York, there would perhaps only be \$5 million left for the remaining 9 months of the fiscal year.

So, it would seem to me that this would tend to unduly restrict and contain, if not destroy, the program.

It is true that the public needs to know what is being done in defense. This program can be used and is used in most instances in a very helpful way in order that the American people can understand what is being accomplished and undertaken in the Defense Department.

I would hope that the amendment would be defeated.

Mr. RHODES. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MAHON. I yield to the gentleman from Arizona.

Mr. RHODES. I am sure the chairman will agree with me that this activity in the last few months has been subjected to a very careful scrutiny by this subcommittee. We understand that as a result of that scrutiny, an accounting system to determine exactly how much is being spent for this activity is being installed and the correct figures will be known for fiscal year 1971.

I would hope that the gentleman from New York would trust the subcommittee to hold this activity down in future years. I agree it is an activity which is important but which can go awry if it is not subjected to rather close surveillance.

I feel that the subcommittee has put in a illumination which allows it to subject the activity to that surveillance and, therefore, I hope that the amendment which has been offered by the gentleman from New York will not be agreed to.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from New York (Mr. BINGHAM).

The amendment was rejected.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will read.

The Clerk read as follows:

SEC. 843. In line with the expressed intention of the President of the United States, none of the funds appropriated by this Act shall be used to finance the introduction of American ground combat troops into Laos or Thailand.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. BIESTER

Mr. BIESTER. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. BIESTER: on page 45, line 5, insert the following new section and renumber succeeding sections:

"Sec. 844. After June 1, 1971, no part of the funds appropriated in this Act shall be expended for the support of United States Armed Forces assigned to the United States European Command in excess of 270,000 members."

(Mr. BIESTER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BIESTER. Mr. Chairman, I have in conjunction with several other Members sent a "Dear Colleague" letter to the members of the committee with respect to this particular amendment. This amendment is offered in order to provide a limitation of the numbers of American Armed Forces stationed for the most part in Western Europe.

I need not remind the Members of the Committee that for over two decades the subject of the numbers of American forces stationed in Western Europe has been a subject which has vexed both the Congress and one administration after another. If I may do so I could refer back even to an article by former President Eisenhower appearing in the Saturday Evening Post magazine in 1963 which he indicated that it was essential that there be a reduction of American Armed Forces in Europe, and that he had indicated during his 8 years in office as President that the time when that should occur would be when the nations in Western Europe had recovered economically sufficiently to afford their own forces.

There is no question but that those countries have now recovered economically.

Western Europe has a gross national product collectively of over \$600 billion annually and, therefore, is one of the major economic powers in the world.

Yet, compared to the sacrifices that the American people make in the diversion of our resources and of our manpower, they divert a very small portion of their considerable gross national product to the defense of that sector of the world which they occupy.

For example, it is estimated that the American taxpayers and the American economy spend out of our gross national product approximately 8 percent for defense including the support of American forces in Western Europe.

While the countries in Western Europe are enjoying one of the greatest economic booms of all times, they spend about an average of 2.8 percent to 4.5 percent of their gross national product in the same effort.

If one wishes to analyze the tax rates paid by the taxpayers of those countries compared to the tax rates paid by the American taxpayers, one sees a similarly cheaper picture in terms of the defense commitment of many European taxpayers.

I realize the need for sustaining an interest on the part of the United States in the defense of Western Europe. I understand the need for the presence of American troops and American forces in Europe. But I also appreciate the need for the diminution in the numbers of those forces.

What we need in Western Europe and around the world are partners not clients.

What we need are allies and friends—and not dependents whom we patronize.

The American taxpayers and the American people are willing to share the burden of defense of Western Europe, but the American people will no longer carry that burden essentially alone.

We cannot forever divert our priorities away from the needs of the American people while those whom we protect decline to make the same kind of sacrifices at the same level of intensity.

Mr. Chairman, the amendment I have offered is a modest amendment. It reduces the number of forces between 30,000 and 50,000 men depending on the size of forces at the moment at which the amendment takes effect.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BIESTER. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I support the amendment to the Defense appropriations bill which would place a limit of 270,000 on the number of American troops in Western Europe. I believe, Mr. Chairman, that we should reassess our military commitment to NATO in a light vastly brighter than the shadow of cold war in the fifties: the light of an era of negotiation.

With the rebirth of Western Europe over the past two decades the relationship of the United States to its NATO allies should have undergone a fundamental change; it has not. We still maintain a 300,000-plus man force in the area—that is to say, our troop commitment has remained relatively stable for the past 20 years. At the same time, the basic political reasons for maintaining this force no longer seem valid.

Within the NATO alliance there has been major political growth: First, with the support of American financial aid Western Europe has recovered economically from the destruction of World War II. The Atlantic nations have established strong and stable governments founded on just this prosperity, so that American men in Europe no longer protect a fragile and disjointed wartime alliance, but a sound and united bloc of nations, capable of a greater role in their own defense.

Second, the magnitude of the American NATO force in the fifties was a demonstration to our European allies that we really were concerned with the threat of Communist aggression and that we would not again withdraw into the shell of our traditional isolationism. The proof has been given. I do not believe any European government need fear a total American withdrawal in the near future.

Third, as is still the case, most of our European-based troops were centered in West Germany. The reasons for this were at that time quite sound: a fear that Germany would rebuild militarily under a vengeful new government or the possibility that it could be overrun by a Communist assault. Under the protection of American forces West Germany has developed a strong economy—perhaps the strongest in Europe—and a stable, democratic government. There is little dan-

ger, I believe, of a complete German collapse—with or without all 210,000 American soldiers.

Just as there have been real changes within the countries of the NATO alliance, so there have been substantial changes in the relationship of the alliance with the Soviet bloc. And both encourage the reduction of American forces in Europe.

Militarily, Mr. Chairman, I doubt that there is at the present time much reason to fear a major Soviet assault on the Atlantic community. Certainly, there was in the fifties, when the West was weak and the American commitment unsure. A more plausible threat of massive retaliation by the West has since been developed with the installation of our broad nuclear umbrella around Europe. The Soviet Union will rely in the future on smaller, more localized actions against individual countries, making inroads all the time, but careful not to touch off a nuclear confrontation.

This new military situation will demand a more mobile and more flexible NATO force, but it will permit troop reductions as well. We know that there is only the most remote chance of a huge attack on the heart of Europe; we might bolster our forces in the Mediterranean area, where surely there is more danger of an explosion. But even here, the 6th Fleet seems sufficient.

On the diplomatic front we have seen a considerable easing of tensions between the NATO allies and Eastern Europe. Perhaps the most encouraging sign was the recent West German-Soviet Nonaggression Treaty; but our own SALT talks and the interest of the Warsaw Pact in discussions for mutual troop reductions have both contributed to the new atmosphere of reconciliation across the continent. The chances of talks with the Warsaw Pact nations would be, I might add, greatly improved if we were to announce a withdrawal of American troops.

My argument so far has been based on the assumption that our withdrawal would actually reduce the NATO troop level. I think that I have shown that this will not impair the strength of the Atlantic alliance. But there is no assurance that this has to happen: the European nations could and probably will increase their own military commitments. This would be in line, of course, with the President's call for our allies to take upon themselves a greater share of their own defense. It should at the same time enhance the spirit of unity and cooperation that now infuses all of Western Europe.

Mr. BIESTER. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. WIGGINS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BIESTER. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. WIGGINS. Mr. Chairman, I wish to commend the gentleman in the well for the position that he has taken on this matter, and I wish to associate myself with his remarks.

Mr. BIESTER. I thank the gentleman.

[Mr. GUDE addressed the Committee. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.]

Mr. RAILSBACK. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BIESTER. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. RAILSBACK. Mr. Chairman, I also want to join together with our colleague in commending the gentleman from Pennsylvania, and I hope the amendment he has offered is adopted.

Mr. BIESTER. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Chairman, I would close by simply saying that if you are concerned about the balance of payments and if you are concerned about the distortion of the priorities in this country and if you are concerned about the inequities in America carrying this tremendous defense load in all parts of the world, then join in support of this amendment to call upon the people of Western Europe to stand up in their own defense and that the burden is going to have to be more fairly shared.

Mr. SIKES. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.

(Mr. SIKES asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. SIKES. Mr. Chairman, I think most of us feel that we have been providing a disproportionate share of the costs and burdens of defense in Europe as well as in other parts of the world.

Nevertheless, we have made commitments, and we honor them. We help to uphold NATO which has been a very important factor for the preservation of peace in Europe.

I can state that efforts have been in progress to try to resolve the question of troop strength in Europe more favorably from our standpoint. I feel that some progress has been made and it is true that we have been able to bring some forces back. There also have been changes in the deployment programs to permit a lesser number of U.S. forces to be stationed in Europe. The President has made it very clear that he is earnestly seeking to reduce the number of American forces as rapidly as he can from all parts of the world.

I just do not think that this is a time when we should require that a cutback be made in the number of U.S. forces in Europe by law. I think it would be precipitous and unwise. It would be interpreted in a most unfavorable light to us in other parts of the world.

There are other reasons. I do not think we should rock the boat during the SALT talks. We should lead from strength rather than weakness during our negotiations with the Soviets while we seek reasonable arms limitations.

I would like to leave one more thought. There is a crisis in the Middle East. It is a very serious crisis. We do not plan to get involved. We know the American people do not want another war. We are not prepared, either mentally or militarily, for another war. But trouble may come that is not of our choosing. We could find ourselves forced into action in that part of the world, and if that time should come—and again, we do not plan it; we hope that it does not come—but if the time should come when we would find ourselves militarily involved, it would be Europe that would be used for the de-

ployment of American forces. A staging area would be necessary and Europe would provide a logical springboard. Regardless of this, the fact that our forces are there and that we are prepared for emergency should have a quieting effect on events in the Middle East.

Mr. Chairman, we would like to have our share of the costs reduced to a less disproportionate level, but from every standpoint I must hold that, to require by law that Americans be brought back at this time would be most unwise, and I ask for a vote against the amendment.

Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.

(Mr. FINDLEY asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. ROTH. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FINDLEY. I am glad to yield to the gentleman from Delaware.

(Mr. ROTH asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. ROTH. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in opposition to the amendment offered by my distinguished colleague and good friend, the gentleman from Pennsylvania.

I agree that there should be a substantial reduction of American troops in the very near future. However, I do not believe that a matter of such delicacy should be handled through an amendment to this bill.

I have long believed that a greater contribution in terms of manpower and money should be made by our NATO allies in Western Europe. However, at this critical point in time, when the President is seeking to negotiate peaceful solutions to the Near East and Indochina conflicts, I believe we must not, through legislative action of cutting off funds, give any impression of tying the President's hands by weakening our military capability. To me, it is not wise to require by law that a set number of American troops must be withdrawn by a fixed day when future events may require flexibility.

Western Europe is of critical importance to American security and we must maintain our NATO treaty commitments. Our basic contribution should be primarily sea and air power as well as providing a nuclear umbrella, but the Europeans should provide the land forces themselves.

Moving our troops out should be handled with great care. I oppose the imposition of a deadline because the withdrawal of ground troops could have an adverse effect in Europe. It is most important that the reduction of American forces be offset by additional troops of the western democracies. Unless handled properly, the opposite reaction could occur, the Europeans further decreasing their contribution.

I believe the proper course of action is for the Congress to pass a resolution recommending to the President that there should be a substantial reduction of U.S. troops in Europe but leaving to the President the flexibility to determine the rate and timing of these withdrawals. I would hope this expression of

congressional intent would help set the stage for mutual pullback of troops by Russia and ourselves and not hinder this prospect, as I fear would be the case under the present proposal.

As a member of the Subcommittee on Europe of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, I benefited from the hearings held between February 17 and April 9, 1970, on the subject of "United States Relations with Europe in the Decade of the Seventies." I urge the committee to recommend the policy I cited before of withdrawing a very substantial number of troops from Europe, but leaving the specifics of time and number to the discretion of the President.

It is my hope that no later than next year the United States can begin reducing its forces in Europe. I would hope that the number of troops to be withdrawn could be substantially in excess of 50,000, within the next 2 or 3 years. I believe that this policy should be executed to the maximum extent consistent with our security.

It is readily apparent that 25 years after the conclusion of World War II, the time has come for our NATO allies to assume a greater burden of the responsibility for maintaining a conventional warfare capability in their homelands.

Our NATO allies, especially the members of the Common Market, are enjoying vigorous, prosperous economies which could very well absorb higher levels of military expenditures.

In 1969 the United States spent 9.2 percent of our gross national product for defense while the 13 other NATO powers spent an average of 3.6 percent of their gross national products.

In 1969 the United States spent \$78.47 billion on defense while 13 of our NATO allies together spent a total of \$23.29 billion or an average of \$1.79 billion for each country.

We now have 310,000 troops in the U.S. European Command area costing at least \$2.9 billion annually. This is the price for maintaining military and civilian personnel in Western Europe and the operating cost of the 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean.

I would hope that the President would make it clear to our European allies what action we will take so that they can make plans to build up their troops. I also hope that this debate in the House today would help put on notice our European allies that they must assume a greater share of the burden.

I believe that the best interests of all nations concerned would be best served by this restructuring of the present arrangements so as to provide new vigor for the Atlantic alliance by increasing the strength of our NATO partners.

Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Chairman, in considering this amendment, proposing to reduce U.S. troops in Europe by 50,000 we must keep in mind several fundamental factors.

First, most of the major movements in NATO in the past decade have been setbacks. This amendment would be viewed as one more—and a major one.

This interpretation, I am sure, is not accepted by the author of the amend-

ment or by many of his supporters. No doubt they view the amendment as fully justified in military, as well as financial terms.

However, in the context in which it is now being considered the cutback will certainly be considered by many significant people worldwide as a major setback. It will be viewed as one more unhappy event in a rather persistent chain of melancholy events in NATO. At the same time it will be related by some to withdrawal patterns elsewhere—the British pullback from east of Suez, U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam—and to signs of isolationism here.

Let me mention some of the negative developments within the NATO community in recent years.

These include: withdrawal of France from the integrated command; reductions in forces by the United States, Canada, and Britain—partly offset by a recent brigade return; elimination—under NPT—of the NATO nuclear option; loss of naval and air advantages in the Mediterranean, with contrasting Soviet gains; disadvantage resulting from advance positioning of eight more Soviet divisions in Eastern Europe; commencement of the 1-year withdrawal stage under the basic alliance treaty. Positive developments include: NATO North Sea fleet coordination, consultation on SALT, NATO satellite, environmental discussions, additions to the U.S. 6th Fleet.

This amendment is a symptom of trouble ahead.

Domestic pressure for a major cutback in U.S. troops in Europe will increase, keep the administration on the defensive, and eventually prevail. Unless effected with great care, the cutback will enhance substantially Soviet influence throughout the continent. This amendment would not effect a cut with the needed care.

Making U.S. cuts likely are these factors: the general and growing demand for a lower U.S. military profile, a demand that will be intensified as our withdrawal from Vietnam proceeds; the requirements of fiscal and monetary policy; the knowledge that the most essential U.S. contribution to European defense is nuclear, not conventional arms; the belief that Europeans are not doing their share—U.S. NATO cost equals two-thirds of total defense outlay by other 14 nations.

The second prime fact I will cite is this: If U.S. troops are reduced, other nations will not pick up the slack.

Substantial increases in quantity of military forces from any quarter are unlikely. Quite the contrary. Quality improvements also will not be striking. Bleeding away of forces could quickly become a hemorrhage fatal to the integrated command.

For several reasons Germany will not increase substantially its own troops, nor is it apt to provide direct financing of U.S. troops.

Other allies either do not see a need for stronger military forces or feel an increase in their own conventional forces would have little real importance.

We should recognize, too, that divisive strains within the NATO community

over trade, monetary, and political matters will persist, if not intensify.

Protectionist sentiment is rising sharply on both sides of the Atlantic. Northern "Socialist" states are increasingly hostile to Greece. The Italian Government is unstable. Turkey is almost isolated between the explosive Middle East and Soviet seapower. The Common Market is taking on greater protectionist character. Britain is now divided over the wisdom of seeking entry.

Germany's insecurity shows no sign of abating.

Chancellor Brandt's own future depends on gains through "east-politics," but at best he can win only very limited objectives. Under no circumstance will Russia yield control over Eastern Europe, including East Germany. German reunification, at least in the foreseeable future, is unattainable. If West Germany senses that U.S. troops are on the way out, it may lose all confidence in the credibility of U.S. nuclear deterrence and seek accommodation to growing Soviet dominance of the entire continent. This could eventually yield a continent of "Finlands."

In mentioning these factors, I do not argue for the status quo. I believe U.S. troops in Europe can be reduced substantially and safely.

To be safe to our rational interest, as well as those of our allies, the reduction must occur in the proper context and setting. Today's deliberations hardly qualify.

When U.S. troops are reduced, the change must occur in a context which will show advance, not retreat.

This amendment simply cuts back on troops. It is stark and bare. This is true because of the restrictions under which amendments to appropriation bills can be considered.

If the U.S. troop cut were announced as a part of a broad long-term plan for NATO, a plan which would include substantial positive features as well as this negative one, a plan formulated within the councils of the alliance and announced as an alliance product—not unilaterally—then the cutback would not harm the cohesion and vitality of NATO. It would not be viewed as a setback.

In fact, I strongly support a troop cutback in such a context. I recently had the privilege of proposing such personally in a discussion with President Nixon. My proposal was that the heads of government of NATO negotiate a 5-year compact, binding—to the extent that the executive can do—member states to these items for the entire 5-year period; that is, minimum force levels, financial arrangements for expenses of common nature, and improvement of purely national character.

In my proposal I suggest the minimum U.S. troop level be two divisions.

Because of the long-term, joint sharing characteristics of the compact, the net effect would be advance for NATO, not retreat, even though U.S. troop cutback would be substantial—more than contemplated in this amendment.

The compact would deal with:

First. Minimum forces to be pledged to the NATO integrated command or other-

wise—as with France—kept available for treaty purposes.

For the United States this should include modernization of our nuclear commitment. As the minimum for U.S. troops, I suggest two divisions but recommend that three be maintained for at least 2 years.

France would, I think, agree to maintain forces at certain minimums even though outside the integrated command.

Second. Financial arrangements for meeting expenses of common nature.

The main objective would be to establish a 5-year moratorium on divisive wrangling over offset purchases, budget contributions, intramural debts.

The unpaid claim dating from the transfer of NATO military headquarters from France to Belgium hopefully could be settled in exchange for French agreement to specific national improvements and to long-term NATO use of French air space.

Third. Improvements in airfields, communications, port facilities, highways, railroads, distribution, and expeditionary force facilities.

These would serve civilian as well as military interests on both community-wide and national scales, and help to give the community a nonmilitary dimension of great appeal and value without subordinating national authority.

The treaty provision under which any member-state may withdraw on 1 year's notice would of course remain in effect—providing each nation with an ultimate way to terminate completely the provisions of the compact. Nevertheless, an executive understanding expressed through this compact would have great force—indeed, a force entirely adequate for the 5-year period.

These are predictable results of the compact:

It would give NATO a powerful, peaceful forward thrust.

It would deal effectively with all of the major factors now working against community interests, that is, by lowering our European military profile, easing our monetary and fiscal problems, putting our NATO contribution on a basis more balanced with that of our allies, retaining undiminished the most essential U.S. contribution—nuclear arms.

It would relieve anxieties—most critical in Germany—about the continuity and effectiveness of alliance deterrence.

It would provide a solid base from which the United States, Germany, and others can proceed, with minimum worry to their allies, in the "era of negotiation" with Communist governments.

It would bring France more prominently and usefully into community affairs, military as well as nonmilitary.

It would tide the alliance over the Vietnam-withdrawal period, one which may develop strong isolationist currents.

It would halt the internal bleeding of forces committed to the integrated command.

It would please powerful segments of public opinion on both sides of the Atlantic who wish NATO to exhibit a lower military profile and broaden activity in nonmilitary areas.

But, troop cuts taken unilaterally, as

proposed in this amendment, would be a grave mistake, conceivably triggering a chain of other unilateral cutbacks.

Mr. MIKVA. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I compliment the gentleman from Pennsylvania for his diligence in putting forth this amendment.

We have heard in opposition to the amendment that this is not the time. This is an argument that has been made for exactly the last 25 years—every time this subject has been proposed. Some time we have to ask: if not now, then when?

Every time the question of reducing the troop force in Europe has been brought up, immediately some country or other, usually West Germany, has said, "Oh, no, this is not the time."

My hat is off to Willy Brandt and his Finance Minister. I think at this point that they are the slickest bargainers in all Europe. They have certainly out-slicked us. When we suggested as an opener that they might possibly start paying the cost of our troops, they said "Oh, horrors, we cannot do that. We cannot even afford to continue to buy our arms in the United States; we may have to buy them in Czechoslovakia." The Members know how our military people responded to that. It could be termed a Pavlovian response.

Then when we suggested that we would call back some of our troops, Mr. Brandt has said, "Of course, we will have to build up a German Army instead." I admit that raises the hackles of many people in Europe and many people in this country—including mine.

But all in all, it results in the fact that we have left over 300,000 hostages in Europe for 25 years, hostages to the question of whether we mean our support of the NATO countries. We have been supporting the NATO countries; unfortunately, West Germany has not been supporting the NATO countries. When Senator MANSFIELD was over in Europe last year, he discovered that some two West German NATO divisions, according to his observations, were not being maintained at full strength.

As Senator MANSFIELD pointed out in his April statement last year:

West Germany has a lower per capita defense expenditure than Britain, France and the U.S. To make another comparison, West Germany's defense budget constitutes a lower percentage of gross national product than that of 5 other NATO countries (Britain, France, the U.S., Greece, and Portugal.)

They make a lower contribution of their gross national product than any other NATO country to the defense of Europe.

This is not a proposal to pull the American troops precipitously out of Europe. This is not a proposal to cut and run. But if Vietnamization makes sense in Southeast Asia, it certainly makes sense to have a much more gradual Europeanization in Europe.

What the amendment offered by the gentleman from Pennsylvania suggests is that we pull a very modest, almost symbolic beginning of our troops back from Europe, to suggest to West Ger-

many and some of our NATO allies that if the Guam doctrine makes sense in Southeast Asia, it also ought to have some application in Europe.

The gentleman from Florida made reference to the fact that there is a crisis in the Middle East. I can say again that over these 25 years there have been crises in every part of the world. However, I do not believe the presence of troops in Europe can necessarily be relevant to the Middle East crisis at this time unless we propose that they swim across the Mediterranean.

I do not know why Europe would be any better staging area than here, if the troops were here. More important, I do not know why we should even contemplate "staging areas" as solutions to the Middle East crises.

This is not an overall troop cut; it is a cut in the number of troops stationed in Europe. It is a modest amendment. It is a modest amendment that can have a symbolic and significant impact on our NATO allies in terms of their recognizing their responsibility for troop coverage.

It can involve a very substantial cut in our budget here at a time when we need it desperately.

I urge support of the Members.

Mr. RHODES. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I hope the amendment will not be adopted for various reasons. First I shall address myself to the statement made by the gentleman from Illinois, who preceded me, that this amendment would somehow reduce the expenditures of the Federal Government. I refer to page 355 of part one of the hearings, to the testimony given by the Secretary of Defense on this very matter. I read a part of it:

However, if we return all U.S. forces to the United States and kept them intact and ready for rapid return to Europe, our budget costs would be greater than those we incur by keeping the forces in Europe. It would be necessary to provide the forces two sets of equipment, one set in their hands in the United States to enable them to maintain their combat readiness, and another set in Europe for our use in combat. In fact, because of the practical limits on the prepositioning of equipment and on the feasibility of acquiring all the necessary mobility forces we would have very limited capability for war unless we had a warning time of several months.

So, Mr. Chairman, the idea that returning troops to the continental United States would not inhibit our defense in Europe, the defense of NATO, is a myth. Of course, it would inhibit it.

It seems to me this is not a time to be attacking the very integrity of NATO, as I am afraid this amendment would do.

The President of the United States has justly recently made a trip to the continent of Europe for the very purpose of assuring our allies in NATO that the United States still stands firmly behind its commitments and we are resolute in our support of NATO. I am afraid the adoption of this amendment at this time would undercut the good work of the President.

I have great respect for the gentleman from Pennsylvania, who has offered this amendment. I congratulate him on an

amendment which is well prepared and well documented.

I should also say that I share the opinion of many who have spoken here that the nations of Europe should be doing more toward their own defense. I hope they will. However, this is not the way to achieve that end. The way to achieve it is by negotiations between our Government and their governments. The matter should be handled at a diplomatic level and not on the floor of a legislative body, as this amendment seeks to do.

Mr. BIESTER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. RHODES. I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.

Mr. BIESTER. I thank the gentleman for his kind words. I appreciate them a great deal.

In fairness I believe we should also point out that the cost impact to which the gentleman referred is only one of several possible cost impacts. If in fact the troops withdrawn were no longer rotated as a part of the military unit, that division would close down and there would be a substantial saving.

Mr. RHODES. Of course, the gentleman is presupposing the troop level of the entire armed services would be reduced, and that is not necessarily a fact, because our NATO commitments would still be extant and must be honored.

I should inform the gentleman that much of our NATO commitment is met here in the United States with troops and naval forces stationed here but nevertheless committed to NATO. The only thing that would happen is that the troops the gentleman wishes to reduce would be brought home but would still be a part of the NATO commitment.

I am sorry to say that in my opinion this would not reduce the cost of the armed services but would actually increase them.

I hope the amendment will not be agreed to.

Mr. MONAGAN. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I oppose this amendment. There are two reasons why. One is long-range and the other is immediate.

So far as the immediate reason is concerned, it seems to me that it is not good policy for us here on the floor of the House to set a specific limit on the number of troops in any given theater. We have been through this in other areas of the world as well as Europe. I think, too, it is true that this is not the time to take any precipitate action of this type. Today, more than has been the case for a long time, what the United States does, what we do in a particular area on the matter of the withdrawal of our forces has implications that can be read in a certain way by those in the world who are our adversaries. Therefore, we should think very seriously before we take any step such as this.

It is interesting to look at the actual experience of what has happened to troop levels in Europe over the last 10 or 12 years. Actually, since 1961, the number of troops has been reduced from 417,000 to 300,000. That is a reduction of 117,000 over that period. So, as far as the factual situation is concerned then, there has